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ENGLAND AND RUSSIA

IN

CENTRAL ASIA.

CASPIAN SEA
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MERV
MESHED
TEHERAN
KHORASAN
HERAT
HAZARA COUNTRY
AFGHANISTAN
BADAKSHAN
WAKHAN
KAFIRISTAN
CABUL
PESHAWUR
CASHMERE
ISFAHAN
PERSIA
CANDAHAR
SEISTAN
SIWISTAN
MOOLTAN
BAHAWALPORE
DERA ISMAEL KHAN
LAHORE
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KHELAT
CAWNPORE
INDIA
LARISTAN
PERSIAN GULF
BELOOCHISTAN
MEKRAN
HAIDARABAD
KURRACHEE
INDIAN OCEAN
MAP OF
PERSIA
AND
AFGHANISTAN
W. H. Allen & Co. London
Scale 150 Miles

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA

IN

CENTRAL ASIA.

BY

DEMETRIUS CHARLES BOULGER,
MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.
AUTHOR OF "THE LIFE OF YAKOOB BEG OF KASHGAR."

32451

WITH TWO MAPS AND APPENDICES.

(One Map being the latest Russian Official Map of Central Asia.)

VOL. II.

LONDON:
W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13 WATERLOO PLACE,
PALL MALL, S.W.
PUBLISHERS TO THE INDIA OFFICE.

1879.

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ENGLAND AND RUSSIA

IN

CENTRAL ASIA.

CHAPTER I.

RECENT ENGLISH EXPLORATIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA.

THE policy which England has closely adhered to for more than thirty years of not interfering in any way in the affairs of the States lying beyond its Indian frontier has borne fruit in one sense much to our disadvantage. Owing to our inactivity, and the restrictions that have been imposed on British officers in going beyond the frontier, we know much less of the regions north of the Hindoo Koosh, and we ourselves are much less known there, than the Russians. In fact, Sir Alexander Burnes's remarkable book of travels is still our highest authority on that region which has become generally known as Afghan Turkestan. The journey of a portion of the Kashgar mission to Wakhan in 1874 was a solitary break in

this mist which has existed since the visit of Captain John Wood a few years after Burnes. Of the Pamir, the adjoining khanates, Hissar, and other portions of Bokhara we possess no information whatever from English sources, save that which has become antiquated. This state of ignorance would have been simply intolerable—and it was found intolerable by several gallant adventurers of whose discoveries we shall have something to say presently—but for the band of native explorers who under the training of Colonel Montgomerie have penetrated far into the recesses of the Hindoo Koosh and beyond that range, as well as in another direction beyond the Himalaya into the mysterious land of the Lamas.

The information acquired by these intrepid explorers is only one degree less valuable than if it had been by Englishmen, but at present only meagre reports have been published of what they have accomplished. These must form the basis of this account of English enterprise in Central Asia, and, although insignificant when compared with the travels of the numerous Russian officers alluded to in the first chapter of the previous volume, it will be found that we have made some solid progress in geographical research from our side. The cause of our explorations has also been considered to be less urgent than that which has impelled Russian officers to vie with each other in overcoming the most formidable natural obstacles. In one respect, too, they have had the advantage of us, for the terror of their name has gone before them; and with the certainty of punishment for any hostile act

hanging over their head, the various peoples have never dared in any way to interfere with a Russian traveller during the last three years. Russian travellers had only to take the necessary precautions against the weather, and a sufficient stock of supplies for desert places. English explorers out of the beaten track had to guard against the hostility of man quite as much as the obstacles of nature. In the future we hope that a bolder policy beyond the mountains, and a firmer foot-hold in Afghanistan will give us an equality in all respects with Russia, and will place at our disposal the means of obtaining recent and authentic information concerning all the countries south of the river Oxus.

We may commence with the interesting journey of Faiz Baksh,* although the pundit Munphil had before that contributed an instructive report on his travels in Badakshan. For a portion of this we are indebted to Colonel Yule's paper on the Upper Oxus Regions, which will be found in the "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society," referred to below. But the pundit returned to his native State of Bikaneer, where he became Minister to the Rajah, and to judge from the result it was after that elevation difficult to extract anything from him. Yet in the little record that is preserved of what he discovered there is much to be learnt concerning the material condition of, and political aspect of affairs in, Badakshan. When Faiz Baksh was deputed to travel through Afghanistan and

* *See* vol. xlii. of "Journal of Royal Geographical Society."

the countries of the Upper Oxus, for the purpose of meeting the first mission into Eastern Turkestan at Kashgar, he had already rendered several valuable services to the cause of geographical research and to the Indian Government by journeys to Cabul and its northern dependencies. In September, 1865, he had travelled by the Abkhana pass route to Jellalabad and Cabul; and thence, *viâ* Bamian and Balkh, had gone on to Bokhara, Samarcand, and Tashkent. On his return journey he had explored Gusar, Shirabad, and the eastern parts of Karshi; and, crossing the Oxus, he had, after visiting Kundus and Badakshan, taken the route over the Khawak pass to Inderaub, Charikar, and Cabul. He arrived in India in November, 1867, having been absent more than two years. Almost immediately after his return from this journey he visited Cabul again, and remained there for six months. In July, 1869, he repeated his first journey to Samarcand, apparently in consequence of the political changes which had just taken place in Central Asia. He was back again in India in February, 1870, ready for fresh work. In the month of May he was deputed to undertake the task of which an interesting narrative will be found in the volume for 1872 of the "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society." The following is a summary of that narrative.

Faiz Baksh gives an interesting table of routes both in Afghan Turkestan and Bokhara; but it is necessary to test these in some details with those furnished by other authorities. The most interesting portion of his narrative is undoubtedly that describing Kundus

and Badakshan. Of the route from Khulm to Faizabad, Kila Panja, Sirikol, and Yarkand, he gives the most ample information, and throws a flood of light in addition upon many of the branch roads which lead to Kulab and the Pamir. In his remarks summing up the course of his journey, he says that the country from Peshawur as far as Wakhan is well-inhabited, and supplies for travellers and caravans are procurable everywhere. Between Wakhan and Eastern Turkestan the country is uninhabited save by a few wandering Kirghiz, but grass and fire-wood can be obtained along the whole of the route. During this later portion of the journey he collected most valuable information concerning the Pamir. He gives some account of the *kuchkár*, or wild sheep of the Pamir, of the horns of which Captain Wood brought home a specimen—now deposited in the rooms of the Royal Asiatic Society. The year that Faiz Baksh visited Wakhan happened to have been a fatal one for this animal, a kind of murrain having broken out amongst them. The explorer said that it would have been possible for two armies to have erected entrenchments with the skeletons and horns of the dead animals which he saw. He testifies to the existence of several roads into Darwaz and Shignan, which were said to continue as far as Karategin. In this year Wakhan only contributed eight hundred rupees towards the sixty thousand rupees sent by the Mir of Badakshan to Cabul. With regard to the climate of the Pamir, the Moonshee says, that "it is not so intensely cold or so lofty and difficult as some of the heights between Leh and Yar-

kand." He gives the people of the southern portion of the great plateau a bad character. Of some he goes so far as to say that they possess the following formidable list of bad qualities, "merciless, ill-bred, wicked, and professional robbers." Of others, he contents himself with summing up their character in the following sentence: "They are habitual thieves and robbers, and merciless and ferocious. They are addicted to selling slaves." Between two peoples correctly described in those words it would be difficult to choose the worthier. On the other hand they appear to honour their Mir, and Colonel Gordon and his party were certainly treated with marked hospitality and attention. Of the important information acquired by this explorer, although it has been only partially revealed, there can be no question. Taken in conjunction with Captain Wood's "Journey to the sources of the Oxus," and Colonel Gordon's "Roof of the World," it gives us a tolerably clear insight into the countries of Kundus, Badakshan, and Wakhan. But out of the main road here we know little or nothing. It is evident that the hero of "Lost among the Afghans" travelled and resided in this portion of Asia for a much longer period than any of the authorities upon whom we depend for information; and it is much to be regretted that the depths of his memory were not more skilfully probed than they were by his editor. There can be no doubt in anyone's mind who carefully peruses the context that the place which John Campbell—the name given to the hero of this remarkable story—visited and resided in for some time was

Kulab, and not Khulm, as his editor assumed. Campbell himself pronounced it Kolaub, and this view is confirmed by the fact that he then went to Chiob —or Chiab, in Badakshan—at that time ruled by an independent chief. No mention is made of the traveller having crossed the Oxus, nor does the question appear to have suggested itself to his interpreter.

Three months after the departure of Faiz Baksh, another native explorer, who had been in the Sappers and Miners, left Peshawur with the intention of reaching Badakshan by a different route. This explorer is known to fame as the Havildar. He left Peshawur on the 12th of August, and crossed the Cabul river near the village of Narath. Three days' march from this place he reached Alladand, the residence of one of the secular chiefs of Swat, and three days after his arrival at Alladand he arrived at Miankalai, the principal place in Bajour. Beyond Miankalai he passed the Janbattai pass, and came to Dir, where he found a brave and able chief named Ramatoolah Khan. From Dir to the banks of the Kunar, and thence to the town of Chitral, there is a road which is, however, seldom used, on account, principally, of the dread of the Kafirs, whose country lies at a short distance from, but on the flank of this route. At the village of Ashreth, which is just before the Kunar is reached, the Kafirs were very fond of collecting in considerable numbers, probably because that place is nearest to their country. "The Kafirs usually keep up an incessant fire here on travellers throughout the night. The explor-

ing party was not spared in this respect, and hence passed a most anxious night, returning the fire of the robbers, but with what effect the darkness prevented them from ascertaining." The Kunar valley has for ages been the battle-ground of the Kafirs and their Mahomedan neighbours. At the village of Shushidurra, near Chitral, it was currently reported that there was a silver mine, but the Chitral chief, afraid of his ambitious and more powerful neighbours, had concealed the discovery from his people. From Chitral the Havildar went to Nuksan, at the foot of the pass of that name, which he crossed with apparently little difficulty, thus having traversed in safety the mountainous and little-trod region that extends from the Indian frontier to the Hindoo Koosh. At the village of Zebak he witnessed an interesting ceremony. The chiefs of Badakshan and Chitral met there on the 1st of November, the former with two thousand, and the latter with seven hundred sowars. It was supposed that this meeting was dictated from fear of their countries being taken from them by the Ameer of Cabul, and hence negotiations for offensive and defensive alliance were entered into on this occasion. Presents were interchanged between the chiefs, the Chitral chief giving twenty-one slaves of both sexes, and also his daughter in marriage to the Faizabad chief's son, and the latter presenting the other with sixty *chogas* of Bokharan manufacture, also two swords and a horse. From Zebak he travelled by the Dora pass south of the Nuksan to Chitral, which he reached on the 17th of November. Several heights

were determined, but apparently the Hindoo Koosh passes were not amongst them.

With regard to recent political events in Badakshan, the Havildar threw considerable light upon them, as well as the relations between Shere Ali and his vassal, the Mir. The present ruler of Badakshan, Mir Mahmoud Shah, was placed there in October, 1869, by the Ameer of Cabul, to whom he is, or was quite recently, actually tributary. He is a Seyyid, and has the reputation of being a learned man. His people are, however, averse to his rule, as he oppresses them by demands for extra revenue, and in other ways. The extra revenue is taken from the people on the plea of its being demanded by the Ameer of Cabul, but a large portion of it, they are certain, is retained by the Mir. The former ruler of Badakshan, Jehandir Shah, was an intimate friend and close relation of Abderrahman Khan, and when Shere Ali was finally triumphant Jehandir fled to Bokhara. In some respects Jehandir was a greater favourite with his subjects than Mahmoud is, but he was a drunkard, and dissolute. Mir Mahmoud must be a man of vigorous character, for in July, 1870, he penetrated, at the head of a small force, into the heart of the Kafir country, carrying off a large number of prisoners, and what plunder was to be derived from sacking their principal place of Kalar. Very few conquerors have been able to achieve what the Havildar and Faiz Baksh tell us the Badakshi chief did only nine years ago.

The next native explorer whose work we have to consider is the one known as the Mollah, who, during the

year 1876, made a survey up the course of the Indus, from the point where it enters the plains above Attock, to where it is joined by the river of Gilgit. All the other portions of the course of the Indus—from the table-lands of Tibet, where it takes its rise, down to its junction with the ocean—have long been surveyed; but up to the journey of the Mollah this portion had remained unexplored, and was shown on our maps by a dotted line, the usual symbol for geographical uncertainty. Here the great river traverses a distance of some two hundred and twenty miles, descending from a height of about five thousand feet to that of one thousand two hundred feet above the level of the sea. Its way winds tortuously through great mountain ranges whose peaks are rarely less than fifteen thousand feet in height, and culminate in the Nanga Parbat, the well-known mountain, the height of which is twenty-six thousand six hundred and twenty feet. The river in many places is hemmed in so closely by these great ranges that its valley is but a deep-cut narrow gorge, and, as a rule, there is more of open space and culturable land in the lateral valleys, nestling between the spurs of the surrounding ranges, than in the principal valley itself.

The positions and heights of all the most commanding peaks in this region had been long fixed by Captain Carter's observations at trigonometrical stations on the British frontier line; but no European has ever yet penetrated into it. Very difficult of access from all quarters, it is inhabited by a number of hill tribes, each independent and suspicious of the other, who are

in a great measure separated and protected from each other by natural barriers and fastnesses. As a whole, the region has never been brought into subjection by any of the surrounding powers. Each community elects its own ruler, and has little intercourse with its neighbours; and with the outer world it only communicates through the medium of a few individuals who have the privilege of travelling over the country as traders. The Mollah possessed this privilege, and thus, in the double capacity of trader and explorer, he traversed the country along the Indus, and through some of the lateral valleys, leaving the rest for exploration hereafter.

This work done, he proceeded, in accordance with his instructions, to Yassin, marching through the Gilgit valley, but not surveying it, because the labours of the lamented Hayward, who was murdered at Yassin, had already furnished us with a good map of that region. From Yassin he surveyed the southern route to Mastuj through the Ghizar and Sar Laspur valleys; this has furnished an important rectification of a route which had hitherto been laid down from conjecture only, and very erroneously; for the road, instead of proceeding in a tolerably straight direction from Yassin to Mastuj, as was supposed, turns suddenly from south-west to north-north-east at Sar Laspur, which is situated at some distance to the south of the direct line, in a valley lying parallel to the valley of Chitral. At Mastuj the Mollah struck on to his survey of the route from Jellalabad, *viâ* Dir and Chitral, to Sirhadd-i-Wakhan in 1873, and then pro-

ceeded along that route towards the Baroghil pass, as far as the junction of the Gazan with the Yarkhun river, and then along the northern road from Mastuj to Yassin. This road turns up the Gazan valley, crosses the Ṭui or Moshabar pass—which is conjectured to be certainly not less than sixteen thousand feet in height—and, after traversing a deep-crevassed glacier for a distance of about eight miles, reaches the point where the Tui river issues in great volume from the glacier; the road then follows the course of the river down to its junction with the Warchagam river, a few miles above Yassin.

Returning to Sar Laspur, the Mollah next surveyed the route to the south-west, up the valley leading to the Tal pass. This pass is situated on a plateau of the range which connects the mountains on the western boundary of the valley of the Indus with those on the eastern boundary of the valley of Chitral, and is generally known by the people of the country as the Kohistan. The sources and most of the principal affluents of the Swat and the Panjkora rivers take their rise in this region, all the most commanding peaks of which were fixed by Captain Carter's triangulation; but of the general lie of the valleys relatively to the peaks, nothing at all definite has been known hitherto. The Mollah has done much to elucidate the geography of this region. On crossing the Tal plateau he descended into the Panjkora valley, and traversed its entire length down to Dodbah, at the junction of the Dir river with the Panjkora, where he again struck on his route survey of 1873. He then travelled along the

Havildar's route of 1868 as far as Miankalai, and surveyed the road to Nawagai and on to Pashat in the valley of Kunar; and finally, returning to Nawagai, he surveyed the road from that place down to the British fort of Abazai. The journey of the Mollah supplements that of the Havildar in several important particulars, and also affords information of value upon fresh points. It was through a part of this region that John Campbell—the young Anglo-Afghan already referred to—first wandered in his search for the country of his ancestors, and from his book, "Lost among the Afghans," many picturesque glimpses of the country may be obtained.

Turning now to another quarter, and leaving native explorers for Englishmen, we find that the veto the Indian Government has placed on English officers in preventing them travelling either in Afghanistan or Turcomania has damped the zeal of several gallant officers who had approached the neighbourhood of places of the greatest moment to this country. Of these victims of the strict believers in masterly inactivity Colonel Baker and his comrade Captain Gill, in their journey to Khorasan and the Atrek region, were the first sufferers. Their examination of the course of that river was interrupted by a summons home. The results of this journey will be found in Colonel Baker's "Clouds in the East." About the same time Captain Marsh, who had followed in the traces of Ferrier, reached Candahar, after visiting Yakoob Khan at Herat, but an official intimation warned him off from attempting to enter the city of Cabul.

He too has placed the narrative of his journey at the disposal of the English reader, who is referred to it. The title of the work is "A Ride through Islam." The gallant author of the "Ride to Khiva" was another martyr to official rules, and was compelled by telegram to return without delay. Interesting as that volume is, what would it have been in comparison to a "Ride to Merv," which the Horse Guards' telegram rendered abortive!

Colonel M'Gregor, whose "Journey through Khorasan" has appeared within the last few weeks—of which it may here be said that it deserves to, and will probably, become the standard book on this region—and who has long been known as an authority upon the subject, was another traveller whose grand opportunity was rendered unavailable by official interference. His plan was nipped in the bud by the receipt of the following letter, while at Meshed, from Her Britannic Majesty's Minister:—"I have the honour, by the direction of His Excellency the Viceroy in India, to inform you that you are *prohibited from travelling in Afghanistan or Toorkistan, or going beyond the boundary of Persia.*"

This is the encouragement held out to British explorers; the reader can contrast it with the opposite method adopted by Russia. Instead of affording facilities to such an one as any of the officers and gentlemen mentioned, difficulties are thrown in their way. When they show a determination to attain a great object they are preremptorily forbidden to leave the outskirts of Persia.

Of Captain Napier's journey in Northern Persia* in 1874, the following, taken from the "Geographical Magazine" for July, 1875, are the salient features:—

Captain Napier left Gulahek, the summer quarters of the British Legation at Tehran, on the 3rd of July, 1874, and thence journeyed eastward in the direction of Shahrud, along the ordinary road for caravans and troops. He was much struck with the fertility of the land about Aineh-Vezan, heavy crops of cereals, maize, pulses, castor oil, and cotton being here raised. With assistance in digging wells and watercourses, and a good road across the mountains to Mazanderan, a large population might here be supported in plenitude. The road lay through Firozkoh, a village situated at the entrance of a rocky gorge, shut in by two opposing cliffs of limestone, between three hundred and four hundred feet high, and crowned with the ruins of an ancient fortress ascribed to Alexander the Great. Through Gursafid and Rudbar, Captain Napier proceeded to the sacred spring of Astani, which is chiefly remarkable for the great volume of water which issues from one point, and the complete sterility of the valley and the surrounding mountains from which it is fed. It is at the junction of one of the main routes from Mazanderan and Astrabad to Shahrud and Damghan, and is thus much frequented by pilgrims. Captain Napier then struck northward by the Tung-i-Shamsherbur pass, a narrow passage about one hundred and fifty feet long, and eighteen feet wide, between two perpendicular walls of smooth limestone, a pass which he identifies with the ancient Caspiæ Pylæ, and thence through the Tang-i-Loodian defile to Shakoh. Here there are seams of good coal, which might be worked from the surface, but the people appear to be ignorant of its use. At Tash, however, a few miles off, there was a mine which had been worked for some time, the coal being carried to Gez to supply the Russian steamers. The working of the mine had ceased with the demand, the steamers being supplied from

* Consult also Captain Napier's Report (Confidential) upon the Turcomans.

some nearer source, or by the substitution of "Baku oil" (naphtha?). Before approaching Shahrud many large villages are passed, all surrounded with walls and watch-towers; but the necessity for these defences has passed, for it is more than eleven years since a Turcoman has been seen on the plain except as a peaceful trader. At Shahrud the Russians have a large connection, and a good trade in cotton bales, raw silk, hardware, and candles is done by means of Armenian agents, who are under their protection. From Shahrud the Captain's progress to Badasht, by way of Armyan, Miandasht, and Abbas-abad to Mazinan calls for no remark. From the last-named place the caravan road keeps on due east to Sabzevar and Nishapur, but Captain Napier struck to the north-west and followed a new route leading through the mountains to Jagatai, the chief village of the Jouven State, and thence to the turquoise mines at Madan and Nishapur. Ferumud (seventeen miles and a half from Mazinan) is the first village, where there are the ruins of a very handsome mosque, dating presumably from the Arab invasion. Between Ferumud and Jagatai the great spur of Alburz, which runs south of Jah Jarm into the Nishapur plain, is crossed. The road runs for some miles across a level uncultivated plain, thence it enters a narrow glen, and at ten miles reaches the crest of the ridge, and the pass into the wide valley of Jouven, beyond which, separated by a low ridge, lies the parallel valley of Isferayin, bounded by the Aladagh and Shah Jehan mountains. Both valleys drain westward. At the thirtieth mile from Ferumud, the road turns down a wide ravine running from the Kabizar about north-east, in the gorge of which lies the town of Jagatai, enclosed by a double wall and substantial flanking towers. From Jagatai to Kamaistan (eighteen miles) the road runs with a general direction of E.N.E.; the first twenty miles of the route from thence to Rabat-i-Gez (forty-six miles) is through the most fertile part of the Jouven valley. Three miles from Rabat-i-Gez itself the valley contracts to a width of eight or ten miles, and a few miles further is divided by a low isolated hill into two undulating plateaus. Madan Bala, the next stage, is

twenty-five miles and a quarter farther on; it is noted on account of its turquoise mines, the trade of which is almost entirely in the hands of a few local agents, who purchase the stones at the mines and send them to Mash-had, whence the best are exported almost exclusively to Russia. Although rival mines have been started elsewhere, the Government still derives an increasing revenue from Madan. About two miles on the road to Nishapur (twenty-eight miles) is a salt mine owned and worked by the villagers. From Nishapur Captain Napier journeyed to Mash-had, where he rested a few days, and thence made for Kelat, crossing the main chain of this branch of Elburg Mountains, a range of hard gray limestones rising in sharp jagged teeth to a height of six thousand or seven thousand feet. The track from Verdeh to Kelat he describes as picturesque beyond description. On one side steep slopes of purple, green, and brilliantly red clay and marl, with high projecting buttresses of sandstone, scantily clothed with fine specimens of juniper; on the other, peaks and crags of slate and limestones, the strata inclined, and sending out into the glen steep spurs, presenting often an unbroken sheet of rock for one thousand feet, with a sharp edge and distinct serrated outline. In places there is scarcely room for more than one horse to pass, and the track is carried from boulder to boulder in the bed of the stream, across very frail and shaky-looking temporary bridges. In the centre and narrowest part of a narrow defile a new gateway was being built, an imitation apparently of Nadir's gates, which have been swept away by successive floods, but which had been erected by him in order to close up the gaps in the rocky barrier of Kelat, and so create a safe retreat and stronghold for his descendants on his death.

After staying a few days at Kelat, Captain Napier returned to Mash-had, and leaving it by the north-west gate proceeded to Kazimabad. He had opportunity *en route* of observing the system of irrigation here practised (as well as in other parts of Persia), which consists in sinking wells at an average radius of two miles and a half from the central point, and thence conveying the water through underground tunnels to the place

to be irrigated, which thus becomes a perfect oasis. Where the soil is light and porous, the tunnel is often supported by short lengths of earthen pipe, but, as may be imagined, slips of earth are not unfrequent, and the cost of maintaining the *kanats* or canals is great. An inspection of the ruins of Toos, which lie about four miles north of Kazimabad, led Captain Napier to conclude that it was not earlier than the time of the Muhammadans, and that the town was built "to order," and not a gradual accretion of dwellings. Gunabad, Chinaran, Rodkan, Jaffirabad, and Kooshan were successively passed, the latter a square-walled town of about a mile a side, and much dilapidated, owing to a severe earthquake which took place two years before. The Kooshan boundary in the Turkman direction is well guarded, there being posts of two hundred or three hundred horsemen on the border.

From Kooshan Captain Napier marched by an apparently new route to Taveel (twenty-four miles) on the road to Deregez, passing several flourishing Kurd villages, inhabited by a race of men of a very different character from the majority of Persians, their features being handsome and regular, the eyes full and prominent, and beards ample. A glance at these well-fed, well-clothed ruddy men, their terraced vineyards, well-stocked orchards, and stretches of land dotted with ploughs or waving with grain, taken in conjunction with the fact that they are secured by a range of mountains impassable for many miles for Turkman raiders, led Captain Napier to consider them as the most prosperous Persians he had yet seen. From Taveel to Chapooshloo is twenty-one miles, but the travelling is very rough, and the descent rapid into a valley fertile but uninhabited, owing to its liability to be devastated by plundering tribes. From the Kibkan stream there is a long stiff climb to the summit of the spur, and the pass of Allahu Akbar, from the east of which a fine view is gained of the plain of Deregez, three thousand feet below. Tall watch-towers, in good repair, guard every path. From Chapooshloo to Muhammad Bagh (*sic*) is eight miles, through vineyards, gardens, and over a well-cultivated plain. Captain Napier had an escort of forty horse-

men, under the command of the Khan's brother, provided for him, the Khan himself being absent at Mash-had. This ruler has about eight hundred horse in his pay, and two thousand badly-armed footmen might be raised on an emergency, but neither he nor the villagers have any means of obtaining remounts except through the Turkmans. Muhammad Bagh is defended by a strong outer wall on a good rampart with a wide and deep ditch, and an inner line of wall with towers. The border villages in the Attock, outside the hills, are always liable to attack from the Turkmans. They are consequently defended by good walls with towers and ditches, and guards of armed villagers are kept at the gates and on the walls. The villagers go to their work with matchloek and sword, waiting till the sun is well up, and taking care to get in before sunset. Though the Turkmans have been less active lately, Captain Napier was nevertheless informed that there is not a house in the twenty Attock villages that had not lost some member killed or carried off into hopeless slavery, the usual ransom being from ten pounds to twelve pounds ten shillings, a sum far beyond the reach of an ordinary villager. For the first few miles from the foot of the hills the soil of the Attock is poor and sandy, and in some parts covered with saline efflorescence, while further out, a fertile belt from four to twenty miles wide abuts on the sandy wastes which reach to the Aral and to the Caspian. Cultivation in the valley and in the Attock is capable of almost unlimited increase, and on irrigable lands in the latter, and on unirrigated lands in both. A very small quantity of silk is raised, and some cotton, tobacco and opium, the latter for home consumption. A few years ago its use was unknown; now it is largely consumed by all classes, but more especially by the khans and their suites.

Nowkhandan, famous for its wine (eight miles further on), was the next stage, and after that Duringar (twenty-four miles), a collection of four hamlets on the banks of the Deregez or Duringar stream. A few miles beyond is the Dawund pass, an easy one, by which the plateau of Kooshan is reached. Isfirji, a large village lying buried in a rocky glen on the south face of

the main range, is surrounded with terraced vineyards and orchards, and groves of plane and poplar, The finest fruit in Khorasan is said to be grown here, and finds its way to the markets of Mashhad and Subzevar, the apples, pears, and grapes being equal probably to the best in Europe. The earthquake that visited Kooshan laid most of the houses of Isfirji in ruins, and appears to have travelled from north-west to south-east. At Sherwan Captain Napier was hospitably received by the Khan's *locum tenens*. The place is inhabited by about one thousand Turk families, the greater part of whom gain their living by agriculture; some carpets are made, and a good deal of coarse silk stuff for home consumption. Two or three hundred of the townsmen are armed with the *Shamkhal*, a long heavy rifle, or the *Khirli*, a lighter piece, and receive two pounds eight shillings and two kharwars of grain per annum. Kooshan is by far the most important of the border States; it is said to number altogether two hundred thousand inhabitants; and a proof of the slight degree in which they were affected by the recent famine is to be seen in the number of children, in other parts of Khorasan it being rare to see a child of more than two or three years of age. Two miles and a half from Sherwan is a fine spring called Kara Kazan, considered by the people to be the source of the Attrek, though there is a higher permanent source about fifteen miles to the north-east. From Sherwan to Chamaran is twenty-two miles, and thence Captain Napier travelled to Bujnurd, where he was visited by the Eelkhani and several of his principal officers. That official assured him that the road along the Attrek from Bujnurd to Astrabad, as well as the Gurgan route, was impracticable on account of the unfriendliness of the Yomud Turkmans, and so Napier crossed the Bujnurd plain to the south of the Aladagh mountain, which, stretching away to the west, forms a water-parting between the basins of the Attrek and Gurgan for about fifty miles. The valley of Shougan here for many miles is destitute of habitations, the fertile meadow-lands, the produce of which would suffice to preserve a whole district from famine, forming (as is the case with most of the fairest valleys of Khorasan) the neutral

ground between plundering Turkmans and Kurds. The population of Chardeh or Sangkhas, eighteen miles and a half beyond, is decreasing in a manner which it is very difficult to explain. Corn is raised for home consumption alone, land being extensively reserved for cotton, which finds a ready sale to Russian agents in Shahrud. An ascent of the Koh-i-Buhar, a few miles west of the route, affords a fair view of all the principal passes used by the Turkmans as far as Nardin, distant about twenty miles. From Sangkhas to Jah Jarm (twenty miles) the route is dotted with small cairns, marking the place were some victim to Turkmans raids has fallen. Jah Jarm is now a small straggling town of four hundred houses, but in the time of Nadir Shah there were five thousand families resident there, the decline being entirely attributed to the devastations of the Turkmans, who destroyed all the irrigation works.

From Jah Jarm Napier marched to Nardur (thirty-two miles). The khan of this place had no horses to organize a proper reception, for his two hundred horsemen had been summoned for inspection to Teheran, and being short of horses had emptied all his stables. From this place Napier's route lay down the valley of Nowdeh to Kanchi (sixteen miles), a district inhabited by a tall, robust, and healthy-looking Turkish race. The glens and ravines are clothed with juniper to a height of two thousand to three thousand feet, above which is a dense forest of scrub elm, oak, and maple. The valley is for the most part closely cultivated, the fields being carefully terraced for irrigation, and fenced. From Kanchi a good path winds through the valley to Nowdeh, where the valley extends and opens into the Gurgan plain. Nowdeh grows rice and wheat, and a little cotton. The people have a tradition that at some remote period the Caspian covered the plain, running into the valley and forming a small bay, along the shores of which was a forest of date palms; the villages on either side of the bay used to communicate by boats, and had an extensive trade across the sea. In those times they paid a revenue of four thousand eight hundred pounds, the produce of the sale of dates. The

mountains were bare of forest, the present dense growth of deciduous trees having spread gradually from the west. In the whole range of the Alburz from Teheran to the Herat river, there is no point at which the chain could be so readily crossed by either road or railway as on the line of the Nowdeh valley, while good coal has already been found in the mountains to the west. Ramayan (twelve miles) and Katool (twenty-two miles) were the next stages, and thence the road to Astrabad (twenty-five miles) lay through a magnificent park-like plain, extending from the foot of the hills to the Gurgan river. Rice and wheat is here cultivated, and cotton of a very fine quality for the Russian market. At Astrabad Captain Napier obtained some information regarding the trade in these parts, and learnt *inter alia* that English goods exported from Astrabad sell profitably at Khiva, no heavy import duties having as yet been put on our manufactures.

Journeying to Kurd Mohallah, sixteen miles from Astrabad, Captain Napier had opportunity of observing the old highway of Shah Abbas, which must have been laid down with great care, being paved throughout with large pebbles from the numerous mountain streams, and drained by deep ditches fenced with good hedges. A small amount of money and pains would make a good passable track. Mulla Killa, a small port two miles from Kurd Mohalla, is frequented by Turkmans, who bring cargoes of salt and naphtha from Chelaken for the Astrabad market. The island of Ashurada is occupied by detachments of two regiments of Russian infantry, and is the residence of the commodore of the East Caspian squadron and other officials. Three or four small vessels of war and a few steam-launches are stationed in the bay to watch the Turkmans and collect the duty levied on their boats. These trade between their own ports and the village ports of Astrabad and Mazanderan, and the island of Cheleken, whence they bring cargoes of naphtha and salt. Every boat is strictly required to show the Russians a pass, and this enforcement has put an entire stop to the coast piracy of the Turkmans, which formerly was so rife. About four miles from Gez, a high green rampart of

earth runs from the mountains through the forest and over the marshy plain to the shore. Its history is obscure, but the sea-face of the rampart being between three hundred and four hundred yards from the water's edge, affords a clear proof of the recession of the Caspian. Ashraf, which Captain Napier visited, is in a far better state than in the days of Fraser and Burnes. It now contains forty or fifty shops; three or four of the leading merchants have transactions with Constantinople and Astrakan, exporting cotton, sugar, European goods, cutlery, and hardware, and importing chiefly iron, iron vessels, crockery, etc. The famous garden of Shah Abbas is now entirely neglected, the buildings, fountains, and raised stone terraces being all in ruins. Its natural beauties are perhaps unrivalled. It is backed by lofty wooded heights, and to the north lies the blue bay of Ashurada. Several springs flow through it; the cypress trees are of gigantic growth, and several of them are covered with massive wreaths of wild vine. Orange and citron trees grow in wild luxuriance, their fruit being left to fall and literally covering the ground. Though now of little note, Ashraf should some day be the centre of one of the most important agricultural districts of Persia.

Captain Napier gives an interesting description of Sari, the principal town of the province and seat of government, but its length will not permit us to reproduce it. Suffice it to say it is flourishing; cotton and wheat being exported, silks, stuffs woven, and a good deal also done in leather-work, while a good display of articles from Western Europe proves that the Russians have a good hold on the market, but not a monopoly. Were the roads across the mountains better, English goods from Ispahan would command a large share of the market; their reputation is great, but their price comparatively too high. From Ashraf Captain Napier returned to Teheran by way of Barfarosh, the commercial capital of Mazanderan. This town has not regained the losses in population suffered during the plague of 1832, but is still a large town with an increasing trade. Its port Mash-had-i-ser, eight miles distant, is said to be frequented by numbers of Russian ships and native craft,

and a mail steamer calls once a week and takes up passengers and light cargo for Baku and Astrakan.

Captain Napier's journey had not long concluded when he was followed by Captain—now Major—Butler, who travelled on this occasion in the disguise of a Chinaman. No particulars worthy of the name have been published of this remarkable journey. Almost as little is known definitely of his later travels, to which reference has been made in former chapters. A general summary of its results was said to have been made public to the following effect.

Avoiding Teheran, Major Butler travelled *viâ* Kum to Meshed, whence, leaving an assistant to receive letters, he proceeded under an escort to meet the Turcoman chiefs secretly summoned at Kooshan. He then, between January and April, surveyed seven hundred miles of the Persian frontier bordering on the Turcoman lands, assuring himself of the following points:—

Firstly, that Kizil-Arvat, in unfriendly hands, forbids the existence of any permanent peace, Cabul being only twenty-one days' journey off. From Herat the road is excellent, even in mid-winter, running through populous and fertile lowlands.

Secondly, that the Turcomans of both their great clans are seeking for British protection, and are ready to offer a combined opposition to a further Russian advance.

Thirdly, that the frontier Turcomans are a thrifty, honest, and settled race, clever handicraftsmen, and animated by a keenly commercial spirit.

Fourthly, that the Kuren Dagh consists not of one range of mountains, but of three, dividing populous and fertile valleys, abounding in numbers of fine camels and horses.

Returning with letters and presents from the Viceroy, Major Butler arrived at Bagdad, where he delayed his journey for a week, and surveyed three hundred and seventy miles of the Euphrates Valley Route, finding only one locality which was not easily practicable for wheeled traffic. He suggests camel transport from Bussorah to Amrah, and thence by mail-cart to Alexandretta, making the whole time of transit between Kurrachee and Dover only fourteen days.

It is to be regretted that the rumour which was current at the same time asserting that this officer was designated for important employment was without foundation. Major Butler has received nothing in any shape or kind. He has rejoined his regiment a poorer if a wiser man.

In considering the explorations which have been made in the direction of Russia it would be wrong to leave out of sight the very remarkable journey of the Pundit Nain Sing in Tibet in the course of the years 1874 and 1875. On several occasions before those years he had visited Tibet, and in 1866 he had determined for the first time the true position of Lhasa. Ten years before he had accompanied the brothers Schlagintweit in their explorations in Ladakh and Cashmere. In 1867 he visited the gold mines of Thok Jalung, and in 1874 he began his journey through the whole breadth of Tibet to Assam. He made further surveys

of the course of the Sanpu and Brâhmapootra, and he took no fewer than two hundred and sixty-seven observations for latitude and four hundred and ninety-seven for elevation above the sea. Shortly after his return in 1875 he retired on a small pension, and was awarded in 1877 the Royal Medal by the Royal Geographical Society.

Having briefly described the achievements of the native explorers, it would be wrong to pass by in silence the man who contributed more than any one else to the success of their various undertakings. The following account of the services of this officer, who has now retired, is taken from the report of the great Trigonometrical Survey for 1875-76 :—

"Lieutenant Montgomerie entered the Department in October, 1852. Soon afterwards he was present at the Base-lines of Chach and Karachi, in both of which measurements he took a leading share. In 1855 he commenced the topographical survey of the dominions of His Highness the Maharajah of Kashmir, which he finished within the next nine years. The scale adopted was varied from two to eight miles per inch, the area amounts to some twenty square degrees or about seventy-seven thousand square miles, which include the stupendous mountain ranges of Karakuram, Changchenmo, Baralacha, Muztagh, etc.; the chief towns fixed were Jummoo, Srinagar, Leh, Skardo, Hanle, Muzaffrabad, Kishtwar, Badrawar, Baramula, Dras, Bij, Behara, Nanshahra, Rajauri, Kargil, etc.; the principal rivers traced were the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Zanskar, Shyok, Kishanganga, Astor, Kara-

kash, etc.; and of snowy peaks (rising from sixteen thousand feet to the culminating height of twenty-eight thousand two hundred and fifty feet of the peak at the north-east head of the Baltoro glacier) may be mentioned Nanga-Parbat, Haramukh, Haramosh, Rakipushi, Ser Mer, Karakuram, Baralacha, etc.; the area of glaciers in this region extended over more than one thousand four hundred square miles, and the heights ascended surpassed those recorded up to that time as reached by men unaided by balloons. Lieutenant Montgomerie's name will long continue to be most honourably associated with these operations, which for magnitude, merit, and importance are unsurpassed.

"Returning, in 1866, from an absence on furlough for two years, Captain Montgomerie directed the survey of Kumaun and Garhwal with much success. As regards local surveys, those of Mussooree, Kosi valley, and Ranikhet were conducted by him, the last presenting an instance of uncommon dispatch, as it was begun in January, 1870, and its eleven maps stood published in the following November. Lastly, he superintended the Trans-Himalayan explorations which have contributed so largely to our knowledge of countries that before were almost unknown. It is exceedingly difficult to give an idea of the provinces thus pierced or circumscribed; a brief attempt is however made in the following descriptions of the routes traversed. From Kumaun northwards to the sources of the Sutlej and Indus, and along a great length of the Brahmaputra eastward through Great

Tibet to Lhasa. From Darjeeling westward to Kathmandu, thence over the Dingri Maidan to Shigatze in Great Tibet, onwards in a north-west direction round the Tengri-Nur Lake, and then southwards to Lhasa. From Cabul, *viâ* Bamian and Balkh to Faizabad and Kila Panjah, thence onwards through the Pamirs to Yarkand and Kashgar in Eastern Turkestan, and so back to the Karakuram pass. From Balkh, near the Oxus, to Karshi and Bokhara. From Peshawur to Dir, Chitral, and Zebak, in Badakshan, etc. These routes represent a total length of fully four thousand five hundred miles, along which our geographical knowledge has been substantially established.

"Lastly, Colonel Montgomerie officiated as Superintendent of the Topographical Survey for a while, and as Superintendent of the Great Trigonometrical Survey for two years; in addition, his services have repeatedly been honourably mentioned by the Secretary of State, and by the Government of India. Nor are distinctions at home wanting, for he is a Gold Medallist of the Royal Geographical Society as well as a Fellow of the Royal Society. His distinguished services in this Department will be long remembered in connection with his works, and many kind wishes from those with whom he was here associated will continue to follow him in his retirement."

Although the English Government has not been as energetic in carrying on explorations as it might and should have been, yet it has not been, as we have seen, wholly idle. South of the Hindoo Koosh, at least, we know incomparably more than anybody else;

and with the country between that range and the Oxus we are as well acquainted as Russia is. Much more remains to be done. We shall be in an actual state of darkness until the Turcoman country—particularly Merv and the Tejend—has been thoroughly explored, and the line of the Oxus with its fords and passages fully determined. A prudent Government will not throw obstacles in the way of the investigation of these points, but will encourage explorers, and urge them on by every means in its power to solve these important questions.

CHAPTER II.

THE ANGLO-INDIAN ARMY.

THERE appear to be exaggerated views in this country with regard to the actual efficiency of that portion of the Imperial army which garrisons India. By some it is looked upon as a most valuable fighting-machine, by others as an almost useless one, formidable against hill-men and rebels, but of little use against a foe with any claims to possessing a regular army. The campaign in Afghanistan has been assumed by the former to prove the complete accuracy of their views, and in the face of its successes hostile criticism has been hushed. It is very unfortunate that the subject of the efficiency of our Indian army should have been made a matter of partizan warfare, for assuredly, apart from considerations of Russia and the Central Asian Question altogether, it is absolutely necessary that the present value of that army should be thoroughly appreciated. A delusion on this point might lead us into many an act of folly, and might

endanger the great possessions which our arms have secured for us. It will probably be found that the truth lies, as usual, half-way between those who assert that the Anglo-Indian army is perfection, and those who say that it is worthless. The first point to be mastered is—What is the nominal strength and composition of this army?

India was conquered by a small band of Englishmen leading a considerable force of native Sepoys. It was retained by a rather larger number of our countrymen commanding native armies. The wars in Afghanistan, and the subsequent campaigns in the Punjab against the Sikhs, were the first causes of the strengthening of the English army in Hindostan. On the eve of the Mutiny the Anglo-Indian army was still essentially a native army. In round numbers there were three hundred thousand Indian soldiers and only forty thousand English; and of those English troops a very large portion was employed as officers, etc., in the native army. The great crisis in 1857 caused the fighting European force to be raised in all to over one hundred thousand men, but when the Mutiny had been repressed, and the rising among the disaffected crushed in all directions, various schemes were mooted for the permanent garrisoning of India, and for the future composition of the Anglo-Indian army. At the very root of all these suggestions lay a well-founded suspicion of the trust that could be reposed in a mercenary force and an alien race. The first step in the schemes of reorganization was not so much the increase of the European portion of the army as it was

the reduction of the native element in it. From the Mutiny to the present year there has been a steady decline in the numbers of our Indian troops. For instance, in 1864 there were one hundred and twenty-one thousand; in 1865, one hundred and eighteen thousand; in 1866, one hundred and seventeen thousand; and in 1878 only one hundred and thirteen thousand.

During the present year it has been resolved to raise the total of the army by strengthening each battalion, which were, to an extent unrealised in this country, veritable skeleton battalions. This improvement will take some time before it comes fully into operation; but in India, so far as numerical strength goes, there will never be any difficulty in increasing our army to any extent whatever. Already we may be sure that the necessary number of applicants have come forward for permission to swell the numbers of each battalion to the authorised seven hundred and fifty rank and file, and it was a matter of common knowledge that each of our native cavalry regiments had a long string of applicants for admission, and this was particularly the case in the Bengal army, which is the most important of all our armies. When this addition to our native army has been fully carried out, it is probable that it will be close upon one hundred and thirty thousand men, and for several reasons we may safely assume that it will not be permitted to fall below this number. Under certain contingencies it might even be found necessary to increase it still further. In this all admit there would be no difficulty.

The English army in India may be computed to be about sixty thousand men, but at the present moment it is probably rather more numerous, as the annual reliefs have proceeded to India and the time-expired regiments have only partially returned. In 1867 there were sixty-five thousand English soldiers in India, and high military authorities declared that this was the lowest number compatible with safety. Yet that force had been considerably reduced, and in a time of emergency such as recent events produced it was found possible to bring its strength up to the "lowest point compatible with safety" only by retaining in India regiments whose period of service had expired. The artillery consists (including siege and garrison batteries) of eighty-six batteries of Royal Artillery, —five hundred and sixteen guns—and the mountain batteries, etc. employed on frontier force. These latter are those of the Punjab Frontier Force, sixteen guns—four batteries of four guns each—the Scinde Frontier Force, two mountain batteries of four guns each, and the artillery of the Hyderabad Contingent, four batteries of four guns apiece. That is to say, there are forty guns to be added to the number of the European army to arrive at the effective strength in artillery of the Anglo-Indian army, which gives a total of five hundred and fifty-six guns in all. But the effective field force is much smaller than this. The latest return placed it at fifteen batteries of horse artillery, and forty-three batteries of field. There are twenty-eight batteries of garrison artillery, of which seven are, however, employed as heavy field batteries drawn either by

elephants or mules. The remainder are either employed in garrison work or are in store. The regulation gun for horse artillery and field batteries is the nine-pounder muzzle-loading rifled gun, weighing for the horse artillery six hundredweight, and for the field batteries eight hundredweight, but a few batteries still retain the Armstrong gun, so as to use up the ammunition peculiar to that kind of ordnance. The mountain gun is a seven-pounder rifled piece, weighing two hundred pounds. The heavy field batteries have each three forty-pounder Armstrong guns, with two eight-inch and two five-and-a-half-inch mortars. Each of the batteries of horse and field artillery has at all times with it its first line of waggons fully horsed, and several that are considered liable to be called on for service at short notice have their second line of waggons with them, provided with bullock draught. In other cases the second line of waggons is kept, ready packed for issue, in the nearest ordnance magazine. Thus, when only one line of waggons is present an Armstrong battery has in possession one hundred and twenty-four rounds of ammunition per gun, and a muzzle-loading rifled battery one hundred and forty-eight rounds. If the second line of waggons is present, the ammunition in possession is brought up to two hundred and fourteen rounds per gun in the Armstrong batteries and to two hundred and fifty-six rounds for the muzzle-loading batteries. The second line of waggons, it may be noted, is at once sent to any battery that is warned for service. A heavy field battery has with it one hundred and twenty-two

rounds for each forty-pounder gun, and one hundred and eight shells and four carcasses for each of the large mortars, and one hundred and eighteen shells and four carcasses for each of the small mortars. Ninety rounds per gun are kept with each mountain battery of Royal Artillery, and one hundred and twenty rounds with the native mountain batteries. In addition to the above about one thousand rounds per piece are kept in reserve in the various arsenals and magazines.

This force is distributed in the following manner. The Bengal army, including the garrisons of the Punjab and the North-west Provinces, is reputed to number about thirty-eight thousand five hundred Europeans and forty-eight thousand natives. To these must be added the Punjab Frontier Force of twelve thousand men and sixteen guns. In Bengal, etc. there are thirty-three batteries. The total garrison of Northern India is then thirty-eight thousand five hundred Europeans, sixty thousand natives, and an artillery force of two hundred and fourteen guns, and of this formidable-looking army more than one-half is stationed in the Punjab. It will be useful to analyse here still farther the composition of the artillery of this army, as it is the branch in which the superiority of our forces should be most decided and incontestable. Of the eleven batteries of horse artillery all possess the nine-pounder muzzle-loading rifled gun mentioned; of the field artillery fourteen out of the twenty-two batteries are armed with the same weapon. Four others have nine-pounder Arm-

strongs, and the remaining four twelve-pounder Armstrongs. The reason given for the retention of these Armstrongs in more than one-third of the field batteries of the Bengal army is that there is a large supply of the ammunition used by them in store, and that it is necessary to exhaust it. The explanation must be admitted to possess force, but it is to be hoped that there is a sufficient supply of the new guns in store to replace the old guns the instant the surplus ammunition has been expended. The Punjab Frontier Force artillery is not uniform, as each battery contains two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and two nine-pounders, with an extra gun in reserve. The artillery of the Hyderabad Contingent is, however, the least efficient of all, each battery consisting of only two twelve-pounder howitzers and two *six-pounders*.

The cavalry of the Bengal army includes six English regiments, nineteen Bengal regiments, and five Punjab regiments. An English cavalry regiment in India has six service troops, and an Indian establishment, which, exclusive of medical officers, gives a total of twenty-five officers and four hundred and fifty-five non-commissioned officers and rank and file, with four hundred and thirty-six horses. These regiments are always selected from either the medium or the light cavalry of the British army, but as our mediums are really heavies, and our light mediums, the native cavalry is better adapted for the duties of light cavalry than the British regiments. The Bengal cavalry muster about four hundred and fifty rank and file to each regiment,

with an estimated strength of seven European officers to each. The Punjab cavalry is rather stronger, probably nearly five hundred men to a regiment. There are therefore thirteen thousand cavalry serving in the Bengal army, which leaves an infantry force of eighty-five thousand five hundred, composed of about thirty thousand English and forty-four thousand natives, to which must be added the strength of artillery, etc. There are thirty-two battalions of English troops, with an average strength of eight hundred and ninety men and thirty officers. Of the European regiments eight at least were armed quite recently only with Sniders, the remainder possessing the Henry-Martini. The native Bengal infantry is divided into forty-nine regiments, and there are twelve of the Punjab force. The Bengal regiments have seven hundred and ten men with the colours, the Punjabis seven hundred and fifty. There are therefore thirty-five thousand in the Bengal and nine thousand in the Punjab, or forty-four thousand foot in all. Later on we will revert to the question of how these regiments are officered, and also to the equally important question of the composition of our native army.

The Bombay army consists of two batteries of horse artillery, two of field, and six of garrison, one of which serves as a heavy field battery. There is only one regiment of European cavalry, and there are seven of native cavalry, three of which are the Scinde Horse. Nine battalions of the same strength as those in Bengal represent the English infantry, and there are thirty native regiments. There are in addition to

the artillery force given two batteries of frontier guns already specified.

The Madras army has also two batteries of horse, eleven batteries of field, and seven of garrison artillery. There are two regiments of English and four of native cavalry, nine battalions of British and forty-one of native infantry. The cavalry both of Bombay and Madras is further increased by the Governors' Body Guards, but the Madras regiments muster only about four hundred sabres. These regiments also differ from the rest of the Indian army in that they are provided by Government with their horses, whereas the Bengal and Bombay regiments are supplied on what is called the Silladar system, that is, each recruit brings his own horse. The Body Guards of the Viceroy and the Governor of Madras each number about one hundred and twenty, and that of the Governor of Madras about seventy sabres.

Beyond the regular armies of the three presidencies there is the minor force known as the Hyderabad Contingent. It is not paid from British revenues, and it usually only serves within the Nizam's territories, but it is officered entirely from the Royal Artillery, Staff Corps, and Indian forces. It consists of four horse field batteries of four guns each, four regiments of cavalry, and six of infantry. It is commanded by a brigadier-general, who is under the orders of the Resident at Hyderabad. Its total strength is about eight thousand men, but its practical efficiency is considerably impaired by the inferior manner in which it is armed. We have already re-

ferred to the character of the artillery, and three of the infantry regiments are only armed with smooth-bore muskets, while the three others have Enfields.

In addition to these four regular forces there are several miscellaneous bodies of troops attached to various commands. Of these may be mentioned a regiment of Deolee and one of Erinpoora infantry, each of three European officers and seven hundred and twelve men; the Malwah Bheel Corps, of three officers and six hundred and twelve men; the Meywar Bheel Corps, of four officers and seven hundred and seven men; and the Bhopal Battalion, of four officers and nine hundred and forty men. In Bombay there should also be included the Guide Cavalry, of four troops with three European officers and three hundred and forty-one native soldiers; two regiments of Central India Horse, with a commandant for the two corps, and six European officers and four hundred and ninety-three men in each regiment; a squadron of cavalry attached to the Deolee, and another to the Erinpoora force, each composed of one European officer and one hundred and sixty-five natives; and the Aden troop, of one European officer and one hundred men. There is also a corps of Belooch Mounted Guides, for service on the Scinde frontier, consisting of three hundred and fifteen men. The Central India Horse, Malwah Bheel Corps, and Bhopal Battalion are under the Governor-General's Agent in Central India, and the Deolee and Erinpoora forces and the Meywar Bheel Corps are under the Governor-General's Agent in Rajpootana; and both these Agents

of the Governor-General report to the Foreign Department of the Government of India.

The strength of the engineer force attached to the Indian army may be taken to be about three hundred and seventy English officers for the whole army. These officers are for the most part employed in the Public Works Department, but several are in the Survey Department, and other miscellaneous employments. They are all available for military duty when wanted, and a small number are always attached to the three native corps of sappers and miners, which have also a proportion of European non-commissioned officers from the corps of Royal Engineers. About two hundred European soldiers are employed in this way and to constitute a skeleton company of Royal Engineers, which is maintained in each presidency for the purpose of supplying European non-commissioned officers for transfer as wanted to the Public Works Department, which in India is a Civil Department, though intrusted as one part of its duty with the construction and maintenance of all military buildings. The three native corps of sappers and miners consist —exclusive of the European officers and non-commissioned officers—of ten companies, or one thousand one hundred and sixty men of all ranks, in Bengal; of ten companies, or one thousand three hundred men, in Madras; and of five companies, or four hundred and eighty men, in Bombay.

In round numbers the army of India may therefore be taken to consist of thirteen thousand artillery, with four hundred field guns, three thousand six hundred

engineers, twenty-three thousand cavalry, and one hundred and forty-six thousand infantry.

The cost of this army for the year 1877-78 was estimated to be eleven million two hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds, including the extra expenditure caused by the advantages given to the native army on the assumption by Her Majesty of the title of Empress of India on the 1st of January, 1878, but it does not include the charges incurred at home for purchase of stores, for pensions and furlough allowances, and for contributions to the War Department for training recruits, pensioning soldiers of the British army, and other incidental charges, which amounted to four million three hundred and eleven thousand eight hundred pounds, thus making the total cost of the Anglo-Indian army fifteen millions and a half, or about fifteen times as much as Russia pays for her Central Asian army.

Having thus far considered the condition of our Indian army by the light of the official returns, and arrived at a total of military strength that to an English reader must appear extremely formidable, it may be prudent to turn to the other side of the question, and discuss the flaws which criticism has discovered in this imposing creation. Upon the character of the English soldier in India the most malignant critic has no aspersion to cast, and the British regiments are acknowledged to be proof against any criticism. It is doubtless to be regretted that all our regiments do not possess Henry-Martini rifles, but this could easily and rapidly be remedied. Perhaps before

these lines are in the hands of the reader it will have been remedied. In 1877-78 no fewer than twenty battalions received the new weapon. The artillery might with increased advantage be made uniform, and the armament of the cavalry leaves certainly something to be desired. But taken as a whole the English garrison in India will rank with any civilised army, and would probably carry off the palm for general efficiency and discipline. Whatever doubts we may have about the strength of, or the degree of solidity attained by, our Indian Empire, there need be no doubt—nay, it would be absolutely unjust to entertain the smallest suspicion—as to the thorough efficiency and high sense of duty of the British military unit in Hindostan. It is possible by an improvement in the armament of some of the regiments to make this first line still more efficient, but the army, whose predecessors won and retained India for their country, is still capable of overcoming any ordinary foreign foe, and any extraordinary combination of domestic foes. The crisis which might be too great for it would be an attack from without and within at the same time. It must be most satisfactory for Englishmen to feel convinced that, although they employ mercenaries of alien races to assist in the task of governing vast territories, their conquests are as a matter of fact retained by English troops alone.

But the grand point to be discovered is the unknown quantity—the efficiency of our native army against an European army. It has been proved to be most serviceable in border wars. In past times it enabled us

to subdue India. The Indian Sepoy in wars during the present century has under English leadership overthrown the Mahratta and the Sikh, the Afghan and the Belooch, and has worsted the Ghoorka on the field of battle. What could he accomplish when the foe, instead of being one of these Asiatic peoples, shall be a Russian?

The native infantry soldier in the regular army is armed, without exception, with the Snider, and so far it is satisfactory to find that there is at least uniformity. The Hyderabad Contingent and the miscellaneous corps possess either Enfields or smooth-bore muskets. He is consequently at a disadvantage as compared with a Russian soldier who possesses the Berdan, and probably now the still more formidable Peabody. This disadvantage is also of a more permanent character than a similar deficiency in our own regiments, because in the first place there is a much larger force to arm, and in the second the men themselves would be less handy in manipulating the new weapon. In face of a sudden emergency it would be impossible to effect an alteration in the arm of our native troops. We should have to take them into the field armed with the Snider alone. There can be no doubt that the greater security derived from the superiority in weapon of the English soldier over the native has operated very much in high quarters against placing the formidable Henry-Martini in the hands of aliens, and it is equally incontestable that this view has much to recommend it, and that up to a certain point its prudence cannot be gainsayed. So long as our Anglo-Indian

army is only called upon to deal with the very inferior antagonists that it has had as yet to face, so long may we permit our equanimity to remain undisturbed by the foreboders of ill; but in calculating before-hand the chances of a fray in which our opponent would be our reputed equal, possessing a weapon scarcely inferior to the formidable Henry-Martini, we must make allowance for the fact that two-thirds of our infantry would be armed with a weapon greatly inferior to that of the foe they were fighting with.

At present we do not possess the necessary stock of the new rifle to give it to the Sepoys; but as there is some talk of arming the Volunteers with it, who are far less likely than our Indian army to be called upon to engage an European foe, it would appear that the difficulty in supply is not the true cause. The more probable reason is that of the advantages to be derived in a domestic sense from the superiority of the armament of the English soldier. But in face of a great external danger such a precaution might prove calamitous. It would have rendered us more secure against rebels to place us at a serious disadvantage with regard to a foreign foe. To some extent the precaution would also have been unnecessary, for by guarding and regulating the supply of ammunition perfect control could be exercised over the good faith of the native soldier. It may at least be asserted that the Sikhs and Ghoorkas — about twenty thousand men in all—whose good faith is assured and above suspicion, should be armed with this weapon, and at once. Other special corps, especially the Madras army

and the Belooch regiments in the Bombay army, might also be placed on the same footing. The Hyderabad Contingent should certainly receive the Snider.

If possible there is greater need for reform in the armament of the cavalry—the British regiments themselves not excepted. There is variety in the arm of the Anglo-Indian horse-soldier if there is nothing else. Smooth-bore carbines and Victoria smooth-bores; Snider carbines and muzzle-loading carbines; rifled pistols and revolvers; whereas their best weapon would be a short rifle or Martini carbine. The cavalry would then be able to cope with infantry; at present there is not a single native regiment that would stand the ghost of a chance in a combat with a company of riflemen. The armament of our Anglo-Indian army must be pronounced to be in an unsatisfactory state for a great war with Russia. It is doubtless easy of remedy if we only had a few years' notice, and in six months matters could be greatly improved. It would be satisfactory if the Indian Government were to give some sign that it is alive to the evil by taking immediate steps for the serving-out of Martinis to the few English regiments—if there still are any—who do not possess them, and also to the Sikh and Ghoorka regiments. The question of the armament of the cavalry is also a vital one, and should not be neglected. To avoid all risk from confusion during a campaign or on the field of battle, the arms should be as uniform as possible, and certainly we might expect that all thoroughly trustworthy troops should have the Henry-Martini, and that those in whom less faith could be

placed the Snider. The artillery should also be of one kind, and the cavalry, if it is to play the great part in any war that it should, must possess a weapon which will not leave it powerless in face of the enemy.

But perhaps of all the weak points in the native army its lamentable deficiency in European officers is most apparent. In the days of the Company each native regiment had twenty-four European officers attached to it. At the present time the allowance is seven. With the former proportion it performed all those remarkable achievements which have earned for it so high a reputation, and upon the memory of which so much is assumed to be secure in the future. With the latter it has engaged in a number of frontier wars of trivial importance, and in the two campaigns in Abyssinia and Afghanistan, each of which was remarkable for the ease with which our arms were triumphant. It is well known that since the year 1862 there have been no direct appointments to the Indian army. All appointments are made through the medium of the Staff Corps, but there still remains a certain number of officers of the old army who retain their rank in the Indian army.

The Bengal Staff Corps at present numbers one thousand and ten, and the General List officers, as they are called, two hundred and seventeen. Of the former there are ten generals, fourteen lieutenant-generals, twenty major-generals, two hundred and seventy-six colonels and lieutenant-colonels, two hundred and forty-one majors, two hundred and thirty-six

captains, and two hundred and thirteen lieutenants. The General List officers comprise sixty-one colonels and lieutenant-colonels, nine majors, and one hundred and forty-seven captains. Of these a very large number is occupied in carrying out civil functions; for instance, the head-quarters' departments take away three hundred officers. Therefore, since the change in the organization of the Indian army, it has drawn all its officers from the Staff Corps, and the Staff Corps are fed by the Royal army. An officer signifying a desire to join the Indian army is drafted into a native regiment, where he serves a certain time on probation. He then passes an examination in certain subjects,—vernacular languages in particular. Having passed that examination he leaves the regiment and enters the Staff Corps. Then his future is assured, and promotion comes in the regular course.

The twenty-six cavalry regiments of the Bengal and Punjab armies have a nominal allowance of two hundred and twenty officers, that is, of almost eight officers and a half, including the doctor, to each regiment. The sixty regiments of infantry have nominally four hundred and ninety-six officers, a fractionally less allowance. But when we begin to consider the actual strength with each regiment we find that these figures are misleading. Of the two hundred and twenty cavalry officers, sixty-six are, as a rule, absent from duty, thus leaving an average to each regiment of only six officers inclusive of the doctor. Of the four hundred and ninety-six infantry officers one hundred and ten are what may be called non-efficients, thus re-

ducing the number with each regiment to about six and a half. The intention, therefore, of having seven European officers serving with each native infantry regiment of the regular army, who should be employed in the following manner, viz. one as commandant, one as adjutant, one as quartermaster, and two with each wing or half-battalion, has not been realised in practice. A large number of these officers, too, are only temporarily serving with the regiment, being either probationers or voluntarily attached. Sir Garnet Wolseley, in a recent report on the Indian army, has said "that the private soldier should personally know and esteem his captain is far more necessary in a Sepoy than in a British regiment; personal influence on the part of a leader, whether he be captain or colonel, has more weight among Indian than among European soldiers."

The principle in the infantry and in the cavalry alike is that the companies and troops are to be commanded by native officers, and the staff and superior positions in native regiments held by European officers. But this principle is made to assume altogether too literal an aspect by the large proportion of officers with field rank that are attached to these regiments, thus of those attached to the cavalry seventy-six out of two hundred and twenty are field officers, and of the four hundred and ninety-six belonging to infantry regiments one hundred and seventy are field officers. Of the officers of lower rank almost one-half of the remainder are captains, so that the subalterns are for eighty-six regiments only two hundred and forty-three in all.

The reply that will be made to this is that the English officers are not supposed to perform subaltern's duties, which are left to the native officers, and that consequently there is no need for subalterns.

The evils of this system which are apparent in the regular army are still more glaring in the irregular forces such as the Hyderabad Contingent and the Central Indian force; but here the results are less mischievous, although calculated to damage the reputation of our Indian army in respect of organization. Nor are the native officers of sufficient strength, character, or trustworthiness to supply the deficiencies of the European element. A regiment of cavalry, composed of six troops, has three ressaldars, or captains, four ressaidars, or lieutenants, and six jemadars, either cornets or troop sergeant-majors. That is to say, there are nineteen officers in all, six European and thirteen native to a cavalry regiment, which, if an English regiment, with a very efficient staff of both troop sergeant-majors and sergeants, would have twenty-five officers. The infantry battalion has sixteen native officers, viz. eight subadars, or captains, and eight jemadars, or lieutenants. Here also the whole regiment is under-officered. A native battalion of about eight hundred men is led into action by six or seven Europeans and sixteen natives. An English regiment of the same strength has thirty commissioned officers. The supply of European officers to a native battalion is made still more insufficient by the fact that they are all mounted, and that from that circumstance as well as from the difference in his uniform,

in his helmet particularly, the English officer is a conspicuous object for the enemy's riflemen.

But weak in numbers as the native officer is, there will be no desire among those who possess any acquaintance with the great mass of that class that they should be increased. They possess neither the devoted attachment to our rule nor the ability to be more than a neutral factor in the question to make us desire such a reform. We may indulge in hopes that they will improve in the course of time, as education spreads more thoroughly among the classes from which they are drawn. But this undoubted weakness in the contingent of native officers should bring more clearly home to us the great necessity there is to increase the number of English officers with each regiment. Can anything well be more absurd than the delusion which we have persuaded ourselves into accepting as an indisputable fact, that our Anglo-Indian army is on the whole in an efficient state when its officering is so hopelessly inadequate? As a matter of fact, in considering the present capacity of this force to cope with an European foe, we must assume that the native officers count for nothing. They certainly have no claim to rank higher than our non-commissioned officers—possibly not so high. We then find that we have about six officers with the colours for each eight hundred of native troops, that is one European to every one hundred and thirty-three natives! On such conditions as that no army can help being totally unprepared for the exigencies of modern warfare. The evil is made still worse by the other causes we have specified, but, above all, by

the fact that the officers are for the most part strangers to the men whom they lead into battle.

We must fall back then on the conclusion that the increase of officers with the native regiment must be among the European alone. In the days of the Company four-and-twenty officers were necessary; at the present time there is no earthly reason why fewer should be able to accomplish the necessary work. It is therefore not a question of doubling the number of officers, as is mooted—that will not suffice. The number with each regiment must be adequate to the performance of all the duties that may be reasonably expected of our Anglo-Indian soldiers; and prominent among those duties must now be placed their capacity to cope with a Russian army. To quadruple the European establishment of the Indian army may appear to some to be a gigantic task, but nothing less than that sweeping measure can effect any marked improvement in the fighting condition of our native army. Certainly nothing short of it can make it capable of coping with a Russian force. Under present conditions an Indian regiment would go into action with the certain fate before it that early in the battle its European officers—conspicuous in every respect—would have been all placed *hors de combat;* and there can be little doubt that with the annihilation of its English leaders every regiment—except possibly the Ghoorkas—would become a mere mob of men.

To an impartial observer it cannot fail to be apparent that there is urgent necessity for bringing up the allowance of British officers to each regiment to a

nominal twenty-four, which, with a reasonable proportion of absentees, would give an effective of twenty-one. There is no doubt that this would add greatly to the expenditure, if carried out under the present Staff Corps arrangements; but by adopting other methods of supplying the deficiency it would not be difficult to adjust the outlay to the greater satisfaction of the tax-payer. The country would also benefit by the reform to an extent that is not fully appreciated. The East India Company experienced no difficulty in securing the services of a sufficient number of Englishmen to officer its native army when that army amounted, not to one hundred and twenty thousand, but to three hundred thousand men. A regiment then had not eight officers, but twenty-four.

The great want of the Anglo-Indian army is a copious supply of subalterns—that is, of lieutenants and sub-lieutenants. This can best be provided by establishing a military college in England as an exclusive nursery for the Anglo-Indian army, on lines similar to the defunct Addiscombe. The surplus candidates for our own regular army would eagerly welcome the alternative career thus held out to them, and a large and increasing supply of European officers would be derivable from this source alone for service in the native Indian army. But this would not be the only means at the disposal of our authorities for remedying the evil caused by the paucity of English subalterns. The deficiency could to some extent be met by drawing upon the redundant list; and

assuredly promotion, which comes so slowly in the English army, could be made less startlingly rapid than it sometimes is in the Indian. By some such means as these it would be possible for the superfluous number of field officers to be weeded out, and a large class of subalterns created, from which their successors might be chosen in greater variety.

But perhaps of all the methods of feeding the native army in officers, none promises to have a more speedy result than to place facilities in the way of militia subalterns who may be desirous of pursuing a military career in despite of their failures at the competitive examination. Many of these, who cannot master their geometrical drawing, or have broken down hopelessly in their spelling or arithmetic, have been pronounced by their colonels to be proficient in their military duties, and of quite as good bearing and stamp as any past officers in the British army. To such as these, eager to serve their country in the most honourable career that lies at their disposal, the Anglo-Indian army cannot afford to close its doors. It should rather throw them wide open, for from this source it might expect instant relief.

A certain number of commissions might also be thrown open to public competition at the same time as those for the Royal army, and the successful candidates might be permitted to select which of the two services they preferred. Many of the most successful would probably choose the one which offered the greatest prospect of active service, and consequent emolument and promotion. At a moment such as the present the

more attractive army would probably be the Indian; on another occasion, in face of an European crisis, the Royal. The pay of an officer in the native Indian army being sufficient for him to live upon, and the prizes to be secured by anyone showing the most ordinary amount of diligence and ability so great, there can be no doubt that the supply of candidates for commissions in the Indian army would, as a rule, greatly exceed the demand. The drafting of a certain number of officers from the militia would produce an immediate improvement in the condition of the native regiments, and that is of imperative necessity. The establishment of a military college, and the throwing open to public competition of say twenty commissions a year, would suffice to supply a permanent source whence the Indian army might derive a complete contingent of English officers. These latter improvements would effect a permanent and a thorough reform, but the former suggestion is intended for immediate and practical utility.

A great reform is necessary in this respect, and the necessity will have to be boldly grappled with and faced. There is a prospect before us of having to increase the numbers of our native army. Extension of dominion, the acceptance of new responsibility, or even a new perception of the duties we have already accepted, might each and all operate so far as to make those in power disposed to admit that the garrison of India was too small for its task. Already to some extent this has occurred. The actual strength of the native regiments has been increased; but until their

rolls show a much greater proportion of European officers than they do at present, it will be useless to look for any great advance in its military value. The first step in effecting any improvement in the Anglo-Indian army will not be by adding to its nominal strength—for in one sense that only aggravates the evil; but it will be by trebling the number of Englishmen, whose presence will give a cohesion to the native troops behind them that would otherwise be wanting. In this way we can add immensely to the practical value of the native Indian army, and only by effecting some improvement in this respect can we expect that this vast and complicated engine can be turned to practical account against an European foe.

There would also be the great advantage, in having a large number of young officers absolutely serving with the colours, that the men would know their officers. There would be no go-betweens. There would also be more sympathy than there is at present, or, rather, a more complete understanding between the Sepoy and his English officer. It might also be found possible to modify the existing system of providing native officers for the army, and as there is high authority for saying that the present does not work as well as could be desired, and as it is notorious that there is, to say the least, a dubious sentiment prevalent among this class as a whole towards us, it would seem to be no slight advantage to take from them some of those duties which should fall upon English officers alone. The true sentiment of a regiment is often, unless the adjutant be a very superior

man, a sealed book to the English officers, and such it must remain until the native finds that his leader and his high exemplar is an English officer and gentleman.

A very important question with reference to the condition of the Anglo-Indian army is its composition, that is to say, the races and the religions which contribute to its ranks. Of the sixty thousand men in the Bengal army, there are about thirteen thousand Mahomedans—Hindustani and Punjabi—the same number of Sikhs, eighteen thousand Hindoos of various sects, chiefly Rajpoots, six thousand Ghoorkas, five thousand Pathans, and about five thousand various, of whom, perhaps, three-fourths are Dogras from Cashmere. The Bengal and Punjab army consists, therefore, of eighteen thousand Hindoos, thirteen thousand Sikhs, six thousand Ghoorkas, and five thousand miscellaneous, non-Mussulmans, as against thirteen thousand Hindustanis and Punjabis, and five thousand Pathans, Mussulmans.

The Bombay army has about nine thousand Mahomedans—including Punjabis, Pathans, and Belooches—eighteen thousand various sects of Brahmins and Hindoos, and five hundred Christians. The Madras army has a larger contingent of Christians, possibly two thousand, and, in addition, there are about nine thousand Mahomedans, and an equal number of Hindoo castes—including Tamils, Telingas, Rajpoots, and Mahrattas. Estimating the whole Anglo-Indian army by the light of these statistics, we find that there are about thirty-six thousand Mahomedans,

forty-five thousand Hindoos, ten thousand Ghoorkas and Dogras, thirteen or fourteen thousand Sikhs, and a small body of Christians.

The proportion of Mussulmans to non-Mussulmans is greatest in the Madras army, where they are nearly equal, the Christian element giving the predominance to whichever side it is classed with, and least in the Bengal, where it is considerably less than one to two. But for the Sikhs and Ghoorkas the relation would be reversed, and in the Punjab Frontier Force, which is called upon to deal with a constant danger from Mussulman tribes, the Mahomedans are largely in excess of the non-Mahomedans. It is said that we have lost the old recruits who used to be procured both for the Bengal and Bombay armies from the valley of the Ganges, and their place, while admirably supplied, so far as physique and courage go, by the new sources from which we draw our levies, has been but imperfectly filled when we remember that our new recruits possess keen and dangerous aspirations, and are far more imperfectly under control than our old soldiers were. There is also the very important and delicate point to decide, whether our system of drafting into the same regiment different races and religions is a prudent one. It must remain a matter for individual opinion whether the company and troop distinctions suffice to make Sikh and Pathan reconciled to the duty of serving in the same regiment. It may safely be assumed that the Sikh has no sympathy with his Pathan fellow-soldier, and such conduct as that shown by certain Mahomedan native officers and men in the

attack on the Peiwar Kotal in December last elicited no sympathy from the Sikh companies of that regiment. Something might be said of the injustice of the Sikh portion of this regiment, whose fidelity no one impugns, incurring a share in the stigma which must for some time attach to this regiment on account of the fanaticism of a few miserable Pathans. This is also an innovation of the last twenty years. The army of the Company—the army on whose laurels the reputation of the present force as yet mainly rests—was divided into regiments, which were each a homogeneous family. They were also doubly formidable from the fact that they were mainly recruited from the warrior class, the Kshetriyas.

Another experiment has also been put in force during the same period, by permitting men of low caste to enter the army. This step is of the most important character, and upon its success may be said to depend the efficiency of the present army more than any other circumstance. In the Bengal and Bombay armies this innovation has taken the deeper root; and in the former there are at least six thousand low caste Hindustanis, and in the Bombay probably four thousand more. That is to say, that one-twelfth of the native army is contributed by a section of the nation which formerly was not drawn upon. The experiment may be justified by success, but, so far, it has not been subjected to any severe test, and until it has it is impossible to feel any great amount of confidence in the manner in which it will be found to answer. There is consequently some reason to feel dissatisfied

with the probably inferior Hindoo soldier that we now in great part obtain. This dissatisfaction must be intensified by the steady increase which the Mussulman element in the army exhibits. Even in the Madras army, which has always been considered the most faithful of all our armies, many regard the large proportion of Mahomedans in it with disapproval. This sentiment, as founded on principle, is most natural and prudent, although it may be admitted that the old view is substantially correct, that the Madras army is more perfectly trustworthy than any other, and that three-parts of it could be employed with safety to the presidency in offensive measures elsewhere.

It is impossible to regard the large number of Mahomedans in Bengal and the Punjab with the same degree of satisfaction, and, but for the Sikhs and the Ghoorkas, there would be grounds for serious apprehension. The great danger to England in India is from Mahomedan fanaticism, and although, for the moment, the fervour of the few violent zealots in Mussulman countries appears to be unable to rouse any general enthusiasm, we cannot count on the continuance of that apathy, even in Afghanistan, where there are so many counter elements at work to blunt the edge of their religious fury. In India the inducements which would serve as the instrument of propagandist zeal are much more apparent and attractive, and, where everything else is divided, the one object which holds forth some prospect of uniting a very large portion of the people in a common cause, is the

creed of Islam. It would be well if some check could be imposed upon the number of Mahomedan recruits, and some counterpoise raised up against any seditious attempt on their part. The necessity to accomplish something of the latter is rendered all the more necessary by the falling off in quality of a certain portion of the Hindustani recruits. The decline in the number of the Kshetriyas makes it all the more necessary that their place should be filled by some equally useful and serviceable class.

Of these, none can equal or excel the Ghoorkas, of whom we have the immense satisfaction of possessing between five thousand and six thousand men. These are divided into five regiments, composed exclusively of Ghoorkas. They are distinguished from each other by their numbers alone, and have been raised at various periods, all since the Nepaulese war in 1816. The service they have rendered us during that period is notorious. Their name is in everybody's mouth. One regiment during the Afghan war was annihilated in the winter of 1841. That blow was the signal to the Afghans, and it marked the commencement of the English reverses. In the later war their comrades amply avenged their fate, and in the Punjab, during the Mutiny, in all our border expeditions, and now in the present Afghan campaign, their valour, steadiness, and dash have all been equally displayed. They have come out of every ordeal without a stain, and are admittedly the bravest of the brave. Their valour rests on such a substantial basis that it seems

almost unnecessary to mention any of the tales that have been narrated concerning it. Yet, as brave deeds, such as those accomplished by the hillmen of Nepaul, will bear repetition, the two following may be given, not as in any way being special instances, but as some of the more ordinary. The very merit of these consists in the natural and business-like manner in which they set about them.

The first of these happened some years ago, during the progress of one of those petty wars on the Punjab frontier that have been of such frequent occurrence since our rule was established beyond the Indus. A small detachment of Ghoorkas was cut off and surprised by a much larger body of assailants; but the gallant little hillmen, indignantly refusing the summons to surrender, fought on to the last man, and the Afghan tribesmen only won their victory with severe loss. Not a Ghoorka remained alive. Of such dogged determination as this, few examples can be found, even in the record of European armies. The second occasion was more recently, during the course of the Jowaki war. The 5th regiment of Ghoorkas—the old Hazara regiment—volunteered to go into the Jowaki country with a single English officer and exterminate the whole clan. It is a pity their request was not granted, for little doubt can be entertained but that they would have accomplished what they said. The Jowakis might have been inspired by some sentiment of chivalry to meet them in the open, where the result would not have been uncertain. The gallant conduct of this regiment at Peiwar, and

in the Sapiri defile, is subject of daily gossip, and need not be dwelt upon here.

The Ghoorkas who enlist in our service are enticed into it partly by the prospect of high pay, but still more by the vent it affords for their military ardour. We maintain a force of five regiments at full war strength, but we should strive by every means in our power to double or treble that force. Our relations with Nepaul have not always been of the most cordial description. In the earlier years of our rule in India they were certainly not free from trouble; but latterly, owing chiefly to the friendly policy, not incompatible with the maintenance, however, of an isolated position, of the late Jung Bahadoor, the prime minister and most powerful individual in the country, our friendship has been uninterrupted. Out of Nepaul's relations with China, whose vassal Nepaul is, sprang our first intercourse with the rulers of Khatmandoo. Nepaul is nominally a tributary of China, and, if we turn to history, we discover that this suzerainty has been in fact maintained down almost to the present day. If we go back to the year 1791, we find that the Ghoorkas, not content with having formed a great and powerful State on the slopes of the Himalayas, had carried their victorious arms into Tibet, and, after ravaging the intermediate country, had entered Lhasa in triumph. After imposing a fine of three lacs of rupees, they returned with much booty besides to their own country. But a Chinese army was despatched after these invaders, and on coming up with them, overthrew them in several engagements

in the Kirong pass, recovered the indemnity and much of the spoil, and successfully reasserted the right of the Pekin Emperor to homage from the rulers of Khatmandoo. The hitherto successful Ghoorkas were compelled to entreat our Government to intercede for them with the conqueror, but although Lord Cornwallis's compliance was the chief cause of their escaping without further loss, all his efforts failed to promote a friendly feeling in the breasts of the Nepaulese.

Once more, so late as 1856, on the occasion of a war between Nepaul and Tibet, did the Chinese compel the former to acknowledge their suzerainty, and, at the present time, the connecting link is still maintained. After the return of the Ghoorkas from the former of these expeditions, they resumed their aggressive operations on Cis-Himalayan territory, and with such success that our own susceptibilities were aroused. On the Nepaulese declining to accede to our terms, the wars of 1814–15 ensued, during which we suffered some slight reverses at the commencement; but Sir David Ouchterlony, by a series of brilliant movements, compelled the enemy to sue for peace, and to restore much of his recent conquests. By the cession of Kumaon, Nepaul was reduced to its present limits. The treaty ratified in 1816 still subsists between the two countries, and the friendly spirit shown towards us by Jung Bahadoor was more unequivocally demonstrated than in verbal protestations by the despatch of a Ghoorka contingent to our assistance during the Mutiny of 1857. This aid received

the reward from our Government of the cession of the Terai. On his visit to this country at the time of the Great Exhibition, this sagacious ruler had doubtless formed accurate notions as to our true strength, while his personal feelings had been flattered by the fêtes of the great and by the cordial reception of the people.

The ruler of this powerful people, who at the present moment are governed by a brother of the late Jung Bahadoor, maintains a regular army of twenty-seven infantry regiments, drilled after the pattern of the English army, and some two thousand artillerymen. The reserves consist of about fifty thousand disciplined troops, and in any emergency considerably more than one hundred thousand men could be placed in the field. It is significant at the present time, when we have been hearing so much of the importation of arms into British India, to remember that most of the larger native States of India, including Nepaul, have their own cannon foundries and arm factories. The Nepaulese army is armed principally with rifles constructed in the factories at Khatmandoo, and a reserve of one hundred thousand of these weapons is kept constantly in readiness for use. A cannon foundry has more recently been constructed, and some four hundred cannon, chiefly twelve- and eighteen-pounders, have now to be included in an estimate of the strength of Nepaul.

It is necessary to state that the ruler of Nepaul is practically independent, and that the only treaty between him and ourselves is drawn up on that supposition, and we have never so much as contested the

claims China has repeatedly advanced to supremacy in Nepaul, and which no doubt at the present time hold good in her eyes. The Ghoorka ruler is not bound to furnish an armed contingent to us in the face of any emergency, and the conduct of Jung Bahadoor in 1857 was purely voluntary, and establishes no precedent. The position of Nepaul is simply invaluable as one of the defences of India. The weakest point in the whole of India is at the mercy of an enemy installed there. It may be admitted that, in the event of some great general or ambitious ruler suddenly appearing among the Ghoorkas, our relations with Nepaul might not be free from danger, and in such a contingency the danger would be very serious indeed, owing to the valour and arms of these hill-men. But, examine the future as critically as we may, it is difficult to perceive any symptoms of such an event occurring. It may even be doubted whether the Ghoorkas in our service would combine with their kinsmen in attacking us, and, if so, the more Ghoorkas we have in our service the safer we should be. Alone among all the native soldiers, not excepting the Sikhs, the Englishman fraternises with the Ghoorka, and regards him, as indeed he cannot help, so far as courage and steadiness go, as his equal. Making every allowance for the possibilities of the future, and taking into consideration the most sinister of rumours, and the most pessimist of views, there would be nothing unsafe in doubling the number of Ghoorkas serving with our army. This would be a real addition to our strength if it be possible, and would, there is good reason to hope,

draw tighter those bonds which should connect India and Nepaul.

There is another quarter, Beloochistan, whence it would be possible to obtain a new supply of troops, but as this is from a Mahomedan source it may appear to some to be in contradiction with much that has been previously stated. But the principal recommendation of this source is that it is beyond the sphere of India, and that the arguments that apply to our Indian army proper would only be partially applicable to a force whose chief duty would be to guard the frontier. The Belooch is one of the most warlike of Asiatics, and is greatly the superior of the Afghan in martial qualities. He has no sympathy with, and is in fact bitterly hostile to, the Afghan; and that antipathy alone removes one of the most probable of dangers from an alliance between Cabul and Khelat. The few Belooches that we have in our service have been remarkably faithful and steady in their obedience. Both at Delhi and in Abyssinia they rendered us great service, and in frontier wars Jacob's Rifles—the 30th Regiment of Bombay Infantry—have earned a deathless fame. Ever since the desperate fight at Meeanee, where the Belooches fought so gallantly on the side of the Scinde rulers, there has been a steadily improving sentiment in force between ourselves and the people of Khelat. Thanks mainly to Major Sandeman's tact and his influence with the Khan Khododad, it never was stronger than it is at present; and the friendship shows no signs of abating.

The great value of a considerable Belooch force—

not of necessity to form part of the Anglo-Indian army—would be that we should have secured the aid of a warlike people beyond the Indus on the flank of Afghanistan either to supplement our own garrison at Candahar, or to provide us with an armed force ready to be pushed forward to any point that it might be deemed necessary to secure. The Khan of Khelat, and the Jam of Las Beyla have between them an armed force of about ten thousand men; but this represents but a small portion of the military class. Former khans have brought into the field thirty thousand men, and perhaps a still larger army; and the population is now considerably greater than ever it has been before. Our object would be gained, however, if the Khan were enabled to maintain a regular army of about ten thousand men, which with Sniders in their hands and a small body of English instructors would be an invaluable auxiliary force. By adopting certain precautions—such as, for instance, compelling the recruit to take an oath to us as well as to his khan, and this oath should in all cases be the national one to Pir Kisri—the new Belooch army would be an unqualified benefit to ourselves, and an additional buttress to our Indian defences.

No one has thrown more light on the martial qualities of the Belooche than Mons. Ferrier in his interesting "Caravan Journeys." The following passages from that work will show what that very observant French officer and traveller thought about these people —rivals to the Afghans in so many ways:—"The Belooches call themselves Mussulmans, but they do

not observe the precepts of the Koran; their religious ideas are a mixture of Islamism, Christianity, and idolatry, the whole seasoned with the grossest superstition. . . . The Belooches are ardent, impulsive, well-formed, and nervous; their complexion is olive, like that of the Arab, and these two nations have more than one analogous point between them; their features express astuteness and ferocity, they are insensible to privations and support them and fatigue in the most admirable manner; no matter how painful and long the journey may be, they are always ready for the march. Their most extraordinary physical characteristic is the facility with which, camel-like, they can for so long a time go without drink in their burning country—a draught of water once in the twenty-four hours is sufficient for them, even on a journey. They march with a rapidity which it is impossible to conceive, and will walk faster than the best horse; there are instances among them of men who will tire out their horses, one after another, in this manner. . . . Of their courage they boast and swagger as much as the Afghans, but perhaps with more reason; the latter are good for a rush, but they do not meet the shock of an attack or stand under the fire of artillery. The Belooches on the contrary, though as ignorant as the latter of the art of war, surpass them in tenacity and bravery; they remain firm under the fire of the enemy, and are bold in their advance. On many occasions they hold firm, and die on the ground like real heroes; there are no better soldiers in Asia than these Belooches." These extracts may suffice to show

what sort of soldier the Belooche, with a little care, might be expected to become.

In pursuing our review of the Anglo-Indian army we have now to consider the part which the armies of the independent princes of India will probably play in the future. The reader cannot do better than refer to Colonel Malleson's "Historical Sketch of the Native States of India," which is the authority, and must long remain so, upon the subject.

The following description of these armies is taken from the columns of the "Times," where it appeared on the 2nd of September, 1878, under the head of "The Armies of our Indian Frontiers":—

"In order to arrive at a perfectly sound estimate of the value to us of our Indian army, we must take into very careful consideration the part that the armies of our great feudatories would play in any crisis when the resources of the Empire were so severely taxed as to make us employ every means at our disposal for its defence. It may be of interest, then, to supplement the account we gave a few days ago of our own Indian army by a description of the forces in the service of some of the more powerful of the princes of India. Whether it could be possible in any emergency to convert their armies, which have been considered a menace to our rule, into a means of making that Empire more stable is a question that concerns us very nearly. It admits however of no very confident reply. In this place we simply wish to chronicle a few facts; but we may say that it is obvious that our policy should be to extract as much use as possible from all the

military systems that exist within our Indian Empire. The ambition and the love of display, which are a second nature with many of the warlike rulers who have by degrees been forced by the weight of arms to acquiesce in our supremacy, have found a vent in the creation of disciplined armies which must be considered either an expensive and all but useless plaything or the means whereby dangerous schemes may be carried out. Strictly speaking, the duty devolves as much on the native princes of defending India from external aggression as it does upon us, and we should be justified in demanding from one and all of these chieftains armed contingents, if at any time we deemed an appeal to their patriotism to be necessary. A far more delicate question is raised, however, by the proposal that these alien forces should participate in any expedition beyond the immediate neighbourhood of the country. Yet it is evident that if these feudatories are not to be trusted, and if their armies are not liable to, or will not of their own free will proceed on, foreign service, when the necessity for such exceptional duty arose for our own native army, its movements would be greatly hampered by the uncertainty that would prevail as to the attitude of these potent vassals. In fact, the striking power of our Indian army would be seriously reduced by any manifestation of discontent on the part of Scindiah or the Nizam. The question very naturally presents itself to our mind, therefore, what sort of armies do our Indian feudatories possess?

"The princes of Rajpootana, by right of birth and

by extent of territory, may fairly claim the foremost place in our review. The district which they collectively occupy is not less than one hundred and twenty thousand square miles in extent, and the population of that province exceeds nine millions. Rajpootana is at present divided into eighteen principalities, but although their State no longer presents an unity of strength, these Normans of India can still with justice lay claim to precedence over all their contemporaries. Among the chief of these Rajpoot princes may be mentioned the rulers of Oodeypore, or Marwar, Jhodpore, and Jeypore. The first of these can bring into the field fifteen thousand foot and six thousand two hundred and forty horse, although in artillery all these princes are singularly deficient as compared with the rest of Indian rulers. The two other Rajpoot princes mentioned have a regular following of about six thousand or seven thousand men each; but each of these could raise a considerably larger number of retainers if necessary. The fifteen other princes have an army at their disposal of some thirty-five thousand strong, the total of the whole of Rajpootana being, therefore, some seventy thousand men. The Rajpoots, all physically strong and well-built, must be classed in the very first rank among the fighting-people of India. There are not wanting ties among them, too, which to some degree supply the place of rival headships, and they are certainly free from many of those disintegrating causes which are in operation in some other of the native States where the ruling family is a stranger by blood to the governed.

"The most extensive and the wealthiest single State in India is Hyderabad, and its army is also the most numerous. According to a return made a few years ago its armed force comprised thirty-six thousand eight hundred and ninety infantry, eight thousand two hundred cavalry, and seven hundred and twenty-five guns. All these troops had undergone more or less training, and, so far as barrack-yard discipline goes, may be said to be tolerably effective. These numbers represent the entire strength of the Nizam's army, and, although we may feel assured that Sir Salar Jung has omitted no opportunity of keeping up with his neighbours, the Nizam essentially employs only a standing army, and does not rule, as many others do, an armed people.

"The Mahratta States come next under our notice, and they are believed to represent the most vigorous of all the native governments. Of these the principal are Gwalior, ruled by Scindiah; Baroda, by the Gaikwar; and Indore, by Holkar. The area of Gwalior is rather more than thirty thousand square miles; its population is about three millions, and its revenue two million pounds. The Maharajah has, however, a large income from private sources, and he has devoted a considerable portion of this to increasing his military strength. His army is numbered at sixteen thousand foot, six thousand horse, and two hundred and ten guns. Of the latter it is known that he could bring sixty effective pieces of modern artillery into the field, while his cavalry, although mounted on small horses, is very efficient. Under his personal guidance, and

acting under the instigation of his able minister, Sir Dinkur Rao, the system of the great Prussian Minister, Von Stein, has rigidly been adhered to, and by this means Scindiah finds himself at the present moment, twenty years after the defection of his followers from him when he adhered to our cause in the Mutiny, at the head of an army which in real efficiency and in numbers is only equalled throughout India by that of Nepaul and by our own. It seems probable from a consideration of the latest returns and of the numbers engaged in past wars, that Scindiah could levy a formidable army of close upon fifty thousand men. It has been asserted that Mahratta valour lives now only in name. This assertion is, to say the least, rash. In all our wars with these Cossacks of India we have never on any single occasion found them to be pusillanimous opponents. We overthrew them at Laswarree, at Assaye, and at Deeg; but it required all the skill of Lake and Wellesley to snatch victory from them; and at Bhurtpore they foiled all the reckless daring of our storming parties. Later on in the 1844 campaign, their old valour had by no means grown cold, and at Maharajpore the Mahrattas rivalled, if they failed to overcome, the determined resolution of our conquering regiments. Even in the Indian Mutiny, it is doubtful whether any other Indian troops except Mahrattas would have fought with such steadfastness as those who followed the Ranee of Jhansi and Tantia Topee. Sir Hugh Rose and the Bombay column did not esteem those as unworthy opponents who defended Jhansi, and who, defeated outside its walls, stood

again at Lushkur, only to incur fresh disaster. Their chief remained faithful to the path which his minister had selected for him, but the Mahratta people bore their share, so far as it lay in their power, in contesting our supremacy. In face of facts like these, it seems absurd to question the degeneracy of a race that has always proved itself to be no mean antagonist of our own. It is far more to the point to remember, as Lord Napier of Magdala has written, that since that era the new army of Scindiah has been created, and that it certainly possesses some superior qualifications to the old, while retaining its great merits of individual courage and gallantry. As long as we retain possession of the fort of Gwalior we may fairly assume that we hold a guarantee for the good conduct of the prince, but at the same time this very occupation of the fortress constitutes a grievance with the ruler and people of Gwalior which is more bitterly felt than even our possession of Gibraltar is by the haughty Spaniards.

"The State of Indore under the sway of Holkar, the rival of Scindiah by historical association, is about one-third of the size of Gwalior. Its revenue is possibly very nearly as large as that of Gwalior, chiefly through the large quantity of opium cultivated in the district of Malwa. The population does not exceed a million, and the regular army is about ten thousand men. Some years ago, too, Holkar secretly constructed a steam foundry for the casting of cannon, and there is reason to believe that he now possesses a small but useful train of artillery. In 1872 he secured

the services of Sir Mahdava Rao as Dewan, or Minister, who had greatly distinguished himself in the management of affairs in Travancore, and who is considered to be perhaps the most able of the many able Indian Statesmen of this generation. These two enlightened men—Sir Dinkur Rao and Sir Mahdava Rao—have endeavoured to remove the hereditary hostility of their masters, and some sort of reconciliation has during the last few years been effected between them. In these negotiations the two Dewans have been the prime movers, and we can only conjecture what were the arguments they made use of to attain their object. Although both of these statesmen have always been noted for their loyalty towards this country, it should not be forgotten that they are of that order of Indian thinkers who look forward to a time when our relaxing strength may permit the reappearance of a native domination.

"The third branch of the Mahratta power is Kattyawar, or Guzerat, more generally known now as Baroda by the name of its chief town. The present ruler, or Gaikwar, is a minor and under our control; but the forces of the State are estimated at fifteen thousand five hundred infantry, four thousand cavalry, and a train of five hundred and four guns. This State is about the same size as Gwalior, and takes rank between Scindiah and Holkar. The whole Mahratta power, which occupies so central a position in India, and which finds such distinguished leaders as are its two chiefs, and such able Ministers as those mentioned to guide its councils, is one of the, if not the very, most

formidable potential dangers to our rule in India which present themselves to our view. The alliance between Holkar and Scindiah, if it is firmly cemented, receives special significance from Sir Dinkur Rao's endeavours to create a good feeling between the State of Gwalior and the Rajpoot peoples. The district of Bundelcund, which is now of much smaller dimensions than it used to be, is stated to have possessed in 1875 an army of twenty-two thousand one hundred and sixty infantry, two thousand six hundred and seventy cavalry, and four hundred and twenty guns. There are numerous other small States, such as Mysore, Bhawalpore, and the Hill States, which aspire to the dignity of owning a standing army; but these are not deserving of any special notice. We have now only to consider those States which fill a somewhat different relation towards ourselves and which have claims to be styled independent. Of these, Cashmere and Nepaul are the principal.

"The Maharajah of Cashmere, who exercises in that beautiful country the power of the last of the Sikh rulers, has in his pay an army of some twenty thousand men. These are almost entirely infantry, and his artillery numbers ninety-six modern guns. He is very proud of his military organization, and with justice. More than any other native army is it called upon to perform duties of considerable importance. It, like our own forces, has to cope with an ever-present danger in the mountain clans lying west of it, and in Gilgit may be seen a corresponding post to our own Peshawur. In garrisoning Ladak, his Trans-Himalayan

dependency, the Maharajah is able to afford another vent for the martial ardour of his people. The best of relations are believed to subsist between Srinuggur and Calcutta, and there is little doubt that the Maharajah would be willing to perform his stipulation by treaty of providing a contingent when required. We have now arrived at the last of the native States which possess a certain kind of military strength, and which certainly must play a very important part in the future, and which must affect in a very marked degree the value of our own native army to us in matters outside of Hindostan. The critical observer cannot fail to perceive that if a great change has occurred in the firmness of our hold on the country since 1857, a not less striking improvement has been effected by some of the native rulers. Where formerly even the Mahrattas could only bring into the field a small following imperfectly armed, they now can raise without an effort, and mobilise with a rapidity equal to our own, a larger and far more perfectly armed force than at any previous epoch. And a similar change is visible in Hyderabad and the other States. It is idle to deny that this rapid progress is not agreeable to us. We forbid any of these feudatories to break the peace towards each other, and we should treat any infringer of this law as a public enemy. What purpose do they then propose to accomplish by means of a large standing army, if they are debarred from the privilege of waging internecine war? Against what public or private foe are the arms of our Indian princes kept so brightly furbished? We garrison British India with

a force of two hundred thousand men, and we, in addition to undertaking the defence of our two hundred millions of subjects, protect, practically speaking, from all foreign aggression those in India who are not our subjects as well. With what object is it, then, that these independent and semi-independent States maintain a collective army of more than three hundred thousand men to protect fifty millions of people from a danger which our presence in India precludes all possibility of ever occurring? At all times the question raised by these facts is a serious one for us, because, whatever danger there may be in native armies, it is obvious that it must increase as the people themselves perceive more clearly the importance of numbers and superior weapons in modern warfare. We have very wisely confined, with a few trifling exceptions, the possession of artillery in our own service to English troops, and we have thereby secured for our cause a great advantage in the improbable event of any fresh Sepoy revolt. We have not been equally foreseeing in the case of the native territories. Scindiah, Holkar, and the Nizam possess an artillery which bears an important relation to the rest of their forces, and a still more significant one to our own. We are not at all desirous of creating any alarm on this subject, for at present we believe that none is justifiable. There is certainly fit subject for inquiry; and the discussion of the efficiency of our own native army makes it prudent for us to remember that there is such a thing as an effective army, or rather a collection of armies, within the borders of India which is quite

beyond our control, and to which our own is intended as an equipoise."

A few days after the appearance of this article in "The Times," the following letter, under the signature of "Anglo-Indian," was published in the "Standard." The significance of its last paragraph is obvious, and the writer of these pages would venture emphatically to endorse the suggestions which are hinted at in "The Times" article, and which are more boldly stated in the letter referred to in the "Standard," which was as follows :—

"Ever since a most remarkable official letter from Lord Napier of Magdala to the India Office was published in the year 1870 the question has been constantly before us—What is to be the future of the large armies maintained by various potentates within the borders of Hindostan? During the last six months the consideration of this question has been more closely pressed upon us by the prospect of a war in which our own Indian army would have been called upon to play an important part; and it consequently became a matter of high importance to know what attitude these States would observe during any severe crisis. Some of them, indeed, came forward spontaneously with offers of their contingents the moment Indian troops were summoned to the Mediterranean, but these were few in number, and old allies of ours in the past. The majority of the States held aloof, and preserved a passive demeanour. I simply record this as a fact, and not as any special fault of the Indian feudatories. Under certain circumstances, I believe, they would

have volunteered for active service and served us loyally and well. With the prospect of an Anglo-Russian war before both England and India, the most powerful princes of the latter State, however, made no move to demonstrate their complete good faith to the dominant Power. When the European complications began to clear off, the Indian Government resumed the consideration of the question of the independent armies, which more urgent matters had postponed. The first result of this resumption of the discussion may be seen in the Indian Arms Act; but as all the greater potentates manufacture their own arms, it is clear that they are unaffected by this legislative precaution. It yet remains, then, to deal with these dubious elements. The Indian Government is fully determined to cope with the difficulty in a decided manner, and it will not be inappropriate to point out at the present time some of the objects that it is desired to attain, and some of the means which may be expected to secure those objects.

"In the first place there are two States which are beyond our present range, and these are Cashmere and Nepaul. Each of these States performs very important and useful functions in the management of Indian affairs, and it would be to our positive disadvantage that any change should take place in the military systems of either of those States. It is not necessary, then, to trouble your readers with any description of either of those armies, nor need I dilate on the various Rajpoot clans, and their large and varied force of armed and semi-armed retainers.

Practically speaking, there are but four armies in India about which the Government need trouble itself. These belong to the three Mahratta States, Gwalior, Indore, and Baroda, and to the Nizam. Of these, Baroda, under its youthful Gaekwar, is almost entirely under our control, but in military resources it is computed to dispose of twenty thousand men and five hundred guns. Scindiah, of Gwalior, has twenty-two thousand men and two hundred and ten guns; but by the establishment of a reserve, which is against the spirit if not the letter of his treaties with us, he practically commands an army of fifty thousand men. Holkar, the chief of Indore, who has recently been rewarded with an increase of territory, has a much smaller army, probably not more than ten thousand men, although he, too, can display a greater number of disciplined troops than he shows on paper. He has, moreover, the best train of artillery amongst all the native States, manufacturing his own arms in workshops and foundries at Indore. The Nizam has about forty-five thousand men with the colours, and a large train of artillery.

"Sir Salar Jung is to all intents and purposes supreme in matters of high policy, and he is known to be in a bad humour with us. The greatest danger undoubtedly lies between Hyderabad and Gwalior, although it is generally assumed that the former is the more formidable. The population of the present State of the Nizam exceeds nine millions, and the revenue and wealth of the country are very considerable. It occupies also a great central position, and is not, like

Gwalior, exposed to prompt attack from several quarters. Admitting that the Government has decided to abolish all armies in India except our own, with which particular State would it be advisable to begin? For various palpable reasons Baroda would seem the most suitable. We have a firm hold on it, its ruler is young, and there would be less risk in initiating a new policy here than elsewhere. On the other hand, to make Hyderabad the first to abolish its standing army would be to strike at the root of the matter at once, and to paralyse at one blow whatever disaffection great vassals might be disposed to indulge in. It has been clear to everyone who has followed the question that the existence of such armed hosts throughout India, and within our lines, is incompatible with our safety—in fact, with the preservation of our Indian Empire. It is thirty years since we waged a war with any one of these States, but during that generation the rabbles of the Mahrattas, the Nizam, and other princes have been steadily converted into disciplined armies. A new order of statesmen has also risen up, whose aspirations are not of that chimerical nature some believe, and the realisation of which would be the downfall of our rule. Disunion in the past broke the vigour of all these States, whom we in turn overthrew; but although disunion still exists it is not with the old force. With each year that passes away in tranquillity fresh links are forged uniting more closely the princes of India in a common cause against the stranger; and unless we are prompt in our precautions we may anticipate with confidence the day when we

shall not have to combat a disunited but a united India.

"But after all has been stated in favour of the abolition of Indian armies from a military stand-point, the most cogent argument has not been adduced in support of such a measure. There is a financial, as well as a political and strategical, aspect of the question, and viewed from this light the maintenance of large and useless standing armies by Indian princes becomes almost a crime to the heavily-burdened two hundred millions of our Indian subjects. The revenue of British India is, in round numbers, fifty millions. Towards that sum the independent princes contribute in the form of tribute about three-quarters of a million sterling. The population of the independent States is placed at forty millions; the revenue by some authorities at fifteen millions, by others at twenty millions sterling. From these figures, taking the smaller revenue as correct, it appears that independent India is either half again as rich, or half again as heavily taxed, as British India. Now the Indian princes spend at least two-thirds of their revenue on either their army or their personal display, which is chiefly of a military kind; that is to say, ten millions sterling is annually sunk in the maintenance of a miscellaneous force exceeding three hundred thousand men, and it must clearly be understood that these armies, with the exception of Nepaul and Cashmere, perform no useful task at all. They are a most expensive luxury, which it is high time, bearing in mind the condition of our own subjects, should be curtailed.

"This disappearance of the Mahratta armies, of the Nizam's force, and of the following of the Rajpoot princes would not necessitate the addition of a single regiment to our own European army, and it would be possible to reduce our native army very considerably. Moreover, the Minister of Finance would be able to reckon on a certain revenue of sixty millions instead of fifty, and at the same time have only to provide for much the same expenditure as at present. For five millions a year we could administer what the native princes now waste fifteen over. We could therefore reduce taxation by one-third, and yet augment the gross State revenue by five millions. With that surplus we could build roads and canals, construct tanks and railways, keep off pestilence and famine to a great extent, and almost become reconciled to the loss of the opium revenue, as the result of some future Anglo-Chinese complication. There are few desert regions which stand in such pressing need of development as India, but what Minister can expend the necessary millions when the equilibrium of the finances appears to be almost as impossible of discovery as the philosopher's stone? That equilibrium is, practically speaking, unattainable so long as only a portion of India contributes to the State revenue. India, rich country as it is, and much richer as it may become, is not rich enough to spend twenty-five millions annually on her army, and it is our duty to see that that waste does not continue longer than can be helped. We have enormous interests at stake in this question of internal policy, and it will be neces-

sary for us to watch that it is not neglected. At the present moment, I believe, the question is under anxious consideration at Simla, and the Indian Government may be expected shortly to take some further preliminary steps in the right direction. There are dangers in premature activity, but they are as nothing compared with those of persistent passivity. The policy of abolishing the native armies, and of either increasing the tribute paid to us, or of undertaking the entire control ourselves, will be not only the strengthening of our position, but also the improvement in the lot of the Indian rayah by the augmentation of our revenue, and a decrease in military expenditure. The elasticity of our revenue will have been secured also at the same time that it is made independent of the opium trade. In all our efforts the object we should set before us is to retain in our own hands the whole armed force of India."

A very important point to be considered, then, is, what are the garrison duties of the Anglo-Indian army, and what precautionary measures have been taken against any hostile move on the part of these feudatories? The following statement is the best reply to this question :—

About fifty thousand men form the permanent garrison of the Punjab.

Eight thousand men—The Hyderabad Contingent—are employed exclusively in watching the Nizam's troops.

Five thousand seven hundred men are absorbed by the irregulars of Central India, Rajpootana, etc.

Four thousand eight hundred hold the eastern frontier from Chittagong to Jalpaigori.

Four thousand three hundred garrison Lucknow.

Three thousand six hundred are considered sufficient for Morar, where they keep watch upon the city of Gwalior, and the army of the Maharajah Scindiah. They also hold the celebrated fortress.

Only two thousand two hundred are stationed at Cawnpore, and three thousand one hundred at so vital a strategical point as Allahabad—the Indian Woolwich.

Two thousand are set apart for the purpose of overawing Dinapore, Patna, and Behar.

One thousand six hundred secure the obedience and loyalty of Benares.

And, finally, five thousand eight hundred garrison Calcutta and its environs; about one thousand eight hundred holding Fort William.

With this distribution no fault can be found. Every probable or possible danger is to some extent provided against, and the very most is made of the small force at our disposal. But, while admitting this, it is equally clear, from a comparison between this statement and the summary previously given of the armies of the independent princes, that many of these possible dangers are only just provided against, and nothing more. Both Scindiah and the Nizam in particular possess a much more numerous army than that employed in controlling them, and their superiority is not confined to men alone, but includes cavalry and artillery as well. In considering the mobilisation of

the Anglo-Indian army, then, all these circumstances must be taken into account, and the more carefully we take them into consideration the more evident must it appear that, in face of a great emergency beyond our frontier, it would be impossible, so long as these great territorial armies exist, to weaken the garrison of Central India and of the Gangetic valley.

The garrison of Central India would have, in fact, to be increased both from Madras and Bombay. The army of the Punjab, a small portion of the Bombay, and a larger contingent from Madras, would then alone be available for the purpose of concentrating a defending force on the Indian frontier. In two months, taking the preparations from their commencement, during the late campaign in Afghanistan three armies of the aggregate strength of from thirty to thirty-five thousand men, and one hundred and twenty guns, were assembled on the Afghan frontier. One month later two fresh armies—one in the north of at least eight thousand men, and another in the south of probably equal strength—had been collected, and pushed forward to occupy the places of those which had advanced into Afghanistan, and these forces were equally prepared in respect to artillery and cavalry. The southern force was, moreover, accompanied by a heavy siege-train. It is true that the military value of the second northern army cannot be placed at a very high point, consisting, as it did in great part, of the contingents of the Punjab chieftains, but, in the eyes of the most carping critic, it could not be considered an utterly useless column. Thus, within three months

of official intimation being given to the various departments to prepare for war, an army of fifty thousand men was assembled on the farther side of the Indus. There is no doubt that the strain put upon the transport service was very great, much greater than was supposed in this country. But if we judge simply by results, we find that that portion of the Anglo-Indian army which is alone available for the purposes of mobilisation—that is to say, the Punjab garrison, and portions of the Bombay and Madras armies—provided the Government with an army of fifty thousand men ready for offensive operations. Of this number about fifteen thousand men were English.

It is also necessary to remember that this number was considered to be sufficient, and that as soon as this force had been collected, the various departments held that they had performed what was required of them. Moreover, they laid themselves down to accomplish this, and nothing more; and they accomplished it. In the future, then, we may assume that with three months' notice we can concentrate fifty thousand fighting-men on the Indian frontier, of whom one-third wil lbe English, and another third good native troops. There are two quarters whence it would be possible to increase that army. The first is Madras, from which it would be feasible to draw a column of twelve thousand men without in any way jeoparding our position there. The second is, of course, England; and with three months' notice we ought to be able to send—if not involved in an European war—at least fifty thousand men to Kurrachee. But,

shutting out from our survey the home country, we find that the Anglo-Indian army, on its own resources, has concentrated fifty thousand men, and that with a slightly increased effort it could bring ten thousand more into the field—that is to say, one-third of the whole army. This must be admitted to be far from unsatisfactory. The effort on our part may be taken to correspond precisely with that required on the part of Kaufmann to bring twenty thousand Russian troops and thirty-two guns to the Oxus. Our preparations, carried out on a similar scale, would give us sixty thousand men, of whom twenty thousand would be English, five thousand Ghoorkas, and ten thousand Sikhs—with an artillery of at least one hundred and twenty guns.

It is incontestable that we should have left in our rear many weak points, many elements of danger; and that the long frontier of the Suleiman would necessitate the division of our army into so many parts that each would be certain to be attacked before it could receive aid from the others. But that danger may be obviated by, to use Lord Beaconsfield's happy phrase, a rectification of the frontier. The day of critical danger to our Empire in India is still remote, but that is no reason why we should neglect salutary precautions. It is within our borders that we must look for those elements of weakness which must neutralise—perhaps fatally—our strength. The great danger is to be found in the unsatisfied ambition and longings of the native courts. The minor potentates are beneath our notice, and they are possibly content

with the position of being great nobles under an Indian Empress, for, whoever rules India, they can never be more.

But it is far different with the greater princes, those who have much of the appearance of royalty, and possess large revenues and considerable armies. These have some reason for aspiring to a greater part, and because they have they are the more dangerous. Astute ministers and princes of gallant bearing may for the time being, and while the sun is on our side of the hedge, be our very good friends and faithful feudatories; but if we were in difficulties to-morrow, would they lend us a helping hand to extricate us out of the dilemma? Is it in human nature to expect that they would? We must face the less agreeable but the infinitely more probable alternative, that far from helping us, they would constitute a fresh difficulty in our path—a difficulty which, if it came upon us when we were pushed in other quarters, might be insuperable.

And if this be so—if as reasonable men endeavouring to discern the signs of the times we are compelled to recognise the possibility of grave danger from the armies of the independent princes of India—should we not proceed to the logical conclusion and decree the abolition of those armies? There cannot be the slightest hesitation in replying that if we are only ordinarily prudent we should. We should be encouraged to take a firm hold of this business by the conviction that these armed bodies of men are utterly useless. They serve no salutary purpose what-

ever. They are not even part of the defences of India. On the other hand they are most costly toys, and are draining away much of the wealth of India. The money expended upon them, which probably greatly exceeds five millions per annum, comes out of the pocket of the Indian tax-payer, although he be nominally an independent one, and all this is expended on a military force which has simply no right to exist. An army is only necessary to a State for the purpose of defending it against foreign foes, and for the maintenance of the authority of the sovereign and the laws. In the Indian States there is no necessity for their existence from the latter cause, and from the former our presence in India effectually protects them.

Forty millions of people are taxed for an army half again as large as that which guards the whole frontier of India and two hundred millions of people! As a matter of fact, so long as these armies exist India is but half conquered. It is useless, as some have done, to talk of these armies being a wing of the Anglo-Indian army. They cannot be anything so useful, for they cannot be trusted; and this was tacitly admitted during the present campaign in Afghanistan, when their services were quite dispensed with.* In the most favourable point of view they can only be a dead weight, and it is far from improbable that when they have become a little more developed they will

* The contingent of the Punjab chieftains in no way affects the accuracy of this assertion with regard to the great feudatories.

constitute a menace of the gravest character, yet one at the same time of such a formidable kind that no ruler would care to tamper with them.

There is also only one way of settling the matter, and that is by a very thorough method of proceeding. It is no use seeking to curtail these armies, for as a matter of fact many of them are curtailed so far as treaties can curtail the will of man. But the stipulations of these treaties have always been evaded in the spirit if not in the letter, and of these delinquents none has been more persistently infringing their terms than Maharajah Scindiah. The only way to make India safe is to pass an edict that there shall be no armed force, beyond a few hundred personal attendants to the greater chiefs, except the Anglo-Indian army; that all arms must be handed over to the Government, for which a certain price will be allowed; and that all cannon foundries and arm factories are to be destroyed. These sweeping measures can be carried out to-morrow with little difficulty; in a short time the task will be more difficult; and later on it may be impossible. In the event of any State resisting, it should be annexed; and the fall of the Nizam, the annexation of Hyderabad, would be an event that would mark the thoroughness with which we had at last taken the business in hand. But wherever it may be necessary to make a commencement, the measure should not be permitted to halt in its prosecution. The game is entirely in our hands at present. Neither Scindiah, nor Holkar, nor Salar Jung himself dare oppose what we decree, and it is most probable that

if they were given no time for combining they would not dream of opposition.

This undoubtedly extreme measure would be dictated in the first place by an instinct of self-preservation, but not the least potent reason would be the persuasion that we should be conferring the greatest possible benefit on the peoples whom we released from excessive military liabilities. These, if they became our subjects, would escape from much of the taxation that now oppresses them, and would become infinitely more prosperous and contented. We should also, for the first time, have secured all the advantages of ruling a united India. Until we have boldly grappled with this question, and conclusively solved it, we shall have done nothing towards rendering our position in India as impregnable as it might be made. The duty before us is certainly not one of the most agreeable, but it must be done sooner or later. The penalty for declining to accept the responsibility and to fulfil the duty is certainly one that no half-measure will afterwards serve to arrest.

Before concluding this chapter it will be appropriate to say something with regard to the Volunteer movement which has taken a strong hold upon the civilian portion of the European population. It is probable that by this means an addition of thirty thousand men could be made to the number of European combatants, and these, if kept at a higher state of efficiency than is the rule, should prove most valuable auxiliaries. They would at the least enable many of the regular troops to be spared for active operations

elsewhere. Their one weakness is that they are scattered far and wide, and can only assemble in small bodies. But in all the principal towns, and in Coorg, Assam, etc. there are volunteer corps of various degrees of strength—some have only one hundred men, others have six hundred. But the principle seems to be taking firm root, and that is the great point, that every Anglo-Indian not in the army, and capable of bearing arms, should be a volunteer.

General McMurdo's views on military settlements are still more comprehensive, and deserve the most careful consideration. They will be found expressed in the paper he read before the Society of Arts on the 15th of March, 1878. (See "Journal of the Society of Arts," March 22, 1878.) From both these sources it would be possible to supplement the effective strength of the Anglo-Indian army very considerably, and to both, as to every other scheme tending to consolidate our position in India, should every sympathy and support be given. But the real point of all is to remove the danger from the Indian feudatories by taking from them the weapons they possess. No time should be lost in this matter, and with so important a business there should be no trifling. At present India is, as it were, a house divided against itself, and such it must remain until the whole military strength of the country is in our hands, and in them alone.

CHAPTER III.

ENGLAND'S POSITION IN INDIA.

HAVING devoted a chapter to the consideration of Russia's position in Turkestan, it is necessary to say something of the position of this country in India; but as the principal point to be taken into consideration in this respect is the military question, which has been dealt with in considerable detail in the last chapter, it shall be brief. In endeavouring to approximate to the degree of solidarity which our Indian Empire has attained, it is necessary to assume many things. The problem is the most complex imaginable, and, perhaps, a vital factor may be left out of consideration, and thus the conclusion at which we have been in the habit of arriving may be utterly untrustworthy. In these pages it will only be attempted to draw attention to those points in which the position of England and Russia in their dependencies may be said to be diametrically opposite. Our object is rather to discover where England's position in India is stronger than that of Russia in Turkestan; and also

in what respects it may be held to be weaker or less secure.

The population of British India may be taken at about two hundred millions, of whom only one-fifth is Mahomedan. The independent States contain forty millions, of whom about one-eighth—chiefly in Hyderabad—is Mahomedan. We therefore find that in Hindostan the follower of Mahomed is to other sects in the proportion of three to sixteen. But while the one hundred and ninety-five millions of Hindoos, Brahmins, Sikhs, etc. etc., are divided amongst themselves into what may be called hostile camps, the Mahomedans all over India are open to the same influences, and are capable of uniting in a common cause. This is the first conclusion which forces itself upon the observer, and from it he may very possibly proceed too rapidly to the belief that the great danger is from the Mahomedan classes alone. There can be no doubt that in the Punjab the Mahomedan, who is in close proximity to Afghanistan and the fanatical world of Central Asia, is more easily acted upon by outside influence than he is elsewhere; and all our frontier wars and expeditions have partaken more or less of a religious character. This was particularly the case with the Sittana campaigns of 1858 and 1868. The very essence of the Mahomedan creed is its combativeness. It languishes during periods of tranquillity, and then suddenly, at the instigation of some fanatical leader, or through some motive difficult to detect, it revives, and as it becomes aggressive its vigour and life seem to be restored. In such phases as this it possesses

great motive power, and is really formidable even to strong governments and settled administrations. But for those periodical fits it is possible that Islamism would die a gradual death; and it is a remarkable fact which tends to strengthen this view, that where the English rule has been longest established in India there the Mahomedans have sunk lowest in the social scale. They apparently do not possess the capacity for adapting themselves to life under a Christian rule; and this is so evidently the result of their creed that it might almost be accepted as an established fact that Mahomedans as Mahomedans can make no regular progress under an alien government. To some extent this is compensated for by the periodical outbursts and religious revivals which have gone far in India towards maintaining the Mahomedan classes in a vigorous condition. There is no doubt grave danger from the Mahomedans in India; but there are several checks upon their conduct, which, if not wholly efficacious, may be taken to be to some extent valuable.

Their great weakness is that they are only a small portion of the community; and behind them there stands no great independent or semi-independent State capable of giving point to their aspirations and animosities. Even the Nizam appears to aspire rather to the conclusion of an alliance with the Mahrattas than to figure as the great leader of the Mussulmans. There can be no doubt that the overthrow of the Afghans has operated adversely to their cause. To the Mussulmans of Northern India the Ameer

of Cabul was the great potentate, and the only one capable of acting as their leader. His defeat removes that hope and that possibility; and if we secure all our objects as the result of the last campaign, not the least useful of them will be the fact that the Ameer's prestige with our Mussulman subjects of the Punjab will have sunk very low.

But so long as the Mahomedans form so large a proportion of the Anglo-Indian army as they do, so long will there be risk that, although in the community they cannot conveniently rebel, in the army they may mutiny. It must also be remembered that India is like a powder magazine, a spark dropt in one portion will carry the destroying element through all classes and sects of the community. So long, also, as the Mahomedans of India look to the Sultan as their head, so long will they possess a bond of union that is possessed by no other portion of our Indian subjects. An educated Mahomedan gentleman recently wrote, with something of the fervour of that fanaticism which is the vital force and the real danger of Mahomedanism, that "the Sultan is the king of our religion, and the Shereef of Mecca is only his viceroy. No amount of learned talk will make the slightest difference in our attitude towards the Sultan, and the fact of our having recognised the Sultan of Stamboul as our Caliph after the fall of our own Empire in India remains beyond dispute. Our sympathy with the Sultan may be termed 'a political force,' but we are grateful to Lord Beaconsfield and his followers. The Mr. Disraeli of the 'Asian mystery' fame will always

elicit a lively tribute of respect and admiration for his rare genius, and ungrateful must be that native of India who at this moment would whisper that England's difficulty is India's opportunity. Frightful to say, two mighty armies are confronting each other in hostile array, and the God of Battles alone knows what may be the consequences. England is strong in her composure, as ready to strike as to ward, and vain and sanguinary must be the attempt of those who dream of throwing off the British yoke, which, however uncomfortable it may sit upon us at times, cannot be accused of being made of iron like that of Russia. By exclusiveness and jealousy we are shut out from having any share in the government of our own country, and Englishmen in future will have to recollect that, as civilisation advances, blind obedience, which can be extracted only from savages, falls into the background, and that the meed of your favours to us Hindoo Parsees and Mahomedans will be a loyalty of intelligence and discrimination of which, indeed, you may be proud. Time alone will heal the wounds which Englishmen and Mahomedans have inflicted upon each other, and my darling hope is that Englishmen will henceforward cease to regard us with 'distrust and suspicion.'"

So long as educated Mahomedan gentlemen who have had the advantage of living amongst us, and of seeing us as we are, write with such nervous energy as is to be found in the above epistle, so long may we be sure that there is a vitality in Indian Mahomedanism that it would be most uncomplimentary to say did not

possess elements of danger to our rule. The key-note to the complaint made in this letter seems to be the desire to succeed us in administering India, and not only the desire, but also the belief in their capacity for so doing. To such as deem we have only what may be styled a life interest in India, and that our rule in India should aim chiefly at preparing its people, both Hindoo and Mussulman, to rule themselves, this may appear the most natural and laudable of requests. But to those who think that our government in India should be permanent and not transitory, who identify the strength of England with the existence of its Indian Empire, the advice is, discourage the Mahomedans, check the number of their recruits admitted into our army, and, in short, treat them as dangerous to ourselves, often, perhaps, in their own despite. The necessities of the Eastern Question make us in Europe and in Asia Minor the allies of the Turks. With that religion has nothing whatever to do. But in India the no less imperative necessities of our position compel us to distrust, and to watch carefully the movements of, the Mahomedans. The elements of danger are accompanied in certain parts of the country by a tendency to ineffective administration as well as to a feeling of insecurity that are striking testimonies to some inherent deficiency in the Mahomedan system. Nowhere is this more striking than in the case of the Nizam's territory, of which Professor Monier Williams wrote as follows in the columns of the "Times":—

My visit to Sir Richard Meade, our able Resident at Hyderabad, enabled me to judge of the condition of the Nizam's

territory, which occupies the central plateau of the Deccan, and has a population of ten or eleven millions. It owes its present prosperity, as most people know, to the excellent administration of Sir Salar Jung, who delivered it from a condition of chronic mismanagement. Our large military station at Secunderabad, six miles from the capital, contains forty thousand inhabitants, and is under our own jurisdiction. We also hold Berar (commonly called the Berars) in trust for the payment of the Nizam's Contingent. It was taken by us from the Marathas, and we have administered it since 1853. It has thriven wonderfully under our management; but as we gave it to the Nizam in 1803, the surplus revenue goes to his treasury. We restored him the Raichore Doab, between the Krishna and Tungabhadra rivers, in 1860. Whether Berar ought to be so restored is another matter. Some good authorities think we did wrong to give up our claim to Mysore, and that we might with as good reason give up Berar. Probably Berar would not suffer much by being given back so long as the continuance of so able a Minister as Sir Salar Jung at the helm could be secured. But India is not likely to produce two such men as Sir Salar Jung and Sir T. Madhava Rao more than once in two or three centuries. I conversed with both these great Ministers not long since in their own houses (one at Hyderabad, and the other at Baroda), and found them capable of talking on all subjects in as good English as my own. Sir Salar Jung (whose person is familiar to many of us from his recent visit to England) showed me his every-day working room—a room not so large as an Oxford graduate's study, plainly furnished with a few book-cases filled with modern books of reference, chiefly English. He has an extensive library in an adjoining gallery, with a window commanding a court-yard, where those who have to transact business with him assemble every day. I may mention, as an evidence of his enlightened ideas, that on hearing that a deserving young Indian, now at Oxford, was in need of assistance, he at once assigned a scholarship for his support, stipulating that he should be trained for the Nizam's educational service. He has other young Indians

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under training in London, similarly supported. I was told that I should see numbers of armed ruffians and rowdies in the city of Hyderabad, and that I could not possibly traverse the streets unless lifted above all chances of insult on the back of an elephant. Yet I can certify that I saw very few armed men, and no signs of disorder or lawlessness anywhere in the city, and that I dismounted from my elephant and walked about in the throng of people without suffering the slightest inconvenience, molestation, or rudeness. Of course, a town of four hundred thousand inhabitants is liable to disturbances, and it is certain that during my stay an Arab, whose father died suddenly, made a savage attack with his dagger in a fit of frenzy on the doctor who attended him. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the stories about murderous brawls in the streets are much exaggerated. Without doubt it must be admitted that the seven thousand armed Arab mercenaries, who form part of an army of thirty thousand men, and the numerous armed retainers of the nobles, all of whom are allowed to roam about without much discipline, are generally ripe for turbulence and mischief. It is, moreover, a significant fact that about three-fourths of the wealth of Hyderabad is concentrated within the limits of the Residency, held to be British territory. These limits are carefully marked off from the rest of the city by walls and lines of streets; and here a population of twenty thousand persons, including the chief rich bankers and merchants of the Nizam's dominions, cluster under the ægis of British jurisdiction and authority.

It is the last sentences that are so eminently suggestive. Despite Sir Salar Jung's staunchness to our cause during the Mutiny, it is well known that he is displeased with our authorities—both at home and in India—for refusing to cede the Berars; and this aggrieved sentiment has become intensified through the withdrawal of Mr. Oliphant. Sir Salar Jung is far too sensible a man to permit personal pique to

impel him to acts of hostility against us. He is not at all disposed to rush blindly on his fate, and the Nizam, as the most powerful and wealthy of all the feudatories, can better afford to wait than any other. It is notorious, too, that the great Indian statesmen advocate a waiting game. They are persuaded that our rule cannot last for ever, and that in the natural course of things we must disappear, while they will remain.

The accuracy of this belief it is difficult to dispute, unless we take certain precautions—unpleasant in themselves, yet unavoidable—in full time, and of these the very first would be the destruction of the native States and their incorporation with our own territory. The preliminary step should certainly be by taking the State of the Nizam first. There can be no question that this course would be an unpalatable one to us. On the face of it it appears but scurvy treatment of allies who have been faithful to us so far as it lay in their power, and who, far from committing any overt act of hostility, have been profuse in their expressions of friendship on all occasions. To sweep these from our path could never be a pleasant undertaking, but if we leave sentiment out of the question, we find that the first law of nature *salus reipublicæ* compels us to recognise the fact that it is none the less necessary. The change can also be brought about gradually; the first step being to deal with those formidable native armies which were discussed in the previous chapter. A refusal to disarm would of necessity be followed by a compulsory annexation, but

in those cases where the ruler acquiesced in the disbanding of his army, the destruction of his stores, and the surrender of his arms, there would be at present no object in taking from him the civil authority which he exercises.

The writer of these lines gives expression to these views with some reluctance and greater hesitation, for there can be little doubt that they will rouse considerable dissent. He would venture to suggest, both to the reader and the critic, that such indignation would be wholly misplaced, and for the following reasons:— India is in exactly the same position now that France was in in the days of Louis the Eleventh, and England during the reign of the first of the Tudors. Her strength is sapped, her resources wasted, by the useless and huge retinues, or armies of the native princes. An immense sum, probably close on ten million pounds sterling, is expended on these utterly unnecessary armies; and they threaten, both in the present time and still more in the future, the permanence of our authority in India quite as much as the authority of the French or English rulers was threatened by the Dukes of Brittany or by the Percies and the Nevilles. In these native States there is, according to our ideas, no such thing as the liberty of the subject. There is a half-concealed tyranny, backed up by a military despotism that cannot obtain the approval of any friend of liberty. There is also a waste of resources that is truly lamentable, and some of the most capable of the Indian races are but an imperfect factor in contributing towards the prosperity of India in consequence

of the excessive love of their rulers to obtain an army efficient in modern requisites. In the interests of the subjects of these rulers, nothing is more desirable than that this waste of public resource should cease. If these feudatories absolutely owe allegiance to us, it is a modified kind of treason which induces them to maintain bloated armaments. The great justification for any act of apparently harsh tyranny in the present time would be the beneficent use to which we should turn the reforms we should have carried out. In order to secure a continuance of the benefits of our rule to two hundred millions of people, it is necessary to prevent forty millions of other people from becoming a danger to it; and so long as these forty millions maintain an army half as large again as that which defends the two hundred millions, so long must it be obvious that that army is maintained for purposes the reverse of friendly to this country.

Although reference up to this has been principally made to the Mahomedans, it by no means follows that there is no danger to our rule from the non-Mussulmans. In fact most of the independent States consist of the latter. There are plenty of proofs too that the Hindoo community in India is quite as active as, if not more so than, the most energetic of Mahomedan propagandists. In all departments of the State we find the native element coming more and more to the front. Posts which were formerly held exclusively by Europeans are now shared with natives, and schools of thought distinct from ours, founded on what may be termed an antagonistic basis to ours, have come

into existence. To quote from the same authority as before with regard to the position held by natives in British India, what can be more suggestive than the following passages?

Natives of India have no cause whatever to complain of our excluding them from their equitable share in the administration of their own country. Our Government is ever zealous for their interests, and ever on the watch to find competent Indians to fill responsible posts. For all the lower grades of executive offices they are now selected before equally competent Europeans. In law courts, in police courts, at railway stations, post and telegraph offices, and in every department of the public service, one meets with Indian functionaries doing the work which was formerly done by Europeans. English barristers and attorneys are now driven out of the field by Indian wakeels. The same applies to the Educational Department. Headmasterships of high schools, which were once reserved for Englishmen, and even filled by Oxford and Cambridge graduates, are now assigned to the ablest native teachers. Even the highest judicial offices are now being filled by natives who have gained admission to the Civil Service through the competitive examinations. The Judge of Ahmedabad, Mr. Satyendranath Tagore, whose guest I was for a few days, is an Indian of a well-known family at Calcutta. He has been elevated to a higher position in the Service than competition-wallahs of his own year, and of at least equal ability. Another Indian gentleman, Mr. Gopal-rao Hari Deshmukh, whom I met frequently at Bombay—a man of great energy and ability, and a well-known social reformer—has lately been appointed joint judge at Tanna, with the personal title of Rao Bahadur. The title was conferred the other day at a public meeting, and Judge Gopal-rao, in acknowledging the honour, is reported in the "Times of India" (September 4, 1877) to have said:—

"'This Sanad is given to me for loyalty and services. I am sure that every sensible and well-informed man in this country is loyal. This country for many past centuries had no govern-

ment deserving the name. There was neither internal peace nor security from foreign invasion. There was no power in India which could put a stop to the evil practices of sati, infanticide, religious suicide, and human sacrifices. The whole nation presented a scene of stagnation and ignorance; but the case is now different. Under the auspices of a benificent, civilised, and strong Government we have become progressive. Light and knowledge are pouring in upon the country. Old prejudices and errors are vanishing. We therefore count it a great privilege to be loyal subjects of the Empress of India. There is now security of life and property, as perfect as human institutions can make it. Those who are old enough are aware of the plundering excursions of Pindaris, who, descending from the ghauts, spread terror in the Concan. These professional robbers have been extirpated by the British Government. We enjoy liberty of speech, petition, and press. We enjoy the blessings of education, useful public works, internal peace, and freedom from foreign invasion.'"

Possibly, we are inclined to go beyond our duty in our appreciation of native merit. It is certain that much bitterness of feeling is being excited among the Anglo-Indians by the present laudable desire to do justice to native ability. Everywhere I heard Englishmen complaining that their interests are set aside and their claims overlooked in favour of natives. Language like the following is commonly used by members of the Civil Service:—"In thirty years," say they, "we English judges and collectors will be swept out of India. The natives we have educated are gradually—to use an Americanism—crowding us out of the country. Even our own Government is inclined to make light of our merits. We have harder work than ever laid on our shoulders, but we get neither thanks nor additional pay. If we were Hindoos we should be flattered and honoured, but, being Englishmen, we are snubbed and reprimanded." Such language, though obviously too strong, may have elements of truth which call for careful consideration.

Other works upon India, some intentionally, others

unintentionally, confirm these sentences. In our desire to do justice to the native we have gone too fast, our motion has been too rapid. We have also done injustice to ourselves, to our own. This is made more important by the fact that we have endeavoured to bring about a social revolution before the time was ripe for one. We have acted as if our position in India were fully assured and consolidated, whereas, as a matter of fact, disagreeable as it is to admit it, it is nothing of the kind. It will take at least fifty years' tranquillity and steady progress to make it that, and unless we put sentiment out of court and adopt several very practical precautions, neither we nor India will have half that time's tranquillity.

The plain state of the case is, that having conquered a large portion of India by a series of remarkably brilliant, and also exceedingly fortunate campaigns, we imagine that we have thoroughly subdued it. Having satisfied our minds on this point, we begin to indulge in qualms of conscience at the manner in which we have achieved our tremendous success. In the acts of Clive and most of his successors it is not difficult for us to find matter to cavil at, or to detect transactions of a somewhat dubious morality. In the story of our conquests in India there are, as a matter of fact, one or two discreditable episodes. Well, what then? The only thing to excite surprise is that there were not a great many more dishonouring occurrences. Considering that India was for a century governed by a Company with which the main point was the dividend, it is extraordinary to find that the hostile critic

of our administration has to go back to Clive's duplicate treaty and the allegations against Warren Hastings to discover flaws in our acts. But unfortunately our conscience has been too much for us. We have been too sensitive, and, in pursuit of a vain ideal, we have not only done an injustice to ourselves, but we have to a considerable degree weakened our position in the country. The India we now rule is not the India that Clive conquered, it is not even the India of the Mutiny. The passage from Professor Monier Williams's observations on Southern India indicates several salient points of difference between the India of the present and the past. But there are others, not the least important of which is that there is such a thing as a native public opinion which found, and still finds, expression in the columns of the vernacular press. It is true that that press no more represented the opinion of educated Indians than certain prints represent English opinion, but the harm they wrought among the uneducated was immense, and is now only partially remedied by the new Press Law. It will serve to bring home to the mind of the reader the true character of the vernacular press if a few specimens of the articles that used to appear in it are given here. Those only are taken which appear indicative of a settled purpose. The vast majority were personal attacks upon individual officials, and consequently beneath notice as the mere manifestations of spite.

From the "Amrita Bazaar Patrika":—

It not unfrequently occurs that a man even on the point of death may survive, so who can say that we will not yet be able

to recover our energies? Hence, when we hear of any aggression in the mofussil (country) these hopes are raised. But no good can come to a nation that depends entirely upon hopes, and not on active exertions.

The policy of the British Government is to destroy our national life, and to keep us under their subjection for ever; for they know that they will not be able to do so by mere force of arms, or by any other means. We are, however, now placed in a very difficult position, because if we can preserve our national liveliness (*sic*) we might most probably arise some day and win our liberty; but if we lose it we will be ruined for ever.

This is especially the case with the natives of Bengal, who a century ago, disloyal to the Mahomedan Government of the day, gave over the kingdom to British rule. There cannot, indeed, be any doubt that in this the Hindoos showed a lamentable ignorance of their own interests, the more so as the occasion was most favourable for subverting Mahomedan rule altogether, and regaining their independence.

From the "Bharat Mihir":—

This war (*i.e.* Russia and Turkey) has led us to reflect on our own condition, and on the fact that thousands of lives are being given up for this cause in Europe, and that while in other countries people are ready to die for it, the natives of India shrink with horror from the idea. The lesson will not be lost upon us.

From the "Behar Bandher":—

Englishmen! What, though you be so powerful and fortunate, you cannot step over the regulated laws of nature, for you too will have to bow your heads before the force of that nature which guides the universe, and will have at its command to take up the heated cauldron, after continual blowing and puffing. If you have the temerity to disregard the rules of nature, do so; yet remember withal that every rule of nature which you discard will turn as it were into a snake and sting you. Of what account is it if the same flag flies over so many lands in different quarters of the globe? You cannot but be

exposed to the laws of nature, for she it is who has made you the lords and us the slaves—England the chief, and India a beggar.

From the same paper :—

You Englishmen do not now trust the Hindustanees and have, in consequence, deprived them of their arms and accoutrements, closed the doors of the army against them, and consider us low because we have become weak, and despise us. We call the Ganges, the Godavery, the Himalayas, and the Vindhyachal mountains to bear us witness that we are not guilty of vain boasting when we foretell the future, and say that a day will come, and, God willing, it will come soon too, when the Hindustanees will have to be looked upon with more trust, and admitted into the army. When will God show us the day in which the people of Behar will be eligible as captains of regiments, colonels, and generals? We wish not to rebel and take by force from Government these appointments, for we possess neither the nature nor the ability to do so. If at one time our Beharis have rebelled, and shown that they were heroes and had still a spark of independence left in them, of what avail is it? Since we have not the same Koer Singh, nor the same independent Ionthals—Englishmen—it is through your beneficence than we have become tractable as oxen and gentle as lambs; for when you deprived us of our arms and accoutrements we quietly submitted, and what can we say now? All warriors, both past and present, in entering the battle-field have done so for one of the three following objects—for the sake of their country, for religion, or for wealth. Those who betook themselves to fight for their country are to be called men; those for religion, animals; whilst those who fight for money ought to be designated demons in human form; but neither of these three motives has influenced our countrymen. If our heroes had had any thought of their country, India would not have fallen successively into the hands of the Mahometans and the Mechelchas; if of religion, then the Vedic creed would not have been supplanted by the Mahometan and Christian; whilst if they had made wealth their object, the Hindustanees would not have had

to suffer, as at present, for want of food and clothing. It were only in consideration of the salt they ate of the Government they served that they in the mutiny thirsted for the blood of their fellow-countrymen.

Much of this is mere idle ranting, and all of it is written by political and literary adventurers. The journals themselves are sustained by a mixed system of corruption and terrorism in the districts in which they circulate, and their circulation itself is small. But the significant tone of the extracts given is unmistakable. In that they all agree. Our rule is looked upon as a transitory one, which is to pass away partly before some manifestation of Providence, and partly before a combination among the Hindostanees. Even Englishmen cannot step over the regulated laws of nature! and the writer of the sentence is perfectly correct. Unless we take every precaution, unless we fasten every rivet in our armour with the utmost care, there is no chance of our being able to maintain the anomalous state of things at present to be found in India. A Bengal Commissioner wrote upon this subject as follows, in 1873, and his remarks were endorsed by Sir George Campbell :—

There is, however, one aspect in which the present unbridled licence of the press is peculiarly injurious to Government, for it affects the feelings of its native officers and subordinates to an extent which is palpably detrimental to the thoroughly upright and fearless discharge of their official functions. I fear that there is not a native deputy magistrate in the country who could deny that he was afraid of becoming the subject of a personal attack in a native newspaper. . . . . I know of scarcely any more exquisite but certain process of torture than that which begins with the publication of a scandalous attack on

a public officer, and leads up to a call for explanation. Even if his explanation is accepted, he has gone through the ordeal; he has been mentally tortured; while his assailant has lurked in the darkness and is beyond the reach of punishment. I say, without fear of contradiction, that this villanous use of the public press affects the whole administration of justice by native officers, and that in the exceptionable state of this country it is monstrous to allow a system of uncontrolled press licence to prevail, which is only suited (even if it is suited there) to nations in which independence and civilisation are more thoroughly established.

From this point until the passing of "An Act for the Better Control of Publications in Oriental Languages," in May, 1878, the Indian authorities were much exercised in endeavouring to discover a remedy for the evil. Sir George Campbell and Mr. Eden favoured stern and repressive measures, and Sir Richard Temple essayed the effect of gentle treatment, and the bringing the influences of Government to bear upon the editors and promoters of the journals.

The great point to remember, however, is that these journals were the exponents of a certain phase of public sentiment. It is a mistake to suppose that they only represented the views of one man. Their influence, although circumscribed, was wider than this. They are now compelled to make use of more delicate weapons. They are no longer encouraged to indulge in ribaldry and personal abuse under the ægis of the liberty of the press. But the sentiments which found expression in such sheets as those quoted have not been uprooted; the very fact of having taken measures to prevent their expression may possibly have

accentuated them, and made them more dangerous. And, after all, these evil influences could only have worked us local trouble. There was undoubtedly much inconvenience and great annoyance caused by such ebullitions of local spite under the cloak of patriotism, but compared with other matters the Vernacular Press nuisance was a small affair. It was wise not wholly to neglect it, but the same energy would have solved the question of the future of the native States—a question of such infinitely greater importance. If our Indian Government could brace itself to the effort to cut the Gordian knot it would possibly be found that in the face of a triumph over the real difficulty, we should have attained the solution of many of our minor troubles as well.

Sir Richard Temple, in an official paper of the highest value, has defined the internal elements of danger to our Empire to come from four classes: first, the priestly class; second, the military and political class; third, the native princes; and fourth, the mob and the dregs of the population. As Sir Henry Rawlinson said of this report, there is "much in it that furnishes abundant food for reflection and uneasiness," and from it it would appear that "*we are living upon a volcano.*" We have already discussed the dangers from the second and third of these classes, and that from the fourth is obvious. This last will probably only arise when some of the other elements of danger have come into action, and is rather formidable because it must intensify the danger from other quarters than from any importance of its own.

Of the danger from the priestly class something more may be said here. At present it is apparently confined to the Mahomedans, and more especially amongst them to the Wahabees, or Puritans of the faith. But the Sittana campaigns, and the arrest and trial of certain prominent members of the sect, have apparently succeeded in checking the dangerous tendency in the bud. The murder of Mr. Justice Norman, in September, 1871, however, recalled to the mind of those who had been indulging in the belief of the final allayment of the Wahabee fervour, that beneath the surface in India there was a "seething, fermenting, festering" mass of disaffection and hostility upon which it was next to hopeless to expect to produce any favourable impression. The murder of Lord Mayo, though not possessing the same political importance as that of Mr. Justice Norman, intensified still further the impression which the latter event had produced. These disturbances were still confined to the fanatical Mahomedans.

It is more difficult to gauge the condition of the Hindoo mind, which is certainly also capable of fits of fanaticism and subject to periods of irrepressible and general fury. In July, 1871, some evidence was afforded of this by the riots that broke out in Amritsir, and which extended more or less throughout the whole of the Punjab. The prime cause of this excitement was an insult offered to the Hindoos by a Mahomedan. But its principal importance is derived from the fact that it afforded an excuse for the Hindoo press and community to make several demands which disclosed

something of the real desires of the nation. The insignificant occurrence at Amritsir afforded an excuse for the demand that in future the slaughter of all cows should be stopped. The dangerous elements in the community were still more fully revealed by the murder of several butchers in this city, and for a time it appeared as if the murderers had escaped. One of the guilty fortunately confessed, and the rest were captured and punished. In these disturbances the Kooka sect played the prominent part, and the whole affair received its principal interest from the harsh measures with which these rebels were punished. Various other petty manifestations of the sentiment of the Hindoos have been afforded both about the same time and more recently. But of these none was so significant as the outbreak in the Bareilly gaol in September 1871. The great importance of this affair is to be found in the fact that it is one of the few known occasions of Brahmins and Mahomedans uniting in a common cause. The governor of the gaol, whose name it is unnecessary to mention, had discovered that several of his prisoners—Brahmins—had, through their high caste, been permitted by their gaolers to evade something of their punishment and to enjoy such privileges as come with double gratefulness to a prisoner. In order to put a stop to these irregular proceedings the governor removed the thread which is the badge of a Brahmin. This act roused their deepest resentment, and they entered into a plot with some of their Mahomedan fellow-prisoners to effect their freedom. On the night of the 6th of September the prisoners to the number of forty-seven

managed to break loose and attack the guard. A desperate fray ensued in which thirty-seven of the prisoners were more or less wounded. A Government inquiry was held, and the governor was reprimanded and removed from his post. This case was certainly unique, but it shows that under certain circumstances the antipathy of creed will not prevent a temporary union between the creeds of India for the purpose of effecting a certain object.

The extraordinary eagerness which the whole nation is manifesting to learn, is also indicative of political lessons of the highest importance. The Indian people are naturally quick and adaptive not in new ways so much as to new ideas. There is an active literary life extant in India that is of the greatest consequence. Already there are the mutterings of that cry which will be raised in the coming generation of "India for the Indians," and already we have paved the way for the attainment of such an object by the internal policy which we have pursued during the last fifteen years towards the people. One English writer ("English Rule and Native Opinion in India," by James Routledge) says of Bengal that the general cry there is "Give us knowledge;" and in describing the sentiments of these people, he says, "Never was there a people more eager for education. The Bengalee will work night and day and will endure much persecution, if only he can have that upon which he has set his heart—the knowledge that will enable him to rise in life." Of course all Indians are not Bengalees, who in the desire to acquire knowledge probably excel all of

their countrymen. But Professor Monier Williams bears testimony to a similar zeal for education in Southern India.

"Indeed," he says, "if advance of education is to be measured by its promoting among natives of all ranks the power of speaking English with fluency, the palm will have to be given to the colleges and schools of Madras; and here, as in other parts of India, missionary schools are, in my opinion, doing the best work."

Among the most useful and beneficial means of extending a necessary and wholesome education among the mass of the Indian nation must certainly be included the efforts of the noble band of missionaries, who, in India and its border lands, have been on many occasions of such service to the State. Professor Monier Williams, who had every opportunity of watching their work and its results, writes as follows on the subject:—

The education they impart is openly and professedly founded on a Christian basis. They teach the Bible without enforcing ecclesiastical dogmas on their pupils. Indeed, my second tour has impressed me more than ever with the benefits which India derives from the active efforts of missionaries of all denominations, however apparently barren in visible results those efforts may be. Moreover, I think that the part they have hitherto played is as nothing compared with the *rôle* they are destined to fill in the future of our Eastern Empire. The European missionary is daily becoming a more important link between the Government and the people. He is confided in by natives of all ranks, and is often able to do what the Government with its wise professions of neutrality cannot effect. Missionary schools attract the children of parents of all creeds, though they openly aim at permeating their minds with a spirit hostile

to those creeds. It may be very true that their Bible-teaching tends to destroy without necessarily reconstructing; but it is gradually and insensibly infusing principles incompatible with the Pantheistic ideas with which the Indian mind is generally saturated. If it does not always build up the true creed in place of the false, yet it lays the foundation of a future belief in a personal God. It substitutes for the slippery sands of Pantheism a basis of living rock, which may be afterwards thankfully occupied by evangelizing missionaries as a common stand-point, when the Gospel is confronted in argument with the Veda and Koran. My conviction is that the vast work of Christianizing India will not be accomplished entirely through missionary instrumentality, but rather through the co-operation of Divine and human agencies, working in a great variety of ways. Yet I am equally convinced that it will be principally effected, and far more slowly, gradually, and insensibly than is commonly expected, through impressions made on the minds of children by a process of education like that our missionaries are carrying out in their schools. Of all such schools visited by me, in Southern India, there were two the merits and effectiveness of which struck me very forcibly. They were those of the Free Church of Scotland at Madras, under Mr. Miller and Mr. Rae, where about one thousand pupils are under education; and the Church Missionary schools, under Bishop Sargent, at Tinnevelly, in which latter district there are about sixty thousand converts to Protestant Christianity. I regret I was unable to visit Bishop Caldwell's excellent schools at Edeyengoody, but I could name a hundred others if space and time were allowed me. Those founded by a native named Pacheappah at Madras and Conjevaram are rendering good service to the community. The Basle Mission schools at Mangalore are also most efficient and useful, and its members most devoted and self-sacrificing. Their example deserves to be followed in their plan of teaching trades and industries, and instructing their converts how to be independent and support themselves.

As compared with Russia's apathy in these matters towards her Central Asian subjects, England is pur-

suing a noble line of conduct towards its great dependency. But it must be remembered that our magnanimity is attended with grave political danger. We are placing in the hands of the people a vast power, and we have no guarantee that they possess the means of controlling the new impulses which increased knowledge and a clearer perception of their strength have brought to them. As a matter of fact, we have taken no precautions against the abuse of our gifts. In the most lavish manner we placed everything at the disposal of the native. We gave him knowledge of all kinds, political and educational; careers hitherto closed to him were thrown open to him; he could, and he did, become a judge, a barrister, an official. Our own universities opened their gates to him. He became in every respect the equal of his conqueror. It is true he has still the disadvantage of having to acquire a strange tongue; but in learning a language he is more proficient than in anything else. He has his political aspirations, and they are certainly dangerous to the permanence of our Indian Empire. No aspersion whatever is intended against the native gentlemen whose opinions are alluded to. They could not well be expected to think otherwise. But that such opinions as those referred to in the previous pages can be expressed of a conqueror, and without exciting apparently any doubt in our minds, is perhaps one of the most extraordinary perversions of theories usually accepted as sound that can be imagined. Grave doubts must cross the mind of every observer of our position in India as to its security when it is seen how

little better prepared we are now to defend our own than we were in 1857, and how much stronger, more united, and more self-restrained the India of to-day has become when compared with what it was in the days of the Mutiny.

If we are not prepared to surrender India—and there can be no doubt that Englishmen are not prepared to do so—then, in order to preserve it, and at the same time to continue our generous policy towards the Indian people, we must take certain very obvious precautions. The first of these would be the total disbandment of the native armies. It is no remedy to compel the reduction of these, as has lately been suggested, for any chief can defeat the object of our Government by passing the whole of his people through the ranks. The only remedy is a complete and total disbandment of these forces. The next would be the passing of an Arms Act for the whole of India, and the destruction of all factories of arms and cannon foundries other than those belonging to the English Government. Those two measures would make our position in India practically secure against all internal danger. Other minor precautions might also be taken, but these are the principal, and, if only carried out in a reasonable manner and with despatch, must secure every object which it is necessary to attain. There could also be no moment more opportune for action than the present, when our arms have all the credit of the triumph in Afghanistan to make them appear invincible in the eyes of India, and by striking boldly at the root of the danger we may render our position secure

in India for the next few centuries. If we permit sentiment to banish common sense, and continue in the same policy as we have been pursuing for the last ten years, it is doubtful whether fifty years hence, apart from Russia altogether, there will be such a thing as a British Empire in Hindostan.

By destroying the armies of the feudatories we should have also paved the way for a reduction of the Anglo-Indian army, rendered still more easy by the attainment of a strong frontier towards Russia. This must be attended by an immense relief to the revenue, which is now barely able to meet the expenditure that falls upon it. There is also the general inelasticity of the revenue, the uncertainty of how long the opium tax may be depended upon, and a currency question which suggest grave doubts of the possibility of that revenue not being maintained. If we turn to the side of expenditure, we find that the only item which affords the slightest possibility of reduction is the military expenditure, and, on the other hand, it would be very desirable if the outlay upon public works could be increased. It will be quite impossible to take a single man from our army so long as there are such elements of internal danger as at present are to be found.

Among various suggestions that have been made to effect a saving in the Indian expenditure, none possesses greater practical value than that for converting a large portion of the European army into a territorial army, by this means affording relief to a very considerable extent to the Royal army. In fact, it is to revert to some extent to the old system. By doing

so a considerable sum could be saved annually, and the services of a large portion of the army not be lost, as at present, to the Government in journeys from one country to the other. The prospect, to the mind of the writer, would be most satisfactory if all the native States passed from being under our protection into our hands. It appears not unreasonable to expect that this addition to our administrative responsibilities could be met by an expenditure of five millions on civil government and public works. There would be no additional military expense, and consequently there would remain the surplus of the fresh revenue thus acquired over the moderate expenses incurred. The revenues of these States have been estimated at fifteen millions, thus leaving a surplus of ten millions. Half of this might be remitted in taxation; and yet there would remain an addition to the revenue of five millions for the Imperial purposes of India. That permanent addition would remove all apprehension from our mind with regard to the loss of the opium monopoly, when China in course of time shall demand its abolition. But it is possible that this change would be attended by other and equally beneficial results. The lands of the Mahrattas are notoriously but very imperfectly tilled, and large expanses of Scindiah's territory in particular have been utterly neglected. The importation of Bengal labour, which could be easily carried out under the sense of security produced by the spread of our government, would be and is the only means of bringing out the resources of these States; and as a result a much larger revenue

than is at present raised might be expected. But, apart from this larger question, which will come in the course of time, it is absolutely imperative upon us to abolish the native armies, which are not less dangerous than useless, not less a menace to ourselves than an unjust and costly incumbrance to the people of India.

Between the position of England in India, and Russia in Turkestan, it is not possible to institute a fair comparison. They are so totally dissimilar. We have already seen that Russia is not free from anxiety in her possessions, but, as compared with the internal elements of danger in our Indian Empire, she may be said to be without care. Many of these, and the principal, have been indicated. The lesson they teach has been expressed without equivocation, and it is incontestable that that lesson is one we should take very deeply to heart. The danger from Russian ambition compels us to consider very anxiously the nature of our position in India, and it is impossible to say that that position is either as strong as we should wish, or as it could be made. The first step in preparing for a Russian advance is to set our own house in order. It is useless to strengthen our position in the outworks of India if in its interior there is insecurity. Therefore the first step, and one in which there should not be even a day's delay, is to remove that source of insecurity, those elements of danger at the root which must paralyse in a future crisis our strength at the extremities. Russia's policy in Central Asia has been less

magnanimous and noble than ours in India, but it has been more politic. It has not conferred any remarkable benefit upon its new subjects, but it has rendered its own rule practically safe and assured. We have yet time to repair the weakness of our policy, at the same time that we retain its virtues; but it would be imprudent to put off obvious precautions because at present there is a calm.

CHAPTER IV.

AFGHANISTAN.

THE past history of Afghanistan has been so recently and so admirably narrated by Colonel Malleson, the historian of many periods and events in Indian affairs, that it would be presumptuous for anyone to dream of treating upon the same subject unless they followed closely in his footsteps. Yet, in order to make the later phases of the political question clear, it is necessary to give a resumè of Afghan history at this stage of our survey, and it will have so far conferred a service upon the reader that it may whet his appetite for more, and thus induce him to refer to Colonel Malleson's vigorous pages for himself.

In the year 1506, Baber, expelled from his kingdom of Ferghana by his rebellious subjects, and fleeing after the rout of his Persian allies before the walls of Bokhara, crossed the Hindoo Koosh, and advanced against the town of Cabul at the head of a miscellaneous following, which could scarcely be honoured

with the appellation of an army. Alone among the great successful invaders of India, Baber approached its frontier in the guise of a distressed prince, and not as a conqueror. He crossed the Hindoo Koosh because north of it there was no safety for him; and that his flight from his own realm proved to be but the road to greater power and empire must be held to be one of the most striking instances of the freaks fortune finds pleasure in playing upon us at times. Before the year 1511 he had conquered Afghanistan as far south as Candahar, and a considerable portion of the Punjab, and by this latter conquest he was brought face to face with Ibrahim Lodi, an Afghan chief at that time reigning in Delhi, and between them a war broke out which resulted, in 1525, in the triumph of Baber and the flight of Ibrahim. For five years Baber, the conqueror of Afghanistan, but the fugitive from Central Asia, was supreme in Northern India. During that time he administered affairs with that remarkable ability which has earned for him the title of Great; but his Afghan subjects, to judge from the testimony of Abdullah Khan of Herat, were not well satisfied with his acts; and the faction of the Lodis was only awaiting Baber's death as the signal for an effort to recover their supremacy.

On Baber's death, in 1530, his son Humayoun succeeded him, but only for a very brief space. The intrigues of his uncle Kamran, and of the Vizier, Shere Khan, of the Lodi tribe, compelled him to seek safety in flight. For a time he maintained himself in Afghanistan, but was soon obliged to continue his

retreat to Persia. There were several notable incidents which occurred during these few years of Humayoun's exile from India, but these belong to the province of the Afghan historian. Of these the birth of Akbar, the most important of all, need alone be mentioned. Humayoun was received by the Shah Tamasp with the most marked cordiality, and during his residence at that monarch's court he received several striking proofs of Tamasp's good-will. But Humayoun wanted the loan of an army with which he might recover his father's possessions, and the most delicate attention and cordial sympathy were as nothing so long as that request remained ungranted. At last, in 1541, Tamasp agreed to support the cause of Humayoun, and he lent him a large army under an experienced general named Bairam Khan, wherewith to regain what the Lodis had deprived him of.

With this Persian army, and the assistance of the Indian people, Humayoun speedily ousted the Lodi dynasty from power, and upon his death in 1555 he left his son Akbar the sovereignty of northern India and of Cabul. Ten years before his death he had, however, ceded Candahar to the Persian ruler in token of his gratitude for the assistance he had received from him, and during his life-time the country known as Afghanistan was divided into two portions, one, the northern, belonging to the Indian emperor, the other, the southern, to the Persian. But Akbar did not consider himself bound by the same ties as his father, who had kept good faith with the Persian; and as soon as he found his rule fairly assured in India, he turned

his attention to Afghan affairs, where he found that the Persian possession of Candahar was an actual menace to the Indian empire that no prudent ruler could afford to disregard. He accordingly captured Candahar, and established an Indian governor and garrison therein.

Until the year 1609 the whole of Afghanistan, from the Suleiman to the Helmund, remained an appendage of the Moguls, but in that year Persia, under its able prince, Abbas the First, or the Great, availed herself of the troubles which beset the Indian ruler in other quarters to wrest Candahar from the Mogul. Jehangir retook it, however, and it was not until 1620 that Shah Abbas established his rule there with any degree of firmness. During the later days of Shah Abbas Candahar was held by Persia, but with his death the Indian emperor Jehangir conquered it from his successor, Shah Sofi. During the next twenty-five years Candahar remained a portion of the Indian empire. In 1648 Shah Abbas the Second, the great-grandson of the first ruler of that name, began his reign with a determined attack upon Candahar, and the attempt was crowned with complete success. This triumph was remarkable for the great moderation with which the campaign was carried out, as well as for the extreme youth of the conqueror. Shah Jehan made several desperate efforts to recover possession of the city, advancing upon it through some of the less known passes of the Suleiman, but failed in all. Candahar remained Persian. North of the Hindoo Koosh, too, the Persian prince inflicted a reverse upon the

Indian emperor. Shah Jehan had, by intrigues and force, expelled an Usbeg ruler named Nadir Mahomed from Balkh, and this prince had come to the Persian Court in search of assistance. He found what he sought, for the Shah lent him a considerable army, which compelled the forces of Shah Jehan to evacuate Balkh. Nadir Mahomed was not a popular ruler, and seditions among his subjects obliged him to flee again to Persia, where he died. With the triumph of the second Abbas, Candahar was finally separated from the Indian empire, and during almost sixty years the authority of the Persian ruler was firmly established there.

Up to this point little has been mentioned of the Afghans. To all appearance they possessed no individual political existence. Their country was the scene wherein the rivalry of Persian and Mogul was fought out. The fate of the southern portion of the State had proved fluctuating, now belonging to the Indian emperor and now to the Shah. With the northern portion it was different. For two centuries Cabul and Jellalabad, Ghizni and Istalif, had been Hindoo possessions. The ambition of the greatest of Persian rulers had never up to this time pictured military triumphs in the northern parts of that country, in the southern portion of which they were so eager to maintain their authority. And now, in 1648, in great part owing to the decadence in the vigour of the Mogul empire, things seemed to have reached a settled condition on the basis of the Persian rule being supreme in Candahar, and of the Mogul

being established in Cabul. For about sixty years this settlement remained in force, and then, when the change came in the south, the *status quo* remained undisturbed in the north for the whole of another generation. But up to this point—and this is very important—there had been no symptoms whatever of a national existence among the Afghans. The career of a large body of the Afghans—sirdars and people alike—lay in Delhi, Agra, and Lahore. Their nationality formed an important, energetic, and aggressive portion of the people of the Punjab. The Afghan element was still more predominant in the army and the court. The victorious Moguls were, long years after the triumph of Humayoun and Akbar, engaged in a death-struggle with their Afghan rivals, out of which they indeed emerged successfully, but to some extent exhausted by the greatness of the effort. And to a certain degree the state of Afghan life and sentiment in the East was reflected in the West. The Abdalis showed the same inclination to gravitate towards Persia that the Lodis had done towards India; and the reason of their not having become merged to some extent with the Persian must be sought in the condition of things in Persia rather than in any hesitation on their part to serve in the capacity of soldiers and ministers to the Shah. We have now to describe the origin and rise of Afghan independence.

The earlier governors appointed by the Shah treated both Candahar and Herat as if they had been subjected provinces, and their oppression served to unite the Afghans against them not so much as a national foe as

a personal tyrant. At first the Afghans had recourse to remonstrance, and a deputation of some of their chiefs was sent to Isfahan to entreat the Shah to deal more leniently with them. This occurrence is of importance, both as showing the relations that subsisted between Persia and the Afghans and also as marking the appearance of the two ruling families of Afghanistan upon the platform of history. The main object of this embassy—of which the following description is taken from the charming pages of Sir John Malcolm's "Persia"—was to induce the Shah to appoint Afghan chiefs as governors, "when their fidelity would be proof to every temptation."

"In the time of the Suffavean kings of Persia the Afghans were often oppressed; and on one occasion they were so discontented with their Persian governor that they sent a secret deputation to Isfahan to solicit his removal and the appointment of one of their own tribe. Their request was granted; and two of the tribe of Abdali were raised to the office of Reish Saffeeod, or Kutkhodah of the tribes, and their authority was confirmed by a royal patent. The name of one of these two persons was Sudo of the family of Bameeyshi, from whom Ahmed Shah, the founder of the present" (that is to say, of the now late) "royal family of Cabul is lineally descended. The name of the other was Ahmed, of the family of Barucksye, from whom the present Afghan chiefs Sarafraz and Futteh Khans are descended. The Afghans were delighted with this arrangement and granted their entire and respectful obedience to the chief appointed

by the Persian Government. Time has confirmed this respect; and the superiority of the chiefs so selected has become an inheritance to their family. The race of Sudo obtained sovereignty, while that of Ahmed has only gained high station and command. The Sudosyes, or descendants of Sudo, are held in such veneration that if one of them was to attempt the murder of an ameer, a lord of another tribe, it would be considered wrong to obtain safety by assaulting the Sudosyes. If an Afghan acted otherwise he would be deemed an outcast in his own class or tribe. There is, however, an exception to this rule in favour of the descendants of Ahmed, and the Ahmedsyes may, without sacrilege, slay a Sudosye; but a great number of the Afghans deny this privilege, even to the Ahmedsyes. Sudo and Ahmed were raised to rank by Shah Abbas the Great, and derived their fortunes from that fountain of dignity and splendour." It is necessary to remember that these lines were written when a Sudosye was seated on the throne at Cabul, and when Barucksye ambition had not come to the surface.

This good understanding between the Persian ruler and his Afghan subjects, this interchange of high dignity and faithful service, it must be remembered, referred only to the West, to the Abdalis. In them the Eastern Afghans had no share—neither the Persian Ghiljies, nor the Hindoo Cabulis. In the debateable land that lay between the fortresses of Ghizni and Candahar, the advanced posts of the Mogul and the Persian, the great tribe of the Ghiljies dwelt. Nominally it was dependent upon the Persian, but the

governor of Candahar was content with a nominal obedience from those who dwelt beyond the vicinity of that city. It is possible that the small restraint which their nominal conquerors were able to exercise over them may have given them a greater taste for freedom, and in his own district each Ghiljie khan appears to have been supreme. In those days the Ghiljies were a confederacy of petty barons, and each had his band of retainers firmly attached to his person and his cause. They possessed all the elements of a formidable irregular power, and a wise ruler would have done his utmost either to propitiate them or to take effectual precautions against their ever becoming a menace to his authority. For fifty years, so far as it is possible to discover, they were treated with harshness at one moment and pampered at another. No regular system was observed towards them. They were made embittered at the same time that they were allowed to gather strength in secrecy and without display. So has it ever been when a conquering Power has allowed warlike races to maintain armed forces within its frontier. The nominally subdued intrigue, and make preparations until their hour of attack comes. It always does come sooner or later, and history teaches us that the effort often does not fail. In the seventeenth century the Ghiljies were but awaiting the dawn of the eighteenth to emancipate themselves, and to lay the foundation of Afghan liberty, while the prouder clan of the Abdalis was to all appearance becoming reconciled to the supremacy of Persia. The picture thus presented is a suggestive

one, and might be further dilated upon had we time or space.

In the year 1702 Shah Hoosein of Persia sent as governor to Candahar a Georgian prince, by name Shah Nawaz Khan, but better known to us as Goorgeen Khan. He came with the avowed intention of thoroughly subduing the Ghiljie clan, but as a matter of fact he had come too late. Thirty years earlier the Ghiljies might have been coerced or won over; now the favourable opportunity had passed by, and it was impossible to see how the Ghiljies were to be thoroughly subdued in their mountain fastnesses. Yet Goorgeen set himself to the task of subduing them with energy, and it is certainly impossible to find fault with his measures on the score of their being half-hearted. Considering the strength the Ghiljies had accumulated, and the general discontent there was against the Persians, it is probable that the measures he adopted were injudiciously severe. There is a vast difference between taking necessary, although stern, precautions, and mere useless, indiscriminating tyranny; but Goorgeen did not apparently recognise it. He ground the Afghans down, and he inflicted various punishments upon the Ghiljies; but he never reached their strength. After four years of his sway they were as formidable as ever, and they were as bitterly hostile as they possibly could be.

The Ghiljies resolved to petition the Shah just as the Abdalis had done, but their petition was haughtily refused. After this, things became worse in Candahar. Goorgeen began to perceive that he was dealing with a

dangerous people, and he fixed upon the persons who had signed this petition as the prime objects of his wrath. Prominent among them, by reason of his personal influence as well as for his rank, stood Mir Vais, the Kelauter of Candahar. The exact duties of his office have not been defined, but considering that the acts of Goorgeen were directed to the rooting-out of native authority more than to any other object, it is probable that these were not as responsible as has been assumed. No sooner was it known that the Shah had rejected the demands of the Afghans than Mir Vais and several other notables were arrested. In an ill-advised moment Goorgeen sent then off to Isfahan to explain their conduct, accusing them of intrigues against the Persian rule, and of being generally dangerous to the cause of the Shah. This act of Goorgeen's defeated the very object he had in view. Mir Vais was skilful enough to avail himself of the corruption of the Persian Court to turn the ear of the Shah and some of his ministers to his side of the question. The Ghiljie managed matters so skilfully that Hoosein came to regard him as an injured individual rather than as a dangerous intriguer. From being a captive he became a Court favourite, and his companions, cleared from the charges brought against them, returned to Candahar. He himself went on pilgrimage to Mecca before he returned to his native country, and there is good reason for believing that while on this journey he obtained the authority of the mollahs of that city for the prosecution of a religious war, on his return, against the Persians as heretic Shiahs. Shortly afterwards he

arrived in Candahar, reinstalled in his office as Kelauter, and, moreover, in secret relationship with the Vizier of Persia, a bitter foe and rival of Goorgeen.

Goorgeen Khan was not willing to acquiesce without a blow in so palpable a rebuff as this; and while prudently recognising the authority of the Shah as supreme, he resorted to another means of asserting his own. He restored Mir Vais to the Kelautership, but he forthwith sent a peremptory demand to him to send him one of his daughters for his harem. By an artifice Mir Vais saved the honour of his house at the same time that he satisfied the demand of Goorgeen. He substituted a female slave for his daughter, and the native historian tells us that, so high did public spirit run at that time, the slave girl absolutely took pride in the part she played for her country's independence. Goorgeen's suspicions were lulled by the readiness with which Mir Vais had conceded his request, and he turned his attention to other matters than the actions of that noble. Never was confidence more misplaced than that Goorgeen so weakly reposed in the Ghiljie. Never was greater blindness manifested by a ruler, who was existing upon a dormant volcano, than by Goorgeen. A petty revolt among the Kakars induced him to despatch his best troops to put it down, and instead of accompanying his army he remained in Candahar with some twelve hundred men. This was the auspicious moment for which Mir Vais had waited so long and so patiently. The Persian army was scattered, the Persian governor was full of faith in the security of his position, and the whole of the Afghans

were united in a common hatred to the foreign thrall. It was then that Mir Vais sent round a pressing summons to all his friends to hold themselves in readiness for immediate action, and his allies and colleagues began to gather their strength to a point, and to look to the quality of their weapons.

Yet even in its later stages the plot worked better than could reasonably have been expected. Goorgeen in a moment of the most extraordinary fatuity accepted an invitation to supper at Mir Vais's palace outside the walls, when of course he and his followers were murdered. Another version—that given by Abdullah Khan—says that Goorgeen led his troops against the Kakars, and that he was murdered on his return near Candahar, when in a state of inebriation. The former is the one usually accepted, but the latter appears to be the more probable if only for the reason that it convicts Goorgeen of rather less stupidity. But apart from the discrepancy in details, the grand facts remain that Goorgeen was killed, that the Persian garrison was destroyed, and that Mir Vais became supreme.

The Ghiljie chief at once set about the task of establishing a regular form of government, and in 1713, when a Persian army was advancing upon Candahar, Mir Vais was chosen sovereign prince. At the head of a small force, he advanced to meet his more powerful assailant, whom, despite his great numerical superiority, he defeated in three pitched battles during the course of the year 1713. The next year the Persians returned in greater force under the command of a nephew of Goorgeen, named Sipahee Salar Kaee

Khosroo Khan, and in this campaign they carried everything before them. Mir Vais was compelled to take refuge within the walls of Candahar, where he was soon closely besieged. The lamp of Afghan independence, which had only just been lit, was on the point of being extinguished before it had been fairly ignited, and it was only the hard terms which the Persian general would alone concede that nerved the Afghans to fight to the bitter death. Their resolution was crowned with success. Candahar resisted all the efforts of the Persian general, and his army was destroyed, partly by surprise, in a battle before the walls, Sipahee Salar himself being amongst the slain. Later on a third Persian army came, under the command of a general named Mahomed Roostum, but it was defeated in several battles, and retired in a shattered condition to Persia. With that campaign Shah Hoosein abandoned all attempts at recovering his lost possession. Mir Vais's scheme for the emancipation of his country had so far proved successful, and the result of these campaigns had confirmed the justice of the Ghiljie uprising against Goorgeen.

After the retreat of the army of Mahomed Roostum Mir Vais did not long survive. He died in 1715. But the work that he had accomplished was such that would endure. The power of Persia had been lowered by constant defeat, and the Ghiljies in a few years under his guidance had learnt something of the duties of a self-governing people. He had shown them how a small confederacy might repulse the onset of a great Power. He had given them a name as well as free-

dom. Military renown was already theirs; and to his sons and principal followers he had confided dreams of higher ambition still. It was he who had pointed out to his successors the road that lies to the heart of Persia through Seistan, which he himself had followed as a traveller, and which his son was to traverse as a conqueror. He had done all these things, but beyond and above all these, he had laid the corner-stone of Afghan independence. He had won liberty and renown for the Ghiljies; but he had also set an example to the Abdalis of the West, and to the people of Cabul and the North. In short, Mir Vais was the founder of Afghan political being, the Bruce or the William Tell of the Afghans. For that reason his is a great figure shining out in the dark past of the history of his country, and because of that has his career been sketched here in tolerably close detail.

It is unnecessary to follow at anything like the same length the acts of Mir Vais's three successors, viz. his brother Mir Abdullah, his son Mahmoud, and his nephew Ashraff. The chronicle of those events belongs to the historian of Afghanistan. The victorious campaigns of Mahmoud in Persia, which he invaded by the route through Seistan, resulted in the establishment of an Afghan dynasty at Isfahan, and when he died his authority passed to his cousin Ashraff, son of Mir Abdullah, whom Mahmoud had deposed. In 1722 Isfahan surrendered to Mahmoud, and two short years afterwards the Afghan conqueror died in a paroxysm of supposed madness. His successor, Ashraff, boldly attempted to arrest the career of the Persian prince

royal, Tamasp, and his general, Nadir Kuli, afterwards the celebrated Nadir Shah. But in this attempt he failed. He was defeated in a pitched battle at Meimandoos, and later on at Moortchekhor near Isfahan. The Afghans were then expelled the country, mainly by the genius of Nadir, and Ashraff himself either died of disease or was murdered in the wilds of Seistan. With his death in 1728 the Afghan empire in Persia terminated. It had indeed been of the briefest, and but for the corruption of the Persian Court and the dissensions that prevailed at the capital, it could never have occurred. By six years' successful campaigning the Ghiljies strove to blot out the remembrance of the Persian domination in Candahar, but the fortune of war carried their chiefs too far. In the brilliant prospect of establishing a powerful government and a family dynasty in Persia, Mahmoud and Ashraff forgot the small and limited power upon which they could depend. It needed but the military skill of Nadir and the recovery of a small section of the Persian people from the alarm into which they had sunk, to show conclusively how hollow the Afghan triumph was.

There can be no doubt that the destruction of the Afghan army in Persia very greatly reduced the fighting resources of the Ghiljies, and taking the reinforcements which were periodically sent forward into account, the numbers of this army were very considerable. The Ghiljies did not possess the numbers or the resources to bear this strain upon them, and the ambition of Mahmoud and Ashraff seriously under-

mined the solidity of the fabric which Mir Vais had erected. The rivalry which at this time manifested itself between the Ghiljies at Candahar and the Abdalis at Herat also occurred at an extremely inopportune moment, when Persia was passing into the hands of a military genius of the first rank. Exhausted by the greatness of the attempt to establish in Persia a dynasty similar to that founded by the Lodis in Hindostan, and at feud with their neighbours, the Ghiljies were but ill-prepared to withstand the attack of Nadir when he in turn resolved to avenge the insult that had been offered Persia by the invasion of Mahmoud. Before the Persian campaign had concluded the people of Candahar had sickened of the useless war in Persia, and had refused to assist the embarrassed Ashraff when he demanded reinforcements. In fact they cast off his authority, recognising as their ruler Mir Hoosein, the younger brother of Mahmoud.

In 1737, nine years after the overthrow of Ashraff, Nadir, having occupied both Ferrah and Herat, advanced at the head of an army variously computed at from seventy thousand to one hundred thousand men, upon Candahar, where Hoosein still ruled. Candahar was nobly defended, but after a siege of more than a year and a half it capitulated. In those days the position of Candahar was very strong, being built upon the slopes and at the foot of a rocky mountain. The present city stands upon a different site, and is untenable against modern artillery. A wise Government would promptly proceed to change its site back

to the old and more eligible position. With the capture of Candahar the whole of southern Afghanistan, and the ruler of Beloochistan as well, acknowledged Nadir as supreme. He immediately proceeded to recruit his army largely from amongst the Afghans, and to avail himself of the aid of a Belooch force in effecting a diversion against the Indian frontier from Kachhi. Several Afghan chiefs, including Mir Hoosein himself, took service with the conqueror, and served him well. In this respect Nadir seems to have possessed many of the attributes of the great Napoleon, inspiring his followers with the utmost devotion to his person. In fact, his Persian officers began to complain that too much preference was shown to the Afghans.

Up to this point the history of Afghanistan has been the history of the Ghiljies; henceforth they are to play a minor part. They never forgot their title to supremacy, nor did they forgive the Abdalis for supplanting them. But their aspirations and their ill-humour bore little practical fruit. Fifty years later, it is true, they plunged the kingdom into a civil war, out of which they emerged with great loss; but that was an isolated occurrence. From Nadir's capture of Candahar down to the present day, when there are some tokens that the Ghiljie chiefs retain a belief in the possibility of restoring the old Ghiljie administration, little, with the exception mentioned, has been heard of them and their ambitious cravings.

The conquest of Cabul from India, and the subsequent campaigns in the Punjab during the rule of

Nadir, possess no special significance for us here, nor need we delay coming to the establishment of the Duranis to follow those remarkable military exploits which debased the Mogul and led to the occupation and sack of Delhi. When Nadir Shah took Candahar, he released two chiefs of the Abdali clan, Zoolfikaur and Ahmed, sons of Zemaun, chief of the Sudosye Abdalis, who were imprisoned by the Ghiljies. Both of these chiefs were among those who accepted Nadir's overtures, but we need only follow the fortunes of the latter. Ahmed bore a prominent part in all those campaigns which made Persia mistress of Western Asia. But no sooner had Nadir died than Ahmed defied his feeble successor at Teheran, and set up an independent and rival authority at Candahar in the year 1747. It was then that he gave a new style to his dynasty, which became known neither as Abdali nor Sudosye, but as Durani, from the monarch's title of Dur-i-Duran, that is, the "Pearl of the Age." The origin of this change is said to have been in consequence of a dream of a holy man directing him to take this new title; but it is most probable that Ahmed Khan hoped by doing so to assuage the bitter feeling which prevailed between Abdali and Ghiljie. Unfortunately he confined the new style to the Abdalis, thus possibly giving double umbrage to the Ghiljies.

The year after his coronation Ahmed Khan invaded India; but in a battle which took place at Sirhind, and continued during eleven days, he was defeated by Ahmed Shah, the eldest son of the Great Mogul. But

in 1751 Ahmed Khan returned, and Mooltan and Lahore were formally ceded to him. In 1756, Ahmed Khan, attacked in his new possessions by the Vizier Ghazi-ud-deen, for a third time crossed the Indus in person, and, defeating the assailing army, pressed on against Delhi itself, which he entered and sacked. Ahmed Khan then turned his attention to Persia, from which he wrested the rich province of Khorasan.

But while his personal attention had been directed towards the West, his arms had become dimmed by disaster in the East. He had left as his representative in the Punjab his eldest son Timour Beg, and at this time his army still retained possession of Delhi. An alliance was formed between Ghazi-ud-deen and the Mahrattas, and Delhi was won back from the Afghans. The Punjab was then invaded, and Timour Beg, after a severe defeat outside Lahore, was compelled to cross the Indus. This was in 1758. Ahmed Khan at once hastened back to Cabul from Khorasan, and there assembled from all parts of his empire troops for the purpose of regaining the Punjab. Towards the close of the year 1759 he crossed the Indus, and commenced the most brilliant of all his campaigns by a direct advance against Lahore. The Mahratta princes Scindiah and Holkar were the mainstay of the Indian army, but their corps, which combined might have overthrown the Afghan, were separated from each other. With extraordinary rapidity Ahmed attacked and routed the army of Scindiah, and then following up his victory by a move against Holkar drove that chief in confusion before him until he at

last turned to bay, only to be driven in hopeless confusion from the field. The tactics by which Ahmed Khan overthrew the two Mahratta chiefs were identical with those employed so successfully by Napoleon forty years later on, and would alone entitle the Afghan monarch to a high rank among great generals. Yet the power of the proud Mahrattas was far from being broken. The Peishwa placed himself with all his power and all his influence in the van of the host that was to avenge the recent disasters by driving back into their mountain recesses those audacious tribes who had pillaged the cities of Hindostan. Nor was that army composed exclusively of Mahrattas. There were the Rajpoot princes with their swarms of cavalry, the Pindaris, and the Jats; all combined presenting a most formidable appearance, and representing, as had never been represented before, or since, perhaps, the Hindoo force of the great Empire of Hindostan. In numbers it was computed to be almost three hundred thousand strong, yet there were those within its ranks who had misgivings, and who believed that it was ill adapted to cope with the antagonist against whom they were advancing with such a light heart. Delhi, which the Afghans had reoccupied, fell at once before their arms; but the outrages committed by order of the Peishwa's cousin disgusted many of the allies. The Rajpoots and Jats in particular were incensed and withdrew, leaving the army of defence almost exclusively Mahratta. Nor was Ahmed Khan without allies, for the Nabob of Oudh and the Rohillas fought for him. The rival hosts, which numbered

on either side about two hundred thousand fighting-men, approached each other in the latter days of 1760 on the historic plains of Paniput. For several weeks the two armies faced each other from behind their fortified camps, neither caring to anticipate the eventful day when the decree of fate was to be pronounced; nor could all the stratagems of the Mahratta horse draw the wary Ahmed from the well-nigh impregnable position which he held. At last the Mahratta chiefs, whose supplies were exhausted, were compelled either to fight or to retreat; and on the 7th of January, 1761, they left their entrenchments to do battle with the Afghan army. The battle commenced with the attack of the right wing by ten thousand trained Sepoys, who had been disciplined by the French officer Bussy. Their advance was spirited, their firing was superior to anything in either army, and their leader, Ibrahim Khan, set them an example which they could not but imitate. The progress they made, however, was slow, for the gallant Rohillas barred the way.

At last superior weapons turned the scale, and the right wing of Ahmed Khan's army was broken. The Rohillas left eight thousand men upon the field, and their assailants five thousand of their number. The Mahrattas promptly followed up this success, and for a moment it seemed as if the day was won. It was just at this crisis, when the fortune of the battle hung in suspense, that Ahmed Khan brought up his reserve, composed exclusively of Afghan soldiers. The battle was then renewed with greater fury than before.

When evening fell the Mahratta chiefs had fled, leaving an enormous number of their followers dead upon the field, besides Wiswas Rao, the Peishwa's son. It is computed that in this campaign the Mahrattas lost two hundred thousand men, and such was the severity of the blow they then received that their strength was utterly broken. Before Paniput Northern India appeared to be on the point of falling into the hands of the Mahratta confederacy; after that overthrow not only did the confederacy break up into divers fragments, but the great chiefs were sorely tried to retain their own States. Ahmed Khan wisely abandoned the idea of holding Delhi, and ruled from Lahore to Khorasan in peace until his death in 1773. He had also conquered Balkh and Cashmere, and his supremacy was acknowledged by the petty ruler of Khelat.

The reign of Ahmed is not more remarkable for the military triumphs which gave it so brilliant a lustre than it is for the fact that it put Afghan independence on a firm basis. For the first time in history, since the fall of the Ghor dynasty, a settled and a native rule was established throughout the whole of the country south of the great mountain range; and the pretensions of both Persia and the Mogul were beaten far back from the frontiers of the State. The task which Mir Vais had partially accomplished was completed and carried out on a larger scale by Ahmed. Side by side, too, with the establishment of Afghan independence the supremacy of the Durani, or Abdali, clan was made incontestable. The traditions of these people supplanted those of the Ghiljies, and a wider

and more imperial policy marked the increased importance of the Afghan ruler. The change in Afghan life and thought that took place at this period was indeed immense, for, as Ferrier graphically puts it, "a conquered nation for generations, they became all at once conquerors."

Ahmed was succeeded by his son Timour, one of whose first acts was to remove the capital from Candahar to Cabul, where it has remained ever since. Timour's accession was not wholly unopposed. Several leading men strove to place his brother Suleiman upon the throne, and Timour, absent at Herat, had to advance with an army on Candahar. His entry was unresisted, and the conspirators were either executed or sought safety in flight. Timour distrusted the fidelity of the Duranis, who had been exasperated by the execution of the vizier, Shah Wali Khan, one of their chiefs, and he sought from some of the minor tribes many of his most trusted officials. In every respect Timour was the opposite of his father, and to his acts may clearly be traced much of the trouble and misfortune which beset his sons in after-life. His wars were uniformly unsuccessful. We have already seen the result of his campaign with Bokhara, and in Scinde the Talpooras cast off the Afghan yoke. In Khorasan, too, his arms were equally unfortunate. When he died in 1793 he left Afghanistan in nominal possession of the greater portion of his father's conquests, but really in an enfeebled condition. The sword which the first Durani had wielded so well was already beginning to rust in the scabbard.

Of the twenty-three sons left by Timour four only need be mentioned—Humayoun, Zemaun, Mahmoud, and Shuja-ul-Mulk; and the three last of these became at different periods Ameer of the country. The claims of Zemaun were considered to be the greatest, and, thanks mainly to the aid of Poyndah Khan, chief of the Barucksye Duranis, he was Timour's immediate successor. We have already seen how the Duranis supplanted the Ghiljies, and as we are now approaching the period when the Sudosyes were displaced by the Barucksyes it is necessary to say something here of this latter family, of which Poyndah was at this time the acknowledged head. When Ahmed Khan was put forward in 1747 as a candidate for the throne, one of his chief rivals was the Barucksye noble Hadji Djemal, who, with rare abnegation, had withdrawn his claims in favour of Ahmed. He became Ahmed's vizier and most trusted adviser. Poyndah Khan was Djemal's son, and he had succeeded to all the influence and high position which his father had so deservedly attained. The Barucksyes were, it must be added, the most numerous and the most warlike of all the Durani clans. The influence of Poyndah made the authority of Zemaun generally recognised, and the defeat of his eldest brother, Humayoun, in a battle near Khelat-i-Ghiljie rendered his triumph still further assured. But his other brothers, and notably Mahmoud, intrigued against him, and several acts of tyranny on his part alienated the sympathy of his friends and supporters. A little later on, Humayoun fell into his power, and was at once blinded. Zemaun

was also successful in the West, where he took Herat and compelled Mahmoud to flee for safety to Bokhara.

Up to this point fortune had been steadily on the side of Zemaun, and in establishing his authority throughout his wide-stretching dominions he had evinced considerable ability. But his jealousy of the Barucksyes had been aroused, and acting under the influence of his vizier Vefadar Khan he had deprived his old champion Poyndah of all his high offices. This act created general indignation among the Barucksyes, and an intrigue was entered into for the deposition of Zemaun. In this plot Poyndah occupied the principal place, and on its being discovered he was forthwith executed. Poyndah's eldest son, Futteh Ali Khan, fled to Persia, where he joined Mahmoud. It was then that Futteh Ali came to the front as the champion of the cause of Mahmoud, and advancing into Afghanistan at the head of a small army he was joined by the whole of the Barucksye clan. Zemaun's army deserted his cause, and after a brief resistance he fell into the hands of his victorious brother. He was then blinded in revenge for the cruelty inflicted by him on his brother Humayoun. The vizier Vefadar Khan was executed at the same time. Zemaun, however, managed to escape and fled to Bokhara and ultimately to Herat, whence he made his way to India, where he resided for about half a century as a pensioner at Loudianah. These later events took place in the year 1800.

Mahmoud's first act was the repression of a revolt among the Ghiljies, who saw in the confusion prevailing in the realm a prospect of re-establishing

something of their old power. Their efforts were, however, all in vain. Futteh Ali defeated them in four or five engagements, thus adding to the claims which he already had upon Mahmoud. This portion of Mahmoud's reign was also marked by a commotion in Cabul between the Kizilbashes and the Cabulis, which laid the seed of future trouble. In 1805, while Futteh Ali was absent carrying out an expedition in the Hazara country, the faction of Shuja-ul-Mulk succeeded in securing possession of the capital and of the person of Mahmoud. Shuja's most formidable antagonist, Futteh Ali, whom he would not propitiate, was permitted to return to his residence at Girishk, when he set himself steadily to the task of effecting the restoration of Mahmoud. The first step in this resolve was to release Mahmoud, and this was carried out successfully by means of the Kizilbashes. A considerable force was then assembled, and with this Mahmoud and his supporter advanced to meet the army of Shuja who was marching on Candahar from the capital. The army of Shuja melted away, and he was obliged to retreat as far as Neemla, near Gundamuck, where he resolved to make a final stand. Here Futteh Ali inflicted a serious defeat upon him, and Shuja fled, after a second reverse near Candahar at the hands of Poor dil Khan, one of Futteh's brothers, to India. Once more Mahmoud was installed in Cabul. This ruler appointed Futteh vizier, and left in his hands all the administrative authority while he abandoned himself to a course of pleasure. During Futteh Khan's tenure of power everything went well. The inroads

of the Belooches, which had latterly become formidable, were completely put a stop to, and Cashmere was reconquered. The authority of Mahmoud was recognised in a larger portion of the dominions of Ahmed Khan than that of either of his brothers had been. In fact Afghanistan, under the guiding control of Futteh Ali Khan, seemed about to recover all its old prosperity. The Sikhs, however, under Runjeet Sing, the governor of Lahore, had cast off the Afghan rule during the reign of Zemaun, and although there was a brief alliance between this ruler and Futteh Ali, for the purposes of a campaign in Cashmere, the friendship was of the briefest, and the Sikhs seized Attock on the Indus, and threatened the Peshawur valley.

Futteh Ali's attention was at this point called away from the East to the West, where the state of things in Herat and the attitude of Persia summoned his immediate attention. This war was remarkable for an Afghan victory at Kussan in despite of the valour of the Persians and the gallantry of one of their leaders, Zoolfagar Khan, who, like Warwick on Towton Field, slew his horse in front of both armies. In this battle Futteh Ali was wounded, and his troops, thinking he was slain, abandoned the field of battle at the same moment that the Persians fled. It was at this stage, when at the zenith of his career, that Futteh Ali Khan fell under the suspicion of his master, Mahmoud. That ruler's son Kamran, "a monster of vice," had long been at feud with the Vizier, and now he managed to gain the upper hand in his father's council, while Futteh Khan was away at Herat arranging the great border

difficulty. In a weak moment the ruler gave an order decreeing that Futteh Ali Khan should be blinded.

Kamran himself hastened off to Herat, loth to entrust to another the revenge upon which he was so eagerly speculating. By means which appear even at this lapse of time strangely insignificant, the Sudosye prince dared to arrest the great Barucksye sirdar in the midst of a town held by the latter's victorious soldiery, and at once put out his eyes. This atrocity was the signal for a rising throughout the country against the authority of Mahmoud, and in this rising the numerous brothers—said to have numbered sixteen—of Futteh Ali Khan bore the prominent part. The first successes of the war went to the side of the Barucksyes, and Mahmoud in despair appealed to his prisoner to employ his influence with his brothers to induce them to surrender. This Futteh Ali Khan nobly refused to do, saying that "since he had lost his sight he had lost all his influence over men." He was at once tortured and murdered with every circumstance of cruelty. So died Futteh Ali Khan, perhaps the greatest of all the Barucksyes, murdered by the order of the man who owed everything to him. Like his noble father, Poyndah, he expired at the caprice of a Sudosye. This act was the death-knell of that family.

The blinding of Futteh Khan had been the signal to the Barucksyes to revolt against the king. His murder made of each subject of Mahmoud a rebel. That ruler was driven out of every quarter of his realm save Herat, where he still maintained the semblance of sovereignty. But the future of Afghanistan

lay in the fate of the eastern portion of the kingdom, and not in that of the western; and here the life of the Sudosye cause was ebbing fast away, although the Barucksye brotherhood was far from being an united or harmonious confederacy.

Of all these brothers Dost Mahomed was the most able and the most worthy to take his brother's place. But, on the other hand, he was one of the youngest, and his elder brothers were clever men, skilled in the management of affairs. In the first settlement after the deposition of Mahmoud, the Dost obtained but a minor post. His elder brother, Mahomed Azim, who had been governor of Cashmere, was supreme in Cabul, and another, Poor Dil Khan, ruled in Candahar. The Barucksyes appear to have been loth to take the ruling authority to themselves—perhaps they were afraid of shocking too deeply the national traditions of Sudosye supremacy, or, more probable still, they were jealous of each other. But at all events, one of Poor Dil Khan's first acts was to enter into negotiations with Shuja-ul-Mulk, that puppet of fortune, for his restoration. Then Shuja returned to Afghanistan, but not for long. His arrogance disgusted the Barucksyes, and he was compelled to flee again to Loodianah. Various other Sudosye princes were placed upon the throne by Mahomed Azim, but none ruled for more than a brief space.

During these internal commotions the Sikhs, under Runjeet Sing, encroached more boldly than before. Cashmere was taken from Jubber Khan, one of the brothers, and the Sikhs forthwith established them-

selves in several places on the right bank of the Indus. It was necessary to encounter this danger at once and without hesitation, for Peshawur itself was not safe from the Sikh assault. In fact it had several times been attacked. Mahomed Azim raised a large army for the purposes of this war, which was carried on with dubious success until the battle of Nowshera, where, in 1822, Runjeet Sing inflicted a severe defeat upon the Afghans. Mahomed Azim committed the egregious blunder of dividing his army into two divisions, separated from each other by the Cabul river, and he had the melancholy fate of witnessing the destruction of one of these corps while he stood a helpless spectator with the other on the opposite bank. After this defeat the authority of the Sikhs was more firmly established on the right bank of the Indus, and over Peshawur itself they exercised a supreme control. One of the Barucksye chiefs, Mahomed Khan, was installed as governor in this important town, paying tribute to Runjeet Sing. The defeat at Nowshera was a great blow to Mahomed Azim, and his death, which occurred shortly afterwards, was considered to have been expedited by that disaster.

The disappearance of his elder brother cleared the way for Dost Mahomed, who, during all these wars and disturbances, was doing his duty quietly and with marked ability. Alone among the Barucksyes he seemed to be free from the superstitious dread of the Sudosyes, and consequently he saw more clearly than any of his brothers the possibility of founding a fresh dynasty in the country. The difficulties of his position

were undoubtedly increased by the fact that his able neighbour, Runjeet Sing, was in the full tide of his successful career. The sudden elevation of the Sikhs into the rank of military peoples had raised up a fresh opponent in the path of Afghan ambition. The danger was made the more pressing by the high efficiency of the Sikh army officered by Europeans, and by the ability of Runjeet Sing and his generals.

But the dissensions between the brothers became worse instead of better, and in the confusion Afghan Turkestan threw off the yoke completely, and passed into the possession of an Usbeg ruler. The government of Dost Mahomed himself in Ghizni was indeed the only respectable administration in the State, and in 1826 he had annexed Cabul to himself also. In this portion of the State he continued to be supreme until the invasion of his country in 1839, while his brothers, Poor Dil Khan and Kohundil Khan, ruled in Candahar. It is instructive even now to read Burnes's estimate of this great man written in the days before the Simla manifesto. "The reputation of Dost Mahomed," he says, "is made known to a traveller long before he enters his country, and no one better merits the high character which he has obtained. . . . The justice of this chief affords a constant theme of praise to all classes; the peasant rejoices at the absence of tyranny, the citizen at the safety of his house and the strict municipal regulations regarding weights and measures; the merchant at the equity of the decisions and the protection of his property; and the soldiers at the regular manner in which their arrears are discharged.

A man in power can have no higher praise. Dost Mahomed Khan has not attained his fortieth year; his mother was a Persian, and he has been trained up with people of that nation, which has sharpened his understanding and given him advantages over all his brothers. He is doubtless the most powerful chief in Afghanistan, and may yet raise himself by his abilities to a much higher rank in his native country."

In 1834 Shah Shuja made another attempt to recover his crown, and advanced with an army of about twenty thousand men, secretly aided by the British Government, and with their "best wishes." Dost Mahomed came with a large army to the relief of Candahar, and after inflicting a severe defeat upon him in the open drove him towards Herat, where his nephew Kamran refused him admission. He fled thence to Ferrah, Khelat, and India. Runjeet Sing so far assisted Shah Shuja that he deposed Mahomed Khan from the governorship of Peshawur, and installed a Sikh officer in his place. It was at this point that Dost Mahomed was proclaimed Ameer, Emir ul Moulminein, by the Grand Mollah of Cabul. A desultory campaign followed with the Sikhs, in which the Afghans were worsted, mainly through the treachery of the Dost's brother, Mahomed Khan. In 1836 the war recommenced, when the Dost's sons, Akbar and Afzul inflicted a severe defeat upon the Sikhs at Jumrood, when their general, Hurree Sing, was slain. The question of the rivalry between the Sikhs and the Afghans now becomes merged in the far more important one of the English interference in the in-

ternal affairs of Afghanistan in the year 1839. With regard to the Persian attack on Herat, where a Sudosye prince still ruled, the consideration of that subject may be for the present passed over while we turn to consider the main thread of the Afghan wars.

It is unnecessary to follow in any detail the policy of the Indian Government before the Simla manifesto, and the signature of the Tripartite Treaty to which Lord Auckland, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, and Runjeet Sing were the signatories. Before the close of the year 1838 it had been resolved to invade Afghanistan in conjunction with the Sikhs, and to place the Sudosye Prince Shuja upon the throne. For more than twenty years that monarch had lived in exile within the borders of Hindostan, and now he was at last within reach of his former power, through the hostility which Runjeet Sing entertained for his countrymen, and the alarm raised in the minds of the English Government by Russia's intrigues in Persia. In those days Ferozepore was the extreme limit of our power in the north-west, and there on the 29th of November, 1838, the Governor-General held his first meeting with Runjeet Sing, the Lion of Lahore. During several days these visits of ceremony continued, and round the banks of the Sutlej there assembled as gallant a display of British troops and Sikh soldiers as has ever been seen, for it was the Army of the Indus. But before this the siege of Herat had been raised, and the intrepidity of Eldred Pottinger, to whom this country has not realised its great debt, had repulsed that last assault against its walls on the 24th

of June. It was resolved accordingly to reduce the proportions of the army assembled at Ferozepore, and not to send the whole force across the Indus. The Bengal contingent, when reduced, numbered some nine thousand men, and there was a special corps, under Shuja-ul-Mulk, of six thousand more. It was this force which left Ferozepore and advanced on Candahar, through Bhawulpore and Khelat. Shuja-ul-Mulk and his English allies were to strike against Dost Mahomed through the Bholan pass and Quettah; Runjeet Sing and his Sikhs from Peshawur and the Khyber. But in order to reach Khelat we had to pass through the territory of the Ameers of Scinde, and between them and Runjeet Sing, as well as with Shuja-ul-Mulk, there were various questions in dispute, notably the Shikarpore difficulty. These were settled for the time in that unavoidably arbitrary manner which must be followed when matters have progressed so far as for a large army to have received instructions to advance. The "Army of the Indus" had received such orders. It was to march on the Bholan, and to obey its orders it had to pass through the territory of the Ameers of Scinde. Englishmen of the present generation are fortunate in not being compelled to resort to the same expedients to reach Cabul that their fathers were when Pottinger and Burnes were our representatives at Hyderabad (Scinde) and Khyrpore. The task of striking at Cabul from Peshawur and the Khyber had to be confided to Sikhs, whose sympathies with the cause soon became equivocal; and to reach Khelat and Candahar we had to adopt a line of action that was distasteful to some

of our best officers. There was another English army in the field also, that of Sir John Keane, coming from Bombay, whence it proceeded to the mouths of the Indus by sea.

This triple army—the Bengal column, under Sir Willoughby Cotton; the Bombay column, under Sir John Keane; and the contingent under Shuja-ul-Mulk—made its way through Scinde upon the Bholan. On the 4th of April it was assembled at Quettah, having traversed the Bholan in safety and without difficulty. On the 6th Sir John Keane arrived and assumed the command of the whole army, and on the 9th and 10th it was traversing the Kojuck pass on the road to Candahar. On the 25th of April it appeared before the walls of that city, the principal place in southern Afghanistan, which opened its gates without any resistance, and Shuja-ul-Mulk was received with acclamation by a small section of the Sudosye faction, or rather so it appeared at first. But, in truth, it was not so. Whatever sentiment of loyalty the family of Ahmed Khan had once attracted to itself had long since disappeared, and Shah Shuja returned almost as a stranger to the land of his ancestors. On the 8th of May it was resolved that the formal ceremonial of installing the Sudosye as ruler should take place, and a grand review was announced to be held in the plains outside the city. But whether this foreign display was the means of alienating Afghan sympathy, or some other cause was at work to mar the harmony of the occasion, there is no doubt that the momentary ebullition of loyalty shown by

some of the Afghans had given place to an apathy that was clearly evidenced by the fact that not a hundred Afghans attended the grand ceremonial which marked the return of the Durani monarch. Dost Mahomed had entrusted the defence of Candahar to his brother, Kohundil Khan, but on the approach of the invading army Kohundil and several of his brothers fled, nor paused until they found safety within the Persian frontier. But Dost Mahomed, the ablest and the most famed of the Barucksye brotherhood, still ruled in Cabul and Ghizni and all the northern country. Whilst our army lingered at Candahar a brigade was despatched under Colonel Sale to occupy Girishk, on the road to Herat, in case Kohundil Khan should endeavour to rally his disheartened followers. Yet the delay at Candahar was not wholly unemployed. Preparations were made for a forward movement, and negotiations were opened up with the Ghiljie clans. In the former some progress was made, in the latter scarcely any.

During the two months' stay at Candahar a certain amount of supplies had been collected, and on the 27th of June the British army resumed its forward movement, this time through the Ghiljie country, upon Ghizni. Sir John Keane appeared before the walls of that celebrated fortress on the 21st of July, and there he found Hyder Gholam, Dost Mahomed's son, in command, with Afzul Khan in the vicinity in charge of a corps of cavalry. Since the days of Mahmoud of Ghizni and Mahomed of Ghor this city-fortress has been famed among the Afghans. As Kaye

puts it, its strength was their boast, and Dost Mahomed anticipated that the force of the invasion would be broken before its impregnable walls. On the other hand, strange to say, our commander was disposed to consider that the reputation of Ghizni was undeserved, and he had accordingly advanced against it with only his field guns, and without any regular train. But a glance at the walls of Ghizni showed our commander that it did not belie its reputation, and that it was a place of great strength, both by nature and by art. Yet, was an English army to be turned aside in its march, even by the formidable ramparts of this stronghold, and its resolute garrison under the King's son? The English general resolved that it should not be, and, in the absence of his battering-train, formed his plans for its capture by assault. To our ally, Shah Shuja, it was incomprehensible how we intended to break into the iron-girt fortress. While the Afghan prince was troubled with the impossibility of breaching the walls, Sir John Keane and his engineers were busy seeking which gate should be blown in. A nephew of Dost Mahomed, Abdul Rashid Khan, had deserted the Barucksye cause, and it was from him that our General learnt that all the gates had been walled up with the exception of the Cabul Gate. The Cabul Gate was the one weak spot in the armour of Ghizni, and it was decided to effect an entrance at that portion of the fortification. Early in the morning of the 23rd of July, 1839, the storming party and its supports, consisting of the four English regiments, viz. the 2nd, 13th, and 17th of the Line,

and the Company's European Regiment, followed the Engineers and Sappers who had gone ahead to explode the mine placed at the foot of the Cabul Gate. The night was stormy, and the early dawn was dark and dreary, weather pre-eminently suited for such a deed as that which lay before Colonels Dennie and Sale. And in the middle of the night Sir John Keane made a demonstration with all his field-pieces against the western and southern sides of the fortress. To the north, where the English Sappers, under Captain Thomson, were busy with the real work of the night, all was quiet. After some hours' cannonade, during which the Afghan garrison was worried by successive alarms in other quarters of the city, Sir John Keane's attack died fitfully away, and all was, for a brief space, tranquil and serene. But it was only for a brief space. Captain Thomson had done his work well and thoroughly. The powder bags had been placed under the Cabul Gate, and Durand, "scraping the powder with his finger-nails," fired the powder, which had failed to ignite on the first application of the port-fire. With a terrific roar up went the solid beams and massive masonry of the gate and its supports, and in rushed the English soldiers. The surprise was complete, and our advanced companies made good their entrance into the outworks of the city. After a brief delay, caused by a mistake, the supports pressed on also, and a desperate hand-to-hand encounter took place in the narrow outlet. The Afghans, driven into a corner, and finding their only avenue for escape barred by the English soldiers, fought well and stub-

bornly, and rushed like wild mountain-cats upon our men. But their desperation served them to little purpose. Ghizni was ours. This great success cost us only seventeen men killed and one hundred and sixty-five wounded. The Afghans lost close on one thousand killed and wounded, in addition to sixteen hundred prisoners.

But the greatness of the blow is not to be realised by a comparison of the loss alone on either side. Dost Mahomed's fortunes were closely intertwined with the fate of Ghizni, and his whole plan of campaign was founded on the assumption that to capture Ghizni would be a task of months instead of an affair of a few short hours. The moment Afzul Khan learnt of its capture he fled to Cabul with his division, and carried the ill tidings to his father there. As our army advanced northward beyond Ghizni, confusion and panic went before it. Dost Mahomed advanced to meet us, and he took up a position at Urghundeh to bar the road to the capital. But there was treachery within his army. One by one his sirdars deserted him, and the Ameer found himself left with a mere handful of personal retainers to check the progress of the victorious English army. He resigned himself to his fate, and fled northwards through Cabul. Close on his track pressed Outram and his five hundred horsemen as far as Bamian; but there they learnt that the fugitive Ameer had crossed the Sighan valley, and was passing into the dominions of the Usbeg ruler of Kundus. Through the treachery of an Afghan sirdar, by name Hadji Khan Khaukur, who

accompanied Outram, and pretended to be our true friend, Dost Mahomed escaped the pursuit of the gallant Outram. The Afghan's treachery did not go unpunished, and he was for many years kept in a state of imprisonment in British India. On the 7th of August our army entered Cabul, and Shah Shuja was placed on the throne he had occupied more than thirty years before, and upon which his father and grandsire had long been seated. With the flight of Dost Mahomed and the entry into Cabul the first act in the Afghan drama terminated. In the short space of three months a great country had been conquered, and the resistance of a turbulent people had been overcome. Up to this point the conduct of the war had been fairly able. No extraordinarily brilliant achievement had been done, but no egregious error had been committed. The mistake in leaving the siege-train at Candahar had been condoned by the skill and valour shown in the assault on Ghizni; and all the difficulties from the country, of which we were supremely ignorant, and dubious allies, had been overcome with credit. It would be well for our military reputation if the subsequent acts had been conducted with equal prudence.

In the meanwhile the corps under Colonel Wade and the Sikh contingent had been operating against Akbar Khan in the Khyber pass. On the 26th of July Ali Musjid fell after a day's siege, and Akbar Khan, sick in body and at heart, broke up his camp at Dacca, and fled to his father at Cabul, whence they withdrew, as already mentioned, to the Hindoo Koosh.

And then it was resolved to weaken the army of occupation. The original intention had been to place Shah Shuja on the throne, and then withdraw; but it at once became evident that the Shah had no party in the State, and that he must be maintained, if maintained at all, by English bayonets. It was necessary, then, to leave a considerable force behind in order to garrison the chief places, and the dubious attitude of the Sikhs, more dubious than ever after the death of Runjeet Sing, added very much to the anxieties of the time. Yet on the 18th of September the Bombay column returned to India, and in a few weeks it was followed by a portion of the Bengal army, under Sir John Keane. Cabul, Candahar, Ghizni, and Jellalabad were garrisoned in force, and Sir Willoughby Cotton was entrusted with the chief command, and General Nott with the charge of Candahar. During the winter of 1839 the English troops remained in safety, and without too great discomfort, in the Bala Hissar, and during that winter and the following spring the principal interest centred round Bamian and the glens of the Hindoo Koosh, beyond which Dost Mahomed still maintained some semblance of authority. By making the most strenuous exertions Dost Mahomed had once more an army at his disposal, raised from Usbegs and Afghans, and during the month of September he advanced against our posts at Sighan and Bajgah. Our advanced troops withdrew as he approached, without suffering much loss in men, but with the loss of all their baggage; and reinforcements were sent up from Cabul to Bamian, where, on

the 14th of September, the English force concentrated under the command of Brigadier Dennie. On the 17th the scouts reported that a small Afghan force was a few miles ahead in the valley that debouches from Bamian, and Dennie at once marched out a small detachment to drive it back. Fortunately Dennie followed with additional troops, for it turned out that the small Afghan force was the vaunted army, computed at forty thousand strong, under the immediate command of Dost Mahomed and his son Afzul. Dennie's little army did not exceed one thousand five hundred men, of whom four hundred were Afghans. The remainder were Ghoorkas and native infantry. But the gallant officer showed not the slightest hesitation, and attacked with his small force and two guns the overwhelming numbers of Usbeg and Afghan chivalry. The result justified his gallantry, and the great victory of Bamian must, among the achievements of the first Afghan war, rank with the assault on Ghizni. The month of September, which had witnessed the reappearance of Dost Mahomed, only to meet with fresh disaster, was to see more fighting in the mountainous country of the Kohistan. Sir Robert Sale commanded our forces there. Among these skirmishes may be mentioned the successful affair of Tootundurrah, and the unsuccessful assault on Joolgah; and during the month of October there was unremitting pursuit after the Barucksye Ameer, until at last, on the 2nd of November, our army came up with him at Purwandurrah. But, as Kaye says, this hour, which should have been one of triumph, was one of humiliation. Our native cavalry fled like

sheep at the charge of the Afghan horse, leaving their officers alone to bear the brunt of the action, and over the fall of Dost Mahomed this gallant action cast a glamour of romance and chivalry. The very next day Dost Mahomed rode into Cabul, and surrendered to Sir William Macnaghten.

From November, 1840, to November, 1841, we continued to garrison the country, and then there broke out those disturbances which resulted in the disasters of that winter. It is unnecessary to retrace the follies that were committed, and those weak negotiations that were carried on with Akbar Khan, now the chief prop of the Barucksye fortunes, nor need we recall those terrible disasters which cost us four thousand Indian troops, and the lives of many a gallant English officer. Those hours were terrible ones, never to be forgotten. But their lesson stands good for ever. The errors then committed can never be repeated by Englishmen. Three places only remained in our possession, and these were Ghizni, Jellalabad, and Candahar. The first of these surrendered after a siege of some weeks, and that blow was scarcely less severe to our prestige than the loss of Cabul itself. Here again the cause of disaster was sheer improvidence and vacillation. Had the inhabitants been expelled, and had the commandant made sure of his water supply, as he could, Ghizni should have been impregnable. The most extraordinary want of foresight was shown by the fact that there was no one in the garrison of Ghizni who understood the practice of gunnery. The siege of Candahar, and the victories won outside

its walls, is the one bright spot during this dark crisis, nor was the gallantry exhibited by the garrisons at Jellalabad and at Khelat-i-Ghiljie less conspicuous. At Jellalabad there was doubt and hesitation as to whether it would be prudent to defend the place, but fortunately the manly counsels of George Broadfoot and Henry Havelock prevailed over the more timid advice of others. Jellalabad was to be defended, and held it was against all comers—against Akbar Khan, against the mountaineers—despite of cold, want of powder, and in the face even of nature's hostility in the destruction caused by the dreaded earthquake, until at last there appeared in the far eastern horizon the glittering bayonets of the relieving legions of Sir George Pollock. At Khelat-i-Ghiljie the defence was not less gallant, and its resolute commandant, Captain Halkett Craigie, held out during that inclement winter until he, too, was relieved by General Nott. And during all these months the work of raising revindicating armies was in steady progress. Not then, as now, could troops concentrate at Peshawur in ten days; not then, as now, were there located forty thousand troops as a garrison in the Punjab; but the Sikhs had to be propitiated or coerced, and the five vast bridgeless rivers to be crossed in the long road from Ferozepore to the Khyber.

On the 5th of April Pollock outflanked the Afghans holding the Khyber, and forced that celebrated barrier with very small loss. In the face of skill and foresight Afghan valour was confounded, and the opposing force seemed to melt away, and while Pollock had been

revindicating not so much English courage as English common sense and tactical judgment, the Jellalabad garrison had struck a final and fatal blow at their old foe, Akbar Khan. On the 6th of April our garrison, under Sale, marched out and attacked Akbar Khan, who had drawn up his army, six thousand strong, to receive them. The victory was complete, and with the loss of ten men killed and fifty wounded the Afghan army was driven in confusion from the field. Such was the consummating act of the Jellalabad garrison, which had nobly deserved the epithet applied to it by Lord Ellenborough of the "illustrious garrison." Then followed in rapid succession the victory of Jugdulluck, where Ghiljie fanaticism paled before English valour, and the final triumph at Tezeen. The battle of Tezeen was the battle of the war. The Afghans were strongly posted, well led, and filled with the courage of patriotism and fanaticism; but nothing could withstand our men. The heights were carried with cold steel, and the cavalry and artillery completed in the plain the work wrought on the heights of Haft-Kotul. Cabul was re-entered on the 15th of September. During these weeks Nott had also been advancing from Candahar. He had occupied Khelat-i-Ghiljie, defeated the Afghans at Goaine, and retaken Ghizni. On the 17th of September, having dispersed the Afghan army collected at Maidan, Nott entered Cabul, where he found Pollock had anticipated him by two days. Afghanistan had been reconquered, and the blood of our soldiers avenged. The task of Pollock and Nott was completed, and their armies slowly with-

drew to Indian territory. We had championed a fallen cause, and we had set ourselves against the force of events. The life of the Sudosye cause had been long extinct, and it was vain to seek to put fresh life into a dead body. The danger from Russia had been more accurately gauged, and the Central Asian Question more clearly appreciated. That there was danger from Russia we now too surely know; but, in the days of Burnes and Macnaghten, it was not close at hand. Yet their political foresight is incontestable, although the means they sanctioned were ill-calculated to effect their object. The Afghan wars of almost forty years ago possess a peculiar vitality to the present day. The causes then at work are still in existence. There is still a divided Afghanistan and an enfeebled Persia, upon both of which the Russian statesmen have sought to work for their own purposes. There is still the great game in Central Asia, greater and more complicated than ever before, and there is still, with all its wide-stretching ramifications, the rivalry of England and Russia.

Such is the story of our two wars against Afghanistan and our brief occupation of the country, as told in the pages of Sir John Kaye and by other authorities. The restoration of Dost Mahomed was followed by years of gradual recovery on the part of Afghanistan, which beheld the re-establishment of the Ameer's authority throughout the realm. In this he was much hampered by his son Akbar, who had tasted some of the sweets of power during his father's absence. He died, however, in 1848. His full brother

Hyder succeeded him as heir, and played a prominent part in the brief campaign against Attock during the Sikh war. In the course of the campaign in the Punjab the Afghans suffered heavy loss, and were deprived of the Peshawur valley. In 1857 Gholam Hyder died, being succeeded as heir-apparent by his next full brother Shere Ali.

After the close of the Punjab war, and the annexation of that province by England, Dost Mahomed turned his attention to the extension of his empire over Herat, and also north of the great chain of mountains. In 1850 he wrested Balkh from the Usbegs, and later on subdued Kundus and Badakshan. On his death-bed, in 1863, when he is supposed to have been more than eighty years of age, he had the satisfaction of entering Herat in triumph. He had restored Cabul, during his long reign, to a high point of prosperity; he had survived the Sikh power, which at one time threatened to absorb his State; he had lived to become good friends with his old foe England; and he left to his son and heir a kingdom which, if not as extensive as that of the first of the Duranis, was at least a splendid territory.

This is not, perhaps, the time at which it is possible for an English observer to do justice to the career of Shere Ali, yet to complete this summary of Afghan history it is necessary that something should be said upon the subject. Now that that career has closed, it should be easy for us to be just. The late rapid collapse of the Afghan defence, unaccompanied, however, by the surrender of either of the rulers, must remain one

of the enigmas of history. It is possible to base too much on the extraordinary contradictions of history that are to be found in recent events, and therefore it is wise to turn to history to discover what the Ameer, who could not resist our arms for a day, had done in his past life, and against other foes.

Of the sixteen sons born to Dost Mahomed, Shere Ali was the fifth. Both Afzul and Azim Khans were older than even Akbar, but their claims to the succession were never recognised by Dost Mahomed. His eldest full brother, Akbar Khan, our opponent in the Afghan wars, died in 1848, leaving two sons, Futteh Mahomed and Jellaluddin. Then came by the same wife Gholam Hyder, who was the defender of Ghizni and heir-apparent after Akbar's death. Shere Ali was the third son by the same lady, and he had also two younger brothers, Ameen and Shereef, offspring of the same marriage. Shere Ali was born about the year 1823, and when Dost Mahomed came as an exile to India he was accompanied by this son, who at all times appears to have been a favourite with his father. Several years before his death he therefore caused Shere Ali to be proclaimed heir, and his brothers were perforce required to acknowledge him as such.

On the 27th of May, 1863, Herat fell before the victorious arms of Dost Mahomed, and on the 9th of June following he died in his new possession at the patriarchal age of eighty. In accordance with his will Shere Ali was at once proclaimed Ameer, and he hastened to secure his possession of the State before his right could be challenged. Those of his brothers

who were with him at Herat were required once more to swear on the Koran fidelity to his cause; and the new ruler, leaving his third son, Yakoob Khan, then a youth of some sixteen summers, but who had already given promise of a great future, in command at Herat, returned by forced marches to the eastern parts of his dominions. Nor was his promptitude unnecessary. His own full brother Ameen Khan, who was at the time governor of Candahar, was the first to appear in arms against him, and the example thus set was speedily followed by both Afzul and Azim. The year passed off without any hostilities on a large scale, and Shere Ali was in December officially recognised by our Government. During the winter of 1863 preparations were being made in silence for the war that was to commence with the first appearance of spring. On the one side Shere Ali strove to cow opposition by a bold front, and to add to the strength of his position by securing the sympathy and practical aid of our Government. In this latter respect he was not at all successful. On the other side, Ameen Khan at Candahar, Afzul at Balkh, and Azim in Khurum, were all preparing for the contest, and thus Shere Ali found himself threatened on three sides by powerful foes. The campaign commenced in April, 1864, with an advance against Azim in the south-east and Afzul in the north. The former of these was speedily overthrown by Shere Ali's general, Mahomed Rafik, and compelled to take refuge in our territory. In the northern campaign, fought out in the passes of the Hindoo Koosh round Bamian, the result was less conclusive. A drawn battle took place at Bajgah, in

which Mahomed Ali Khan, the eldest son and heir of Shere Ali, greatly distinguished himself. Both sides then showed themselves anxious for an accommodation, Shere Ali because he dreaded the price of victory, Afzul because discouraged by the defeat of Azim. A truce was promptly arranged, and the two armies, lately drawn up in hostile array, entered Balkh in company. For a short time things looked well, but Abderrahman, Afzul's son, was detected in some act of treachery. This underhand plotting afforded Shere Ali an excuse for adopting harsher measures in his dealings with his rivals. Afzul was arrested and imprisoned, but Abderrahman escaped across the Oxus into Bokhara. Whatever blame may have attached to Shere Ali's summary proceeding, there is no doubt that his triumph was almost complete at the close of his first campaign. With Azim and Abderrahman fugitives, and Afzul a captive in his possession, Shere Ali seemed to have crushed all resistance to his authority before it had shown its head. In the south alone was disaffection to be seen triumphant, where Ameen Khan held independent court in Candahar. To the governorship of Balkh Futteh Mahomed was raised, while the Ameer in person returned to Cabul for the purpose of dealing with his last rival. But by this time the year was drawing to a close, and military operations had to be suspended until the snow had melted. In the meanwhile Ameen Khan had been joined by his brother Shereef, and Jellaluddin, his nephew, the son of Akbar. In the north, too, Abderrahman, at the head of an army raised in Bokhara,

was again preparing to take the field. In the commencement of the year 1865 Shere Ali's position was grave, but he might reasonably have expected to triumph over all his difficulties by promptitude and audacity. The army of Ameen Khan was in the field several weeks before that of Abderrahman could stir, and before Shere Ali left Cabul had attempted to seize the fortress of Khelat-i-Ghiljie by a *coup de main*. The resolution of the garrison foiled the attempt, and the Candahar forces retired as Shere Ali's army advanced towards them. At Kujhbaz, near the town just mentioned, the rival armies halted in face of each other, and prepared for the struggle which was to decide this part of the campaign. On the Candahar side the three confederates and Surwar Khan, the eldest son of Azim, were in command. On the Cabul side were Shere Ali himself, his eldest son Ali Mahomed Khan, and his best general, Mahomed Rafik. The battle commenced early in the morning of the 6th of June, and during the earlier portion of the day Shere Ali's army was getting the worst of it. At the crisis of the engagement he rode up to his eldest son, and taunted him with want of courage. The story goes that, deeply stung at this accusation, Ali Mahomed led a desperate charge into the thickest of the battle, and finding himself face to face with Ameen Khan, fought with him, when they slew each other. To his eldest son's bravery Shere Ali owed a victory when he was nearly being defeated, and the death of Ameen Khan extracted all real danger from the Candahar defection. Within a week Candahar surrendered and

formed the base from which most of Shere Ali's subsequent operations were carried on. The chief importance of this success was indeed that it restored communications with Yakoob Khan, who, during all these disturbances, had maintained his father's authority in Herat. For the moment it seemed as if all Shere Ali's troubles were about to cease, for his arms had up to this point been uniformly successful, and in all directions. So assured did his triumph appear that the Ameer withdrew to Candahar to indulge in the luxury of grief for the loss of his eldest and favourite son. Had this prince lived, all doubt as to his successor—a point which afterwards weakened his position—would have been obviated; but it is useless to speculate on what might have been.

Ibrahim Khan, his second son, but on the death of Ali Mahomed his presumptive heir, was entrusted with the northern campaign, which was to be carried on in the vicinity of Cabul itself. About six weeks after the battle of Kujhbaz, Abderrahman crossed the Oxus at the head of an Afghan army, and was at once joined by the forces which had been entrusted with the defence of Balkh. Shere Ali's nephew, Futteh Mahomed, fled through Bamian to Cabul. During the months of August, September, and October, inaction prevailed on all sides, save that the army of Abderrahman was daily drawing closer to Cabul. At this moment Shere Ali's cause received a serious blow by the defection of his general, Mahomed Rafik, whom Ibrahim Khan had wantonly insulted, and of his own brother, Shareef, whom the Ameer had despatched

with reinforcements to Cabul. Azim had now also joined Abderrahman, and the hostile camp again presented a united and formidable appearance to the embarrassed ruler.

The year 1865 closed ominously, but no blow had yet been struck. Courage and rapidity of movement might do much against greater numbers. Still the unfortunate Shere Ali passed his time in Candahar in idle lamentation. In February, Azim, who had now assumed the chief command, summoned Ibrahim Khan to surrender, and, after some paltry skirmishing, the army of Shere Ali melted away, and the capital was given up. On the 2nd of March, Azim was installed as ruler, while Ibrahim was wending his way with the ill tidings to his father at Candahar. With the occupation of Cabul, the second stage of this bitter contest closed. Shere Ali, victorious at Kujhbaz, lost all the fruits of that battle by his subsequent lethargy; and, by employing the incapable Ibrahim, had done much towards the ruin of his cause.

The news of the fall of his capital roused him from his torpor like the sound of battle to a war-horse. The black cloud which had partially obscured his reason for nine months, was dispelled by fresh disaster. Great efforts were made in Candahar and the whole southern portion of the State to raise and to equip another army; and from Yakoob Khan at Herat large reinforcements of brave troops were received. With such energy did Shere Ali devote himself to his task, that in the middle of April he was in readiness to advance to the relief of Ghizni, which still held

out for him. His army numbered some fifteen thousand men, of whom a large proportion was cavalry, and he had also twenty-five guns more or less effective. Ghizni was entered in triumph on May-day, and once more the opponents were reduced to an equality. After a few days' rest in the neighbourhood of this fortress, Shere Ali marched north against the confederate encampment at Shaikhabad. On the 10th a general action commenced, wherein the impetuosity of Shere Ali was unavailing against the tactical skill of Azim. Ghizni at once opened its gates to the conqueror, and Shere Ali fled to Nanni with a few hundred followers. His defeat had been complete. All his artillery, stores, equipage, and most of his troops had fallen into the hands of the victor; and he was left alone and as a fugitive to oppose the resistance of half-a-dozen conquering princes. Yet he did not despair. His adversity was God's will, but human energy and determination could retrieve much that had been lost through misfortune. With the fall of Ghizni Afzul recovered his liberty, and he, as elder of the two brothers, was installed as ruler. Then there ensued a lull in the contest. Apathy characterised the movements of the victors after Shaikhabad just as it had characterised those of Shere Ali after Kujhbaz, only in this case with less excuse. Afzul Khan reigned in Cabul, Ghizni, and the northern khanates; Shere Ali in Candahar, Ferrah, and Herat. There were two *de facto* rulers, and the State was divided into two almost equal parts. But at this moment the confederates were beginning to be disunited, and

Afzul, who had become a confirmed debauchee, was speedily supplanted in Balkh by Faiz Mahomed, one of the Barucksye princes and half brother to Shere Ali.

Shere Ali was still at Candahar endeavouring to arm the levies which his own energy had gathered around him. All his overtures to procure assistance from us in arms or in money were rejected, and he had slowly to construct his own artillery, and to collect his own muskets for the recovery of his realm. In the meanwhile his opponents were playing into his hands. Azim had developed into a blood-thirsty tyrant, Afzul into a drunkard, Abderrahman into a dissatisfied intriguer. During the reign of terror at Cabul under the auspices of Azim, Mahomed Rafik was arrested and murdered in a fit of passion. This act of treachery alienated much of the popular sympathy from the side of the confederates, and public opinion was veering round to the side of Shere Ali at last. The year 1866 passed by in preparations for the contest, but early in January, 1867, Faiz Mahomed, now the ally of Shere Ali, forced the Bamian pass, and advanced on Cabul. A diversion in his rear compelled him to return, and the imminent danger from this quarter passed off. In the meanwhile more important events were in progress in the south. The armies of Shere Ali and Azim had encountered under the walls of Khelat-i-Ghiljie, and once more the fortune of war decided against the former. Khelat-i-Ghiljie and Candahar fell into the hands of Azim, and Shere Ali was now expelled from all his possessions except those in the west.

The most important result of this victory was the recognition of Afzul by our Government as Ameer of Cabul and Candahar. Azim was appointed governor of Candahar, and preparations were made for the invasion of Herat and the final overthrow of Shere Ali's power. At this period a brief gleam of sunshine to the distressed Ameer appeared in the staunchness of Faiz Mahomed, who won another battle at Bajgah in the neighbourhood of Bamian. An interview took place in the mountains between Shere Ali and Faiz Mahomed, and a league was formed between them for the recovery of Cabul. It was now that Shere Ali, in disgust with our neutrality, made overtures to Russia and to Persia, which, however, came to nothing.

Late on in the autumn, when all hope of foreign aid had to be abandoned, the army of Shere Ali and Faiz Mahomed set out for Cabul. It had not proceeded far before Abderrahman caught the division of the Balkh chieftain in the defiles near Kila Alladad, and routed it. In the battle Faiz Mahomed was slain. This event occurred in September, and early in the following month Afzul died. He was succeeded by his able brother Azim, who was recognised even by his nephew and rival Abderrahman. Our own Government deputed a *Vakil* to reside at his court, and he might now fairly claim the title of Sovereign of Cabul by right of possession. His triumph was complete on all sides, for even Balkh, after the death of Faiz Mahomed, had been occupied by Abderrahman. Surwar Khan, Azim's son, was governor of Candahar, and Azim himself remained in Cabul. For three years

fortune had been uniformly adverse to Shere Ali, in council chamber and on the field of battle. It was now, at last, when all things were at their blackest, about to veer round to his side with its true inconstancy.

Up to this stage in the war Shere Ali had fought his own battles, and before his brother Azim's or his nephew's military capacity his skill had appeared to great disadvantage. In the campaigns we have described he had been well served by Mahomed Ali and Mahomed Rafik alone, and with the death of the former and the defection of the latter all the *onus* of the strife fell on his own shoulders. He had been notoriously ill served by Ibrahim Khan. But now, when all hope seemed to be abandoned, he found a supporter and a champion in Yakoob Khan, his third son, who was then a young man of twenty-one. Up to this moment the part he had taken in affairs had been only of secondary importance. He had performed the useful but somewhat inglorious office of sergeant-major to the army, drilling and despatching to the front the raw levies of Ferrah and Herat. Now he was to take a more prominent *rôle*. Abderrahman has been styled the Hotspur of the confederacy, but if that comparison be just, it is far more appropriate to call Yakoob Khan the Prince Harry of the rightful cause. In the spring of 1868 Yakoob Khan set out from Herat to attack Candahar, and, without much loss of time, drove Surwar Khan out of the city. He then advanced on the town of Ghizni, which opened its gates.

In the meanwhile Abderrahman was bringing up reinforcements from Balkh, but these Yakoob Khan

intercepted by forced marches, and defeated with considerable loss. Seizing the opportunity caused by the withdrawal of Yakoob Khan, Azim relieved the garrison of the fortress of Ghizni, which still held out for him. But with the defeat of Abderrahman victory was assured to Shere Ali; and Azim, unable to retard the victorious progress of the combined army of Shere Ali and Yakoob Khan, evacuated Cabul itself. In Balkh, however, the uncle and nephew plotted during the ensuing winter how to regain their lost position. In the depth of winter along the snowy heights of the Hindoo Koosh the struggle was yet to rage for some more months, but the end was no longer far off. A conclusive battle took place at Tinah Khan, near Ghizni, when both Abderrahman and Azim were defeated by Yakoob Khan. Now Shere Ali was triumphant, and on the 26th of January, 1869, he held public Durbar in his regained capital. In his deepest distress he had found a heaven-sent champion in his third son, and to the abilities of that youth was it solely owing that the tide of war had been rolled backward from Herat. Azim meanwhile was flying through Seistan, but died of the privations he had undergone on his road to Teheran. Abderrahman fled to Balkh, whence he was expelled by Ibrahim in the spring of 1869. He found refuge and hospitality among the Russians at Samarcand, where he resides in the receipt of a large pension from the Government of Tashkent.

With the close of the civil war fresh negotiations were opened between Shere Ali and Sir John Lawrence. The result of these negotiations, it will be

sufficient to state here, was that our Government made a large immediate advance of money to the Ameer, and gave a promise of a larger supply later on, together with arms of various kinds. Then the Earl of Mayo succeeded Lord Lawrence, and what has been termed an "intermediate" policy replaced that of "masterly inactivity." The old traditions still possessed force, however, and no definite and decided line of action was marked out for us to pursue. Even the Umballa meeting failed to bring matters in this respect to a crisis. Shere Ali was undoubtedly charmed with his reception, and flattered by the open marks of English friendship which were showered upon him, but he had anticipated something more precise. Neither Abderrahman nor Azim were yet so irretrievably crushed that he could look forward to peaceful times with any great degree of confidence. In his past difficulties he had trusted much to British aid, and had always been disappointed; in his future struggles, whatever these might be, he had resolved that our money, our arms, and our countenance should all contribute to the promotion of his cause. He entered the Punjab with this idea, and he believed that the apprehension Russian annexation north of the Oxus was rousing in our bosoms would greatly facilitate the accomplishment of his plan. He was doomed to grievous disappointment. Money he got, and arms also, but neither in treaty nor in any other definite detail did he obtain the thing which he most desired. The old treaty of 1855 with Dost Mahomed was still the base on which all Anglo-Afghan relations rested. Even in a minor matter Shere Ali's private inclinations

were thwarted. He had left Cabul in the charge of his son Yakoob Khan, who had been appointed Wazir, but up to this time it does not seem that any heir had been proclaimed. The public voice pointed unanimously to Yakoob Khan as the proper person, and the splendid services he had rendered to his father made it difficult for him to throw cold water on so admirable a scheme.

But between this son and Shere Ali there never was any very great personal affection. In fact he had seen less of Yakoob Khan than of any of his other children, and very possibly Shere Ali was piqued at feeling that he was indebted to a mere boy for the recovery of his power and independence. There was another reason still to account for Shere Ali's indifference to Yakoob Khan. The history of his family and the experience of his own life too clearly showed him that the nearest ties of blood did not stand in the way of attaining personal aggrandisement. The bitterest of all Shere Ali's rivals was, beyond doubt, his full brother Ameen Khan, and, despite all his fidelity and all his service, Yakoob Khan, on account of his high qualities, became an object of distrust to his sire. Whatever affection Shere Ali retained for his children was confined to his youngest son, Abdullah Jan, and during the Umballa negotiations he sought in many ways, direct and indirect, to secure the approval of our Government for his proclamation as heir. Lord Mayo skilfully avoided committing himself, and the project had for the time to be postponed. Yakoob Khan insisted on being recognised as heir-apparent, and his father, unable to

refuse, acquiesced for the time being. Yakoob Khan was then employed as Governor of Candahar at one time, and of Herat at another; but throughout he was always supreme in the management of the army. But the scheme to supplant Yakoob Khan by his younger brother only slumbered. Shere Ali was only awaiting a favourable opportunity to follow out his pet plan. It is not clear even whether Yakoob Khan was ever really proclaimed heir, or only put off with promises. According to one account he was in rebellion as early as in September, 1870, and he certainly was a fugitive in the debateable Seistan districts in 1871. Among the freebooting clans of that region, Afghan and Persian, he raised a force with which he besieged and took Herat. Then he was appointed governor of that town by Shere Ali, and a reconciliation took place between them. But the truce was hollow, and each side intrigued against the other. In November, 1873, Abdullah Jan, a boy of thirteen or fourteen years of age, was publicly made heir, and the rupture between Shere Ali and his other son was thus rendered complete. It was when things had progressed thus far that Yakoob Khan sought to erect an independent principality at Herat. He even endeavoured to enlist the approval of his father in his design, and but for one want, he would have attempted its accomplishment on his own resources; without money he could, however, do nothing. Even in the wild solitudes of Afghanistan the most needful of all materials for warfare is the "almighty dollar." In order to obtain a certain sum for the protection and advancement of the little dis-

trict which had been made independent by his energy, Yakoob Khan thought the most feasible mode would be to ask his father in person for the sum he stood in need of. He presented a petition at Cabul for permission to visit it for ten days, which was readily granted, but no sooner had he arrived in the capital than he was arrested and thrown into prison. This breach of faith Shere Ali extenuated by asserting that Yakoob Khan was about to hand Herat over to the Persians. The best proof of the falseness of this charge is to be found in the fact that Ayoob Khan, Yakoob's younger brother, who had been left in command at Herat, did not hand it over to the Persians, as he most assuredly would if his brother had entertained such an idea. From that day to this little was heard of the gallant Sirdar until his release from confinement last December by Shere Ali. When his father fled with the Russian mission to Balkh, Yakoob became supreme; and upon Shere Ali's death his authority appears to have been recognised in Cabul.

The next event of general importance in which we find Shere Ali engaged is the difficulty with Persia about the Seistan frontier. Our good offices were accepted in this question, and after some delay the award of our arbitration was adopted. The pith of the award was that Persia had encroached too far, and had therefore to give back a considerable slice of territory to Cabul, not as much, however, as Shere Ali claimed. The Granville-Gortchakoff negotiations in 1872 brought the whole Central Asian Question prominently before the public, more particularly that portion of it which concerned Afghanistan and the Oxus.

The infinitely more complicated and more serious question about Persia and the Atrek was disregarded, as it always has been disregarded except by Sir Henry Rawlinson and a few of his chosen followers. The upshot of those interchanges of opinion between St. James's and St. Petersburg, which, however, never assumed any tangible form, may be said to have been an English guarantee for the preservation of Balkh and its neighbouring khanates in a state of independence or of incorporation with Cabul. The Oxus was thus made the Ebro of the Russians. But these negotiations had another effect. They greatly disturbed Russian equanimity in Tashkent, however necessary they may have appeared to the officials in Europe; and they also gave Shere Ali a chance for devising a new policy which should redound to his own advantage. At all times in his career Shere Ali had sought to reap as much advantage as possible from Anglo-Russian rivalry, but up to this time the diplomatic caution of both countries had foiled him at every turn. He may even have grown doubtful whether all this talk of the hostility between the two States was not a myth, made use of by designing men. But here at last was proof afforded that the sentiment was a reality, that Russians did not regard Englishmen with the most lively sentiments of affection, and that Englishmen to some extent were of a similar turn of mind. The partition of Khiva, the overthrow of Bokhara, and the annexation of Khokand, had at last aroused England into action. It only remained for Afghanistan to reap as much benefit as possible from

the change from inactivity to activity, and for Shere Ali to exert all his wits that so splendid an opportunity should not be thrown away. Shere Ali experienced, no doubt, intense satisfaction at being able, as he thought, to force our hand. His rejoicing was slightly premature, for the Indian Government showed itself exceedingly indifferent to the boastful attitude now assumed by Shere Ali. He was compelled, therefore, to confine most of his intrigues to overtures to Tashkent, where all Afghan matters were referred for comment to Abderrahman, whose game is by no means yet played out. Soon return emissaries came across the Hindoo Koosh bearing presents and friendly messages for the Afghan king. Then the Russian Government accredited agents to reside at Cabul, and Russian influence, which had been non-existent in the past, began to make itself felt in the council chamber of the Bala Hissar. The commencement of the late troubles in Eastern Europe found Russia strengthened in the very outworks of India itself. As those troubles grew in size and importance, and their remedy appeared to be at last only by the sword, the Russian agents, prematurely, no doubt, began to enlarge the sphere of their activity. Some manifestation of popular opinion, or some other unseen force, reminded Shere Ali that he was going too far, and the agitation was checked without scruple. The lesson was not thrown away on our Government, and the intelligence that a somewhat similar design had been formed in Khelat added to the significance which the whole affair had begun to assume. Shere Ali's responsibility lay in the fact that

he, when a fair broad road was straight before him, had preferred to turn aside into a tortuous bye-way, which could only lead him into a morass of embarrassment. Let us admit that the inconsistencies of our own policy in past years had done much towards bringing Shere Ali to this frame of mind, and, although this admission may not entirely absolve that ruler from all blame in the matter, it will at all events exonerate him from any charge of premeditated treachery against us. The assertion of the Jowakis and their kinsmen that it was his encouragement which urged the former into their aggressive conduct against us, is a statement that will not bear close examination, although Shere Ali's rash words in the spring of 1877 did undoubtedly tend to produce an irritation along the whole of our Punjab frontier.

The Stoletoff mission in August 1878 proved, however, that Shere Ali had gone farther than had been supposed, but of these later events it is unnecessary to say anything here. The history of Afghanistan during the last three centuries has been sketched. For ampler details the reader cannot do better than turn to Colonel Malleson's work, which is as exhaustive as the materials extant upon the subject admit. There are lessons to be derived from this history, some of them obvious, others perhaps not so apparent. The grand one is that history proves that the Afghans have often been contented subjects of an alien ruler, and that they have only been virtually independent for little more than a century. It is also clear, geographically, that Afghanistan is an appendage of India,

in fact its Wales; and history teaches us that during its happiest and longest period it held that relation towards Delhi which the time must come when it will hold again.

CHAPTER V.

ENGLAND AND PERSIA.

ENGLAND first came into contact with Persia in the reign of the Great Shah Abbas, when two English gentlemen of good family and military reputation arrived in the country. These were Sir Anthony Sherley and his brother Robert. They* had originally left England under the auspices of the Earl of Essex, with the object of participating in the war the Duke of Ferrara was waging against the Pope, but ere they reached Italy a peace had been concluded between the antagonists. Loth to return without accomplishing anything after a waste of "time, money, and hope," the Sherleys, with their small band of twenty-six followers, went on to Persia, which at that time was a well-known country, by repute at all events, in Eastern Europe. This band of English adventurers reached Persia while Shah Abbas was absent in Khorasan, but

* *See* "Sir John Malcolm's Persia," and "Purchas's Pilgrims."

their reception at Kazveen was honourable. On the Shah's return, Sir Anthony approached him with the request to be permitted to enter his service, presenting at the same time numerous presents, which will be found particularised in his interesting narrative of his travels. Shah Abbas was flattered by Sir Anthony's compliments, and gave the English knight every encouragement. The two brothers busied themselves in disciplining the Persian army, and in this they succeeded to a great degree, as was proved in the wars which Shah Abbas so often waged. It is even said that they specially trained, if they did not absolutely create, an artillery force, thus commencing that task which more than two centuries later on other Englishmen perfected.

Sir Anthony's services were, however, utilised in a different fashion, for he was sent in the capacity of Envoy Extraordinary to all the chief European courts, especially to the "Great King of Muscovie." In addition to the credentials with which Sir Anthony was furnished, he carried a firman admitting Christians to enter and settle in the Persian empire, and guaranteeing such persons the fullest safety and freedom in carrying on their business. While Sir Anthony was travelling through the capitals of Europe, arrested and ill-treated in Moscow, and honoured in Germany, his brother Sir Robert was taking a prominent part in the Shah's wars with the Porte. He was present at the capture of Tabriz, and received three wounds in the great victory near Erivan. In these campaigns the Persians were uniformly successful, and

the Turks, who at the time of Abbas's accession held Tabriz and Bagdad, were driven back behind the Tigris and upon Diarbekir.

The result of Sir Anthony's mission was the establishment of factories by English, French, and Dutch merchants at Gombroon, which henceforth became known as Bunder-Abbas. These settlements were protected and favoured by the Shah, but the possessions of the Portuguese in the Gulf were regarded with far different sentiments. The conquests of the great Albuquerque had indeed disappeared, with the exception of the island of Ormus, but that foreign settlement within sight of his shores was a standing insult to the great Persian. It had been wrested from his predecessors in time of internal weakness and division, and it behoved him now that Persia was united and strong to reacquire that of which his ancestors had been dispossessed. Notwithstanding, too, its natural barrenness, Ormus had become a mart of considerable size, and its position effectually prevented Bunder-Abbas attaining the first place among the seaports of the Gulf. Shah Abbas resolved to conquer Ormus, and in effecting this he availed himself of the commercial rivalry between the other Europeans and the Portuguese.

In this enterprise the English took a prominent part, possibly to be attributed to the influence of the Sherleys. It is certain that Shah Abbas made the most direct overtures to them, and that they entered very heartily into the proposed scheme. The Shah on his part made promises of the most attractive character, exempting the English from the payment of import duties, and giving

them a share in the imports raised upon other foreign merchandise. He also promised those who took part in the enterprise a share in the spoil and the prisoners. Ormus was attacked by an allied Anglo-Persian force, and taken mainly by the gallantry of the English sailors. The influence of the Portuguese was destroyed with their settlement; and the English East India Company seemed about to reap all the advantages of the triumph in the undivided monopoly of the Persian trade.

But the dreams of English merchants were doomed to disappointment. Shah Abbas, instead of keeping his promises, broke them. None of the stipulations of the arrangement were observed, and the English factory at Bunder-Abbas, instead of becoming more flourishing, from this period languished more and more, until at last in 1761 it was abandoned in consequence of the oppression of the local governor. In 1763, however, when Kurrum Khan of the Zund family had become ruler of the country, a fresh firman was granted to the dispossessed merchants of Gombroom or Bunder-Abbas to build a factory at Bushire, higher up the Gulf. During the life of Kurrum the English were undisturbed, and their trade in the Gulf may be said to have been fairly prosperous. But upon the death of Kurrum disturbances broke out in the country, and during these the English merchants were oppressed, and their trade languished through harsh and unjust exactions being made upon them. Yet, with the tenacity of their race, the English merchants stuck to their posts, and

established factories at several places along the coast, notably at Bussorah. In 1788 they obtained from the Persian ruler permission to carry on unrestricted trade with his country; and during the reign of Aga Mahomed Khan, founder of the Kujurs, their privileges were maintained if not extended.

Down to this point the relations between England and Persia had been almost purely commercial. The representatives of England were the agents of the East India Company. It is true that Persia had sent two missions to England and Europe, one under Sir Anthony and the other under Sir Robert Sherley, and that there had been in return the embassy of Sir Dodmore Cotton, in James the First's reign, of which Sir Thomas Herbert gives such a graphic and interesting description in his "Travels." But these were exceptions, and all occurred during the reign of the Great Shah Abbas. During the next century and a half they continued to be commercial alone. We have now to consider the later and political stage of the relations between England and Persia.

As has been well said, this closer connection between the two Governments had its origin in three causes: the fear of an Afghan invasion of India, the designs of the French on the British dominions in the East, and the competition of European powers for influence at Teheran. All these causes were more or less at work in influencing the further course of the question, but there can be no doubt that the two first were the most potent, although the third continued to operate when the others had been finally dispelled. The dubious

attitude of the Afghan ruler on several occasions during the later years of the last century, when all the traditions of Paniput were in active force, compelled our representatives in India to look beyond the borders of India itself, although the British power was then separated from those borders by a large tract of independent country. The ambitious schemes of Napoleon, proved by the Egyptian expedition to have assumed a very clear light in the eyes of the Great Conqueror, made it absolutely imperative that some preparation should be taken to avert a danger which at a glance appeared to be so formidable.

The most obvious step was to secure an ally in Persia, and with that object in view Captain John Malcolm left India as Envoy to the Persian Court. In 1801 he concluded two treaties with the Shah. The first of these referred to political affairs, the second to commercial. By the terms of the first the Shah engaged to devastate the country of the Afghans if ever they should attempt to invade India. He also bound himself to prevent the French from settling or residing in Persia. In the event of either France or Afghanistan making war on Persia England was to assist him with military stores. The grand point in this treaty was that we had secured an ally against the Afghans, whose vigour in the Punjab depended on the condition of the frontier towards Khorasan and Seistan. We had also obtained the alliance of the country holding the half-way house for a French army advancing against India. The more accurate informa-

tion which was obtainable, after the failure of the French campaign in Egypt and Syria, with regard to the feasibility of an invasion of India from the shores of the Mediterranean, detracted indeed from the value of this latter stipulation, but the former continued for long to be in force, and to operate beneficially for our interests in the gradual development of the Afghan question.

The commercial treaty also secured us very substantial favours, for all the privileges of the old factories were restored, several fresh ones were granted, and the duties to be raised upon the purchases of staples were reduced to one per cent. The result of these treaties was, therefore, that not only was Persia secured as an ally, but that it was also thrown open to English enterprise. The mission of Captain Malcolm had been successful in a double sense, and the relations which he established with Futteh Ali Shah, nephew of Aga Mahomed, were cordial, and promised to be durable. But this good understanding soon became clouded. In 1805 Russia was invading Georgia, and had obtained several successes over the Persian army. The Shah, under the terms of the treaty, which he construed as a defensive and offensive alliance, appealed to us for aid. But in those days no one was far-sighted enough to see that the danger to India in the future lay from Russia and not from France. Then France and the overweaning ambition of Napoleon were the great menace to our Eastern possessions, and Russia instead of being a foe was an ally and fellow-fighter in the cause of curtailing

Napoleonic aggrandisement. We denied the Shah's reading of the treaty, and stood aside.

It was then that Futteh Ali appealed to France, and a treaty between France and Persia was sketched out if not actually drawn up. The French bound themselves by it to obtain from Russia the surrender of the provinces that had been seized from Persia, and also to provide the Shah with all necessary military stores, and with officers to drill his troops and reorganize his army. On the other hand, the Shah, in return for this active assistance, was to declare immediate war upon England, to advance upon the Indian frontier through Afghanistan, and to permit a French army to march by the same route, and participate in driving the English out of the peninsula. Napoleon had not then abandoned the dream of emulating the career of Alexander. The treaty of Tilsit between France and Russia nipped these negotiations in the bud. The Persian treaty, which rested on its hostility to Russia, had to be dropped, and France, whose activity in Persia has been revived at fitful moments since then, retired temporarily from the scene.

But both in England and in India these relations between Persia and France produced alarm and almost consternation. It was most unfortunate that at the same moment of time the attention both of London and Calcutta should have been directed to the same quarter, for without any mutual knowledge an envoy was deputed to Persia both by the Crown and the Governor-General of India. Sir John Malcolm, who had been knighted for his first mission, was sent a second time to

Persia from India, at the same time that Sir Harford Jones was setting out for the same destination from England. This unfortunate *contretemps* produced some unseemly complications, which had the effect "of rendering both Governments ridiculous in the eyes of the Persians."

Sir John Malcolm's instructions were that in the event of Sir Harford Jones reaching Bombay—the route followed in those days—before him, he was to proceed as envoy to Bagdad, with the object of establishing an alliance with the petty chiefs of Arabia, leaving to Sir Harford Jones the conduct of the more difficult and more important negotiations at Teheran. But the recovery of our paramount position in Persia was to precede all other considerations, and if Sir John Malcolm reached Bombay first, he was to continue his journey to Teheran at all risks. The Indian envoy was the first upon the scene, and he entered the Persian State before the signature of the Treaty of Tilsit, while the Persian ruler was in the full flush of expectation on the strength of the promises of France. An attempt, which was probably due to the instigation of the French ambassador, was made to prevent his being admitted to the royal presence, and to compel him to carry on negotiations with officials of inferior rank. With that promptitude which was one of his most marked characteristics, Malcolm perceived that if such was the spirit of the Persian rulers there was no use in wasting time in further negotiations which could only be idle. Upon reaching Shiraz he recognised that his mission would prove abortive, and smarting under a

sense of the indignity of his reception—an insult of the most marked kind in the East—Malcolm abandoned his journey, knowing well that if Persia cared to resume the negotiations he would be intreated to alter his determination, and that reparation would be offered him for the slight that had been thrown upon him and his country. Nothing of the sort took place, thus confirming the accuracy of Sir John Malcolm's view, and proving that France, by promising Persia the restoration of the provinces wrested from her by Russia, had played a better card than any that was in our possession.

Sir John Malcolm urged upon the Indian Government upon his return to India the adoption of prompt measures, and prominent among them was the occupation of the island of Kharrack, whence it would be possible to "either negotiate with dignity or act with effect, should war be declared." The Earl of Minto, at that time Governor-General, entered fully into Malcolm's views, and preparations were made for carrying them out. But at this moment the arrival of Sir Harford Jones spoilt the bold plans which were being formed, and which must have tended to exalt our dignity and power in the eyes of the Persians, and to place our Government on a much firmer footing with regard to the Shah than any it has since been possible to obtain.

Sir Harford Jones's instructions were to the effect that he should await at Bombay the result of Malcolm's mission, had that preceded him. But in the event of its having failed in attaining the object for which it had been despatched, or if it had succeeded in

the conclusion of a preliminary treaty or understanding, he was to pursue his journey to the end. Unable to recognise the wisdom of Sir John Malcolm's prompt departure from Persia, and to adapt his instructions to the altered circumstances of the case, Sir Harford thought by literally obeying them he would be earning the commendation of his Government and countrymen. After his departure from Bombay, further instructions arrived suspending his mission. It was too late. Sir Harford was on the road to Teheran.

In the meanwhile a great change had come over the spirit of their dream among the councillors of the Shah. The French had made friends with the Russians, the great foe and constant dread of Persia, and instead of a treaty of alliance at Teheran for the curtailment of Russian power, there was a pact at Tilsit for the formal aggrandisement of the two Emperors. When Malcolm reached Persia, French influence was supreme; when Jones arrived, it was utterly debased. The mission of Sir Harford Jones was an ostensible success, and a treaty was signed in March, 1809, by the terms of which the Shah abrogated all treaties previously in force between Persia and European powers. He also engaged to prevent the passage of the army of any European power through his dominions, and on our part we promised to assist him with troops or a subsidy if any European power should attack him. In one point this treaty differed essentially from those that had been signed previously, for whereas the treaties of 1801 had striven to promote dissension between Persia and Afghanistan,

the treaty of 1809 aimed at smoothing over the differences between the two States—for were we not also negotiating with Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk? We were to take no part in any war between Persia and Afghanistan save as mediators.

Unfortunately, the very great concessions which were obtained by this treaty were weakened in their effect by the continued misunderstandings between the English and Indian authorities. Lord Minto, it is true, ratified this treaty, but he recalled the successful negotiator, sending in his place Sir John Malcolm once more. In the meanwhile Sir Harford Jones had received instructions from London to remain at his post until relieved by Sir Gore Ouseley, whose powers specially superseded those both of Sir Harford Jones and Sir John Malcolm. There can be no doubt that these repeated changes in the person of the English negotiator were attended with great disadvantage to the interests of this country in Persia. Neither Sir Gore Ouseley nor Sir Harford Jones had any real experience in Persian affairs, while Sir John Malcolm had already proved his remarkable skill in the negotiations during the year 1801.

None the less, however, did it happen that ostensibly these later embassies were as successful as they well could be. In March, 1812, Sir Gore Ouseley concluded a treaty defining more clearly the stipulations which were contained in that of 1809, and during all these years English influence may be held to have been supreme in the country. The treaty of 1812 was referred to England for ratification, and two

years afterwards a definitive and final treaty was concluded in the month of November, 1814. By the sixth article of this treaty the English Government bound itself to assist Persia against any European assailant by despatching a force from India or by a large subsidy. We also took a part friendly to Persia in the discussion as to the frontier between Russia and Persia, a question which had been left unsettled by the Treaty of Gulistan, and which was yet to prove a fruitful cause of difference between those two States.

In the year 1826, as we have already seen, war broke out between Russia and Persia, because the former Power had occupied—and wrongfully occupied—the border district of Gokcha. Under the clauses of the treaty just referred to, the Persian authorities appealed to this country for that active assistance which had been promised and which it would have been our true policy to have afforded. We refused the application and we never for a moment entertained the prospect of affording military aid to the Persians. The war, too, began in an irregular manner, and at a first blush it appeared as if Persia were the aggressor and not Russia. When the campaign was over—and it ended in a complete Persian overthrow—a clearer view began to obtain as to the provocation given Persia by the Russian authorities, and then by the payment of two hundred thousand tomans we fulfilled the letter of our obligations while denying ourselves the accompanying advantages. In those days we were beginning in a fit of lassitude to shirk some

of those responsibilities which are the necessary accompaniment of Imperial power. The genius of Paskevitch had laid northern Persia at the feet of Russia, and between his army and the Persian capital there remained nothing save the shattered battalions of the army of Abbas Mirza. Under our mediation the Treaty of Turkomanchai was signed, and we hurriedly sought to free ourselves from the obligations which we had been eager to accept in 1814. It was said at the time that this treaty was a fruitful source of disagreement with the Shah, but before we can admit this plea we must remember that this difference of opinion only arose from the fact that we refused to fulfil those obligations which we had voluntarily accepted. The third and fourth articles of the treaty of 1814 were cancelled, thus abrogating the sixth and seventh articles as well.

To this time must be traced the subsequent misunderstandings which have repeatedly marred the effect of our policy in Persia—a policy which, without exaggeration, might be so moulded as to influence every other phase of the Central Asian Question in the favour of this country. Our desertion of Persia before the cession of Erivan and Nakhitchevan undoubtedly produced an irritation at the Persian Court which has never yet been removed. Our present of two hundred thousand tomans was but a sorry equivalent for the loss of two provinces and the destruction of a gallant army. It is possible, as Mr. Aitchison says in his all-valuable collection of treaties, that the importance of the Persian alliance was exaggerated

during the years preceding the Treaty of Turkomanchai, but it is impossible to look upon the course of events subsequent to that arrangement without perceiving that Malcolm and the earlier negotiators had much right upon their side. They did not, indeed, perceive in all its intense reality the danger that their grandchildren and great-grandchildren would have to deal with in the face of a steady and persistent career of Russian aggrandisement; but if they did not penetrate so far into the future, they at least are entitled to all the credit which is due to those who recognised, when there was no pressing external danger, that a predominant position at Teheran was necessary to the stability of our rule in India. Regarding the matter in this light, it was impossible to exaggerate the importance of the question, and it was in this light that it should have been regarded when Persia appealed to us in 1826. We shall never make ourselves supreme in Persia until we revert to that policy which was proclaimed in the treaties of 1801, and which was revived in 1814. Under the pressure of a great apprehension we had adopted a policy which was far-sighted and statesmanlike, but when that apprehension passed away we were unable to temper our common sense with a just allowance for the possibilities of the future.

It is not extraordinary to find that the representative of the Russian Government at the Persian Court made as much use as he possibly could of the favourable opportunity afforded by the growing distrust between the Shah and his whilome friends the English. Some

of the causes, and the principal, of that distrust have already been specified, but there were others still in operation, and of these not the least was the doubt which had arisen in the mind of the Shah as to the exact relationship between England and the Indian Government. The negotiations between the years 1805 and 1814 had completely discredited the reputation of the Indian authorities, and the Shah persisted in regarding himself as only justified in treating with the representatives of England. We were not long brought into contact with Persia before its ruler conceived that his dignity was lowered by carrying on negotiations with a mere company. The ability of Simonitch and the policy of Nesselrode for many years gave a vitality to that sense of wounded self-esteem; and on the other hand our policy strove to add still further to the significance of the change in the bosom of the Shah by neglecting to define any clear line of action, and by leaving our representatives often without specific instructions.

When Futteh Ali Shah died, in 1834, England and Russia combined to place his grandson Mahomed Shah upon the throne. The event justified the Russian foresight, rather than the British, for during the years immediately succeeding that event the Russian influence in the country became more and more pronounced, until at last Mr. Ellis—our minister—was recalled in sheer despair. But in justice to a very deserving public servant, it is necessary to point out that on Mr. Ellis none of the responsibility for this gradual Russian supremacy can fall. He clearly perceived all

the consequences of the growing friendship between Persia and Russia, and so early as 1835—that is to say, in the first year of the new Shah's reign—he pointed out to Lord Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary of the time, the full significance of the relations which subsisted between Simonitch and the Shah. It is not within our knowledge that Mr. Ellis proposed any bold measure, such as Sir John Malcolm would have done, for thwarting the schemes of the Russian officials. He may possibly have done so, but at all events he clearly described what was taking place in Persia itself, particularly those schemes which were formed for the purpose of wresting from the Sudosye refugees the strong place of Herat. To Mr. Ellis belongs also the credit of having been the first person who distinctly perceived the danger to India from Russian ambition. In no hesitating language did he express this belief, as may be seen from the following passage from one of his official letters:—"I have the complete conviction that the English Government cannot permit the extension of the Persian empire in the direction of Afghanistan without placing the interior tranquillity of British India in danger. This extension will bring Russian influence to the very threshold of our Indian empire, and as Persia will not, or dare not, enter into a sincere alliance with England, our policy for the future should be to consider her, not *as a barrier which covers India, but as the first parallel from whence the assault will be given.*"

Mr. Ellis's wisdom has been confirmed by later events, and so far as it is possible to define a policy,

which scarcely deserves the name of a policy, that pursued has been based on the assumption which is to be found in the words that are italicised. They seem to the writer of these pages to be words of great and practical wisdom, considering they were written in 1835. Sir John Malcolm in 1805 would have made use of words of higher and more statesman-like character, but Mr. Ellis was fettered by all the actions of his Government in 1828. It is with regret that the admirer of Lord Palmerston must admit that in those days he was blind to the danger from Russia. His response to the representations of Mr. Ellis was to bid him live on good terms with Count Simonitch! The reward for Mr. Ellis's wisdom and foresight was his recall, and the tortuous thread of Persian policy passed into the hands of Mr.—afterwards Sir John—McNiell, who believed as keenly as ever that British influence in Persia was equal to Russian, and that the occasion only needed the verbal war of threats and promises.

Unfortunately Sir John's bright anticipations were unrealised. The Shah was fully resolved to extend his dominions into Afghanistan, and the Russian minister, partly with and partly without his master's authority, encouraged that determination in every way. He was even lavish of promises of direct assistance, and it is said that an auxiliary of Russian troops was also stipulated for. Be that as it may, it is certain that when Sir John McNiell reached the scene of action he found that Russian influence was supreme, and that Mr. Ellis had not in any way exaggerated the position of the case. In fact we find him using

language identical with that employed by Mr. Ellis, and demanding further instructions and fuller powers!

At last, in 1837, Mahomed Shah threw off the mask, and marched against Herat. The English minister at once protested against the act, and on his own responsibility warned the Shah of the dangers of the course which he was about to pursue. He was out-manœuvred, however, by the Russian representative, and Mahomed Shah persisted in the attempt to realise the dream with which he had come to the throne. At the head of a large army, which certainly exceeded thirty thousand men, Mahomed Shah laid siege to Herat. The dissensions in the Persian camp assisted the resolution of the garrison, and the siege terminated in failure nine months after the Persian army had sat down before the walls. The course of this siege was marked by two events, the heroism of Eldred Pottinger, which will be described in our next chapter, and the withdrawal of the English minister from the Persian Court. In March 1838 Sir John McNiell left Teheran for the seat of war; but the reception he met with was far from cordial. The English minister was not easily discouraged. He repeated those arguments which he had previously employed, urging upon the Shah the necessity for casting aside the Russian alliance and for joining heart and soul with this country. His arguments were unavailing. He could give nothing, and his threats were remote when they were not vague. With regard to the expedition against Herat, the Shah is generally reported to have

said: "I am not a free agent, I am afraid of giving umbrage to the Russian Government by abandoning the siege. If I had known that I was running the risk of losing the friendship of the British Government, I should not have gone so far, and if you are in a position to inform me that I shall be attacked by the British if I do not at once desist from the siege, I will desist. I must be spoken to in this manner, and thus treated by Great Britain, in order to be able to support myself against Russia."

For three months the Persian camp was the scene of constant negotiation and bitter recrimination between the minister of the Shah and the envoys of England and Russia. In this war of words Simonitch, who had all the cards in his favour, won the game, and in June, 1838, Sir John quitted the Persian camp. The alliance with Persia was thus summarily concluded, and the McNiell campaign in Persia which had begun so auspiciously closed without anything beneficial having been accomplished.

At this moment our Government awoke to the importance of the question. Lord Palmerston sent Sir John McNiell that authority which he had so long demanded, and when it was found that the Shah had chosen his path, and refused to concede what we in the plainest terms demanded of him, we proceeded to follow up by acts that which we had so clearly defined in diplomatic language. A fleet was sent to the Gulf, and the island of Kharrack was occupied. This bold action had the desired effect, and the failure of the

attack on Herat tended further to discredit the reputation of Russia. Count Nesselrode hastened to recall Count Simonitch, and other agents of his Government, such as Captain Vickovitch, were more completely disowned. It would almost appear, from the apathy which the Russian statesman showed in this matter, that there was not as clear a view in Russia as to the feasibility of an Indian invasion as had been supposed. With the recall of Simonitch Russia had voluntarily placed herself under disadvantages from which she had formerly been free, and it may without hesitation be asserted that Russia missed in 1838 one of the most favourable opportunities that she could ever hope to have of securing a position which would enable her to invade India.

The subsequent course of Anglo-Persian relations possesses neither the interest nor the importance which on several previous occasions attached to it. Yet now, not less clearly than formerly, does Persia represent the first parallel in an attack on India. The importance of Persia is consequently as great as ever it was. In one respect, too, it is more important, for Persia has become weaker instead of stronger, and the doubts of her ability to shape a policy for herself have consequently increased instead of decreased.

In August, 1848, Mahomed Shah died, and was succeeded by his son, Nasir Eddin, the present Shah. The earlier years of the present reign witnessed a resumption of those schemes against Herat which had marked the previous one; and in January, 1853, it was found necessary to secure from the Shah an agreement

binding him not to touch the province of Herat. The truce was hollow, however, and in November, 1854, the English minister once more quitted Teheran, and later on, on the 26th October, 1856, Herat was occupied by a Persian army. War was immediately declared by England, and the island of Kharrack forthwith occupied. A brief campaign took place in southern Persia, and an alliance was formed with Dost Mahomed. In March, 1857, peace was patched up and a treaty signed at Paris between the belligerents.

We have already seen the Persians desire to aggrandise themselves at the expense of Afghanistan, but it should not be forgotten that a similar systematic encroachment was going on or was being attempted in the direction of Beloochistan. Out of these disturbances, and also of the differences between Persia and Afghanistan with regard to the Seistan frontier, sprang that English Commission which, in 1871, laboured to effect a settlement between the neighbours. The dispute between the Persians and the Belooches appears to have been satisfactorily settled with regard to Mekran, but the Afghan question was more difficult. In 1855 a chief had set up an independent power in the province of Seistan. His name was Ali Khan Sarbandee. This chief broke off from his connection with Afghanistan, and leant instead upon the Persians. He married a princess of the Persian royal house, and accepted a regular subsidy from the Government. In 1858 Ali Khan was murdered by his nephew, Taj Mahomed, who, seizing the authority in the district, declared himself independent. He still

maintained a nominal alliance with Persia, but in 1867 he was removed by Persia and placed in confinement in Teheran. By this means the authority of Persia became virtually supreme in Seistan, and the Afghans, too much occupied in their own internal disputes, were unable to check the aggressive policy of Persia.

The English Government had never recognised the right of Persia to hold possession of Seistan, and in 1862 we made a formal intimation to that effect to the Shah, when he appealed to us to fulfil some of the conditions of the treaty of 1857. The frontier commission, which laboured in 1871–72 to effect a settlement of the difficulty, arrived at a decision which appears to have been acceptable neither to Shere Ali, who made it one of his stock grievances, nor to Nasir Eddin, who appealed against the decision. In all probability the dissatisfaction which was shown by both of the litigants was the highest possible proof of the justice of the award.

The narrative of our past relations with Persia cannot fail to remind us that our position has been much affected by doubt and want of purpose in the past. We have often apparently not known what our policy should be, and when we have chanced to have come to some determination upon the subject we have usually marred its effect by vacillation in carrying it into execution. There is no reason to believe that these old vices in our system have passed away. There are no grounds for saying that Mr. Thomson possesses ampler instructions than did Mr. Ellis and his successors, and

so long as there is no clearly-defined policy to follow, so long must our representatives labour under peculiar disadvantages. It is high time that this state of things should cease. We are no longer unskilled in the mysteries of Central Asian State-craft. We may even claim to be quite as skilled as the Russians, and this being so, it is vain for us to pretend to shut our eyes to the fact that to secure a strong position in Persia should be the corner-stone of the foreign policy of India. This view was clearly recognised in the days of Malcolm, and of its soundness there can be no doubt. The position of Persia is peculiarly advantageous in a strategical sense, being approachable both on the north and the south by water, and holding all the chief roads which pass from South-west Asia to the East. It is difficult to imagine one more strikingly favoured in every respect than the kingdom of the Shah, and although Persia has been shorn of much of its power by the loss of the Caspian provinces it still remains a State of sufficient strength and resource to present a bold face even to a great Power.

It is very necessary that the policy of this country with regard to Persia should return to the first principles upon which it was based in the earlier years of the century, and by putting aside that spirit of indifference which is ill-suited to a Power charged with the trusteeship of such important interests as England is, assist in regenerating a country which was never weaker than at the present moment. What do we behold? The Persian army, which is the germ of a very formidable force, passing under the control of

Russia more and more; generals from Tiflis going as far as Hamadan to review Persian troops; and numerous Russian officers entering the service of the Shah, with the object of drilling the raw recruits, who are now neglected, and of reorganizing the artillery service, which still retains some symptoms of its former efficiency when under English and French officers. But not only are these schemes boldly formulated, but others of scarcely less importance are also mooted.

The talk of constructing railways in all directions in northern Persia, where there is really no obstacle in the path of constructors, is probably greatly exaggerated, but it is significant to observe that the rumours daily increase. The first step in these schemes must necessarily be the construction of a line between Batoum and the Persian frontier. This can be done by taking the round-about route through Tiflis. After that has been accomplished there is no reason why that line should not be extended to Tabriz, Teheran, and Herat. It is said on good authority that the proposed route has been sketched out and approved; and that the works may be shortly expected to be commenced. Be that as it may, all these schemes clearly prove that although Persia may not be most cordially disposed towards Russia, the Shah cannot help himself. He is practically impotent, and must do what he is ordered.

In this fact lies the secret of our policy. We should give him and his ministers the moral courage which they require to enable them to resist the Russian demands. By concluding a treaty with Persia, and by adhering to its stipulations, we could make

Persia sufficiently bold to run counter to the views of the Russian authorities, and the first proof of this would be afforded by enabling Persia to extend her territory into the Turcoman country across the path of the aggressive Lomakine. The reward of that policy would not be uncertain, and it is most probable that Russia would hesitate to oppose Persia if she knew that England had resolved to follow in that country the same bold policy which was adopted in face of the lesser danger from French ambition. In any case the results would be all important and beneficial. Sir Henry Rawlinson has more than anyone else pointed out the great advantages that would accrue to us from having a firm ally in a strong and rejuvenated Persia.

At present, instead of having an ally in Persia, we have a dubious and uncertain friend, whose action through sheer weakness it is impossible to depend upon with any degree of certainty. So long, too, as we hold aloof, so long as the subjects of other Powers officer her army, and are supreme in her councils, so long must we occupy but a secondary position at Teheran. It will require a bold, consistent, and determined policy, advocated with skill and pushed with eager determination, to recover all the ground we have lost. But it is not too late for diplomacy to retrieve the day. There was a time in 1834 or 1835 when Ellis or McNiell might have averted the fatal result had they been properly supported. They were not, and the rupture came in 1838. It is possible that we have reached a somewhat similar stage now; but if

we have—and there are many reasons all pointing to the same conclusion—what cause have we to hope for as happy a result as that which came in the end of 1838, when the Persian army retired baffled from before the ramparts of Herat? If we permit matters to reach that pass again we shall certainly not have a repetition of the same good fortune; and if we do not adopt prompt precautions, if we do not secure the introduction of an English element into the army, if we do not encourage the Shah and his ministers to thwart and oppose the Russian schemes, we shall certainly be failing to take the only remedies which it lies in our power to secure. The Central Asian Question cannot be solved by divided action in any one phase of it. There must be vigour throughout; but nowhere can vigour be more beneficial than at Teheran, where it has been so long absent.

Since the preceding lines were written, Sir Henry Rawlinson made the following important statement, with regard to the future of the Persian army, at the United Service Institute, which should be taken to heart by all those who are interested in the future of that country and its military resources:—

"It is now forty-five years since I went to Persia, but whilst there a very good opportunity was afforded me of testing the real value of the military resources of the country. I was deputed to proceed to one of the frontier provinces for the purpose of raising three or four regiments amongst the frontier tribes. I undertook the work *ab initio*, actually enlisting the men, then forming them into squads and companies,

and afterwards taking the brigade to head-quarters. In the course of that mission, I was able, of course, to test the general adaptability of the men for military service; and the opinion I formed of them from that experience, added to that of five years connection with the army, was that there were no people in the world presenting better rough material for soldiers than the Persians. Their physique was admirable; there was an absence of all intemperance amongst them, and their general intelligence and personal courage were really beyond all praise. But the Persian soldier has never had a fair chance; not even in the present day. He has always been at the caprice of interested governors or officers, who look more to filling their own pockets than to the efficiency of the force they command, or to the national interests. Thus the army has become, so to speak, the sport of interested motives, and has never emerged, except for a short period during the administration of Christie and Lindsay, from a condition of military mediocrity. But there was the material out of which any European Power could really construct a splendid working army, far superior to anything which Turkey could produce. On one occasion I took the trouble to calculate, from the sergeant's road-book, the average of ninety-five successive marches, and I found the figures yielded an average of twenty-one miles a day. That I believe surpasses any record of the kind in military history. In an abstract sense the subject of the Persian army does not immediately affect this country; but when we come to consider it in connection with political con-

siderations of vast moment it will be found to be one that concerns us very nearly. The geographical position of Persia, between Russia and Turkey on the one side and India on the other, makes it absolutely certain that she will be an important factor in the future political conditions of the East. It is impossible that she can remain quiescent, surrounded as she is by other nations now undergoing important political changes. The events which are taking place in those nations must necessarily influence Persia herself; and as that influence acts upon the Government and the country, so it will react upon our interests in India. If the military resources of Persia were placed at the command of a Power hostile to England it would constitute a most formidable menace to India. On the other hand, if Persia were brought into honest and cordial alliance with England, and if her military resources were developed and strengthened by material assistance in money, arms, and instruction, then she would form a most impregnable barrier in the protection of India. As a well-wisher of Persia, and as a patriotic Englishman, I hope that the policy of suspicion and neglect which has so long prevailed will now be exchanged for one of confidence and mutual interest; for I believe that, with a real and a cordial alliance between England and Persia, India would march rapidly on in the paths of peace, of successful commerce, of social improvement, and of enlightened civilisation."

CHAPTER VI.

HERAT.

ROUND the name of Herat more political interest has accumulated than is the case with any other part of Central Asia; and the Herat question, as it may be called, has attracted a degree of attention which in this country is not surpassed by any other subject connected with Asian politics. Nor is the reputation of Herat due, as some would have us suppose, to the apprehension of a few English officers at Russia's advance southward, nor indeed does it arise at all from an English origin. It is quite a mistake to suppose, as so many persons in this country do, that the Central Asian Question and its subsidiary parts, the Afghan and the Herat, have come into being since it was our fortune to establish an empire from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya. In all ages and at all periods those questions have possessed more or less of active force. With the splendid possessions which the genius of our ancestors has secured for us, we also of

necessity have accepted the responsibilities which all previous possessors of our privileges have had to fulfil, and we can no more be absolved from them than was the Emperor Akbar. Of these questions the Herat one is not the least important, and it is certainly one of the most interesting.

The ancient history of Herat is lost in the mist of antiquity. By some it is said to correspond very closely with the territory called Aria by the historian of Alexander, of which State the principal cities were Artakoana, Aria Metropolis, Sousia Akhala, and Candace. It is probable that Herat stands upon the site of one of these places; but it would be rash to attempt to indicate with any precision which of the cities mentioned has the privilege of being the original Herat. The earlier Persian chronicles make mention of the city of Heri as a place of considerable importance as the capital of Aria. It is said to have been founded by Lohrasp, and to have been increased and embellished by his successors, Gustasp and Bahman. It is not our purpose to sketch the remote and uncertain chronicle of this Asiatic town, for that would serve no practical purpose, and might only tend to confuse if briefly discussed. Twice during the sixteenth century did Herat as a Persian city undergo a siege at the hands of the Usbegs of Central Asia. On the first occasion it was besieged for eighteen months, but the garrison held out resolutely for that period, and was then relieved by Shah Tamasp. On the second occasion, later on, the Usbegs were more successful, and Herat surrendered after a nine-months' siege.

It soon passed again into the possession of the Persians, and their Government continued to be supreme there until in the commencing years of the eighteenth century the Abdali tribe of Afghans made that descent from the mountains of Ghor which was among the originating circumstances of Afghan independence. Before the year 1719 Ayadullah, who had established his authority over the Abdalis, had defeated the army of the Persian ruler, severely hampered by his war with the Ghiljies, and had wrested from him his all-important fortress in Khorasan. During twelve years the Abdalis maintained their position in Herat, and it was only when Nadir Shah was in the full tide of his successful career that the Abdali Afghans were compelled to yield to a more powerful antagonist. This was in the year 1731, but Herat then resisted for ten months the utmost that Nadir could do. During Nadir's reign Herat remained one of his chief possessions, and on his death, in 1747, it passed after a brief interval into the possession of Ahmed Khan. The siege only lasted for two weeks, and in 1749 Herat became a portion of the new Afghan kingdom.

The Durani established in Khorasan a principality which he placed under the control of Shah Rokh, son of Nadir, who ruled for many years in this province as a vassal of the Afghan ruler. This scheme was very prudent, and for a long time worked well. It effectually prevented all attempt on the part of Persia to assail the western frontiers of the Durani ruler. Strong in Herat, and with an ally established at Meshed, Ahmed was able to defy the utmost that the

malevolence of the ruler of Teheran could wreak against him. Shah Rokh himself became long years afterwards, in 1796, the victim of the avarice of Aga Mahomed Khan, who tortured him in order to compel the confession of large stores of valuable jewels, and the unhappy ruler died under the torture he endured. Thus perished, fifty years after the death of the great conqueror, the grandson of Nadir Shah.

It would be equally unprofitable to trace in close detail the numerous occasions on which the Persians have since striven to establish their authority in Herat. Whenever Afghanistan has been disunited then the Persians have sought to obtain possession of this place, and although they have always failed in their direct efforts, they have on several occasions succeeded indirectly by establishing themselves in a kind of supreme position over the ruler of Herat for the time being. Of the great siege in 1838 a circumstantial description is to be found in the narrative of its defender, Major Pottinger, as well as in the "Caravan Journeys" of Mons. Ferrier. Here it is unnecessary to do more than briefly recapitulate such well known events. The check which was then given to the pretensions of the Shah was so far severe that it was not for several years afterwards that his successor dared to attempt its repetition, and then it was only in consequence of the dissensions which had broken out in Herat itself—at that time independent of the rest of Afghanistan.

For when, after the murder of Futteh Ali Khan, Mahmoud and his son Kamran fled westward, it was to establish in Herat the semblance of the power which

they left behind them in Cabul. For many years Mahmoud was the nominal ruler, the actual privileges of power being dispensed by Kamran, and then Mahmoud suddenly died. There were rumours among the ill-disposed that Kamran had played a part in this event, but no proof whatever has been produced. At all events there was nothing impossible in such an occurrence. Kamran's character had from the very earliest been marked by utter unscrupulousness and cruelty. The murderer of Futteh Ali Khan and of his cousin Kaissar would not have hesitated to have turned parricide had he thought it would have served his own purpose. But there is no proof of Kamran's guilt—and Mahmoud died, to be succeeded as ruler of Herat by his son. This event occurred in 1829.

Upon the death of Mahmoud, Kamran, who had formerly given some evidence of the possession of administrative capacity, sank into a mere debauchee, giving himself up to the use of baneful drugs and leading a life of retirement. At first he entrusted the task of ruling the State to Attah Khan of the Aleckosye tribe, and during the first twelve months this able man as Vizier repressed in an incipient stage the rebellions which various intriguers attempted to excite against the ruler. In 1830, however, Attah Khan died, and he was succeeded by his nephew, the able but infamous Yar Mahomed Khan. Yar Mahomed's father, Abdullah, had been a devoted follower of the fortunes of Shah Mahmoud, and at one time had held the high appointment of Governor of Cashmere. It is said

that Yar Mahomed began at once to intrigue with the object of obtaining supreme power. He removed those from office who might be supposed to be inimical to his person, installing his dependants in their place. But this may very possibly have been done with the view not of ousting Kamran from power, but of maintaining himself in the position of Vizier.

In 1832 the Persians, under the command of Abbas Mirza, attempted to recover in Khorasan some equivalent for what they had lost elsewhere by the Treaty of Turkomanchai. They also menaced the independence of the State of Herat. The Persian prince summoned Yar Mahomed to his camp to discuss matters, as he said, of common interest, but as soon as he found the Vizier in his power he began to importune him to surrender some of Kamran's claims to independent government. This Yar Mahomed steadily refused to do, and, enraged at his firmness, Abbas Mirza even went so far as to torture him. Shortly afterwards, however, Yar Mahomed was released, and returned to Herat, and then the whole scene was changed by the premature death of Abbas Mirza.

When his death took place Abbas was on the point of advancing against Herat, and indeed his son Mahomed Mirza had reached the vicinity of the town with a portion of the army. The death of the Prince Royal caused the abandonment of the enterprise, which, four years later on, Mahomed Mirza, then become Shah, resumed. Yar Mahomed employed this lull in extending his power into Seistan, and in drilling his army and placing it on a more regular basis.

He also strengthened the fortifications of Herat, and took other measures for improving the condition of the country. In short, he proved himself to be a remarkably able ruler. For his own personal ends he followed a not less skilful policy, and Ferrier says that he had "the tact to make the odium of the plundering and discontent on the part of the people fall upon the king Kamran, while he managed to secure to himself all the praise of whatever was good." A very graphic description of Yar Mahomed and his measures will be found in Mons. Ferrier's two works, which have been previously referred to.

When Mahomed Shah advanced against Herat in the year 1837 there was general expectation throughout the East. For several years rumour had been rife, and the grand rivalry between England and Russia which had during some time been accumulating force seemed about to burst in a thunder-cloud. In the year of grace 1837 men's minds turned anxiously to the far East, where the political horizon had assumed a lurid hue; and as the year 1838 passed by, greater anxiety and apprehension were aroused by the progress of events in the Indian border-lands. There was one drama, on a small scale perhaps, round which the whole interest of the question settled, yet that drama not only demonstrated the nature of the rival forces, but it also reduced to a focus all the antipathies of the various Powers in Western Asia. That drama was the siege of Herat, and round that fortress and within its walls might be seen Russian ambition, Persian chicane, Afghan vacil-

lation, and English indomitable resolution all personified. It was but the prelude to "the great game in Central Asia."

During ten months a Persian army closely beleaguered the fortress, and during that period Yar Mahomed and the English officer, Eldred Pottinger, desperately and in the result successfully held the walls. No one can read, however, the story of that siege without perceiving that the result was due as much to the divisions in the Persian camp as to the gallantry of the defenders. In Kaye's brilliant description of this event (Kaye's "History of the War in Afghanistan," Vol. I. Book ii. Chap. 2) it will be seen that there was a point in the crisis of the assault of the 24th of June when even the resolution of Yar Mahomed broke down before the success of the Persian assailants at one part of the ramparts. In that moment the fate of Herat was nearly decided in favour of Persia. The garrison was abandoning its post and fleeing before the victorious Persians. Yar Mahomed was incapable of rallying them, and lost all heart. Despite the taunts of Pottinger, the Vizier sat down helpless, utterly unequal to the occasion. At last Pottinger's inspiriting conduct reflected itself in the action of the Afghan, and Yar Mahomed, "rushing like a madman upon the hindmost" of the retreating soldiers, compelled them to face their assailants. "The effect of this sudden movement was magical. The Persians, seized with a panic, abandoned their position and fled. The crisis was over, and Herat was saved," thanks to the intrepid resolution of Pottinger. In this assault

the Persians lost nearly two thousand men; and after that the siege languished. In September, 1838, the Persian army had destroyed its entrenchments and was in full retreat.

Next year an English envoy, Major D'Arcy Todd, was sent to Herat, when he concluded a treaty with Yar Mahomed, acknowledging him as minister of Herat, and the channel of all communication with Shah Kamran. We also promised supplies of money and the loan of officers for the service of Herat. In return this ruler pledged himself to have nothing to do with any other European nation. He also agreed to promote trade and to abolish slavery. Various sums of money were placed at his disposal, and for some time the English influence remained supreme in Herat. But this state of things did not long continue. The championing of the Sudosye cause in the person of Shuja-ul-Mulk was far from being pleasant to the prime minister of another and older branch of that family. Moreover Yar Mahomed aimed at the supreme authority, and we came as the champions of the divine right of kings.

Within a very few weeks of the signature of the treaty Yar Mahomed was detected in intrigues with Persia, and it is affirmed that he even went so far as to offer to place Herat in the hands of the Shah. His insolence obliged Major Todd to withdraw, after refusing to continue the subsidy of twenty-five thousand rupees a month which we allowed the Government of Shah Kamran. In fact, Shah Kamran manifested a desire to free himself from the presence of his

too powerful minister, and many suggestions were made to Major Todd to assist in ridding the world of the tyrant. It needed but a word from the English envoy to have cost Yar Mahomed his life, but that word Major Todd, like the gallant English gentleman that he was, refused to say. Yar Mahomed, however, saw in the presence of the English an obstacle in his path towards attaining complete power. He could not murder his master so long as Major Todd resided in Herat. It was then that he entered into intrigues with Persia, carrying on an extensive correspondence with the Governor-General of Khorasan.

On learning this, Major Todd at once communicated with the English Resident at Cabul, saying that it was indispensable to the security of Shuja's rule that the principality of Herat should be annexed. The reply to this came after some time from Lord Auckland himself, giving Yar Mahomed's previous acts the benefit of oblivion. But this concession only inflamed still more the hostility and apprehension of the Vizier, and at last Major Todd was compelled out of self-respect to take his departure. The East India Company failed to recognise the merit of this able officer, and even went so far in their disappointment as to say that he was "*incapable of filling a political appointment, and ought to rejoin his regiment with dishonour.*" That decision, unjust and cruel, was afterwards reversed, but its effect on Major Todd could never be removed. Five years later on he met with a glorious death on the field of Ferozeshah.

Once free of the presence of the English officer,

Yar Mahomed intrigued more openly against his master, and took steps to effect his overthrow. Shah Kamran saw the storm that was approaching, and, acting under the guidance of his sons and a few staunch supporters, threw himself into the citadel with five hundred men. At that moment, it was in the doubtful days of 1841, the English were unable to send troops from Candahar to his aid, but Major—now Sir Henry—Rawlinson did everything in his power by subsidising Dine Mahomed, Yar Mahomed's cousin, who had set up an independent authority among the Eimaks, to assist the unfortunate Kamran. When Dine Mahomed woke up from the lethargy into which he sunk, the opportunity had passed by, and his aid came too late.

The Sudosyes made a gallant defence in the citadel, but after a siege of fifty days it surrendered. Kamran then became a State prisoner, and was despoiled of his wealth. In March, 1842, when there was no one near to proffer him assistance, when the English were expelled from every place save Candahar, and Shuja-ul-Mulk had been murdered, Yar Mahomed resolved to rid himself of his master. Such was the end of Kamran, Sudosye, a quarter of a century after he and his father Mahmoud fleeing from the victorious Barucksyes had set up in the west an independent power. Yar Mahomed had attained the wish of his life. He was supreme and independent.

Yar Mahomed at once proceeded to turn his triumph to good account. He continued those schemes of improvement which he had partially carried out when he was minister, and although embarrassment through

want of money caused him to adopt many measures which were tyrannical, yet under his auspices the province of Herat made considerable progress. His expeditions in the Ghor region added much to the extent of his dominions, and he effectually checked the encroachments which Kohundil Khan of Candahar attempted to carry out. It was at this period that his hands were greatly strengthened by the marriage of his daughter with Akbar Khan, the son of Dost Mahomed; and Kohundil, menaced on the north from Ghizni, was unable to resent, as he would otherwise have done, the aggressive acts of Yar Mahomed. Nor did this ambitious ruler confine the sphere of his activity to the country lying immediately round Herat. He aspired to play a greater part, and by the adoption of a bold policy sought to extend his influence in various directions. He successively invaded the khanates of Maimene, Shiborgan, and Andkhoi, and established his power in all that region. He even threatened the integrity of Balkh, which a few years later was to pass into the hands of Dost Mahomed. His writ ran, as the expression goes, in all that northern country.

The height of his triumph lasted but for a brief space, and a disastrous campaign against the Usbegs compelled him to curtail his field of activity. His success also excited the jealousy and hostility of his neighbours; but from their machinations, partly by good fortune and partly by his ability, Yar Mahomed suffered no loss of power. The death of Mahomed, Shah of Persia, in 1849, tended still further to con-

solidate the power of Yar Mahomed, and the new Shah, Nasir Eddin, adopted a very friendly policy towards Herat. But shortly after this, his career was cut short, and in 1851 his son Seyyid Mahomed was ruling in Herat in more or less proclaimed dependence upon Persia.

For seven years Seyyid Mahomed reigned in Herat, and then he was deposed by Mahomed Yusuf, grandson of Feroz, and grand-nephew of the three brothers of the Sudosye family, who reigned in Afghanistan alternately during the first years of the present century, but his reign was very brief, and he was deposed by a faction in the city headed by Esau Khan, who set himself up as ruler. Mahomed Yusuf was sent as a prisoner to the Persian camp, and Esau Khan became a vassal of the Persians. But he still desired to retain his independence, and a Persian army consequently advanced upon Herat with the intention of taking it. During four months of the year 1856 Esau Khan defended Herat against the attempt of the Persian general Hassan to take it, but on the 25th October it surrendered, and Esau Khan was installed as vizier. A few days after the surrender he was murdered, however, by a party of Persian soldiers. The author of "Lost among the Afghans," who played a very considerable part in the siege, gives a different and more sensational account of this than that which is ordinarily accepted. "The King of Persia wrote to Abdul Ali Khan, the first officer of the artillery, secretly, and commanded him to kill Esau Khan. One day I was sitting with Abdul

and I noticed that he was dressed as a common soldier. I was astonished at this, still more so when I saw him load a large pistol and hide it in his breast in the folds of his clothes. Presently Esau Khan came riding by. Abdul went out and accosted him, saying, 'I am a poor soldier; I want you to take my petition to the prince. Oh, King of Herat, hear me!' Esau Khan stopped his horse, and asked what the petition was. Abdul said, 'I must speak it in your ear, it is a great secret.' So the king leant over to listen to the request; then Abdul drew out his pistol and shot Esau Khan, and ran back into his tent. The sturdy Afghan, though mortally wounded, did not fall without giving one more proof of his prowess. Drawing his sword and pistol, he shot one Persian soldier and cut down two more; then he fell from his horse and died."

It was at this point that England entered into an alliance with Dost Mahomed for the purpose of expelling the Persians from Herat. The Treaty of Paris, concluded in March, 1857, placed matters on a fresh basis, and the Persians again abandoned those pretensions which whenever they had been put forward had been a fruitful cause of displeasure to this country. And now, in 1857, Herat for the first time became the possession of a Barucksye ruler, and the last appendage of the Sudosyes passed into the hands of the conquering and aggressive family that had obtained supremacy in the rest of Afghanistan. The ruler who was selected to wield power in Herat was Ahmed Khan, nephew of Dost Mahomed. He was also his

son-in-law. Ahmed Khan soon became better known as Sultan Jan, and appears to have aspired to play something of the part of Yar Mahomed. At all events, he leant more on Persian support than he did upon Afghan, and he was decidedly hostile to the interests of this country. It is strange to find how often the policy of England has defeated itself through imperfect information, for it was hoped if not believed that Sultan Jan was well-disposed towards this country and far from being hostile to our cause. In March, 1862, he advanced against his cousin, Shereef Khan, a full-brother of the Ameer Shere Ali, who was established as governor in Ferrah. This expedition was completely successful, and as it placed great aggressive power in the hands of the ruler of Herat, it was at once determined in Cabul to arrest the career of the youthful conqueror. Dost Mahomed collected a large army for the purpose of acquiring possession of Herat, and advanced against it in person in the summer of 1862. On the 29th of June he retook Ferrah, and on the 28th of July he laid siege to Herat. Ten months afterwards it surrendered upon the death of Sultan Jan. Dost Mahomed only survived this great triumph a fortnight; but since then Herat has remained an integral portion of Afghanistan.

Shere Ali appointed his third son, Yakoob Khan, to the post of governor, which he retained without a break until the year 1868. He then left it to win back his father's kingdom, and for two years he took a prominent part in the administration of affairs in Cabul. But in 1870 he was compelled to leave the capital,

and in 1871–73 he had set up in Herat an independent power of his own. It was at this time that Captain Marsh came to Herat and found the youthful ruler striving hard to found a respectable government on the ruins of that series of worthless administrations which had been established there since the days of Yar Mahomed. With Yakoob Khan's capture when visiting his father on a safe-conduct, Herat passed again into the possession of Shere Ali; and the governor whom he appointed there, Omar Mahomed Khan, still, so far as we know, upholds the authority of the Barucksye family.

Such has been the history, briefly told, of this city and province. Its unique position on the frontiers of the two States of Persia and Afghanistan has not been turned to any of those useful purposes to which it might have been, but has rather served as an incentive to military and other adventurers to set up an independent authority in the outskirts of two tottering and enfeebled kingdoms. The claims of Persia are, however, much more remote than those of Cabul, although during a great portion of the period of the Durani sway Herat has been a State within a State. But for sixteen years the Barucksyes have been supreme there as everywhere else in the country; and it does not appear that the Persians have in that period resorted to any of those bare-faced schemes which were so frequent before. Persian pretensions slumber with regard to Herat, and for the peace of our dominions it is well that they should continue to lie dormant. Nasir Eddin has probably not forgotten the dreams and aspirations of his early

days, but he is wise enough to know that the time has not been favourable for their realisation. It is only in a time of uncertainty and popular confusion that Persia can hope to wrest Herat from the Afghans; and the danger in such a crisis as the present, when Afghanistan is fast becoming what it was for so long before the last century—a mere geographical expression—is very great indeed.

Some description of the town of Herat will here be opportune. The position of Herat in the centre of a country remarkable for its natural fertility is eminently felicitous. Before the siege of 1838 the country round Herat was a smiling paradise, and after it it was a wilderness. The devastation wrought by the Persians was incalculable. "The late war," wrote Pottinger, "and its consequences have so changed the entire neighbourhood of the city that under its present appearance it would not be recognised by its former visitants." Nor has Herat made any great progress since those days. The town itself has indeed recovered something of its old prosperity, but the country around is still plunged deep in the abyss into which a series of unfortunate wars have dragged it. Nor can any improvement be expected to take place so long as the inhabitant has no guarantee that his efforts to improve the condition of the country will not be assisted by the support of a firmly consolidated government.

The size of Herat is generally taken to be a mile square. It is surrounded by a rampart of considerable thickness and a ditch. According to the usual version there are five gates, but the author of "Lost

among the Afghans," whose evidence might be trusted upon a point such as this, says there are seven. Possibly the two additional ones he mentions are posterns. The city, which lies wholly within the walls, is divided into four portions, or quarters. Speaking of these Pottinger says, "The interior of the city is divided into four nearly equal divisions, by two streets which at right angles cross each other in the centre of the city. The principal one joins the gate of Candahar to the Pay-i-Hissar, and was formerly covered by a succession of small domes, springing from arches which cross the streets. About two-thirds of this magnificent bazaar still remain; but so choked up with rubbish, and so ruinous, that it has lost much of its attraction to the eye. This bazaar was about one thousand three hundred yards long and six in width. The solidity of the masonry of this work should have insured its stability; but unfortunately the arches are all defective—not one has a key-stone. They are built, as all others are in this country, with a vacancy at the apex filled merely with bits of broken bricks. The whole of the lower floors on each side are used as shops."

The walls are made of hard earth, a great quantity of which has been dug out from the interior of the city, and on these another rampart or screen has been constructed connecting the towers with each other. On an average the height of the earth rampart may be taken at ninety feet. It is supported by a counterfort of brick, and in front of it lies a ditch which can be filled or emptied at pleasure. The towers on the ramparts are separated from each other only by

fifty feet, and those at the corners are massive and very strong. Ferrier says that guns can be mounted only in these latter. There are also two covered ways or *fausse braye*, one commanding the other, cut out of the thickness of the rampart, and these add greatly to the strength of the fortification. They were in existence when Captain Marsh visited Herat. Kaye goes so far as to call them the real defences of Herat.

The citadel or ark of the town, which in old days was called Kella-i-Aktyar-Aldyn, was by itself a formidable construction, and although it has long been neglected it still preserves an important place in the list of the defences of this city. It is situated in the north, where the ground is most elevated, and forms a prominent object in the landscape for miles around. This fortress within a fortress stands on an artificial mound, which is more elevated than the ramparts, and its walls of burnt brick with towers upon them are not less formidable in appearance than those of the city wall. It is also surrounded by a wide ditch, and were it repaired and armed with proper artillery it would be impossible for an enemy to take it. There are two heights within a thousand yards of the walls at Thalehbengy and Mosulla, whence it would be possible to bombard the outer walls; but as these places are only on a level with the rampart, and consequently considerably below the foundation of the citadel, it would be impossible for an enemy to establish his batteries upon them if the citadel of Herat itself were properly armed.

Several improvements were carried out under the

direction of Major Todd after the failure of the Persians to capture it. The line of the ditch of the outer wall appearing weak it was filled up in certain parts, and a fresh one dug in advance of the old line. This has improved the rampart, by giving it a greater elevation, quite as much as it has strengthened the ditch, and the construction of flanking defences, called *caponnieres*, has still further improved the defensive condition of Herat. But these improvements, which, if continued, would have made Herat in course of a short time practically secure, were all nipped in the bud by the withdrawal of the Herat mission, and it is probable that the defences of Herat, which Ferrier saw at their best, suffered in the Persian siege of 1856 and in the Afghan of 1863.

Ferrier says—and in matters of this sort his opinion is entitled to great weight—that if these improvements had been carried out they would have proved an efficient protection against the attacks of Afghans, Persians, or Usbegs; but "were an European army to lay siege to it, the defence would not last twenty days, for it is, after all, but an immense redoubt, and, like all works of the kind, has the defect of four dead angles and a ditch difficult to defend." This opinion, in itself correct, is a little too sweeping, for, as Ferrier himself admits, it would not be difficult to construct those flanking works which are necessary in order to make Herat impregnable. There appears to be no reason also why the two heights mentioned should not also be fortified, as they are not themselves commanded from any quarter. In fact, the whole district is a mass

of ruins, and strewn around the plain lies the material for reconstructing Herat whenever the task shall be undertaken. By erecting flanking towers, and strengthening the ark, Herat might be made, as has always been asserted, impregnable. It would require a considerable garrison no doubt to man its walls properly, but there would be no necessity, whether Herat falls to England or to Russia, for that garrison to be composed of Europeans. In fact, as has been well observed, that is one of the great points in favour of Herat, that its possessors can always raise from amongst its inhabitants a band of brave and docile soldiers. The Heratee has no political tie whatever to wean him from his allegiance to the authority Providence places over him, and his fidelity depends solely on the degree of regularity with which he is paid.

It is difficult to give the population of an Asiatic town, and in none has it fluctuated so much as in Herat. Before the year 1838 it was computed to contain as many as seventy thousand people. Kaye only gave it forty-five thousand; and during the great siege it dwindled down to six thousand. It is probable that there are at least thirty thousand people in Herat now, and there may possibly be forty thousand. Captain Marsh speaks of considerable crowds in 1872, and from his narrative * it would seem safe to conclude that it must be the higher number. He speaks of the dirt, and of symptoms of squalor in the bazaars and streets; but he was told these appearances were to some extent

* *See* Captain Marsh's "Ride through Islam, 1877."

intentional. No one desired to appear too rich! It reminds one, however, very much of Captain Conolly's description of the state of things at Herat when he was there many years ago. The probable truth is that Herat has improved still more since 1872, and that it is now a fairly thriving town. But the neighbourhood is probably much as it was in Ferrier's time, and it certainly has not resumed that attractive appearance of corn-fields, orchards, and vineyards which once belonged to it.

But Herat is still something more than the shadow of a name. It lives in the memory of a mighty past, and it may aspire, on the grounds of its position and its innate wealth, to a prosperous and brilliant future. But in order to attain that improved position it must be assured a tranquil government. The pretensions of Persia must be conclusively dispelled, and all apprehension from Afghan disturbances removed. These can only be effected when a strong authority has been established there, and that strong authority must be an European power. Until then Herat may progress slowly, but the improvement can only be uncertain and subject to fits of retrogression. The districts round it can also never be expected to become populated and thriving until all danger from Persia and from robbers out of Turcomania, Ferrah and the Hazara country has been conclusively dispelled. With regard to the future of Herat so much is well assured.

But there is another future of Herat, which is for England of the highest importance, and that is its political future. In words which should form the text

of our policy towards Herat, Sir Henry Rawlinson has declared that "*we cannot afford to expose Herat to the risk of being taken by a Russian coup de main.*" Yet that is precisely what Herat lies exposed to so long as it is held by a feeble or by a hostile State. At the present moment it is held by a country which is not only enfeebled, but is also absolutely hostile to us. Without any precise information upon the subject we know that the state of things in Herat cannot but be disturbed more or less by the disruption of Shere Ali's power to the East, and now that the Ameer has died, and the authority of his successor may be held to be vague, we may expect, with tolerable certainty, that some soldier of fortune or other adventurer will strive to set up therein an independent authority of his own. Already we have learnt of some of those inroads into Herat territory on the part of the Turcomans which are the sure sign of a relaxing of vigour on the part of the governor.

The overthrow of the Ameer and the uncertain future before Cabul bring clearly before us the fact that the immediate future of Herat is concealed from our gaze by no slight mist, or rather while it is impossible to perceive the exact progress of events there, one possible aspect of them is only too easily to be foreseen. A return to the state of things before its capture by Dost Mahomed, when a series of petty despots ruled there in more or less proclaimed dependence upon Persia, would be matter for grave consideration and apprehension. During the existence of that state of affairs the Persians were on no fewer than five occasions on the point of wresting Herat

from Afghanistan, and on one occasion they absolutely succeeded. In 1838, had the great siege ended successfully, it is tolerably clear that Russia would have taken an active part in the war, and that Herat would have had to be reconquered by a British army.

The past history of the question makes the future stages of the possessorship of Herat more clear. Forty years ago, when Herat was in the hands of the exceptionally able ruler Yar Mahomed, who had all the advantages of the advice and military skill of Major Pottinger, it was on the point of surrendering to the Persians, and it seems extraordinary, when reading the record of the siege, that it was not taken. In 1856 it was taken from Esau Khan with apparently little difficulty. In short, Herat in the hands of a weak ruler, and divided as it always is into antagonistic factions when the supreme authority is not firmly held, cannot oppose any great amount of resistance to an attack. Under present circumstances the danger is rather that it would not offer any resistance at all. Nothing is more probable than that in a collapse of Afghan authority the Persians should be recognised in that position of over-lord which they have so often held, even should they fail to become the actual possessors of the fortress. But the great point of difference between the present time and the past is to be found in the altered position of Russia with regard to this question.

In 1838 Russia had no Central Asian possessions. It is true that she possessed then, as she does still, the best base for the prosecution of a great enterprise

against India, in the Caspian. But on the other hand there was little enthusiasm in Russian circles with regard to the topic. Fifteen years later on, when an advance had been made along the Jaxartes into Turkestan, General Duhamel was the first to give expression to the desire to invade India. Before that Count Simonitch had indeed striven hard to compel his Government to back up the pretensions of Mahomed Shah by armed force, and his efforts had been gallantly aided by the devoted Vickovitch. But he failed. Count Nesselrode refused to be involved in a costly war for an object the utility of which the mass of Russian public men failed to perceive. Had Herat surrendered, and an English army advanced to reconquer it for the Sudosye ruler we had installed at Cabul, it is possible that Russia would have actively intervened.

But everything is changed since then. The prominent object before the Russians has become in their Asiatic policy the extension of their empire southward, and the consequent and unavoidable attack on the British possessions. Herat instead of being a name signifying nothing to the Russians has become a prize of the highest value in their eyes. A new motive power has been called into being by the annexation of the khanates. The attention of the authorities of Tiflis has been diverted from Armenia—where they have obtained all they can hope to secure—to the Atrek, and a campaign of unknown extent and importance has been commenced along a new road to Herat. Every forward step in this movement not only brings

them nearer to the Afghan frontier, but tightens their hold on enfeebled Persia. Even now the overthrow of the Akhals at Khoja Kala would have an immense effect upon the attitude of all the Persian governors along the frontier. It would decide the action of the Shah and his ministers during the coming crisis.

In these circumstances is to be found the radical difference between the present condition of the Herat question and the past. Never at any previous time was there greater risk of Herat falling to a Russian *coup de main* than there is at present, and the risk is further intensified by the fact that now, not as formerly, there is keenness in Russian circles to dispute this country's claims to influence in Herat. Nasir Eddin, if he should seek to fulfil the dreams of his younger days, might count on far more active support from Russia than could Mahomed Shah, and if the future of Herat is to witness the reappearance of some other Yar Mahomed or Sultan Jan, his position will for the time be rendered more secure by the assistance of the Russian generals in Trans-Caspiania. Between the condition of affairs in Herat in 1839, when D'Arcy Todd gave the wise advice to his Government to occupy that place with a British force, and now in 1879, there is little similarity. The danger which was remote then is now close at hand, and over the occupiers of Herat we possess no hold whatever. We have no influence either on their fears, or their hopes, or their present condition.

Yet it is at such a moment that our troops are being withdrawn from the Helmund, to which the division

of General Biddulph had advanced! Before the powers of resistance of the Ameer of Afghanistan have been more than half crushed, for neither Ghizni nor Cabul have been occupied, and he still possesses an armed force, and he has not made the slightest concession, or manifested any desire to treat us otherwise than as his country's foe, we are paving the way for a retreat by concentrating our troops at Candahar, and then reducing them to a minimum. In fact we are retaining in Candahar sufficient men to garrison the place, and no more. By abandoning Girishk we have left the Durani tribes the opportunity of coalescing against us, and by our evacuation of Khelat-i-Ghiljie we have probably produced upon the Ghiljies the impression that we are unable to hold our own. Both of these retrograde movements must be characterised as unfortunate. They assume the appearance of being imitations of the worst blunders of the war of 1839.

By retreating from the Helmund we have admitted our intention not to interfere in the affairs of Herat. By abandoning Girishk we have deprived ourselves of the means which were ready to our hand, which we should have exerted to the very utmost, of founding among the Duranis a confederacy which might have been entrusted with the custody of Herat, and of the country between that town and Ferrah and the Helmund, under British influence. It would have been an advance of the British arms to Herat! Undoubtedly, but it would have been one made under the most favourable circumstances. It would also have

held forth a certain prospect of a definite and satisfactory result. The opportunity has not yet passed away, and by a bold forward movement beyond the Helmund we can paralyse the under-current of hostility to us among the Durani tribes, and settle once and for ever the future of Herat. The prize and the inducement to secure it could not be greater, but the difficulty of attaining the former grows with each day's delay.

CHAPTER VII.

ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN.

In the preceding chapters much has been said incidentally of the relations between England and Afghanistan. But considering that this topic is of the highest importance, it will not be waste of space to devote a chapter to its consideration in closer detail. Of the earlier events little need be said, but at the risk of recapitulation it will be well to summarise the diplomatic relations that subsisted between England and Afghanistan from the beginning of the century until the death of Dost Mahomed.

Our first embassy to Cabul was despatched at a moment when the great danger to India seemed to be from the overweening ambition of Napoleon. The causes of it were much as follows:—In the year 1800 Zemaun Shah, the grandson of the great ruler Ahmed Khan, was the sovereign of Cabul. Through various clearly ascertained causes, he roused, as has been seen, the hostility of the powerful Barucksye clan under its

chief, Futteh Khan, and a conspiracy was formed against him by his brother, Mahmoud, in league with these discontented vassals. Zemaun Shah was deposed, tortured, and glad to escape with bare life to Indian territory. He died our pensioner at Loodianah. Mahmoud's triumph was short-lived, however, for a younger brother, Shuja-ul-Mulk, expelled him in 1803, and ruled for a brief season over the monarchy of the Duranis. In 1808 the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone was despatched to Cabul for the purpose of forming a defensive alliance with that State against any aggression on the part of Persia urged on by France. Mr. Elphinstone was very well received, and a treaty of the closest amity was concluded between the two States, which was ratified by the Governor-General, Lord Minto, on the 17th of June, 1809. The chief stipulations—there were only three articles in it—were that Afghanistan should prevent to the extent of its power, and that the British State should heartily assist in repelling, any aggressive movement on the part of Persia or France; and "that friendship and union shall continue for ever between the two States" of Afghanistan and England.

Scarcely had our envoy left the capital before it became the scene of fresh disturbances. Mahmoud Khan had not abandoned all hope of regaining his throne, and his allies the Barucksyes were as ambitious as ever. Futteh Khan and his following raised the standard of revolt, and once more Mahmoud was a king, and Shuja-ul-Mulk a fugitive like his brother Zemaun. He, too, came, after long wanderings, to

Loodianah, which he reached in 1816. But although Futteh Khan had, in reality, secured the throne for Mahmoud, he received at the hands of that monarch nothing but ingratitude; and falling under the suspicion of an Eastern potentate, was promptly arrested, and slain, after having been first blinded. Then arose in the full fury of the vindictive Afghan nature that feud between Sudosye and Barucksye which has continued down almost to our time, long after the triumph of the latter had been completed. Futteh Khan is said to have left twenty brothers behind him, of whom by far the most celebrated was Dost Mahomed. These chieftains wrested the whole country, except Herat, from Mahmoud, and apportioned it out among themselves, Ghizni falling to the lot of Dost Mahomed. But from that advantageous position he gradually extended his sway over Cabul. He was also at first in close league with his half-brother, Kohundil Khan, at Candahar. In the meanwhile, Shah Kamran, Mahmoud's son, held out in Herat, and there preserved the last relic of the Sudosye dynasty. In 1833 Shuja-ul-Mulk commenced a series of plots for the invasion of Cabul, and at first he allied himself exclusively with Runjeet Sing, "the Lion of Lahore." In that year he advanced with an army of Sikhs as far as Candahar, when he was routed by the Afghan ruler Dost Mahomed, who, two years later on, was in turn worsted by Runjeet Sing in the neighbourhood of Peshawur.

From 1808 down to this period, or for a whole generation, English diplomacy was quiescent on the western and north-western frontier. The momentary

alarm from Napoleon's grandiose scheme passed away with the advance of the Grand Army against Moscow, and no disturbing circumstances occurred until after the signature of the Treaty of Turkomanchai between Russia and Persia. That was in 1828, and in 1837 Mahomed, Shah of Persia, attempted to put his scheme for the reconquest of Afghanistan into execution by attacking Herat. That attack, which was made under the direction of Russian officers and with a large Persian army, was unsuccessful; but the result would have been widely different had not Eldred Pottinger found himself within the walls of Herat when the Persian army approached against them. The same year Captain, afterwards Sir Alexander, Burnes was despatched by Lord Auckland on a special mission to Dost Mahomed. The nominal object of that mission was a commercial one, but its true intention was political. In those days Afghanistan was almost a geographical expression. Dost Mahomed ruled in that year over but a small portion of the Durani monarchy; but of all the losses he felt his country had suffered, none oppressed him so much as that of the territory subdued by Runjeet Sing. He looked to England to restore that which he had lost. He believed in the indefeasible claim of the Afghans over the Punjab; and accordingly his first question to Captain Burnes was whether our authorities intended to assist him in securing that object. He might possibly have rested satisfied with the restoration of the Peshawur valley and the remainder of the Trans-Indus country. But Captain Burnes had no such

instructions. Our Government instead of being hostile was friendly to the Sikhs, and therefore Dost Mahomed was obliged to incline, even while the Persian was thundering at the gates of Herat, rather to the side of Russia than to that of England. It was then that in an ill-judged moment it was resolved to undertake that unnecessary and ill-timed expedition into the heart of Cabul, which had for its nominal object the restoration of the Sudosye dynasty, but which, it was hoped, would effectually dispel all danger in the future from Persian aggressiveness incited by the machinations of Russia. In short, it was determined to ally ourselves with the Sikhs, and to jointly put forward the claims of Shuja-ul-Mulk to the throne of Afghanistan. With that intent a tripartite treaty was signed in June, 1838, and on the 8th of May, 1839, after a successful campaign, that unfortunate prince was crowned in Candahar. Shortly after that occurrence Dost Mahomed surrendered to our army and came to India as a prisoner, accompanied by his son Shere Ali. During our stay in Cabul we despatched an envoy to Shah Kamran at Herat, and a treaty of friendship and alliance was signed between that envoy, Major D'Arcy Todd, and the ruler of Herat, on the 13th day of August, 1839. It will be well to say something of the fate of Major Todd's treaty with Shah Kamran. That prince was equally unfortunate with the rest of his house, for his ambitious vizier, Yar Mahomed, chafing under the restraint he considered the presence of a British Resident imposed upon him, began to carry on intrigues with Persia for the surrender of the

fortress. When our Resident was withdrawn and our arms had become tarnished by disaster, Yar Mahomed threw off all reserve, and having strangled his master, Shah Kamran, proclaimed himself Governor of Herat in dependence upon Persia. Yar Mahomed maintained this scarcely veiled independence until his death in 1851, when he was succeeded by his son, Seyyid Mahomed Khan, who was, in his turn, deposed in 1858 by Mahomed Yusuf, grandson of Feroz, a younger brother of Shah Mahmoud and of Shuja-ul-Mulk, and the chief remaining representative of the Sudosyes. In the meanwhile there had been a war between England and Persia, and the Treaty of Paris compelled the Persians to evacuate Herat, which they had occupied through the instrumentality of Mahomed Yusuf.

Then a nephew and son-in-law of Dost Mahomed was installed there as a sort of independent ruler. This was the well-known Sultan Jan, who annexed Ferrah, and thereby incurred the wrath of the Afghan ruler. He also carried on intrigues with Persia and Russia, and at last was closely besieged in 1862–3 by the Ameer, and after a ten-months' siege compelled to surrender. Sultan Jan died shortly before the time for surrendering. Herat then became an Afghan fortress, which it has remained ever since. During these years we had become more intimate with and more interested in Cabul, for we had annexed the Punjab; and a treaty was signed between Mr. John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, and His Highness Dost Mahomed Khan, Wali of Cabul, on the 30th of March, 1855, at Peshawur. The tenour of this treaty was

simply to secure the perpetuation of friendly relations between the States, Dost Mahomed seeking to give emphasis to his good intentions by despatching his eldest son and heir, Gholam Hyder Khan, as his representative. A more definite treaty was signed at Peshawur on the 26th of January, 1857, when our representatives were Sir John Lawrence and Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Edwardes, C.B. This was by far the most important of all the Anglo-Afghan treaties, for not only did it bestow on Dost Mahomed a large subsidy, both in money and arms, for the prosecution of a war with Persia, but it also, more than any previous arrangement, made the interests of Cabul and India appear in the eyes of the world as practically identical. The fourth clause authorised our Government, so long as the Persian war continued, to send English officers with a suitable escort to Cabul, Candahar, or Balkh, "or wherever an Afghan army be assembled to act against the Persians," and the seventh to maintain a native Vakeel at Cabul. So long as Dost Mahomed reigned this very important treaty smoothed the path of Anglo-Afghan relations. Both the treaties of 1855 and 1857 are marvels in their way of terseness, and the absence of protestation might delude a reader into a belief that they were arrangements between two scrupulously honourable and very friendly individuals.

With the death of Dost Mahomed in 1863 the principal interest in our relations with Afghanistan commences. Up to that time we had a policy, and, still more important, the Ameer himself had a policy; and

the shortcomings of the one or the other were made up by the real friendship which glowed warm below the surface. But in 1863 that state of things ceased. In place of Dost Mahomed, with his unequalled experience of the vicissitudes of human life, stood Shere Ali, a man of striking ability, but labouring under certain defects of temper and sentiment which went far towards marring the effect of his other great personal characteristics. But there had been something more than a change in the personality of the ruler. The claims of Dost Mahomed to the Ameership were simply incontestable. He had not only overthrown all his rivals, but he had a second time vanquished them by surviving them. There was no other Barucksye that could compare with him, and the Sudosyes had lost all claims to consideration. His supremacy was admitted on all hands and in every quarter of the realm.

Regarding the matter in the light of Eastern custom, and more especially by reference to that obtaining in Afghanistan, there can be no doubt that Shere Ali was the rightful successor of Dost Mahomed. He was the third son of the principal wife, and his two elder brothers, who had been in turn proclaimed heir-apparent, were dead. Both Afzul and Azim, the eldest sons of Dost Mahomed by a woman of inferior origin, had been twice passed over, and now they were again ignored. In this there was nothing to excite surprise. The true cause of the internal confusion that ensued in Afghanistan is to be found in the fact that the ambition of these princes could not be reconciled to a subservient part under Shere Ali,

a comparatively unknown man. But there were other elements at work. A time of confusion was evidently approaching, and in it a warlike and ambitious temperament might aspire to acquire the supreme place, even although his legal claims should be more than doubtful. To the circumstances of the time must undoubtedly be attributed the risings that soon broke out under Shere Ali's full-brother Ameen, as well as under his half-brothers Afzul and Azim.

But if these plots against the authority of Shere Ali were produced by internal and unavoidable causes, principally arising from a want of confidence in the character of the new Ameer, it is impossible to doubt that the policy which our Government adopted tended to increase the importance of the seditious movements, and to inflame the evil passions then prevailing, by holding forth a more hopeful prospect of success. Had Lord Elgin at once recognised Shere Ali as Ameer, it is probable that Shere Ali's authority would have been firmly established, and that his brothers would have acquiesced in his title without resistance. At all events it would have been much less formidable. On the 12th of June, 1863, three days after his father's death, Shere Ali wrote a letter* to the Viceroy of India, informing him of the event, and also expressing his friendship to the English in these words: "As long as I live I will, please God, follow the laudable example of my father in maintaining the strong ties of friendship and

* For this and other official papers referred to, *see* the Afghan Blue Book and its annexes, placed before Parliament in November and December, 1878.

amity subsisting between the British and this State." This letter reached Peshawur on the 7th of July.

On the 28th of July Lord Elgin wrote to the Indian Secretary describing these events, saying that it was his intention to put off, until he had received further information, the formal step of acknowledging Shere Ali as Dost Mahomed's successor. The British Vakeel had been instructed to notify to the new Ameer that his letter had been duly received, and that a reply would be sent. From this letter it is evident that the accession of Shere Ali was either a surprise, or distasteful to the English authorities. It could not have been the former, and we are consequently compelled to accept the latter. This view is confirmed by the last passage in the letter referred to, for there it is mentioned that Afzul was said to be raising an army —fighting did not take place until 1864—and that consequently it would not be "long before the contest for power began." This intimate acquaintance with the plans of Afzul shows where the sympathies of our authorities lay. To them, as to a large portion of the Afghan people, Shere Ali was a stranger. They had no confidence in his abilities, and it was clear that in the task of establishing his power there would be some difficulty. A prompt acknowledgment on our part would have smoothed his path greatly, but then, not knowing him, it was not given.

On the other hand, we knew his brothers Afzul and Azim well. With the former as Governor of Jellalabad, and with the latter as Governor of Khurum and Khost, we had had many relations. They were recognised

as tried soldiers, with the experience of thirty years. To their influence, particularly to Afzul's, the inaction of the Afghans during the Mutiny was mainly attributed. It was not in human nature for the Punjab officials to resist feeling sympathy with Afzul when the rumour came through the passes that he intended to dispute his younger brother's rights. But in July, 1863, even Afzul had not manifested any symptom of an intention to resist his brother's authority. His English friends were more eager in making him an opponent of Shere Ali than he was himself, and they based upon that sentiment their policy of "masterly inactivity." Before this period there was no necessity to have any particular policy towards Afghanistan so long as Persia remained quiescent and Russia was far-distant. Masterly or any other form of inactivity answered its purpose well enough, and the friendship of the *de facto* ruler compensated for want of skill or foresight on our part. But the death of Dost Mahomed was the termination of an old condition of things. We had lost one friend, and took no steps to secure another in the person of his successor. We could no longer count on the friendship of the Ameer. Yet we continued to follow our policy of inactivity.

But as a matter of fact this inactivity was the worst form of activity, for our very refusal to acknowledge Shere Ali until we received further information was the most active support we could have rendered the cause of his brothers. Dost Mahomed had indeed cautioned us never to interfere in the internal disputes of his family, and the advice, though coming from one

who could not take the English view of things, may be accepted as wise. But he never told us not to acknowledge as his successor the son who by every right of Afghan usage and by his own selection became Ameer upon his death. It was in direct contravention of all our understandings, and it was an act calculated to hurt the best interests of Afghanistan and England alike. In Lord Elgin's letter may be perceived the germ of that mischievous and drifting policy which culminated ten years later on in the refusal of Shere Ali's reasonable requests. It would be most interesting to know who was the author of that letter. Assuredly it was not Lord Elgin with whom that policy of waiting originated, and the information with regard to Afzul's movements and intentions could only have emanated from the Governor of the Punjab, who was at that time the present Lord Lawrence.

But although in July 1863 Afzul Khan was said to be raising an army, the year closed without any open outbreak against Shere Ali. Most of his brothers had sworn upon the Koran to obey his authority, and he and his skilled general, Mahomed Rafik, were supreme. There was no longer an excuse for deferring a reply to the letter received in the beginning of July, *five months and a half before.* On the 23rd of December Sir William Denison sent a reply to the notification of the death of Dost Mahomed, explaining the delay by the severe and protracted illness of "my lamented predecessor," Lord Elgin. The remainder of the letter deals rather with the affairs of

Herat than of Cabul, for at that time it was uncertain whether Persia would peacefully acquiesce in the occupation of that place by the Ameer. From this date until April, 1866, there is a break in the official correspondence. It is not to be supposed that during this period no communications passed between the Home and Indian Governments upon the subject of Afghanistan, where the fortune of war was being so typically illustrated, and it is possible to supply the missing link to a very considerable extent.

Shere Ali's reply to the letter of Sir William Denison was to send his most trusted general, Mahomed Rafik Khan, to Simla on an embassy. He came in the first place to negotiate a fresh treaty, to apply for aid in military stores, and to secure the recognition of the Ameer's eldest son, Mahomed Ali, as his heir. He met with the cold reply that there was already a treaty in force between the two States, and that no other was necessary. Mahomed Rafik returned to Cabul to find that during his brief absence the storm-cloud which had long been gathering had at last burst. In September, 1863, and again in October, Azim Khan made overtures to the Punjab authorities, but these, probably mainly due to the advice tendered by the Commissioner of Peshawur, were not pursued further. During that winter Azim raised forces in Khurum, but in the spring of 1864 Mahomed Rafik defeated him, and, his army deserting, he was compelled to seek safety within the English territory. He was permitted to reside at Rawul Pindee.

In the meanwhile Afzul had retired north of the

Hindoo Koosh, where he was raising by the aid of his son Abderrahman a large army. In April of this year Shere Ali's son Mahomed Ali advanced upon Bamian, near which place a battle took place. In that fight Afzul had rather the worst of it, and shortly afterwards a truce was concluded between the two brothers on the understanding that Afzul was to retain the governorship of Turkestan. But in a few days Afzul's son Abderrahman was detected in some plot against Shere Ali, and the good understanding was at an end. Afzul was cast into prison, and Abderrahman fled to Bokhara. The fortunes of this war have been already described (see Chapter IV.), and it is unnecessary to pursue this portion of the subject any farther.

But although Shere Ali's star had waned in the spring of 1866, we find that the Government of Lord Lawrence had so far altered the opinions of 1863 that they recognised in Shere Ali the equal in capacity of his elder brothers. The words used are: "he in many respects possesses the qualities of a ruler." At this moment Shere Ali was sunk in a state of lethargy at Candahar, and, as this State paper admits, "Shere Ali may recover his power." At that time "sound policy dictated that we should not be *hasty* in giving up the Ameer's cause as lost." Then followed the defeat at Shaikhabad, and nine months later the rout at Khèlat-i-Ghiljie.

The latter victory produced a change in the policy of our authorities. Up to this time Shere Ali was the only Ameer recognised by us. We had not helped him, it is true, but on the other hand neither had we

helped his brothers. But Afzul's victory at Khelat-i-Ghiljie was so complete, and Shere Ali, having abandoned Candahar, retained nothing save Herat, that Lord Lawrence was not proof to the advances which Afzul made for formal recognition. On the 3rd of February, 1867, Afzul wrote a letter to the Viceroy in which he styled himself Ameer of Afghanistan, describing the course of this campaign. On the 25th of February, that is by return of post, Lord Lawrence replied to this letter, acknowledging Afzul as Ameer of Cabul and Candahar, and with those general expressions of friendship which were so freely uttered on both sides during the course of this correspondence. At this time the opinion was prevalent among the authorities in the Punjab that Shere Ali was not in his right mind, and the opinion was expressed by one of them that he "could no longer hope to regain power, and Afzul Khan, if not completely established in the chiefship of Afghanistan, is nearly so, and much more likely than anyone else to consolidate his power." It is true that Shere Ali still held Herat and the country west of the Helmund, and that his ally and half-brother Faiz Mahomed was supreme north of the Hindoo Koosh. But whereas the same persons had found reason in 1863 to defer their approval of Dost Mahomed's selection for nearly six months, in 1867 no hesitation was shown by them in recognising as ruler a man who had no *rightful* claims to the throne, because he had just concluded a victorious campaign.

But no sooner had we committed ourselves to the

recognition of Afzul Khan than we found that his position was far from secure, and that Faiz Mahomed and Shere Ali were advancing on Cabul from the north. This state of things gave rise to much inconvenience, and by reference to page 17 of the Afghan Blue Book it will be seen to what an undignified position our over-hastiness had brought us, and how nearly we were being obliged to take an active part in the Afghan civil war. Already, too, had symptoms manifested themselves of dissension in the camp of Afzul. The jealousy of Abderrahman and his uncle Azim was a standing menace to the durability of the power of Afzul. Yet all this time we were flattering ourselves that we had made friends all round, and that "our relations with Afghanistan remained on their first footing of friendship towards the actual rulers." There is an extraordinary self-complacency in the letter from Lord Lawrence and his Council to the Indian Secretary of the 20th of June, 1867, of which that passage forms part.

But on the 3rd of September it was followed up by a second letter, which of all Lord Lawrence's papers is the most extraordinary, and quite out of keeping with everything else he wrote upon the subject. It was occasioned by the rumours that were prevalent of intrigues between Shere Ali and his son Yakoob Khan on the one side, and the Shah of Persia on the other. In face of this danger to Herat, Lord Lawrence and his Council spoke out, and propounded a scheme for supporting the cause of Afzul which beyond all doubt would have made the rule of that branch of the

Barucksye house assured. If this plan had been carried out with consistency and firmness it would probably have secured our main object, a friendly Ameer with undisputed authority over his people. The advocates of "masterly inactivity" never seem to know that the great sin which is laid to their charge is not that they abandoned Shere Ali in favour of Afzul, and then of Azim, but that they throughout these years proved false to all the candidates. Had Lord Lawrence boldly declared his preference at the outset for Afzul, and openly opposed Shere Ali, then nothing could have been said against his policy, although he would have made a mistake. But he retained his secret partiality for Afzul at the moment that events forced him to recognise Shere Ali unless he was prepared openly to interfere. For during all these years Lord Lawrence was the *one* authority on Afghan affairs. None, from the year 1855 to the year 1868, dare dispute the infallible wisdom of his opinion. He had negotiated our two treaties with Dost Mahomed. He was the friend of that prince in a greater sense than could be said of any other Englishman. To him belonged in a higher degree than to any one else the credit of having maintained friendly relations with the Afghans during the worst stage of the Mutiny, although much of the praise should have been given to Dost Mahomed and his son Afzul. And then when Dost Mahomed died it was to Sir John Lawrence that the Indian Government and Lord Elgin turned for guidance. It is true, in a sense that is not thoroughly appreciated, that from the year 1855 our Afghan policy

was arranged by the present Lord Lawrence, and that whether Lord Dalhousie, or Canning, or Elgin were Viceroys, the *dictum* of John Lawrence was on all matters connected with Cabul supreme.

It is as certain as anything can be, that the chief responsibility for the hesitation shown in recognising Shere Ali in 1863 falls on the shoulders of the present Lord Lawrence. Even if he were not consulted, it was his duty, considering the weight of his voice, to have proclaimed that the Government was following a mistaken course. He at least should have known how to say the words, "Refuse your recognition to Shere Ali, and support Afzul." There is no reason why Afzul should not have made as good a ruler as Shere Ali, and his able son Abderrahman would have been a most eligible successor. In the letter which has been referred to, Lord Lawrence is compelled to consider the necessity of proffering Afzul that assistance which, if it had been given four years before, would have made him supreme in the country. More than that, he even sketches out a scheme for the protection of British interests in Herat, which has in it the ring rather of Burnes than of Lawrence. It is much to be regretted, for his Lordship's sake, that he did not formulate this in 1863, and insist upon its being carried into effect. Had this been done he would have become the prophet not of the outgoing school of inactivity, but of the incoming one of action.

On the 7th of October, shortly after the defeat and death of Faiz Mahomed, Afzul died of dropsy, and was succeeded by his brother Azim, his nephew Abder-

rahman acquiescing in what he was unable to prevent. On the 13th of November, Lord Lawrence formally recognised Azim as Ameer, expressing his "earnest hope that this auspicious event may tend towards the consolidation and prosperity of the kingdom." At this time there appears not to have been the slightest doubt in the Indian Council Chamber but that Shere Ali was crushed and his cause hopelessly ruined. The overthrow and death of Faiz Mahomed had destroyed his last chance, and when Azim became Ameer it was supposed that whatever danger there lay ahead consisted in the jealousy of Abderrahman and not in the hostility of Shere Ali.

But on the 16th of October, 1868, all was changed. On that date Lord Lawrence wrote home speaking of a letter from Shere Ali Khan *of Cabul.* The fortune of war with its well-known fickleness had veered round to the side of Shere Ali. Azim was a fugitive. Candahar and Cabul had been recaptured. But as the victorious Ameer himself said, "From the British Government I have received comparatively no friendship or kindness with reference to my success in this miserable civil war, until God Almighty of His own favour has again bestowed upon me the country of my inheritance." In reply to Shere Ali's letter announcing his success, Lord Lawrence, on the 2nd of October, 1868, congratulated him upon his triumph, "which is alone due to your own courage, abilities, and firmness." Never were truer words uttered than these. Despite our indifference, and notwithstanding our benevolent neutrality toward Afzul and his brother, Shere Ali had

won the game, and with the death of Azim in Seistan and the flight of Abderrahman to Samarcand, he was left alone to enjoy the fruits of success.

It was then that he turned himself with diligence to secure that for which he always had striven, the friendship and moral support of the English Government. His experience had proved that this possessed less value than was supposed, but he could not do without it, for in the eyes of his people it was of considerable moment. Moreover, he was in great pecuniary embarrassment. The revenues of Cabul had been called in for one year, if not for two, and the conqueror had nowhere to turn to obtain that money of which he stood in such desperate need. The sum sent him by Lord Lawrence and further increased by Lord Mayo in February, 1869, relieved him from all embarrassment, and enabled him to carry out that campaign which resulted in the victory at Tinah Khan.

With the arrival of Lord Mayo and the departure of Lord Lawrence, what has been very appropriately styled an "intermediate policy" was adopted. Lord Mayo began his tenure of power by perfecting those schemes for a grand meeting with the Ameer which had been mooted before his arrival. The early months of the year 1869 were occupied in busy preparation for the forthcoming interview, and on the 7th of February the British Vakeel was able to announce that the Ameer intended setting out from Cabul on the 10th of the month. On the 3rd of March Shere Ali reached Peshawur, whence he pursued his journey to Umballa. A detailed history of this important durbar will be found

in the Afghan Blue Book, pages 87 to 91. It is unnecessary to give even the salient features of this gorgeous ceremonial. Our object is to discuss its effect upon the policy of the Ameer, and also upon that of the British Government.

The great point in connection with the Umballa durbar was the question of British agents, and here it will be pertinent to say something upon the subject, as the Duke of Argyll, in his recent work upon the Eastern Question, has laid great stress upon it. His Grace insists that one of the chief promises to the Ameer was that no European officers would be placed as Residents in his cities, and he goes on to contravene the belief of certain officials that Shere Ali was willing in 1869 to "consider the subject of British agencies in Afghanistan, had he received encouragement to enter officially into the subject, and had his expectations of being granted a new treaty been responded to." The Duke of Argyll's opinion was first expressed in a letter to the "Times" on 23rd of November, 1878, but it is amplified and expressed with greater force in his "Eastern Question." The statement has called forth replies from those most qualified to speak. Major Grey, who had officiated as interpreter throughout the Umballa conference, wrote on the 18th of January from India as follows to the "Times" (*see* "Times," February 24, 1879).

Some time ago Mr. Seton Karr, late Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, stated that Amir Shere Ali Khan had never expressed his readiness to receive agents of the British Government at Cabul or elsewhere. Mr. Seton Karr

was able to say this with certainty, as all communications with the Amir were conducted by himself as Foreign Secretary. Though aware that Mr. Seton Karr's memory deceived him in the matter, as might well be the case at this distance of time, it appeared to me that what the Amir might or might not have said ten years ago imported little to the questions now pending between him and ourselves. It did not, therefore, seem worth while to question Mr. Seton Karr's statement, until I observed that his authority was used at a public meeting in London, and that his statement was quoted in the Press.

I was confidentially employed by Lord Mayo on the occasion of the meeting with Amir Shere Ali Khan at Umballa. I kept full memoranda of everything that occurred, and these, with copies of official reports, semi-official notes, and other papers that passed through my hands, are now before me.

Mr. Seton Karr should be cognizant of what passed between myself and the Amir or his Wazir on various occasions during the Umballa meeting; for I embodied the results of my interviews in official reports, dated the 29th of March, the 3rd of April, and the 4th of April, 1869. In the last of these, which was a summary of my entire proceedings, I gave an abstract of the results of private interviews with the Amir or Wazir on the 26th of March (before the Viceroy's arrival), the 27th, 29th, 30th, and the 31st of March, the 1st of April (three interviews), the 2nd of April (several interviews), and the 3rd of April. These reports were not evidently before Mr. Seton Karr when he made the statement which I now write to correct. In the first of them is the following passage:—

> He (the Amir) is open to any proposition for securing his northern border; while doubtful of any Russian power for aggression for some years to come, still thinks precautions should be taken; would construct forts on his own part or under our superintendence, and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would gladly see an agent or engineer superintendent there (in Balkh), Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul, which might lead to the supposition of his being a puppet. There would be no danger to such did they respect the Afghans and themselves.

My summary of the 4th of April 1869, before referred to, states that the Amir was a party to this conversation, which

occurred previous to the first private interview of the Amir with the Viceroy on the 29th of March. I obtained the Amir's opinions on this point with a view to the matter being broached at that interview, which, however, for some reason, was not done. The second private interview between the Viceroy and Amir occurred on the 3rd of April. My official summary of the 4th of April says :—

On Friday, the 2nd of April, I had several interviews with the Amir and Wazir regarding points to be settled by the latter with the Foreign Secretary next morning (the discussion regarding trade routes), and by the Amir at the next day's private interview.

My private memoranda says on this head :—

In accordance with my representations, therefore, a new letter was addressed to the Amir, to which I was directed, if possible, to obtain a reply of complete satisfaction, and also to arrive at a definite understanding with him on various other points noted below, after which should be held the second private interview, which should in a manner sanction and confirm the results of the negotiations. The points were :—(1) That the Amir should accede to our deputation of native agents wherever we pleased—to this the Amir agreed, and promised to assist them in every way; (2) to ascertain whether the Amir was agreeable to the deputation of an envoy at some future date—on this point the Amir expressed his willingness to receive an envoy as soon as things had somewhat settled down, anywhere save at Cabul, where he thought it would affect his power with the people. . . .

In March 1875, the Government of India inquired from me whether my knowledge of what passed at Umballa led me to believe that the Amir would receive British officers at Herat or Candahar. I replied, giving the facts detailed above, and adding, "I may note that the Amir was at the time eager to meet our views, or what he supposed to be such; and his whole attitude was that of one anxious to please." I further explained myself, semi-officially, as follows :—

In saying that he would receive an envoy when matters had somewhat settled down, the Amir referred, as I understood, merely to his immediate troubles, Afghanistan being then still much disturbed, and a campaign in Turkestan imminent. I had been instructed to ask whether the Amir would receive an envoy "at some future date." He had agreed to the deputation of native agents "wherever we pleased," and his only stipulation regarding British envoys was that they should not reside in Cabul.

To that letter Mr. Seton Karr made the following reply :—

I am very unwilling to re-open a controversy regarding the readiness or otherwise of the Amir to receive British—*i.e.* English—agents in his territory, but the letter from Major Grey, published in the "Times" of this morning, leaves me no option.

Major Grey, when he states that my "memory" may have deceived me in the matter, can scarcely have read my letters to the "Daily News" of the 12th of December last, and he is evidently ignorant that my statements do not depend on "memory," but on full and accurate copies of official reports, demi-official papers, and private correspondence, all written at the time; and the very papers to which Major Grey refers have been before me since the commencement of the controversy. Those who wish to see the subject exhaustively treated need only turn to Vol. II. of "The Eastern Question," by His Grace the Duke of Argyll. The whole evidence there reviewed, as you yourself have recently stated, settles the question regarding the Amir's wishes and Lord Mayo's promises "beyond the possibility of dispute."

But, after all, granting, for the sake of mere argument, that at some moment, in some unguarded conversation, the Amir may have expressed to some person or other his willingness to receive an Englishman at some future time, in some part of his territories, the question really is, what was the result arrived at after the durbar? And we have Lord Mayo's own word for it, that no English Resident was to be "pressed" upon the Amir against his wish. It is quite possible to argue that, under an altered state of things subsequent to 1875, the Amir ought now to consent to admit an Englishman in his territories; but it cannot surely be right to go behind the distinct promise made to him in the clearest manner by the Viceroy of the day. The word of a Governor-General or the "yea, yea, and the nay, nay of a British envoy," as Lord Macaulay said, used to be regarded in India as fully equal to the most solemn and formal treaties.

The next day the "Times" contained the following letter from Sir Henry Rawlinson :—

In justice to Major Grey, whose accuracy of statement has been again called in question by Mr. Seton Karr with regard to the language used by the Amir Shere Ali at the Umballa conference on the subject of admitting British agents to reside in Afghanistan, I would ask you to publish the following extract of a letter to my address from the late Lord Mayo, under date Simla, June 10, 1869, the original of the said letter being now before me :—

I own I am very sceptical as to the propriety of placing a British agent at Herat, but I will reserve my opinion until I hear the reasons. As a rule, I am totally opposed to sending European "politicals" to any Asiatic town if it can be avoided. They are a dangerous class, and many a misfortune can be traced to their honest but misplaced activity. I do not believe from what the Ameer said at Umballa that he would offer any opposition to an English agent being placed at Candahar, Herat, or Balkh, though he would strongly object to the appearance of one at Cabul; but I do not think that he at all wished for it anywhere, fearing the effect that it might have on his own subjects.

This extract seems to me fully to bear out the statements of Major Grey, and I think it only fair to him, therefore, that it should be made public.

Colonel Burne, who was Secretary to Lord Mayo, and knew more thoroughly than anyone else the policy of that nobleman, and who, moreover, was one of the principal objects of attack on the part of the Duke of Argyll, wrote to the "Times" on the same day as the above to the following effect :—

I have hitherto refrained, for obvious reasons, from entering into anything like a public or controversial discussion on the question of Shere Ali Khan's willingness or otherwise at the time of the Umballa durbar in 1869 to receive British agents into his territories. But the recent publication of the Duke of Argyll's book on the "Eastern Question," in which His Grace disputes, although in terms of which I cannot complain, the

accuracy of evidence given by myself on this subject, coupled with the letters from Major Grey and Mr. Seton Karr which have appeared in your columns, makes it difficult for me to keep silence without risk of misconstruction. I trust, therefore, that I may be allowed to add my testimony to that given by Major Grey in his communication to you dated the 18th ult.

In his interviews with Lord Mayo in 1869 Shere Ali emphatically stated that there was nothing he would not do "to comply with the wishes of the Indian Government in any particular," and at the same time he intimated to those in his confidence around him his willingness to receive, if desired, British agents within his territories elsewhere than at Cabul. Personally, even according to Mr. Seton Karr's testimony, he had no objection to their presence even at the latter place.

Lord Mayo was, however, unwilling at that particular moment to encourage or adopt a measure which would at once have committed the British Government, in the state of things then existing, to an active interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; in other words, to a support of Shere Ali's dynasty against his internal foes. There was at that time no immediate danger either of foreign aggression on Afghanistan or of the Ameer's capital becoming a centre of foreign intrigue; consequently, the whole object and purport of Lord Mayo's policy was to send the Ameer home satisfied, while keeping his own hands perfectly free to deal with future contingencies. His policy, in his own words, was an "intermediate one."

On ascertaining generally what pledges would satisfy the Ameer, Lord Mayo gave those, and those only, contained under his own hand and seal, in a letter addressed by himself to the Ameer, dated the 31st of March, 1869 (p. 90, Afghan Blue Book, No. 1). I admit that words used by Lord Mayo in certain private letters to the Duke of Argyll, and in the Government of India despatch on the 1st of July, 1869, if taken by themselves, support a different view; but it is impossible that those words can have been intended to bear the meaning now placed upon them—a meaning opposed alike to records in the Indian Foreign Office and to the Viceroy's other writings.

Three months after the Umballa durbar Lord Mayo wrote to Sir Henry Rawlinson (10th of June, 1869) treating the question of British agents at Herat, Candahar, and Balkh as an entirely new one, on which he desired to reserve his opinion. Individually, he was indisposed to any such measure, though, to use his own words, he did not believe from what the Ameer said at Umballa that his Highness would "offer any opposition to an English agent being placed at Candahar, Herat, or Balkh, though he would still object to the appearance of one at Cabul."

It is singular that throughout past discussions public men should not have been able or willing to recognise the distinction between a "Resident at Cabul" and "Residents elsewhere than at Cabul."

If, as I maintain cannot be gainsaid in the face of official records, the Ameer was in 1869 not unwilling to receive British agents at his outposts, it stands to reason that it cannot have been the chief, or, indeed, any object of his visit to Umballa to extract a solemn pledge from the Viceroy that they should not be sent to such places.

Is it, indeed, possible that Lord Mayo should have tied to all time his own action and the action of his successors by a pledge in the sense understood by the Duke of Argyll? Could he have done so without specific instructions from the Home Government? Would it not have been given personally by the Viceroy to Shere Ali? Wonld not Shere Ali have mentioned it in subsequent transactions? Would not Nur Mahomed have brought it forward as an unanswerable argument to Lord Northbrook in 1873, when his Foreign Secretary pressed on that wily Asiatic the advantages of a permanent British representative at Cabul? Would he not equally have given to such a pledge a prominent place in his arguments at the Peshawur conference of 1877, and have thereby effectually stopped all further discussion?

Mr. Seton Karr's remark as to the weight which should attach to the "Yea, yea," and "Nay, nay," of a Governor-General is sound enough; but I venture to think he will agree

with me that such a "Yea, yea," or "Nay, nay," is never uttered by a Viceroy to an Asiatic chief without being at once officially recorded. Indeed, this is one of the most invariable rules, supervised by the Viceroy himself, in the conduct of Indian foreign administration.

I could say more on this subject, but I refrain from trespassing further on your valuable space.

These letters should prove conclusively that in 1869 Shere Ali had no objection to the *principle* of admitting British officers into Afghanistan. All he required was a *quid pro quo*. It is a piece of rhetoric to say that this demand was the dread and abhorrence of Shere Ali, and the numerous accusations which have been based upon that charge all fall to the ground.

Then there followed the Seistan Boundary question, and the negotiations with Russia with regard to the northern frontier. The former ended, it was thought, to the satisfaction of the Ameer, but later on he brought his unsatisfied claims in this quarter forward as a grievance against us, so the conviction is forced upon us that Shere Ali, for some reason or other, was not satisfied. There can be no question but that the English arbitrator did his duty, and that the scales of justice were held evenly between Persia and Cabul. With regard to the latter point, they terminated, so far as we were concerned, in our defining the Oxus as the border line of the Afghan State; but it must always be remembered that this transaction ended in a hasty and irregular manner, and that Russia has in no way bound herself to accept as final what we alone have ruled to be correct. Comparatively speaking, both these events are of minor importance.

On the 23th of March, 1873, Lord Northbrook, in Council, expressed to the Duke of Argyll the satisfaction of the Indian Government at Count Schouvaloff's assurance that the Russian Government had no intention of retaining possession of Khiva or of crushing it under an indemnity which would take more than twenty years to pay off. Trusting to that assurance, the Indian Government ignored the progress of events in Khiva, until in July of that year Shere Ali made an application for a definite promise of aid to our Government, thus forcibly reminding our authorities that though they might trust to Russian assurances the people of Asia did not, and that with the fall of Khiva they clearly recognised that the independence of that State had practically ceased. There was clearer vision in Cabul than at Simla, and for the moment it had its effect upon Lord Northbrook.

On the 24th July 1873, Lord Northbrook telegraphed to the Secretary of State for India that the Ameer was "alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with our general assurance, and anxious to know definitely how far he may rely on our help if invaded." It is necessary to remember that Russia had just made a fresh stride forward, and it was very uncertain how far the expeditions General Lomakine and other officers had undertaken against the Turcomans might bring Russia on the road to the outlying dependencies of Shere Ali. Lord Northbrook's telegram proves that he fully realised the importance of the occasion, and his own words show that he was prepared to take immediate advantage of the fact that apprehension at

Russia's approach had at last compelled the Afghan ruler to take a side, and the side he was willing to accept was that of England. And what did Lord Northbrook propose? "I propose assuring him that, if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations, we will help him with money, arms, and troops if necessary, to expel unprovoked invasion." Lord Cranbrook did not, therefore, misrepresent Lord Northbrook when he said that he was willing "to guarantee Shere Ali against unprovoked aggression." The reply to that message was sent by the Duke of Argyll on the 26th of July, also by telegraph, and it was to the effect that the Cabinet did not share at all in the alarm of the Ameer, and thought there was no cause for it. On those two messages is based the charge that the Cabinet of Mr. Gladstone was mainly responsible for the great rupture that took place with Shere Ali in that year. An attempt at a defence for that act is set up by asserting that Shere Ali actually wanted us to defend him against domestic as well as against foreign enemies. Sir Henry Rawlinson has exposed the shallowness of this view, but it cannot be forgotten that a clear reply to Shere Ali as to what we should do for his defence against an attack by Russia by no means involved us in an engagement to defend him against any rival claimant to the throne. Moreover, the Russian danger might have appeared in the guise of an internal disturbance, had the Russians instigated Abderrahman Khan to set up his claims once more; and, although that would have been to some extent a domestic

danger, we can scarcely believe that anyone would have questioned the wisdom of our actively, if necessary, opposing an adventurer who came backed by Russian influence, and assisted with money and arms from Tashkent, to establish himself as ruler in Cabul. The question still remains whether—even if we had had to guarantee Shere Ali and his heirs against every foe whatsoever, "to be the friends of his friends and the enemies of his enemies"—it would not have been wise to have gone that length, provided Shere Ali had given us the right to station agents in his cities, and to use a discretionary power in his external relations.

Lord Northbrook did not acquiesce in this view, and he consequently published a Memorandum, in which he endeavoured to show that the policy adopted by the Government of Mr. Gladstone towards Shere Ali in 1873 was carried out with his complete approval. He thought it right, "in common justice to the Government under which I then served," to explain as clearly as possible what really occurred; and this he proceeded to do in the Memorandum referred to. The point to be decided is a simple one. Did Lord Northbrook recommend a policy to the Secretary of State in his telegram of the 24th of July which that Secretary of State, after a Cabinet Council, virtually refused to sanction? To that question the only possible answer is that the text of Lord Northbrook's telegram bears out the supposition. "I propose to assure him, if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations, we will help him with money, arms, and troops if necessary, to repel unprovoked invasion."

To that message of Lord Northbrook's the Duke of Argyll replied, "The Cabinet think you should inform the Ameer that we do not at all share his alarm, and consider there is no cause for it." Lord Northbrook so far modified his intention on the receipt of that telegram that he did not carry out his proposition of promising Shere Ali material aid against unprovoked invasion. Instead of doing so we find that the Ameer is informed of the good understanding that exists between the Governments of England and Russia, and also that there is no danger to Afghanistan from the north, because Russia has declared that State to be outside the sphere of her operations. When the Ameer's envoy remarks that Bokhara, whose ruler has claims over the Trans-Hindoo Koosh region, was no party to that arrangement, he is informed that the action of Bokhara would not invalidate the promise given by Russia. Perhaps not in our eyes, but what about Russia, who was known to be keeping back those Bokharan claims to sovereignty over Balkh as a card to play under certain contingencies? Shere Ali knew this fact well, and he was apprehensive of Russian schemes, through the agency of Bokhara, as well as of his nephew, Abderrahman. When the envoy asked for instructions with regard to the Turcoman tribes the reply was that they were "robbers and kidnappers, and the cause of a large portion of the mischief in Central Asia," and that Shere Ali would do well to have nothing to do with them. These replies were given at a time when Russia was rewarding Bokhara with a share of the Khivan spoil, and was prose-

cuting in a relentless manner expeditions against the Turcomans.

The negotiations that were carried on during the summer of 1873 between the Viceroy and Nur Mahomed Shah more than bear out the assertion that Shere Ali was alarmed at the rapid approach of Russia to his frontiers; and there can be no doubt on any one's mind, who realises the fact that Russia's policy up to this time had not aspired so much to making Shere Ali a friend as to upsetting his rule through support to be given to a rival pretender to the throne, that this apprehension was a prevailing sentiment with the Ameer. It is said that we should judge the conduct of the Government in 1873 by the light of the information that then existed, but it is the strong point of the adverse criticism which that conduct has undoubtedly received, that it has been generally judged by that light. The fall of Khiva should have convinced all observers that Russia was bent on extending her dominions far to the south of their existing frontier line, and with the acquisition of a considerable portion of the Oxus bank it needed, it might be imagined, no great amount of foresight to perceive that Russia was in a position to break ground, either as a friend or as a foe, in Cabul as soon as she felt disposed. Despite Sir Henry Rawlinson's remarkable Memorandum on Central Asia, written so long ago as July, 1868, and nothwithstanding that attention was called in the press and in Parliament to the danger to India from the annexation of the Amou Darya district, we find that the Government remained

blind to the future. The Ministry were perfectly satisfied with Prince Gortschakoff's promises, and Lord Northbrook, who, as being on the spot, possessed special means of acquiring information on the topic, acquiesced in what was a weak and a mistaken policy. We placed an implicit confidence in Russian good faith, we declared to Shere Ali that that country was our good friend, and we absolutely refused to take the precautionary measures ready to our hand in the Ameer's request for an alliance, defensive and offensive, when the opportunity offered for doing so. It is because Lord Northbrook and the Duke of Argyll acted thus that the Simla conference is now condemned, and it was because Lord Northbrook's telegram of the 24th of July, 1873, pointed to a wiser policy and a more resolved attitude that, in fairness to the Viceroy, it was sought to distinguish his policy from that of the home authorities. Lord Northbrook refuses to avail himself of the opportunity that was afforded to him, and he accepts the charge of defending those negotiations which were carried on with the Ameer's representative at Simla. He must, therefore, share in the blame that must be attached to the Government of the day for declining to sympathise with the very reasonable alarm that Shere Ali had conceived at the Russian danger.

The crisis in our relations with Shere Ali came at that moment when we should have been most alive to the danger from Russia in Central Asia, yet our authorities were blind to it. Had Shere Ali made his overtures to us when Russia was quiescent,

it would have been excusable for our rulers to have striven to minimise the danger from Russia. But there is no loophole for escape from responsibility in that direction. Lord Northbrook insists that Shere Ali was not disposed to concede any equivalent to us for the very great demands he made upon us, and he emphasises the point that the Ameer seemed to expect as a right that which he should have implored as a favour. With that the vital question has little to do, and it probably arose from Shere Ali conceiving that the clause in the treaty of 1855 by which Dost Mahomed bound himself to be "the friend of our friends and the foe of our foes," was reciprocal. A little explanation would have cleared up that point, had Shere Ali's request been practically granted. If we had said, as we might have said openly and without harm, "We will guarantee you against unprovoked attack from Russia, at all costs," Shere Ali's minister would have returned satisfied to Cabul. And had we notified at St. Petersburg that we had entered into that arrangement with Shere Ali, we should have prevented those intrigues which have been in progress during the last five years, and which have borne fruit in the present crisis. But what would have been the equivalent? it will be asked. Lord Northbrook says that Shere Ali demanded this concession as a right, and that he would not have conceded anything. In fact, he hints that Shere Ali would at once have become aggressive either towards the north or towards Persia; but that would not have been our affair. Our guarantee applied to Russia alone. There is every

reason for saying that Shere Ali would have granted us anything we liked to demand in return; but as this Simla conference actually failed with the refusal of Shere Ali's request, no opportunity was afforded for the Ameer showing how far he would comply with the demand for the right to station British agents at Candahar, Balkh, or Herat. It is not to be questioned that that right would have been conceded to us had the conference arrived at its proper termination. Shere Ali had decided, if we gave him a defensive and offensive alliance, to join us; but we threw him into the arms of Russia by our apathy and short-sighted policy.

Lord Salisbury's masterly despatches of the 22nd of January and the 19th November, 1875, deserve the most careful study; and his instructions to Lord Lytton as to affairs in Afghanistan undoubtedly mark a turning-point in the foreign policy of our Indian empire. From that day to the present the necessity has been kept steadily before our authorities of coming to some clear and unequivocal arrangement with Shere Ali, who was known to be corresponding with the Tashkent authorities; and it was in furtherance of that design that those overtures, which should have been attractive to the Ameer, and to which Lord Lytton refers in his letter of the 10th of May, 1877, were made to him in the autumn of 1876. But the sore had rankled in the mind of Shere Ali, and all those old grievances, which had been mitigated by Lord Mayo's open manner, revived when he found that the English Government still pursued that devious

"settled" policy which had held aloof from him in 1863 and 1864, abandoned his cause in 1867, and refused him in 1873 that promise of support to which a friendly Afghan ruler was legitimately entitled. Therefore, when the alteration came in our policy—when we were actually willing to give him that which had been refused him in 1873—we found that the change had come too late. Shere Ali was completely alienated, and although not prepared to come to a rupture with us, was only waiting some definite act on the part of Russia to do so. The tedious negotiations at Peshawur in February, 1877, between Sir Lewis Pelly and Nur Mahomed Shah were a mere farce. The envoy had no instructions to accept the condition which Sir Lewis Pelly was alone authorised to treat upon, and with the rejection of our demand for an agent at Cabul or Herat, the conference abruptly terminated when a favourable opportunity for closing it offered itself in the death of the Ameer's envoy. Since then the course of events is well known. Russia has added one more perfidy to those committed in the past. She has cajoled and then abandoned the Ameer. She has left him to his fate to die an ignominious death as an exile in Balkh, while we through her machinations have been compelled to inflict chastisement on a people who should have been our allies. The war with Afghanistan has been an unnecessary war in the sense that but for Russia it would never have taken place. The first step was to nip the danger in the bud by crushing Shere Ali's powers of resistance, and the second is to take effectual steps so that the

same danger can never occur again. We have accomplished the former, and it only remains to consider here briefly how the latter is to be effected.

The death of Shere Ali undoubtedly simplifies the task of negotiation. The letter in which Yakoob Khan informs us of the event is a still more promising token of the removal of the dead-lock that has for the last two months existed. We shall very shortly be in a position to arrange terms with Yakoob Khan, who, if he escapes assassination, is the most likely of all the candidates to the succession to obtain the lead. The question which it is imperative for us to consider is—What are those terms to be? Of course there will be no hesitation shown on the point that British agents, with a proper escort, must take up their residence at Herat and Balkh, probably also at Maimene and Faizabad. That is admitted to be a *sine quâ non*. There should also be a supervision of the army such as has been proposed at various periods in the past. An English representative at the capital is the more necessary now that it has been shown that a Russian can reside there in safety. A fresh treaty should be concluded guaranteeing the integrity of Afghanistan in its widest extent on the condition that it is to be for the future a closed country to Russian agents, officers, and merchants. Herat should be fortified, and garrisoned by a special auxiliary force of five thousand men, trained, disciplined, and partly paid by the Indian Government. With regard to the actual annexation of territory, this will be more perfectly treated upon in the chapter on the Indian frontier which

stands in need of rectification. The new Ameer would have to give a general promise of friendship, but as little as possible should be left to his inclination. At a very considerable expense we have overcome the regular resistance of the Cabul ruler. It behoves us by judicious firmness to obtain every concession our position requires. Those specified are absolutely essential to us, and on them there should be no yielding whatever. Taken in the aggregate they are worth more than any actual acquisition of territory, but they acquire greater value and importance if accompanied by an advance of the Indian frontier.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE INDIAN FRONTIER.

At the present time the subject of the Indian frontier possesses peculiar importance. It is evidently on the eve of modification, if not of complete change. Like an old garment it has served its purpose, and now, in face of fresh necessities, and a more complicated future, it must be replaced by one more adequate to the purposes of our rule in India. It is a subject which in itself is well-nigh inexhaustible, and can be regarded from the most opposite points of view.

The north-west Indian frontier begins on the north in the Kaghan valley, which is wedged in between Cashmere and the mountain tribes, of whom we know very little, holding the chain on the left bank of the Indus. At Umb it reaches that river, and at Torbela it crosses over to its right bank, which it skirts at varying distances to the sea. From the Kaghan valley to the borders of Scinde and Khelat the distance is eight hundred miles. Ignoring the independent Hazara

clans, of whom we know so little that to say anything of them would be sheer waste of time, we may pass on to the great Yusufsae (Yusuf Zei) clan, which occupies the northern portion of the Peshawur plain, as well as the adjacent hills stretching towards Buneer and Swat. They are divided into the two sections, Mandan and Yusuf. The former dwells mostly within our border, and is computed to number one hundred and fifty thousand, of whom one-fifth, or thirty thousand men, may be available for military purposes. The chief sub-divisions of this section are the Otman-zei, one thousand two hundred matchlocks or fighting men; the Chiqur-zei, five thousand matchlocks; the Ama-zei, one thousand two hundred matchlocks, and so on, or all in combination some thirty thousand fighting adults. During the life-time of the Akhond of Swat these were all more or less under his influence. The Yusuf section is entirely beyond our border, and numbers one hundred and ten thousand people, of whom forty-three thousand two hundred are said to be able to bear arms. The chief divisions of the Yusuf are the Isa-zei, the Ilias-zei, the Mali-zei, the Rane-zei, and the Aka-zei. These are, in turn, also sub-divided. The Isa-zei muster five thousand fighting men; the Ilias-zei and the Mali-zei dwell in Buneer, and are generally spoken of as Buneer-wals. Their strength is two thousand matchlocks. The Rane-zei are five thousand strong. But the remaining Yusufsae who hold Buneer number at least ten thousand fighting men, and the people of Swat probably more. The Bajourees, who also were

subject to the late Akhond, are computed at six thousand. The Yusufsae confederacy is consequently a very powerful one, only fortunately the confederacy exists only in name. The Otman Khel, a very powerful Pathan tribe, hold the country that intervenes between the Yusufsae and their neighbours the Momunds. They can bring into the field probably five thousand fighting men, and have given us a great deal of trouble. Their last outrage was the well-known Swat canal affair in 1876. The two sections of the Yusufsae are therefore computed to be able to bring seventy thousand fighting men into the field; but their striking power is infinitely less. Not only are they split up into almost innumerable sub-sections, but they are to a great extent within our frontier, and very much at our mercy.

The Momunds, although less numerous, are in reality a much more formidable clan than the Yusufsae. They are also more under the influence of Cabul, and their intimate connection with the ruling family, and Yakoob Khan's blood-relations with them, make their future action dubious. Their fighting force is almost twenty thousand men. They hold the country on the north-west border of the Peshawur valley, touching Bajour and Kunar on the north, and the district of Ningrehar on the west. The Cabul river defines their country on the south, and our frontier on the east. They were in direct communication with the Ameer, from whom they received cash allowances, and the revenues of certain districts in the Jellalabad province, amounting in all to seventy thousand rupees per annum. They hold the

important post of Lalpura, on the northern bank of the Cabul river, and since the construction of our forts at Michni and Shubkudhur, they have not given us very much trouble. But when we first occupied the Punjab they were most refractory, and several large expeditions had to be despatched against them. Sir Colin Campbell, in 1852, inflicted a severe blow upon them in the open field; but in the Umbeyla campaign they were hostile, and assisted the Buneers, and they have generally struck in with the Afghans when they have openly taken the field. Dost Mahomed had great influence among them, and Yakoob Khan, who is himself half a Momund, probably possesses as much, if not more. It was by Momunds that Major Macdonald was murdered in 1873, near Michni. South of the Cabul river, and stretching east as far as the Jowaki country, and west along the declivities of the Khyber, lies the region held by the great Afreedee clan. Their fighting strength is given at twenty-five thousand men. They are subdivided into Khels, and the principal of these are the Kookie, three thousand four hundred fighting men; the Sipah, Kummer, Mullikdeen, and Khumber, combined, ten thousand men; the Zakka, five thousand men; the Ákha, one thousand eight hundred men; and the Adam, three thousand five hundred men. The Kookie Khels dwell in the Bara country, south of the Khyber pass; but during the winter they move down to the entrance of the pass itself, which they hold as far as Ali Musjid and the caves of Kajoornai. It was with these that our recent arrangements for keeping the Khyber open were made. We

have had little trouble with the Kookies during the last twenty years, and our chief intercourse with them is confined to the purchase of fire-wood for our forts and camps. The Sipah Khel and its confederates occupy that part of the Bara valley known as Kajoornai, and are close neighbours of the Kookies. The Zakka Khels hold the north side of the Khyber, and have never caused us much trouble. They are noted as bold and cunning marauders, however, and they shared with the Kookies the right of keeping the Khyber open for us. The Akha Khels in summer live on the Teerah mountains, and in winter along the Kohat pass. One branch of them, the Bussi Khel, receives a small portion of the pass allowance. But it is the Adam Khels who mainly hold the Kohat pass and the country lying east of it. Our troubles with the Afreedees have been mostly with these people, and the grand object of keeping the Kohat pass open has cost us more blood and more money than any other cause in our border wars. It is impossible to rely very confidently on the good conduct of the Jowakis and the other Adam Khels during any crisis in affairs. To the west of the Afreedees, and close in on Kohat, come the Orucksye. They are divided into four sections, mustering in all twenty-nine thousand fighting men. Those sections are named Dowlut-zei, Ishmail-zei, Lushkur-zei, and Hamsayah. We have various arrangements with them and their neighbours, the Zaimooshts, who inhabit the hills towards Khurum.

The great Pathan tribe of the Waziris, which can

bring into the field forty-five thousand warriors, holds the mountainous territory west of our frontier from Thull and the Khurum valley as far south as the Gomul pass. There are five sub-divisions—the Zelai, the Goorbaz, the Utman-zei, the Ahmed-zei, and the Muhsoods. The Zelai and Goorbaz are those which are in the vicinity of the Khurum valley, and as yet we have never been in contact with them. But with the Utman and Ahmed-Zeis, as well as with the Muhsoods, our troubles have been never-ceasing. The most refractory of all has been the Cabul Khel branch of the Utman-Zei, and the task of our officers at Bunnoo and Tank has been no holiday one in dealing with the bold and turbulent Waziris. The Muhsoods have often been punished, but never so effectually as on the occasion when General Neville Chamberlain proceeded against them. He marched against the Muhsoods in 1860, when the force under his command operated against these marauders in the very heart of the hill country. The most striking part of this campaign was the gallantry with which an original plan was carried out. The little army, five thousand strong, left its base of Tank, in the month of April, 1860, and pushing its way up the Zam stream pressed on boldly and steadily for the Muhsood stronghold. The force was accompanied not only by mountain guns on mules, but also by ordinary field guns. Their village of Kot Shingee was occupied, and a surprise on our camp at Puloseen was repulsed, after some hard fighting, with heavy loss to the assailants, who left one hundred and thirty dead upon the field. From Puloseen we marched on

their capital of Kaneeghorum, which was occupied after a severe fight had taken place along the banks of the Zam. The Muhsood country surrounds the lofty pinnacle of Peerghul, and is very inaccessible to attack. The lesson read them by the present Sir Neville Chamberlain was a severe one, although it had cost us many lives and no small sum of money; and ever since the Muhsoods have given us little trouble on a large scale, although petty acts of marauding continue. The Waziris are the last of the great tribes on the Punjab and Derajat frontiers. The Hazara clans, the Yusufsae, the Momunds, the Afreedees, the Orucksye, and the Waziris, can in all bring into the field some hundred and ninety thousand men, but, as was pointed out, the numbers of the Yusufsae are greatly exaggerated, and probably the true fighting force, if every man were summoned to the front, would be one hundred thousand men. Practically speaking, the two most formidable are the Waziris and the Momunds. These are not only more united among themselves, but also more closely connected with the Afghan ruler. The Swatees, Bajourees, and Buneerwals are also fanatics, and might strike in against us if our arms were dimmed by any momentary reverse along the frontier. The Afreedees appear to be friendly, but no firm reliance can be placed on their various sections. Besides, their real service is to keep the Kohat pass open, and towards performing the same useful service in the Khyber they can only assist. The matter rests more with the Afghans and the Momunds. But there can be no doubt that from the

Gomul pass to the borders of Cashmere there is a difficult frontier, held by warlike and semi-hostile tribes, to be kept in a state of good order.

South of the Gomul pass and the Waziri country the prospect is altogether more satisfactory, both in respect to the nature of the country and the disposition of the tribes. Taking them in their order, these are the Buttanees, four thousand five hundred fighting men; the Sheoranees, four thousand; the Ooshteranees, nine hundred; the Kosranees, one thousand five hundred and fifty; the Khetrans, four thousand six hundred; the Bozdars, two thousand seven hundred; the Loonds, two thousand; the Khosahs, four thousand five hundred; the Loogarees, eight thousand five hundred; the Goorchanees, one thousand two hundred; and the Mayarees, two thousand. Those tribes take us from Tank to Jacobabad, and along this portion of our frontier there has been a far greater amount of tranquillity than among the tribes to the north. It is in this direction that some of the best passes into Cabul are to be found, notably that by the Sangarh river from Taunsa, which has two embouchures, the Lundi pass and the Sounhra pass. There is also farther south the Sakhi Sarwar pass, of which more will probably be heard. We are on terms of good standing with most of these clans, and not only is the range they inhabit of much less altitude, but also much narrower than those to the north. In fact, to the south of the Waziri country the mountains are only a chain, and the altitudes in no case exceed eight thousand feet south of the Gomul pass.

It will be interesting at this point to give some description of the character of these hill-men who represent such a very potent force upon the Indian frontier. Nothing can be more authoritative or instructive upon the subject than Sir Richard Temple's "Report upon the Independent Tribes of the North-west Frontier," from which the following is an extract :—

Now *these tribes are savages,* noble savages perhaps, and not without some tincture of virtue and generosity, but still absolutely barbarians nevertheless. They have nothing approaching to government or civil institutions ; they have for the most part no education ; they have nominally a religion, but Mahomedanism, as understood by them, is no better, or perhaps is actually worse, than the creeds of the wildest races on earth. In their eyes the one great commandment is blood for blood, and fire and sword for all infidels, that is, for all people not Mahomedans. They are superstitious and priest-ridden. But the priests (*Mullas*) are as ignorant as they are bigoted, and use their influence simply for preaching crusades against unbelievers, and inculcate the doctrine of rapine and bloodshed against the defenceless people of the plain, The hill-men are sensitive in regard to their women, but their customs in regard to marriage and betrothal are very prejudicial to social advancement. At the same time they are a sensual race. They are very avaricious; for gold they will do almost anything, except betray a guest. They are thievish and predatory to the last degree. The Patan mother often prays that her son may be a successful robber. They are utterly faithless to public engagements; it would never occur to their minds that an oath on the Koran was binding if against their interests. It must be added that they are fierce and blood-thirsty. They are never without weapons : when grazing their cattle, when driving beasts of burden, when tilling the soil, they are still armed. They are perpetually at war with each other. Each tribe, and section of a tribe, has its internecine wars, every family its hereditary blood-feuds,

and every individual his personal foes. There is hardly a man whose hands are unstained. Each person counts up his murders. Each tribe has a debtor and creditor account with its neighbours, life for life. Reckless of the lives of others, they are not sparing of their own. They consider retaliation and revenge to be the strongest of all obligations. They possess gallantry and courage themselves, and admire such qualities in others. Men of the same party will stand by one another in danger. To their minds hospitality is the first of virtues. Any person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe, but will be kindly received. But as soon as he has left the roof of his entertainer, he may be robbed or killed. They are charitable to the indigent of their own tribe; they possess the pride of birth, and regard ancestral associations. They are not averse to civilisation whenever they have felt its benefits; they are fond of trading, and also of cultivating; but they are too fickle and excitable to be industrious in agriculture or anything else. They will take military service, and, though impatient of discipline, will prove faithful, unless excited by fanaticism. Such, briefly, is their character, replete with the unaccountable inconsistencies, with that mixture of opposite vices and virtues, belonging to savages.

During the thirty years that we have held the Punjab there have been more than thirty expeditions against these turbulent hill-men. The expense has been very heavy, and the cost in life not inconsiderable, and the result has not been of that complete character that was hoped and necessary. In fact, such success as has been obtained is due not to our expeditions and our preventive measures, but to the charitable acts of our authorities. It is to the construction of roads, the opening of dispensaries, the preaching of missionaries, the influence of commerce, etc. etc., that whatever better feeling there may have

been generated within the last few years is traceable, and it is from a further development of that system that the most beneficial results might be expected. But there certainly appears to be something necessary in the way of restricting the carrying of arms within British territory.

Any independent hill-man may cross our frontier now with arms in his hands, and whether these are only matchlocks or swords, they offer an efficient means for offence. This is simply placing a premium upon lawlessness. By insisting upon every bearer of weapons carrying a license, and by refusing to admit armed foreigners from crossing the Punjab frontier, we should be able to effect a great improvement in the condition of the border districts. Preventive measures are found to be more efficacious in dealing with these hill-men than punitive, and should be adopted by preference to any other. Before passing on to the larger question involved in the consideration of the true, or rather of the best, frontier for India, it will be in point to say something of the principal passes through our present one, viz. the Suleiman and Brahuik ranges.

Through these there exist innumerable passes of various degrees of practicability. The smaller of these mountain ranges, known as the Brahuik Mountains, lies just beyond the borders of Scinde, and divides the Belooch district of Kachhi from the metropolitan State of Khelat. Kachhi was conquered from the Nawabs of Scinde by Abdullah Khan, of Khelat, in 1730, and ever since that year has formed part of the State of Beloochistan. Through this

range are several passes, notably the Bholan and Mula, but there are nine others which the natives make use of in passing from Kachhi to Sarawan and Jalawan, and the crossing of which occupies seven days. The Nagau and Bhore passes lead to the city of Khelat direct, and are, if feasible for camel traffic, the most advantageously situated of all the Brahuik passes. The Mula and Bholan are formed by the action of the rivers, or rather torrents, of those names, and mark respectively the southern and northern limits of this mountain range. The Mula (Muloh), or Gundava pass, begins at a place called Pir Chatta, nine miles distant from the town of Kotri, which is ten miles south-west of Gundava. Between Pir Chatta and the next stage, Kuhau, the Mula river has to be crossed nine times. During the later stages of the journey the same stream has to be passed repeatedly, so tortuous is its course. The pass continues in a southerly direction as far as Narr, which is a cultivated spot where supplies can be obtained. At Narr a cross-road leads through the village of Gaz, to the Belooch town of Khozdar, but the Mula pass turns north-west in the direction of Khelat. The top of the pass is reached at the village of Angira, where the altitude is five thousand two hundred and fifty feet, but it is only for a short distance that the height exceeds four thousand feet. The great objection to the Mula pass is its length—one hundred and two miles—and the fact that it only leads to Khelat, one hundred and three miles south of Quettah; for otherwise it is preferable, in a military sense, to the Bholan.

The average rise for the whole distance is forty-five feet in the mile. General Willshire returned by this pass after the capture of Khelat, and Mr. Masson had also travelled by it. This pass is open throughout the year; but it is in July and August dangerous from the floods that come during the wet season.

The Bholan pass, of which we practically hold possession by our garrison at Quettah, and its support at Dadar, begins five miles to the north-west of the latter place. Its great advantage over the Mula is that it is only sixty miles in length, and that it leads straight to Quettah on the Afghan frontier. Its crest is five thousand eight hundred feet above the sea, and its average ascent gives ninety feet to the mile. The great obstacle used to be from the Sir-i-Bholan torrent, but that was only active during a few weeks in the wet season. In the old days this pass used to be invested by the Marris and Khakas, Belooch tribes, but since our occupation of Quettah there has been complete tranquillity. In 1839 the army of Sir John Keane took six days to traverse it, and this must be held to have been capital marching when we consider the vast multitude of camp-followers and the difficulties of transporting a siege-train. A light column could perform the distance in three days. It is necessary to remember in computing these distances that these passes take one far into the Afghan territory, and not, like the northern passes, only into its outskirts. Quettah is very nearly in the same longitude as Khelat in the Ghiljie country, and considerably westward both of Cabul and Ghizni.

North of the Brahuik range, but one hundred and fifty miles to the east of it, comes the Suleiman. That distance is marked by the ill-defined border between Kachhi and the Afghan province of Siwistan, and is held by the Marris, Boogtees, and other tribes. The Loosharees and Loogarees are their neighbours, and acknowledge in some very vague sense their Afghan nationality. Through the Suleiman range proper there are numerous passes; the Vaddor pass from Dera Ghazi Khan; the Sari and Sounhra passes from Lund; the Sangarh pass from Taunsa; the Drug pass from Jhok Bodo; the Burkoie and Vahowa passes from Vahowa; the Shakau and Draband passes from Dera Ismail Khan; the Gumal or Gomul from Tak or Tank; and the Dawar from Bunnoo. Of all of these passes we know little or nothing; but their principal drawback is that they lie beyond the most inaccessible portion of the Indus, and out of the way of our two true points of passage at Attock and Sukhur. Our knowledge of the Gomul pass is principally derived from Mr. G. T. Vigne's account of his visit to Ghizni and Cabul in 1836. From his narrative it is clear that the Gomul does not present any great difficulties, and of these the vicinity of Waziris must be considered the worst.

The Gomul pass leads straight to Ghizni, and was the principal one used by Mahmoud of Ghizni in his numerous invasions of Hindostan; but in view of the hostility of the Muhsoods and other Waziris it may be held to be at present useless to us. To some minds the Draband pass, from Dera Ismail Khan through the Sheoranee country, is the most likely among the passes

in this quarter to be of importance to us in the future. There are roads of some kind that lead due west into Afghanistan, and that would strike the Cabul road probably at Mukur, half-way between Khelat-i-Ghiljie and Ghizni.

North of the Dawar pass and Bunnoo the Waziri country makes an indenture into the Indian frontier similar to that farther north by the Afreedee tongue of land between Kohat and Peshawur, and twenty-five miles to the north of Bunnoo, with the Waziri territory intervening, lies the small place of Thull, on the banks of the Khurum river. Its importance is that from it there is a pass by that river to Cabul and Ghizni. Sir H. Lumsden's mission entered Cabul by this road. So far as the fort of Mahomed Azim, fifty miles, the road is direct and fairly passable. From this place to Habib fort, and thence through the Peiwar pass, the English mission in 1857 worked its way by a devious route to Haidarkhel, a village on the Cabul road, a little to the south of Shaikhabad. But there is a shorter road to Cabul than this, which is available during the summer months at all events, and that is by the Shaturgardan pass, north-west of the Peiwar, which debouches on the places named Dobandi and Zurgonsha, in the immediate vicinity of the capital. By this road the distance from Thull to Cabul is under one hundred and fifty miles. In order to reach Ghizni, the road followed by the Lumsden mission must be taken, turning off near the village of Kushi. It is unnecessary to say much of the Khyber, which has been often described, and which is the most

northerly of these passes. There are various small passes north and south of the Khyber, which strike that pass to the rear of Ali Musjid, and which, if utilised, would simplify the task of passage very much. To make these available both the Momunds and the Afreedees must be propitiated. The travels of the Mollah have thrown considerable light on the Bajour district north of the Cabul river, and from them it would seem to be quite possible to reach Lalpura, by an advance from our fort of Abazaie by the Inzare pass. Lalpura is at the Afghan entrance to the Khyber, and a stronghold of the Momunds. It lies on the northern bank of the Cabul river. It could only be occupied with their approbation, but it is *apropos* to remember that, in 1839, we installed at this place a new ruler, Torabaz Khan, who remained faithful to us through good and ill fortune. This precedent might prove to be of practical importance.

Having described the chief passes that lead through the Suleiman and Safeid Kho, let us glance briefly at those farther west in Cabul itself. Between Quettah and Candahar there are two ranges of mountains, and the country to be traversed is far from being as easy as some would have us believe. The English army took eighteen days in marching the hundred and fifty miles that intervene, although their advance was unresisted. The country is admirably adapted for purposes of defence, and at Hydersye, Hykulsye, and the Khojuck pass a resolute soldier could easily retard the advance of an invading army. The Khojuck pass through the Amran range is over seven thousand feet.

Once established at Candahar the whole of Afghanistan south of the Hindoo Koosh would be at our mercy, for between that city and Cabul there are no passes worthy of the name, although the position on the Maidan hills is very strong. In the direction of Herat there are several, but these present no extraordinary difficulties, and as Girishk and the Helmund are the proposed limits of our frontier, they need not be discussed here. Of the northern passes through the Hindoo Koosh, the best known is that of Bamian, or Sighan. The altitude of this, on the direct road to Khulm and Balkh, is eight thousand five hundred feet, and the Harakotal pass at the northern entrance of the Sighan valley is the same. From Bamian another road branches off due west to the Balkh river and Shiborgan, and the heights of the two or three passes here vary from five thousand to eight thousand feet. There is a fair road in this direction from Bamian, *viâ* Kilai Jahudi to Shiborgan, and Andchui to Kerkhi, the Russo-Bokharan post on the Oxus. The distance from Kerkhi to Bamian by this road is only three hundred and fifty miles, and from Khoja Sálih and Kilif the distance is rather less.

East of Bamian there are the following passes leading into the fertile valley of Panjkir:—The Koushan, the Salalang, the Girdshak, and the Khawak. Their altitudes vary from ten thousand to twelve thousand feet. The Khawak, between Kundus, Inderaub, and Cabul, is the most important and the most used. North-eastward of the Khawak are the Dora and Nuksan passes, about thirteen thousand feet high, leading

from Badakshan and Wakhan to the Chitral valley; and then, continuing along the Hindoo Koosh, we come to the Baroghil, twelve thousand feet, leading from Kashgar. But although these are the names of all the passes we know, it is evident, from the chronicle of our campaign of 1839–40 in these mountains, that there are many more—in fact, that between the valleys of Northern Afghanistan—and it is nothing but a succession of valleys—there is constant communication, by means of passes of all degrees of practicability. But on one point an opinion may be ventured, and that is that the outer passes—those which lead from the main range of the Hindoo Koosh down to Balkh, Khulm, Kundus, and Badakshan—are susceptible of being made impregnable, and the earthworks, the form our fortifications should take, could be left during the winter months, when the cold drove our soldiers into the plains and warmer valleys of Cabul.

In the western portion of the Hindoo Koosh—viz. the Koh Siah and the Koh-i-Baba—there are passes at frequent intervals, made either by the Helmund or the mountain torrents which rush down to the Heri. In this little-known quarter of Afghanistan, held by Eimak and Hazara mountaineers, and the whilome seat of the great Abdali clan, there are several trade routes used by the inhabitants. They all point either to Herat or southward to Girishk and Candahar, or northward to Maimene and Balkh, Bokhara and Samarcand, the cities of wealth and luxury in the eyes of Central Asiatics. And in the low country bordering on the Turcoman desert and

lying north of the mountains of Ghor there is that main road from Herat to Maimene which crosses the Murghab at the village of its name, and which is traced on through all those northern khanates until it strikes that Little Pamir trade route which passes through Wakhan and Sirikul to Eastern Turkestan and the western cities of China. That fortunate highway lies beyond the passes alike of the Suleiman and the Hindoo Koosh, but if the Hindoo Koosh were the Indian rampart it would be beneath our walls that the wealth of Western Asia and the prosperity of Eastern Asia should pass to combine in promoting the welfare of less happy Central Asia, and it should be under our auspices that the regeneration of the southern portion of Asia should take place. And this bare enumeration of mountain passes of various degrees of altitude, and of different capacities for assisting in the advancement of the nations, bare and uninteresting as at a hasty glance it may appear, will serve to remind us of the double function that is common to all passes. A pass is, after all, only a door —a "duar," as they call it in Northern India—a means whereby armies and merchants may be admitted or shut out. The barrier of a mountain range is almost impassable, if the custodian of its crest refuse to open it, as witness the long range of the Himalaya, where Chinese exclusiveness and suspicion have closed the way to the interesting secrets of Tibet and the western parts of China. The barrier of a river will never prevent the people on either side of its banks from knowing each other, from manifesting their

love or their hatred; and it is because the light of past experience is so clear upon this point that English statesmen and thinkers are beginning to recognise in the Hindoo Koosh the true frontier—true in an historical sense also—of our Eastern empire.

And this brings us to the consideration of the real question of the hour, the rectification of the Indian frontier. The preceding remarks, and the *data* which have been given of the numbers and condition of the border tribes, will suffice to show that there are two aspects of this question—the first is its local significance, and the second, for want of a better word, its imperial. The series of petty wars, which will now have to be further augmented by an expedition against the Waziri assailants of Tank, and by a general campaign, it is said, against the Afreedees, render some more effectual mode of procedure absolutely necessary, and it is difficult to perceive what method short of annexation can be expected to prove effectual. Neither among the Afreedees nor the Yusufsae nor the Momunds is any improvement visible in the tone of the hill-men towards us, and, to judge from recent events, when no single tribe has remained attached to our cause for any length of time, it is impossible to look forward to any better feeling in the immediate future. Apart altogether from the action of the Cabul Ameer, the question of our relations with the frontier tribes is one that imperatively demands a settlement. No power could tolerate the continuation of the state of things which exists at present upon the Indian frontier, where a collection of fanatical and

robber clans, containing in the aggregate one hundred and fifty thousand fighting men, with arms of various kinds in their hands, maintains a complete independence and a covert hostility which is but thinly veiled. When it is remembered that these tribes are becoming in steady progression better armed, and in closer sympathy with each other, it will be obvious that the danger, far from being stationary, is a growing one.

No Power holding India with a small army, and exposed on its north-west frontier to a standing menace from a great military empire, can afford to overlook the factor in the political question which is represented by these armed hill-men. To put it at the very least, these represent a local danger which it is impossible to ignore. At the very moment when we should need all our strength it would be seriously lessened by the outbreak of a border war of the largest proportions and the most harassing character. It is not clear that the most perfect understanding with the Afghan ruler would remove that difficulty. But, apart from the *foreign* danger, there still remains for domestic reasons the necessity of mitigating, if not of dissipating, the causes for trouble and apprehension which are to be found in the condition of our relations with these border tribes, whom neither stern measures nor gentle can reduce to a sense of order.

There is but one way of effecting a certain remedy, and it is a gradual one. That is by the occupation of the country of an offending tribe, to be followed by a disarmament of the males, and by the construction

of roads throughout the annexed district. In bad cases it would perhaps be necessary to go beyond this, and adopt that process of ejectment and resettlement which was carried out with such advantage to the border by Sir Charles Napier in Scinde in the case of the Jakranis. It is only by adopting a settled system of coercion that we can hope to cow these tribesmen, and, by thoroughly subduing them, prevent them remaining any longer a thorn in our side. In order to do this our chastisement in the future must be annexation, which, if followed up by disarmament and the construction of roads, must prove effectual in securing the objects before us, viz. the tranquillity of the border and the removal of a standing danger. There are signs that we are on the eve of a border war, when we shall have to adopt the most thorough measures, and it appears possible that we may have to organize a military frontier on the pattern of the Austrian along the borders of Turkey. In carrying this into practical effect we must derive considerable assistance from adopting to some extent the scheme of Sir Charles Napier.

The consideration of these points forces the conclusion upon us that it is impossible to properly rectify the Indian frontier if we ignore the hill-men. The problem is unfortunately not so simple that it can be decided on purely strategical considerations. If it were, nothing could be more perfect than the scheme expounded by General Hamley, than whom there is no greater authority among English generals. In a strategical sense the construction of fortified camps in

face of the Khyber, the Khurum, and the Gomul passes, and the occupation and strengthening of Candahar would meet every requirement. Our defensive position in the north would be very strong, and in the south we should occupy a post of great vantage for the prosecution of offensive measures, while we should have outflanked the advance of the invader. General Hamley states this view of the case with characteristic ability in his paper on "The Strategical Condition of our Indian North-west Frontier," read before the United Service Institution on the 13th of December, 1878. But, as Sir Henry Rawlinson observed, although we "might be strategically strong, we should be neglecting those calls upon our protection" which were demanded of us. It is for this reason that General Hamley's scheme, in so far as the northern part of it is concerned, is inadequate to the necessities of the occasion. This is an admission that cannot be made without great reluctance, for if it were possible by other means to obtain what is necessary assuredly no one would be found to urge the advance of the British frontier beyond the passes of the Punjab.

It may be predicted with confidence that none of the authorities responsible in India for the results of this war will advocate the abandonment of the Khyber. On that point there can be little doubt, and the improvement of the road through the pass will be rendered permanently beneficial both to Afghans and British subjects by the garrisoning of a fort at the upper end of the pass as well as the lower. Whether

that post is to be placed at Dacca or at Peshbolak is at present immaterial, and it is possible that both these places will have to be fortified and held. The main point is that by some means or other the Khyber will have to be rendered secure at all seasons against the depredations of the hill-men. This necessity will probably compel us to occupy the adjoining valleys, as well as the actual pass, and thus would be paved the way for that extension of British authority which must sooner or later take place. It is necessary to remember that Dacca only commands one entrance to the Khyber, and that the other outlets would have to be equally guarded. No single position seems to fulfil the required condition, and consequently there will have to be a chain of posts from Lalpura to the Safeid Koh. It would be wise, however, to follow General Hamley's advice in so far as political considerations will permit, and *if peace be promptly concluded with Cabul*, to content ourselves in this quarter with the possession of the Khyber. Jellalabad might therefore be wisely abandoned, and restored to the Ameer. Lord Napier of Magdala, however, says that it should be held.

In the Khurum valley our actual frontier will probably not be extended beyond Peiwar, although in Khost, and up to the Shaturgardan our influence will become supreme. The advantages of an extension of British authority in this direction have been greatly magnified, and in a strategical sense it is difficult to perceive any benefit that can accrue from an advance beyond Thull that is not more easily ob-

tained by less dangerous measures elsewhere. With regard to the Gomul pass—the third great route into Afghanistan, and that followed by the Povindahs—General Hamley's scheme for an intrenched camp would seem to meet every requirement. Any annexation of territory here can only take place as the result of a punitive campaign with the troublesome Waziris.

But it is in the south that the Indian frontier admits of most easy rectification. Here the local aspect of the question is comparatively unimportant, and its imperial character most clearly perceptible. The two passes through the Brahuik range, the Bholan and the Mula, have been already described; it remains only to mention that these are now being supplemented by a new route devised by Sir Richard Temple from Sommeeanee Bay. So far as it is possible yet to predict the result of this new route the scheme promises to work well, and if it does a short road will have been secured from England and from Bombay to Southern Afghanistan. If it be found to realise the expectations which are now formed of it, there will be little delay in constructing a line of railway from the sea to the town of Khelat, and this must be attended by a most rapid development in our trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia generally. Strategically its advantages would not be less apparent. The construction of a line of railway from Sukhur to Dadar, which was first advocated by that far-seeing soldier and administrator, General John Jacob, would supplement this route, and would give us two capital roads to Southern Afghanistan.

This improvement in the means of communication must undoubtedly encourage us to secure the full meed of our military success in this direction. Hesitation in advancing to Candahar was indeed intelligible so long as it was doubtful how we were to maintain communications with our garrison there, but now that we are in possession of a route from the sea there is no longer room for apprehension on that score. There is, moreover, the possibility of opening up two fresh roads to the Indian frontier, the first through the Zhobe valley to Dera Ismail Khan, and the second by Thull and Chotiali to Dera Ghazi Khan. The former starts from Candahar, the latter from the Pisheen valley. Of neither of them do we possess much information, but the Chotiali route is at present being explored. There is also every reason for believing that the Gwaja route over the edge of the Amran range will displace the Khojuck as the main route from Pisheen to Candahar. There is apparently no reason why the more western road still through Gulistan, which completely turns the Amran range, should not be utilised. In maintaining communications throughout the year with Candahar by one or other of these roads there should be no difficulty; and with a railway from Sommeeanee to Khelat, Candahar would be as near to England as Peshawur is now. By that effort, which is always being contemplated as possible in the future, and upon which so many arguments are based in favour of ignoring Russia's movements in Central Asia, fifty thousand English troops could be despatched from these shores, and concentrated, not

along a strategically bad frontier, but in a position of commanding importance and one of incontestable military strength. Regard the Indian frontier from whatever point of view we may, there is no avoiding the conclusion that in the whole extent of that frontier—that is, from Cashmere to the sea—Candahar is the dominant position of all. Its importance is indefinitely increased, now that it is admitted that it can be brought into direct communication with the sea. Whatever else we take, or abstain from taking, on the conclusion of this war, it is imperative that Candahar should be retained, and converted into a strong fortress. That measure alone would be "rectifying" the Indian frontier, and strengthening it in its weakest point.

The consideration of the future of Candahar brings us to the inquiry of what is to be the reward to the Khan of Khelat for the great assistance he has given us during the campaign. He surely will not rest contented with expressions of friendship on our part. It would be impolitic in a double sense to give mere lip-gratitude for such valuable service as he has rendered to us. Great credit is due to Major Sandeman for his tact in manipulating the Khelat ruler, Khododad Khan, who has not at all times been so well-disposed towards us as he has proved himself to be since our occupation of Quettah; but in order to give permanent effect to the skill of our representative it is necessary to reward the fidelity of the ruler. This can only be done by an extension of territory, and the only extension that can be made is to transfer the much-talked-of valley of

Pisheen to Khelat. The increased revenue which the Khan would thus receive would enable him to strengthen still further his position among his sirdars, and we should have increased by this act the value of our Belooch ally. It would also remove the necessity of placing English garrisons in this district, thus enabling us to concentrate our force at Candahar. Apart from these arguments we owe it to ourselves to give some substantial token of our sense of the Khan's good conduct.

With regard to the frontier question, admitting that the Indus, which is not a good frontier line in a military sense, for reasons admirably stated by General Hamley, is also impossible for political reasons, and that our present straggling frontier between mountains and a bridgeless, fordless river, is a bad defensive one, as cannot be denied, the question remains, are we to rest content with present deficiencies?

What those deficiencies are may be best seen by briefly reviewing the existing Indian frontier. It is when the Indus enters British territory at Umb that the true question arises of whether our present Indian frontier is a good one or not. From Torbola to Dera Ghazi Khan our frontier may be defined as an irregular line drawn at the base of the Suleiman and Safeid Kho mountains, backed by the river Indus, at a distance varying from ten miles to fifty. Along that frontier we possess seven important posts, viz. Peshawur, Kohat, Bunnoo, Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, Vahowa, and Dera Ghazi Khan, and each of these posts is to all intents and purposes dependent upon its own re-

sources. The Indus Valley Railway, which in other ways is of inestimable importance, does not provide all the places named with ready communications to the rear. When the line is finished to Attock and Peshawur the latter place and Kohat will undoubtedly be made readier for offensive as well as defensive purposes. But Bunnoo, Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, and Vahowa, will still remain, for defensive purposes, isolated from support and exposed to attack. Through the Suleiman passes it would not be difficult to transport an army, and the Muhsoods, Oosteranees, and other clans might not be loth to open the way for a consideration. The main point to remember is that these garrisoned positions are quite detached from our centres of power, and have, moreover, in their rear the Indus, which is often two, and sometimes three rivers. Even Dera Ghazi Khan, the best off of these places, can only preserve communications with Mooltan, its base, and a station on the Indus Valley Railway, under difficult and uncertain conditions, for both the Indus and the Chenab intervene. The difficulties of maintaining communications across the Indus are immense, and it is only at Sukhur, where the Indus Valley Railway crosses the river, that they have been with some success coped with. At Attock it is impossible to view the occurrence of any great strain without serious apprehension. In carrying on offensive measures in Cabul these elements must be admitted to be an important factor in the question. But these drawbacks to offensive measures become magnified when they are regarded as weak points in our defensive system. Our

whole line from Kohat to Dera Ghazi Khan is, practically speaking, defenceless, and it is extremely doubtful whether a prudent general would hold on to Peshawur and Dera Ghazi Khan. Practically speaking, then, before a great invasion, which we declined to avert in Cabul, the most prudent course would be to withdraw behind the Indus. Every one who is acquainted with Indian opinion knows what that would mean, and the best token of its impossibility is shown by our having crossed that river thirty years ago to take up a position in the vicinity of very troublesome neighbours.

The true frontier of India and Afghanistan, which are as much one country as England and Wales, is the great northern mountain-range, the Himalaya, the Karakoram, and the Hindoo Koosh. The points to guard are not the multitudinous passes through the Suleiman and the ranges to the south; they are the comparatively few outlets that pierce the great ranges just mentioned. Our outposts should not face west and north; they should point north alone. Our natural line is marked by Peshawur, Jellalabad, Cabul, Inderaub, Bamian, the Kohi Baba, and Koh Siah ranges, Herat, Girishk, Candahar, and Quettah. Beyond that frontier Sarakhs, Maimene, Andchui, Balkh, and Faizabad should be advanced fortified posts. With this line of defence it would be simply impossible for a Russian army to pierce the Hindoo Koosh in any direction whatever. The places necessary to hold in force would be Candahar, Cabul, Herat, and Jellalabad. Peshawur might be abandoned. Our principal line of communications should be with the sea either at Kur-

rachee or Sommeeanee, and railways should be constructed from Candahar to those places. It has been objected in a quarter entitled to respect that, in the event of a rising in the Punjab, we should find our communications severed between Cabul and Hindostan. This would not be the case if we make full use of our true roads to Afghanistan *viâ* the Bolan and Mula passes, and of the routes from the sea. In talking of the natural difficulties of these roads, it should be remembered that the former has recently been greatly improved by dynamite being employed to clear the way, and that it is possible that many other passes may be rendered, by the same agent, more useful and more suitable for the construction of light railways than their natural condition would warrant us in expecting.

In the event of attack from Persia and not from Khokand, Herat might be left as an advanced post corresponding to Balkh in the north, and then our line here would be the river Helmund and the town of Girishk. The frontier sketched here is attainable; it is no ideal one, but thoroughly practical and in accordance with geographical formation.

At present it is unnecessary to realise the full extent of that design. A more moderate scheme will secure every object that we have in view. Candahar and the Helmund mark the limit of our present necessities. By garrisoning that place, by annexing the valley of Pisheen to Khelat, by opening up both the Zhobe valley and Chotiali routes, by perfecting our communications with the sea and also with the Indus, we can secure a dominant position in Afghanistan, which nothing could shake.

But in that position the actual possession of Candahar is absolutely necessary. It is the key-stone of the arch. If we abstain from retaining Candahar all our other schemes will have been in vain, or only of partial utility; and we shall have lost the most favourable opportunity we are ever likely to have of settling the Afghan problem wholly to our own advantage. With regard to Herat, we shall have neglected the most promising chance of securing a supreme voice in the decision of its fate. If we abandon Candahar we mar the effect of our policy along the whole of the Indian frontier, and in no exaggerated language it may be asserted that by doing so we shall have nullified the triumph of our arms, and blindly refused to accept the favours which fortune has showered upon us with no grudging hand.

CHAPTER IX.

RUSSIA AND AFGHANISTAN.

We have already followed Captain Vickovitch, the first Russian envoy to Afghanistan, in his journeys to Cabul and Candahar, and we have seen how that experiment resulted in the failure of the Russian scheme for various causes, and in the eventual disgrace of Vickovitch himself. But the journey of Vickovitch was not an utter failure. If it failed in accomplishing any political object, if it did not bring Russian bayonets nearer to the Indus, it at least established a precedent, and encouraged the Russian Government with the hope of what might yet take place. In a sense Vickovitch was the fore-runner of Stoletoff, and but for the former it is doubtful whether the latter would ever have undertaken his journey. It was to the efforts, so nearly successful, of Vickovitch that all our subsequent vigilance with regard to the reception of Russian agents at Cabul must be attributed.

But although we possess no exact information of the

arrival of any Russian officer in Cabul from the time of Vickovitch to that of Stoletoff, there is a considerable amount of evidence to show that during that long interval Russia has been far from passive in Afghanistan. During the progress of the civil war when Russia had first overcome the army of Bokhara, it is said that Faiz Mahomed, the ruler of Balkh, had entered into negotiations with the Russian generals; but whatever scheme was then afoot it was shortly nipped in the bud by the defeat and death of Faiz Mahomed. During the next few years there were constant rumours of the arrival of Russian officers in the country, but nothing definite could be ascertained. It was not indeed until a much more recent period that decided intelligence on the subject was procurable, and then Russia had resumed her activity in Afghanistan, not by means of a Russian officer, but through the instrumentality of native representatives. In this later stage the Court of Bokhara was, as a rule, the intermediary, and Bokharan subjects were principally employed in the work of carrying on communications between the Governor-General and the Ameer.

The correspondence commenced at the time of the Khivan campaign, when Shere Ali, as we know, was greatly alarmed at the progress of Russia in Central Asia, and had turned to us for a fresh guarantee of the integrity of his dominions against Russia. While his prime minister was endeavouring to move the phlegm of Lord Northbrook at Simla, his master was carrying on a correspondence with Kaufmann. So far as Shere Ali was concerned he was not responsible for

this correspondence. Kaufmann commenced it, and the Ameer regularly submitted the letters he received, and his replies, to our agent at Cabul. The Russian general was at pains to keep Shere Ali *au courant* with the course of affairs in Khiva. In these letters—particularly in that written on the 1st December, 1873—it is perceptible that the grand object in the mind of the writer is to bring two things clearly before the mind of Shere Ali, the first being the power of Russia, the second her magnanimity. The former is taken to be proved by the complete overthrow of Khiva, one of the historical great States of Central Asia; the latter by the fact that Seyyid Mahomed Rahim Khan had been placed again upon his own guddee, and in possession of his ancestral dominions. In this correspondence over the Khivan campaign is to be found the origin of Shere Ali's subsequent eagerness to enter into an understanding with Russia. At first he was alarmed at Russia's advances, and then, finding that we were not in sympathy with him upon the subject, he reconciled himself to what he could not help, and then speedily began to derive pleasure and to dream dreams from what he had at first only tolerated out of compulsion.

This correspondence assumed a more important aspect within the next few months, for it then became mixed up with the dynastic questions which were raised by the declaration of Abdullah Jan as heir, and by the revolt of Yakoob Khan. Early in the year 1874 Shere Ali notified the proclamation of his son Abdullah Jan as heir to the throne to the Governor-

General of Turkestan, and in the absence of General Kaufmann a reply was sent by General Kolpakoffsky. The following is the letter, and it bears date 7th Mohurrum (25th February, 1874).

The murrasillas forwarded by Your Highness on the 6th Zilhij (25th January, 1874) to the address of the Goobernat von Kaufmann reached me, but, as he is still at St. Petersburgh, I will forward them to him without delay. As for the present his duties are intrusted to me by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, I have the honour to send replies to these communications. In your murrasilla of 6th Zilhij you sent information that you had nominated your son, Sirdar Abdoolla Khan, as your heir-apparent; I congratulate you on this selection. Such nominations tend to the comfort and tranquillity of the kingdom. I wish perpetual possession of your kingdom by you and your heirs, and hope that after your death Sirdar Abdoolla Khan will follow your example and make himself an ally and friend of the Emperor. Your Highness is aware of the friendly relations which hitherto existed between the English and Russian Governments, but lately these relations have been confirmed by an alliance between the Rulers of these two kingdoms. The daughter of the Emperor has been married to the second son of Her Gracious Majesty the Queen Victoria. I send this happy information to your Highness on account of the friendship existing between your Highness and the Russian Government, and hope that you will consider this relationship advantageous to our friendship with the English Government, who are favourably disposed to you. May God be your protector under all circumstances and keep you happy.

But in order to fully appreciate the nature of this correspondence it is necessary to read a previous letter from the same general, of the 6th (N.S. 18th) December, 1873, which runs as follows:—

Your Eminence's letter of the 25th day of Ramazan, of the

year 1290, and addressed to the Governor-General, General Aide-de-Camp Von Kaufmann, has been duly and opportunely (in a good hour) received by me.

On his return from the glorious Khivan campaign the High Governor-General left for St. Petersburgh in order to report to His Majesty the Emperor on the condition of affairs in this province.

Being charged with the government of Turkestan during the absence of His Excellency, I consider it my duty to express to you my satisfaction as regards the feelings of friendship and devotion which you set forth in your letter.

In despatching the same to the High Governor-General for his favourable consideration, I entertain the hope that he will not refuse your request, and that he will represent to His Majesty the Emperor your conscientious mode of action, and your endeavour to become worthy of the grace of my august Master.

I fully share your opinion that peace and tranquillity serve to develope the welfare of a State, and to render durable friendly relations existing between two Powers.

Continue to follow the same straight road along which you have hitherto gone, and you will become convinced that it is the right and advantageous road as regards both yourself and the welfare of your people.

I wish you health, welfare, and good fortune in all your undertakings.

Even Lord Northbrook felt compelled to call the attention of the Home authorities to the very significant tone of this letter. Already was there talk of "devotion" on the part of the Ameer and of "grace" on the side of the Czar.

From this date until the outbreak of the revolt in Khokand in the autumn of 1875, there is a lull in this correspondence, but the ground had been well prepared. Russia had so far played her cards with complete suc-

cess in that she had produced the impression in the Cabul durbar that she was at hand ready to proffer advice and afford assistance whenever a crisis should come in the relations between England and Afghanistan. She could not possibly have accomplished more than this, for this alone induced Shere Ali to take up an obstructive attitude towards us, which became intensified as time went on. But the progress of events in Khokand undoubtedly gave a point to the whole transaction. It was at this time that the Ameer was on the eve of taking steps for the consolidation of his authority in the Khanate of Maimene; and the Indian Government, while recognising his perfect right to do so, only conceived that it would be proper to inform the Russian Government of what was about to take place. Of the result of this movement on the part of the Ameer nothing definite was ever known, but it probably resulted in the Khan's formal submission.

The following letter from General Kaufmann, dated 8th Jamadi-ul-Sani (July 12, 1875), was brought to the Ameer by a native envoy, by name Aishan Khoja of Samarcand:—

By order of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, I stopped for about one half-year at St. Petersburgh to settle some matters of this country (viz. Russian Turkestan). Now by command of him (the Emperor) I have returned to Tashkend, and consider it advisable (*lit.* a friendly trouble) to inform Your Highness of my arrival. During my sojourn at St. Petersburgh I was gratified with the receipt of two friendly communications from you. In one of these murrasillas you mentioned the appointment of one of your sons, Sirdar Abdoolla Khan, as your heir-apparent. I hope that the [A] chain of friendship

existing between Russia and Afghanistan will in future increase and become firm, owing to the recent alliance between the Emperor of Russia and the Queen of England. This (alliance) has tended to the fulfilment of the best wishes of the two families, and I doubt not that this alliance of the two Powers will be an omen (*lit.* a mark or sign) for those countries (the people of) which *under the protection of the Emperor of Russia and the Queen of England* live in great peace and comfort. [B] May God save you for the sake of your dignity and the comfort of (your) people! And may you live long and enjoy happiness!

The tone of these letters increases in significance with each fresh one, and well might the Cabul authorities observe that "this paragraph was of a new tone, for the Russian Government had made itself a partner in the protection of Afghanistan." The cool assumption of General Kaufmann in placing Russia on an equality with this country, in so far as Afghanistan was concerned, fairly deluded the Afghan authorities as to the intentions of Russia, and coupled with the assertion of the envoy that forty thousand fresh troops had been sent to Turkestan must have led the Afghans to believe that Russia was the more powerful of their neighbours.

Shere Ali's reply, dated 19th September, 1875, was a model of cautious phrasing:—

I received your friendly letter of 8th Jamadi-ul-Sani, in reply to my two murrasillas by hand of your envoy Aishan Khwaja Bazurg, and was highly gratified with its contents, from which it appeared that you had returned from St. Petersburg to Tashkend, and in which you gave happy news of the confirmation of the friendship existing between Afghanistan and Russia. By the grace of God nothing contrary to the said

friendship shall take place on my part, and the despatch of friendly communications should be considered one of the principles of our friendship. I am gratified with the news contained in the last paragraph of your letter regarding the confirmation of the alliance of the (two) Great Powers (viz. Russia and England), as this alliance will increase the comfort and security of the creatures of God "Khalk-ula." Continue to afford me happiness by giving information as to your health, etc.

In the meanwhile events progressed in Khokand, and of these General Kaufmann placed a summary before the Ameer in his letter of the 27th of October. This was a reply to the above, and was brought to Cabul by a messenger of the Ameer of Bokhara:—

Your friendly murrasilla of 19th September, 1875, reached me at Khojend. You must have heard that three months before its arrival I had been deputed by the Emperor with troops to quell the disturbances raised in Khokand. These disturbances took place on 1st Rajab (3rd August, 1875), and Khudayar Khan, the Ruler, having fled (from Khokand) took refuge in Russian Turkestan. I was obliged to proceed against Khokand with troops. I defeated Kipchak, Kirghiz, and Khokand rebels near the fort of Makhram, and took possession of the Khokand city (where no fighting took place), and appointed the eldest son of Khudayar Khan, viz. Nasrudin Beg, to the Chiefship. His Chiefship was previously accepted by Moollas and other people, but they subsequently forced him to become an enemy of the Russian Government. Having entered into negotiations with him, I returned to Namangan viâ the right bank of the Sir, and to avoid future difficulties posted some troops there. After a few days I was informed that disturbances had again been raised in Khokand, and that the young Chief had taken flight to our territory. Now I have posted troops at Namangan and other frontier cities of Khokand, and have quelled the disturbances and afforded comfort to the people.

Through real friendship I have given you an account of the

Khokand expedition. I hope that the chain of friendship existing between Russia and Afghanistan will daily increase and remain always firm. I desire your health and safety. May your success increase in all your affairs and actions.

On the 3rd of February, 1876, Shere Ali replied to this, saying that the intelligence had impressed his heart, and that he strongly hoped, "if God pleases," that nothing will interfere with the progress of friendship between Russia and Afghanistan. It was at this stage that General Kaufmann wrote that lengthy letter in February, 1876—which must have crossed Shere Ali's note just referred to—that called forth a decided protest on the part of Lord Lytton and his Council. Although lengthy, this document is so important that it is given here *in extenso*.

Your Highness may have heard that some time ago (*lit.* in these days) some evil-disposed persons persuaded (*lit.* commanded) the people of Khokand with a view to gaining their (own) object, and considered it advantageous to endeavour to promote the same (object), and that consequently in the territory of Khokand several sad and dangerous (mohlik) occurrences took place.

My Lord (*lit.* Oh exalted Dignity!) I have considered it useless to give a full detailed account of these (occurrences) in this despatch, but it is most important to communicate them (to you), otherwise it would be contrary to the friendship existing between Russia and Afghanistan (*lit.* also the contents of this letter would have been somewhat repugnant). Consequently I have deemed it incumbent on me to give in this murrasilla, in continuation of previous murrasillas, a brief account of the occurrences in Khokand and of the manner in which they terminated.

Last year in the month of "Ayeeul," corresponding with Jamadiul Sani, the people of Kipchak and Kirghiz tribes insti-

gated and persuaded the people of Khokand to revolt, and their Sardars (headmen) Isa Aulia, Abdul Rahman Aftabchi, and other conceited persons, adopted measures against their (Khokandis) lawful Khan and expelled him from his country towards our dominions to seek shelter. At that time our agents armed with good offices had gone to the people of Khokand, and the Khan took refuge and came with them (the agents) to our territory.

As soon as Khuda Yah Khan reached here, an agent of the head of the rebels arrived at Tashkend from Khokand with all speed with a letter to the Governor-General (meaning General von Kaufmann), stating that all the people (in Khokand) had rebelled against Khuda Yar Khan in consequence of his oppression and deviation from the (Mahommedan) law, and had driven him from their country, and that they had desired Nasiruddin Khan, the legitimate heir to the Chiefship, to become their Khan. . . . General von Kaufmann most kindly accorded his consent (to their proposal) and sent a letter to the new Khan, Nasiruddin Khan, to effect that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia was prepared to agree to his Khanship: but his agreement depended on the fulfilment of certain engagements of the people of Khokand, though it was understood that those engagements did not differ from the (contents of the) treaty with Khuda Yar Khan.

The Russian Government felt anxiety as to whether the Sardars of the rebels would accept (*i.e.* obey) the new ruler (Nasiruddin) and would exercise no oppression over the people, show ability and excellence in administration, and make endeavours towards peace and comfort, and after acknowledging the authority of their great neighbours, the Russians, abstain (*lit.* forget) from seeking their own interest and gains, *i.e.* from deposing the Khan accepted by the Russian, and would thus gain the good-will of von Kaufmann. The next occurrence proved that the deputation of the above agent to Tashkend was only a stratagem and to gain time, they disregarded the kindness of General von Kaufmann, and their coming as representatives into the Russian possessions was a mere stratagem. When their agents were in Tashkend, they gave trouble to the

people of Khokand in coming to our dominions, so much so that they told them that the Russians exercise great oppression over the Mahommedans. Having become enemies of the Russians they endeavour to kindle fire (of insurrection) in our subjects of * (?) therefore they sent invitations and letters to the Mahommedans of Khojend, Tashkend, and other border territories to join in disturbances. Before their agents had left our territory (*lit.* whether they had left or not), crowds of people of Khokand and Khojend, Karma, and Arp-tazan collected in Khojend Naloo and "Kari-ablik." We repulsed these people at once, still they succeeded in killing in a most brutal manner some of the residents of Alsatna, *i.e.* Rahats, and two Karkhanas and some cartmen, and in taking prisoner some travellers and Russians.

The Russian authorities lost no time (*lit.* were not negligent) in defence; the Governor-General collected troops at once in Killa Mahram and repulsed the Khokand rebels, and this victory was so successful that it became impossible for them to regather. Nasiruddin Khan acknowledged that it was vain and puerile on his part to oppose the Russians, and having expressed repentance declared himself an ally (*lit.* his submission) of the Governor-General, and in company with the rebels hastened to meet him, and solicited him to restore his Khanship to him permanently. He (the Governor-General) considered the offence of the Khan and the people of Khokand somewhat light, and thought that the people of Khokand were innocent and the Sardars evil wishers; then the people of Khokand and the Sardars came and were made to think over and understand their interests (*lit.* discriminate between gain and loss). Then the Governor-General of Turkestan, *i.e.* von Kaufmann, made over management of the territories of the Khan to him (the Khan), and reinstated him in the Chiefship permanently, and forgave the faults of the Sardars and rebels. . . . As punishment to the Khan and his officers, the territory of Namangan lying between the right bank of the

* "Ahal-i-hawas," meaning not understood.

River Sir and the point where the River Narin falls into the River Sir, was annexed to Russian possessions. As soon as, according to our new treaty with Nasiruddin Khan, our troops vacated Khokand, disturbances took place in Khokand, at the instigation of Abdul Rahman Aftabchi. Like his father, Khuda Yar, Nasiruddin fled from Khokand and was obliged to seek refuge under us; then the people of Khokand made Faulad Khan, a man of low family (*lit.* of unknown birth) their Khan, but he could not govern them owing to his being destitute of common sense, sound judgment, and ability, and talent. He, in the commencement of his rule, caused brutal executions in Khokand, and killed a large number of good men, as well as all the survivors of Khuda Yar Khan, such as his sons, grandsons, etc. He attempted to try his fortune in opposing us, and to recover Namangan, and even to drive us out from Tashkend. For this purpose, with the aid and at the instigation of Abdul Rahman Aftabchi, he collected a great number of people in Andejan to attack Namangan. The Governor-General sent General Tor Daski (?) from Namangan, and he got possession of Andejan, and Faulad Khan and Abdul Rahman took to flight. The General Tor Daski considered the punishment sufficient, and by order of the Governor he abstained from ordering a general slaughter in Andejan and returned to Namangan; had Faulad Khan, Abdul Rahman, and their advisers and councillors been sensible and experienced persons, the above punishment would have been sufficient for them, and instead of adopting lengthy operations and risking their lives, they would have tendered apology and allegiance, but as they did not possess such sense they again raised disturbances in Namangan. As God has given us strength, and as He helps all true and just undertakings, General Skobeleff, after quelling the disturbances raised in Namangan and punishing his subjects, suitably attacked Faulad Khan and Abdul Rahman Aftabchi several times, demolished several large buildings (perhaps forts or entrenchments are meant), and took possession of Andejan; then severe fighting took place in Aska, and Faulad Beg was forced to fly towards Karatagin. Abdul Rahman recovered his

senses (*lit.* his eyes were opened) and confessed that it was most difficult and impossible (for him) to succeed in his hostilities with the Russians, and tendered voluntary submission and begged pardon. He was followed by the head Sardar of Khokand rebels, who came into Major-General Skobeleff and repented his actions, and begged for forgiveness. After more than six months the people of Khokand, who were in a very distressed condition, felt inclined to make Nasiruddin Khan their Khan. He was at the time in Killa Mahram, and finding his people in straits he left for Khokand; before he had arrived at that place the Kipchaks and Kirghiz collected a large body of people and severely opposed him (several of his followers were taken prisoners), and those who escaped returned to Killa Mahram. Dissension exists amongst the people of Khokand, and in consequence of this ill-feeling some desired to appoint Nasiruddin, some Faulad Khan, and others some dissolute person (or worthless fellow), Aubash, as their Khan. The majority of the people, however, expressed their wish for assistance from the Russians; with this view the people of Khokand, Marghinan, Osh, and Isfara, and the agents of other provinces, waited on Major-General Skobeleff and intimated their repentance at their enmity towards the Russians, and their inability to oppose them (the Russians), and expressed their wish for an amicable settlement of matters. They acknowledged their weakness, and begged for peace for their countrymen. They also made confessions of allegiance and submission, and brought letters from their countrymen to effect "we have submitted ourselves to the Emperor, their submission may be accepted."

* * * * * * *

This petition was accepted. The Emperor could adopt no other mode to restore peace and comfort to the people (of Khokand), because Nasiruddin was twice appointed Khan of his hereditary country, but he was expelled on both occasions towards Russian Turkestan (by his people). His Imperial Majesty considered it safer to keep these people under his own control with regard to their circumstances, and he therefore on

this (last) occasion approved of their submission. Their territory (*lit.* lands) was annexed to Russian possessions, the provinces included in the Khanship of Khokand were denominated Ublus Farghana. I intimate these events and the policy of the Emperor to your Highness, and also state that the Emperor ordered me to take possession of (*lit.* make submit) all the territories under the (late) Khan of Khokand. On receipt of this order I left with all speed next day, and reached the Ublus of Farghana; then I made over (the management of) Ublus-nai on the Sir (Darya) to Governor-General of Turkestan and Lieutenant-General Golovachef. I beg to add as a supplement to this letter, that the Russian Government is bound (*lit.* entrusted) to deal with friendship and peace in all affairs with their neighbours who govern and rule countries in the East independently (*lit.* permanently), and for this reason Russia abstains (*lit.* silent) from taking possession of them (countries), though on the present occasion we have been constrained to annex Khokand to Russian possessions; in reality this annexation has not been effected for the interests of Russia, but at the request of the people of Khokand merely to afford them tranquillity. As on account of these evil habits and intentions old-standing dissension existed amongst these people, as appears from the history of their country, and they could never attain to tranquillity under a native government, or till they accepted a powerful ruler and government, such a ruler as the Emperor of Russia. I indulge in the hope that my unchanging friendship and regard may be accepted by your Highness.

After this the correspondence became more frequent, and at last, after two years' secret negotiation, Russia openly despatched a high Russian functionary, General Stoletoff, one of her most distinguished Asian generals, to Cabul as ambassador. The month of July, 1878, was passed in a state of considerable uncertainty in this country. It is true peace had been assured to us

at Berlin, but the rumours of Russian designs in Afghanistan were too frequent and persistent to be wholly without foundation. At last definite news reached us, and then it was found that General Stoletoff, and a considerable staff had arrived at Cabul, where they were received with marked cordiality by the Ameer. It is only necessary to say here that a portion of this embassy visited Herat, exploring a new line of country to the Russians, and that another portion remained with Shere Ali at Mazar-i-Sherif up to the last. In the short space of six years Russia broke fresh ground in Afghanistan from Turkestan, and attained a firm foot-hold therein. From being an object of suspicion to the Ameer she became his friend and ally, and then acting upon the principle that all is fair in war—when war there was not—she embroiled that ruler with this country, and then left him to his fate. Never has the worthlessness of Russia's promises been more loudly proclaimed, and seldom has so heartless a betrayal of the cause of an innocent ally occurred as that of Russia abandoning Shere Ali to his fate. Such conduct as that makes Russia almost beneath contempt, and if Kaufmann had had one spark of manhood or of honour he would have resigned when he found that the Czar would not support the policy which he had carried out in Cabul. When peace has once more settled down over these regions the story of Russia's perfidy will be told to her lasting discredit, and the Afghans in particular will remember the value that is to be placed on a Russian word. Nor is it impossible that Russia will yet have to repay the wrong she has done

her duped ally. The effect of her treachery must be more wide-reaching than she at present perceives, and it may be expected that inconvenience, if not absolute danger, will attend much of her future action south of the Hindoo Koosh. Of her falseness to this country throughout the whole of these transactions we will treat in the next chapter. But towards the Afghans and Shere Ali her policy has not only been marked by falseness, but also by poltroonery.

CHAPTER X.

THE RIVALRY OF ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.

In the preceding pages we have described in detail the various subjects which assist in defining the relative positions of England and Russia in Asia; and the policies which either Government has sought to carry out in the independent countries of Central Asia, such as Persia, Afghanistan, and among the nomad population of Kara Kum, have been treated upon. It only remains in conclusion to discuss the grand question of all, the rivalry of England and Russia. It is hoped that the reader comes to the consideration of that question with some clearer knowledge of the subject than he had when he first took up this book—more especially is it to be hoped that he has formed some definite opinions upon the subject, and that he has not reached the last stage of all with doubts upon his mind as to what the main object in Russian policy has been throughout the present century, or as to the necessity there is upon this country for parrying at

as early a stage in the struggle as possible the deadly thrust which has been so long in preparation for delivery. If any such there be, his doubts cannot long continue now that England and Russia are brought face to face here, as they must still continue to be in the war of diplomacy, and eventually on the field of battle.

The idea of attacking India probably first suggested itself to the Russian mind in the days of the Czar Peter, and the preliminary operations which that ruler carried out in the Persian outskirts with such complete success, and those others which were doomed to failure in Khiva, sufficiently prove that the man who had worsted the Swede and the Turk perceived that a career as a great Asiatic conqueror lay open to him through the dissensions among the Persians, and the growing weakness of the Mogul. But the dream of Peter remained a dream. He had deadly foes in the West, and in the East a greater soldier than he was fast acquiring a supremacy that was not easily to be shaken. Europe diverted Peter's attention from Asia, and the advent of Nadir effectually dispelled the prospect of Russian aggrandisement.

Sixty years later on, another Russian ruler, an Empress, attempted to avail herself of the evil plight of unhappy Persia, and for a time it seemed as if she had overturned the authority of the Shah in the outworks of his State. But once more fortune stepped in, and the Russian design was foiled by the death of the Empress Catherine. The wars which broke out in the first quarter of the present century, and which

resulted in the Treaties of Gulistan and Turkomanchai, gave Russia several fertile provinces, and carried her arms to the banks of the Araxes. At the same time her flag alone flew on the waves of the Caspian. From the days of the Treaty of Turkomanchai to the present time Persia has been a cypher in the hands of Russia. The Shah has not loved his adviser, but he has had no help for it save to obey. The Treaty of Turkomanchai gave Russia possession of the first parallel against India, and after more than a century's intrigue and warfare the Czar found himself in the position which the great Peter aspired to secure in the course of a few campaigns.

Up to the signing of the Treaty of Gulistan there was no rivalry between England and Russia. Certainly there was no such sentiment on our part, and we may give Russia credit for as much. It is true that in the interval between Peter's capture of Derbend and this treaty we had established ourselves in Hindostan, and had made ourselves the supreme power therein. We had not only become a rival to Russia in the realisation of the dream which is identified with the name of Peter, but we had become a successful rival. We had supplanted her. But at this period there was no national sentiment prevalent in Russia upon the subject, and even among public men those who preserved the traditions of Peter and of Catherine were a minority. It may even be questioned whether the Treaty of Gulistan made much difference in this respect. But it is undoubtedly from this event that the political occurrences of the last sixty-five years take their

colour. In the Treaty of Gulistan the rivalry of England and Russia had its birth.

When this treaty was concluded between Russia and Persia, England, or rather British India, was only just recovering from the dread of French schemes in Persia. In those days the great contest with France coloured all contemporary events. France was the disturber of the world's peace, and the Czar was the friend of humanity rather than her enemy. The treaty of Gulistan modified that impression, and Anglo-Indians began to perceive danger more grave from the shores of the Caspian than that they had conjured up, but a few years before, from the Levant and the deserts of Mesopotamia. To that impression the second Russo-Persian war gave further force and greater consistency. The rivalry between England and Russia became proclaimed, and the contest for supremacy commenced in earnest when Russia secured Erivan and Nakhitchevan, and England refused to stand by the provisions of her treaty of 1814. The effects of the Persian policy pursued by each country have already been discussed, and it is unnecessary to add a word here to that which has been expressed. In those days Russia had the great advantage over us in that she had an Asiatic policy apart from her European. She alone knew how to disassociate the two. She pretended not to let her right hand know what the left was doing. Nesselrode at St. Petersburg was the antithesis of Simonitch at Teheran. While Lord Palmerston was restraining Mr. Ellis, and pooh-poohing his views as "alarmist," in accordance with the turns

in the political chess-board in Europe, Nesselrode was giving his minister at Teheran *carte blanche* in his efforts to promote Russian interests, at the same time that he pursued the even tenour of his way in Europe in apparent innocence of there being such a place as Teheran or such a minister as Simonitch at all. Had the conduct of British affairs in Persia been guided in those days from Calcutta and not from London, the whole question would have been changed, and, instead of having witnessed a siege of Herat, that generation should have beheld an attack on Tiflis and on Erivan.

During ten years Russian policy was supreme in Persia, and then the fortune of war baffled the skill of diplomatists. A siege, which half-a-dozen Russian regiments could have made successful, ended disastrously, and then came the bold, but unfortunately unjust, invasion of the dominions of Dost Mahomed by an English army that was almost irresistible. In face of this decided act on the part of England, the heart of Russia failed her. She repudiated Simonitch, and she abandoned the Shah just as she did the Ameer the other day. Her only reply to the challenge we threw down to her was to despatch Peroffsky's unfortunate expedition against Khiva. With the failure of that enterprise Russia abandoned the contest, and became a mere spectator of what she was unable, and apparently unwilling, to prevent.

But for the miserable weakness of our policy in Afghanistan, the reputation of Russia had received a blow from which it would not easily have recovered. The blunders of 1841 fought Russia's battle in a

double sense, for not only did they carry a grave shock to our credit, but they also concealed the ignominious retreat which Russia had just made. The wretched trifling of our policy in Herat, where we refused to back up our able representative, Major D'Arcy Todd; the unfortunate delusions which we maintained in Afghanistan itself, where we continued to occupy an anomalous position; both sufficed to nullify the effects produced by Keane's victories and the subsequent surrender of Dost Mahomed. Russia had made her first attempt against India, but in carrying it into practice her heart had failed her, and she had only partially revealed her hand. When the year 1840 closed, it witnessed the discomfiture of Russia. Within twelve months the blunders committed on our side had removed to a great extent the remembrance of that discomfiture. As Ferrier says, Russia had retired from the contest, but as she retired she had fired a Parthian thrust at her enemy.

The Afghan war was followed on our side by a period spent in strengthening our hold upon India. The overthrow of the power of the Sikhs, and the annexation of the Punjab, fully occupied our hands. In the meanwhile Russia had set herself to the task of subduing the Kirghiz, and had thus commenced her career as a conquering Power in Central Asia. By the time that the Punjab had been absorbed, Russia had set her foot on the banks of the Jaxartes, and her flag flew, if with some timidity, upon the Aral. She was breaking ground in a new direction, but the day was yet far distant before she would be supreme in the

khanates. From Orenburg to Kazala was, however, no small stride to have made in the course of a few short years. The difficulties of nature which had been overcome in that advance were at least as great as any that were to be encountered in the further march that was to take place in the country beyond. The steppe —even now, when a high road has been constructed through it, passable only with difficulty—from Orenburg to Kazala presents features that deter the traveller, and obstacles that cannot but retard the general. These had, however, been vanquished by General Peroffsky, and, moreover, the Kirghiz tribes, if not completely vanquished, had at least been inspired with a wholesome respect for the authority of the Russian officers.

In a few years after the annexation of the Punjab and the first advance of General Peroffsky, while we were placing our relations with the Khan of Khelat on a new basis, and at the same time that General John Jacob was formulating bold plans for the strengthening of the Indian frontier by the occupation of Quettah, the Russian general was carrying on a second and more determined campaign against the outlying dependencies of Khokand. In 1853 the fort of Ak Musjid, the most important position on the lower Syr-Darya, surrendered, and only the Crimean War averted those triumphs in Turkestan which, ten years later, General Tchernaieff was to secure. The activity of the Kirghiz, under their leader Izzet Kutebar, added still further to the difficulties which hampered Russian activity in Central Asia, and when the Crimean cam-

paign closed, it was in Persia that Russia sought once more to push forward her interests in Asia and towards India. We do not possess the requisite information to discuss the part played by Russia in the various manœuvres which were made by the Persian Government to secure possession of Herat, but there is no reason to doubt that Russia was as active as she could be, without proclaiming her hand, in the council-chamber of the Shah. But in those days the Turkish power in Armenia neutralised the effect of the army of the Caucasus, and, although the capture of Kars carried a severe blow to the prestige of England throughout the lands of the East, the restoration of that fortress to Turkey on the conclusion of peace left Russia in the same predicament as before of having to take into consideration the Turkish army of Armenia. But, being without exact information on the point of Russia's intrigues with Nasir Eddeen and Mahomed Yusuf, and his successor, Sultan Jan, it is useless to surmise on the subject, more especially as the chief interest begins with the disappearance of an independent rule at Herat, and the incorporation of that place with the Afghan kingdom in 1863.

The year 1863 marks a crisis in the history of the States of Central Asia, and also a turning-point in the rivalry of England and Russia. Up to this year there had probably been no general desire either in England or in Russia to precipitate the collision, either friendly or unfriendly, which the more far-seeing of the statesmen in each country, such as Sir Henry Rawlinson in England and M. Gregorieff, ex-Governor of West

Siberia, in Russia, pronounced to be inevitable. It was a question which concerned only a small section of the people of either country, and only claimed consideration at fitful intervals. Over intrigues in Persia, and such palpably hare-brained schemes as that of General Duhamel, there could be no enthusiasm among the Russian people. The experience of our own Afghan wars had operated so far upon us that we gauged more accurately the difficulties which Russia would have to contend with in advancing upon India. In fact, we had rushed to the other extreme and assumed that the undertaking was impossible because it was attended with great difficulty. But in the year to which we have referred a great change came over the spirit of the Russian Government and people. They had no longer to fix their eyes upon their minister's doings at Teheran, but they had opened up to their gaze in Central Asia a boundless prospect of conquest, which the ability of their generals and the courage of their soldiers might make a promenade of endless triumph through the capitals of Turkestan to the Wall of China and the frontiers of India. That vision was one in which a nation could take interest, and towards realising which it might be expected to act with enthusiasm. There was nothing vague or shadowy about it. Great as was the undertaking, it was one which the Russian people were justified in believing that they could accomplish.

In the year 1863, therefore, time had brought two great changes to pass, and not the least important of these was the change which had taken place in Russian

sentiment. Nor did the Russian generals dally in acting upon the schemes which they had declared to be feasible. The campaigns of Tchernaieff, Romanoffsky, and Kaufmann resulted in the complete subversion of the authority of the various rulers of Turkestan. In ten years Russia's frontier had been advanced to the Oxus, and between it and India there only lay the independent State of Afghanistan. That was a great and an astonishing result. At a first glance it appeared to possess equal importance with an occupation of Persia, but further consideration sufficed to show that so long as Tashkent was not connected by railway with Orenburg its importance was not so great as was supposed. Russia's best base still continued to be in Persia, but until the army of the Caucasus was permanently released the other day by the acquisition of the Armenian fortresses there was no section of the nation sufficiently interested in the Persian scheme to make it more generally considered than by a few specialists. But now this is different. The Persian problem has become the vital concern, the prime object, with the Tiflis authorities and the army of the Caucasus. There the prize is so tempting, and so easily to be secured, unless the policy of England becomes much more vigorous in Persia than it has been for more than half a century, that we may look forward with confidence to as great an activity in this quarter on the part of the Russian authorities as took place in Turkestan in 1863, when the overthrow of the Kirghiz left Russia free to realise the fulness of her triumph.

The campaign of Tchernaieff called forth a protest

from this country, and in reply to that protest came Prince Gortchakoff's circular quoted in the first volume of this work. But there was no disposition to restrain the measures of the Russian generals. City after city in Khokand was added to the possessions of the Czar. Up the course of the Syr Darya steadily pushed the squadron from the Aral, and on either bank the army kept equal progress. The prestige of Bokhara was laid level with the dust, and the principal passages of the Syr Darya were occupied, thus severing communication between Khokand and Bokhara. In the later campaign, too, there was no reluctance shown to secure permanent possession of Samarcand, and then in a few years Khiva was dismembered and Khokand formally annexed. On several occasions during these twelve years from the fall of Tchimkent to the deposition of Khudayar, the British Government had made several more or less feeble protests against the extension of the Russian dominions. To all of these there came the stereotyped reply that Russia could not help herself. The depredations of her semi-barbarous neighbours compelled her to advance in despite of her own inclinations. But in addition to this reply, this explanation, Russia gave a promise. She bound herself down in the most formal manner by State paper and by verbal assurance to one engagement. Whatever else might happen, Afghanistan was to be beyond the sphere of Russia's action. Prince Gortchakoff, Count Schouvaloff, M. de Giers, the Czar himself, and even General Kaufmann, at different times and in various ways bound themselves down to that engagement.

It became the one fixed quantity in a world of uncertainty, and trusting in this safe-guard which gave India a neutral outwork of three hundred miles at its nearest point, the apathy of the Home and Indian Governments was placed in a more favourable light than it deserved. The English public became reconciled to "masterly inactivity" when coupled with the condition that Russia should not pass south of the Oxus.

The promise not to interfere in Afghanistan was made in accordance with the necessities of European politics. It was eminently distasteful to the authorities at Tashkent. It curtailed their sphere of action, and it greatly hampered their movements in the whole Oxus region. Yet despite discontent in Turkestan the astuteness of Russia's policy remains incontestable. Had not that promise been made with reference to Afghanistan it is at the least probable that this country would have been compelled to have intervened in Central Asia long ago, and had that been done Russia's career would have been nipped in the bud. That promise—empty as we now know it to be—blunted the edge of our wrath. Khokand, Khiva, Bokhara, the Turcomans and the Kirghiz, had all felt the weight of Russia's hand; but in the face of these incontestable facts we sought consolation in the belief that Afghanistan was safe from a similar fate. The whole hierarchy of Russian statesmen had sworn that it should not be touched, and what reasonable man could fail to be satisfied with so august a guarantee!

But General Kaufmann was not content with the

arrangement, for if strictly adhered to it completely dispelled all prospect of an invasion of India. To abstain from interfering in Afghanistan meant nothing more or less than the abandonment of the main object of the advance into Central Asia. To General Kaufmann it represented still more. His own ambition and vanity urged him to achieve personally the great scheme which had been sketched out for Russia; and the diplomatic engagements of his country's statesmen forbade the realisation of that design. But, fortunately for the peace of mind of General Kaufmann, diplomatic promises have never carried much weight with Russian statesmen. Their consciences have not been greatly afflicted when the necessities of the time have compelled them to break their most solemn declarations. General Kaufmann, knowing himself and the traditions of the service of his country thoroughly, undoubtedly consoled himself with the persuasion that his breach of the engagement would not be very severely visited by his imperial master. Without casting any needless aspersion upon Kaufmann's personal character, it may be asserted that the lavish promises made from St. Petersburg with regard to the thorough independence of Afghanistan, were never received in Tashkent with more than a contemptuous smile at British credulity. Gortchakoff's language was a mere *façon de parler*.

With the occupation of Khiva in 1873, therefore, Kaufmann at once proceeded to break ground in Afghanistan, "to establish neighbourly relations," as he would have termed it. The release of Afghan sub-

jects, held in slavery in Khiva, afforded him an excuse for communicating with Shere Ali, and then, as we saw in our previous chapter, the correspondence, once started, flowed briskly on. The letters of General Kolpakoffsky—Kaufmann's *locum tenens*—were still more significant than those of his superior, and formed a clear and distinct infraction of the spirit of the obligations by which Russia was bound to this country. It is doubtful whether the fact of there being Afghan slaves in Khiva—if literally correct that there were such they could only have been Turcomans of Andchui and Maimene—afforded Kaufmann a just cause for corresponding with Shere Ali, but certainly no reason can be alleged for the continuance of that correspondence, and for its increasing significance. To letters soon succeeded native envoys, *fêted* on arrival in Cabul in the same manner as the British agents, and receiving precisely the same presents both for themselves and their retinue. On several occasions the Indian Government called the attention of the Home authorities to these matters, and then our ambassador at St. Petersburg made representations to the Russian officials, who replied with various excuses, but always concluding with the declaration that Russia still held herself bound by her previous engagements to this country with regard to Afghanistan. Up to this moment this stereotyped reply is by some considered to be sufficient.

But General Kaufmann knew very well what he was about. The great point was to obtain information about the country of Afghanistan, and the degree of solidarity attained by the Government of Shere Ali.

To effect this it was necessary to humour the Ameer. From the letters of the Russian authorities they strove to humour him by treating him with consideration, styling him the friend of the all-powerful Czar. They also expressed sympathy with his preference for his son Abdullah Jan, and were generally solicitous after the welfare of the heir-apparent. They regarded his faults with the partiality of an indulgent friend, while we on the other hand were interfering in favour of Yakoob Khan, and assuming the character of a severe critic of his acts. While Kaufmann was whispering in his ears the great power of his master, and advancing incontestable proofs of the success of his arms, the Indian Government was laying stress upon the friendship that existed between England and Russia, and was warning him not to carry out various aggressive schemes that were attributed to the Ameer for the purpose of extending his dominions to the north. The solicitude evinced by Kaufmann in his welfare was grateful to the feelings of the Ameer, while the attitude we observed towards Russia was altogether incomprehensible to him.

But if Shere Ali had received from us those unequivocal expressions of support for which he hungered, there is every reason to say that at any point up to the close of the year 1873 he would have proved himself true to the traditions of his father, and cast his lot wholly and heartily in with the English. But the Central Asian Question in all its important ramifications was a bugbear to our Government. If "masterly inactivity" was undiluted wisdom in Afghanistan, how much wiser and more statesman-like it was in

Central Asia! We had a verbal and a written guarantee from the Russian Chancellor that Afghanistan should not be touched, and our response to Shere Ali's appeal for assistance was that there was no ground for his apprehension, and that England and Russia were good friends. It is true this reply was given at a moment when we had recently accepted another imperial promise as the condition upon which we would remain inactive during the campaign against Khiva. The conviction was also prevailing in high quarters at the time, *apropos* of the definition of a neutral zone, that it would be possible to reconcile the interests of England and Russia in a harmonious manner; and it was held to be in the highest degree necessary not to give Russia the slightest cause for taking umbrage.

Within a few short months everything was changed. The expedition against Khiva, just in itself, closed with the annexation of a large portion of that State, and with the practical dismemberment of the remainder —an act of treachery to this country that should never have been condoned. Instead of permitting ourselves to be put off with the weak arguments of the Czar and Prince Gortchakoff—which were as much an insult to our common sense as to our dignity—and confining our diplomatic action to feebly pointing out "dangers which might arise from the expeditions against the Turcomans," we should have taken up a bold position, and stood upon the inviolability of international obligations. But the same Government, which permitted the Black Sea clause in the Treaty of Paris to be abro-

gated, disregarded its plain duty in Central Asia. In place of taking up a bold and unshakable position in the Khiva business, and compelling Kaufmann to relax his hold upon his prey, we entered into a wretched drivelling controversy at St. Petersburg, in which protestation of friendship took the place of an unequivocal demand for what was right and due to this country. Had we only been firm on this occasion, and not weak, had we only shown courage and not pusillanimity, Russia's plan would have been thwarted, Khiva would have remained independent, Shere Ali and the Afghans would have respected us, and the baffled Governor-General would have had to discover some other theme than the greatness of his master to have poured into the ears of an Ameer who was England's natural ally.

But the faultiness of our policy did not end here. We had acquiesced in the dismemberment of Khiva, we had condoned a breach of faith—but even these errors might have been excused, had our Government profited by its new experience. The annexation of Khiva by Russia could have been deprived of much of its political importance by a bolder policy in Afghanistan, and by an unequivocal championing of Shere Ali. Russia's breach of faith might have been made positively a benefit, had we resolved that for us in future Russia's promises should possess no value. But even this minor credit cannot be awarded the statesmen who swayed the destiny of this country during those years. In July, 1873, Lord Northbrook was willing to do something to appease the mind of

the Ameer, but the Duke of Argyll refused to listen to it. Remembering that we had only just accepted a Russian guarantee that Khiva was to be evacuated as soon as a sufficient punishment for the past had been exacted, there is excuse for our having been very careful in our dealings with the Ameer lest we should give Russia the slightest ground for departing from her word. Until Russia had proved false, it would have been bad policy to have assumed that she intended to be untrue, and therefore the action of Lord Northbrook and also of the Duke of Argyll, so far as it showed an intention to repose confidence in Russia, may be considered to have been prudent. But, even under this supposition, something more ought to have been done to reassure Shere Ali than the words of cold comfort which he received from us during the conference at Simla. There was no compulsion upon us in those days to espouse the cause of Shere Ali, and Russia was so far off that it appeared undignified on our part to take any special concern in her doings. We looked upon Afghanistan in those days as our "preserve," and Russia had formally recognised the justice of our claim.

Early in June the city of Khiva surrendered to General Kaufmann. Months passed, and still the Russian troops were established on Khivan soil. Summer passed away into autumn, and still the stipulation to England remained unfulfilled. Kaufmann was evidently loth to give up anything of his spoil, and for five months he occupied the country on the left bank of the Oxus. In August, however, a treaty had been

concluded with the Khan of Khiva which revealed the intentions of Russia. The second article of that treaty declared that "the boundary between the Russian and Khivan territories shall be the Amou Darya, from Kukertli down the river as far as the point at which the most *westerly* branch of the Amou Darya leaves the main stream, and from that point the frontier shall pass along such branch as far as its mouth in the Aral sea." By the fifth article, "Russian steamers, and other Russian vessels, shall have the free and exclusive right of navigating the Amou Darya river." This treaty was signed on the 24th of August, and its purport became generally known in September, shortly after the final close of the Simla conference. It was then that the weakness of our policy, the drifting attitude which we had permitted ourselves to take up, appeared revealed in all its want of statesmanship. Up to that time there was some reason for trusting in Russia—though, surely, confidence should have been shaken by her action with regard to the Treaty of Paris two years before—but, when Kaufmann's treaty with Khiva came within our knowledge, what further faith could be reposed in the engagements of the Czar or of his lieutenants?

It was then that the action of the Duke of Argyll and Lord Northbrook a few months before should have been reversed. It was not too late to repair the blunder. We had trusted to Russia, and our confidence had been wholly abused. We had acted by her in the most scrupulously honourable manner—and for having done so our statesmen deserve the credit which

is always due to British statesmen, and has been earned by them, whoever they may have been, and under every circumstance—and we had laid aside our apprehension and our jealousy, and were prepared to welcome Russia as a great fellow-participator in the work of civilising Asia. We were prepared to start on the enterprise in her company without a single concealed aspiration, and we were willing that she should take the lead. But how did Russia inaugurate the undertaking, by what act did she seek to show that she was wholly of the same mind as ourselves? By an act of treachery. False to her word, and utterly regardless of those scruples of conscience which attend the mind of even the less honourable of human beings, Russia avowed her falseness to this country by the retention of that portion of Khiva which to her was of greatest value. Up to this point we had done our duty, and it only remained for us to profit by our experience.

But the Government of that day had a singular way of showing that it profited by its experience. It at once proceeded to obtain some more of those imperial promises—which had proved so valueless—with regard to the Turcomans and Afghanistan. The Czar himself assured Lord A. Loftus that there was no intention to carry out an expedition against the Turcomans, and that Russia still held herself bound by her engagement towards Afghanistan. And we were satisfied. The faith of treaties lay level with the dust. The spoiler had secured his prey, and Lord A. Loftus congratulated the Czar on the release of the slaves in Khiva

—"an act," he said, "which would form the brightest page in the history of his glorious reign"—at the very moment when those slaves were dying in hundreds on the steppe and the desert through the wanton carelessness of that Czar's lieutenants. Instead of at once according Shere Ali the concessions which had just been refused to him, in an undeserved trust upon Russia's word, we abstained from action altogether. We left the chagrin which the failure of the mission of Nur Mahomed Shah produced upon the Ameer to rankle in his mind, and under widely different circumstances, when the word of Russia was proved to be no more enduring than the condition of the political divisions of Central Asia, we acted in utter indifference to what had just taken place. Our indifference, mischievous before, became further intensified, and its evil effects more disastrous and wide-reaching. Up to the revelation of the treaty with Khiva, the conduct of the Duke of Argyll and of Lord Northbrook is not only capable of being defended, but it may with some show of reason be held to have been as prudent as any other that was at the time suggested. But when our authorities persisted, after the breach of faith with regard to Khiva, in showing indifference to Afghanistan, at the same time that they extended a further lease of trust to Russia, they failed in their duty to their country, and proved that they were quite incapable of reading the changed signs of the times. At the very least we should have refused to accept any further promises from Russia as a guarantee on political subjects, and we should at

once have proceeded to grant those demands which Shere Ali had made upon us. By observing these very simple precautions, and by telling Russia that an advance on Merv, or any infraction of the Afghan frontier, would be regarded by us as an act of hostility, we should have rendered our position in Afghanistan secure. We should also have placed the Central Asian Question on a clearer and less equivocal basis by proclaiming that there was a conflict—unavoidable under the circumstances—between the interests of England and Russia in Central Asia. A bold statesman would have demanded more than this, but it was the very least which, as men of ordinary prudence, we could have required. Instead of making the breach of faith with regard to Khiva a new starting-point, from which time we should possess a clearer vision with regard to the policy of Russia, we consented to blot it out from our remembrance, and to deprive our political action of the strength which it should have derived from one of our most precious and dearly-purchased experiences.

When Lord Salisbury succeeded the Duke of Argyll at the India Office in February, 1874, he took up the thread of these matters when they had been conclusively settled. It was a matter of impossibility to reopen the Khiva question, upon which the previous Government had refused to act. But within twelve months an effort was made to repair the blunder to some extent by setting our house in order with Afghanistan, but Lord Salisbury's intentions were thwarted by the decided opposition of Lord Northbrook

to the establishment of a British agency at Herat. Ten months later, in November, 1875, Lord Salisbury wrote a despatch with regard to sending a mission to Cabul, but again Lord Northbrook objected, and the scheme was withdrawn. In February, 1876, a new viceroy, Lord Lytton, had assumed control of Indian affairs, and Lord Salisbury sent him on the 28th of that month a long despatch sketching out the policy which the Government desired to be carried out towards the trans-frontier States of Afghanistan and Beloochistan. Twelve months after his arrival in India Lord Lytton broke ground in the Afghan business, and then ensued that abortive conference at Peshawur which brought home to the minds of all impartial observers the fact that the ruler of Afghanistan was becoming alienated from the English alliance. At the same time Lord Lytton carried out his other instructions with regard to Khelat, and in this he was completely successful. By enforcing the claims of the treaty of 1854 he occupied Quettah, and thus secured a strategical point of the highest importance on the flank of Afghanistan. Alone among Indian viceroys of recent years he took precautions lest his amicable overtures to Shere Ali should be slighted.

For already there was a vague presentiment that Shere Ali might prove unamenable to reason. Rumours had come through the passes of the reception of Russian agents at Cabul, and they had either boasted beyond their instructions, or those instructions were of a more elastic kind than was revealed to our vakeel. In any case rumour had magnified their importance, and there

was a general belief that Shere Ali had thrown himself into the arms of Russia. Instead of sitting down supinely under these allegations Lord Lytton, while holding out a hand of friendship and alliance to the Ameer, did not fail to take precautions lest the sinister tales should be true. And in fact these were true, although their scope and importance had doubtless been exaggerated, for Shere Ali was indeed leaning to that alliance with Tashkent towards which our policy up to this point had been most calculated to impel him. From us he received nothing but the weary phrase of British alliance, but to him that alliance for twelve years meant nothing but cold words and scant assistance. On the other hand his Russian counsellors, always at his elbow, ever eager to take advantage of his weakest moments, gave him not indeed substantial aid, but the warmest of lip-sympathy and the most enticing prospect of aggrandisement in the future. When Lord Lytton took up the tangled thread which his predecessors had left as their unnatural legacy the evil had been done, and statesmen could only provide by other means against the danger which they had arrived too late to avert. During the unfortunate controversy which the publication of the Afghan Blue Books gave rise to, when the real interests of this country became lost sight of in a question of party warfare, nothing was more remarkable than the manner in which the present Viceroy of India was singled out for attack and abuse. On the face of the evidence that was produced nothing could be less fair than these tactics. Lord Lytton in no respect went beyond

the instructions which he received from Lord Salisbury; and, indeed, the policy which he has carried out, with great ability and with success, falls very far short indeed of that bolder policy with which his antagonists have sought to saddle him, and which was so ably expressed in the despatches sent by Lord Salisbury to Lord Northbrook during the year 1875. But when we come to regard the course of events in India and its border-lands during the past few years with calmer minds and clearer vision, it may be confidently anticipated that the policy which Lord Lytton has carried out, though far from being as perfect as it might be, will be proclaimed by all men of sober judgment to have been incomparably superior to that pursued by any of his immediate predecessors.

The policy which General Kaufmann adopted towards Afghanistan during the Khivan campaign, and which gradually became developed with the further progress of Russian arms in Central Asia, until at last, when Turkey and Russia entered upon that death-struggle —which has now closed, leaving consequences behind that must for long prove disquieting elements to the world at large—Kaufmann found himself sufficiently strong in Afghanistan to bid for supremacy with this country. In the spring of last year a settlement of the Eastern Question without a collision between England and Russia seemed to be impossible. To the Russian authorities in Central Asia the prospect of such a war was apparently very agreeable. It afforded them the prospect of realising their one great ambition, and they would not have been worthy of being soldiers

had they permitted themselves to doubt of its possibility. The Russian forces in Turkestan were accordingly mobilised and an army ready for active operations was concentrated upon the frontier of Bokhara, and an ambassador, General Stoletoff, was sent on to Cabul. At the very same moment, however, the Eastern Question was settled for the time being in the Conference Hall at Berlin. General Kaufmann neither stopped nor recalled his envoy, but permitted him to continue his journey to the Court of Shere Ali, where he resided for several months. But the main point for us in this transaction is that Russia once more broke that engagement so repeatedly assented to with regard to her non-interference in Afghanistan. It was indeed only what should have been expected as the natural outcome of our indifference in the past. Russia had sworn not to touch Khiva, yet she had taken a large portion of it. She had also bound herself down not to molest the Turcomans, yet what summer was there that did not witness an expedition against them? And now she, or rather, if it is necessary to distinguish, her Asiatic authorities, were determined, on the principle, their partisans say, of everything being fair in war, to infringe, when there was no state of war, the stipulations by which they were bound in the most formal manner to this country. But it is necessary at this point to enter a decided protest against this theory that war nullifies all international obligations. Had we sought to turn Afghanistan into an ally in a war with Russia, then, indeed, there would have been some sense in saying that General Kaufmann was justified

in foiling our intent by an interference in Afghanistan. But such was not the case. Almost as soon as Stoletoff set out from Djam it was known in Samarcand and Calcutta that the peace of the world was assured. Yet no express was sent after him commanding him to return.

The moment was much too favourable in the eyes of General Kaufmann for revealing the foot-hold he had obtained with remarkable skill in Afghanistan, to permit it to pass by unutilised. He was also sceptical of the durability of the new understanding that was asserted to have been patched up between England and Russia, and he did not permit himself to doubt that should the Ameer become involved through his Russian proclivities in hostilities with this country he could so manipulate his master's policy that he would be able to afford the Afghan ruler practical aid, either by direct means or indirectly. But it is very clear that whatever encouragement Kaufmann's schemes received before the Berlin Conference, they were not very favourably discussed in St. Petersburg afterwards. Kaufmann's views could only be approved of when it was proposed to oppose this country. When a desire to rest upon the laurels obtained became uppermost in the Czar's Council it was evident that Central Asian topics would not stand much chance of being discussed in a spirit favourable to acts of aggression. General Kaufmann knew these things, but despite his knowledge he persisted in an undertaking the fit season for which had passed by.

He doubtless hoped to force the hand of Prince

Gortchakoff's policy, and he may possibly have indulged in expectations that, if a war should ensue between England and the Ameer, we might meet with some military disaster which would play the game into his hand. But when he was compelled to demobilise his army he should have perceived that the auspicious moment had passed by, and that the more prudent step would have been to have recalled General Stoletoff as rapidly and as secretly as possible. The chances, in the eyes of any sane man, in a war between India and Cabul were so wholly on the side of the former, that unless Kaufmann had authority to step in with active help, it was bad policy on his part to place an ally of Russia at the mercy of England. For the reason that General Kaufmann should have foreseen the possibility of his having to perform the "painful duty" of abandoning Shere Ali to his fate, the mission of General Stoletoff must be pronounced to have been a mistake. But when we remember that Russia then played one of her best cards, and fully revealed to us how utterly false and untrustworthy her word of honour is, then we must pronounce this mission, which has ended in every respect disastrously for Russia, to have been a much greater mistake still.

Even if we regard the matter from a purely Asian stand-point, and test it by the effect it and Russia's subsequent conduct must produce upon the mind of Asiatics generally, we find that it cannot but be attended with the most baneful influence upon the reputation of Russia. An Asiatic ruler depending upon the promises of the highest Russian authority in

Central Asia, conveyed to him by one of his most distinguished subordinates, quarrels with old friends who have been attached to him and his house by an alliance of more than twenty years, and embarks upon an adventure, in company with Russia, of the most perilous description. In the short, decisive contest which ensues he is vanquished. His new-found ally gives him no assistance, and the instructions of that ally do not admit of his infringing them. In the broad face of day Russia, who has been solely responsible for the folly of Shere Ali, admits her inability to afford him any practical aid, and abandons him to his fate. The effect of this conduct has yet to be seen, but the opinion may at least be hazarded that petty rulers will be careful in the future how they trust themselves to a Russian alliance until Russia has decidedly committed herself to hostile acts against us.

The Stoletoff mission is a great warning for this country. The sting has in a few short months, partly by good fortune, but principally by our own energy—for which the chief thanks are due to Lord Lytton—been extracted from the danger. All so far has gone as well as it possibly could go, and there is no reason why, with ordinary prudence and sustained attention, the affair should not end well, and with permanent results. But that is the Afghan portion of the question. The greater question of the future relations between England and Russia remains behind. The rectification of the Indian frontier, and the settlement of our interests in Afghanistan upon a new basis, will only very partially attain the solution of the

Central Asian Question. The rivalry of England and Russia will remain untouched. The impossibility of reconciling the interests, commercial and political, of the two States will still be as patent as before, and the acquirement of a stronger position of defence will not have made the design of attacking that position hopeless for Russia to achieve. Towards solving the Central Asian problem petty changes on the Indian frontier can only very partially operate. They are steps in the right direction, and for local reasons absolutely necessary, but they affect the great question in only a slight degree. How, then, is it to be solved?

It is impossible any longer to feign ignorance with regard to Russia's intentions in Central Asia. Her recent action in Afghanistan proclaims the fact, which she has often striven to deny, that India is her goal, and nothing short of that prize will content her. That being so, the rivalry of England and Russia must be pronounced to be irreconcilable. No airy schemes of dividing the continent of Asia between the two empires can avail, and our policy should certainly not be one of conquest or aggression. Let Russia pursue her conquering mission, but let us regenerate the few States that still remain independent, so that they may themselves be able to preserve their freedom. Our policy is still to make the Afghans strong in proportion as they are friendly, and if their friendship be assured there is no reason why they should not remain practically independent in the greater portion of their State. It is because their friendship is, to say the least, pro-

blematical, that other precautions have to be adopted. For this Russia is, above all, to blame. But in Persia still more than in Afghanistan is it necessary for us to adopt this policy of affording protection to the weak, in order that they may have time and opportunity to become strong against the powerful and the ambitious. The regeneration of Persia should be made the cardinal point of our Central Asian policy. If we succeeded in our object we should have done more towards the permanent solution of the whole question than by any other act that lies at our command. If the Central Asian Question is to be solved by decided action in any one place, that place is certainly Teheran; but in order to attain a complete result it will be necessary to follow out a bolder and a wider scheme.

Few persons will any longer care to deny that there is such a thing as a bitter rivalry between England and Russia in Central Asia. The experience of the last fifteen years has forced that conviction upon the majority of Englishmen, resolutely as they have striven to avoid the logical conclusion of facts. But events have now progressed beyond this. That conviction should have obtained long ago, and it is difficult to perceive how anyone could have failed to entertain it after the revelation of the Khivan treaty. But now experience should have taught us more. Not only do we know that Russia's ambition is to upset our domination in India; but we have also learnt by what means she seeks to realise her ambition. We have been taught that the more lavish Russia is of her promises, the more false does she intend to be to them

when they have served their turn. No scruple of conscience, no hesitation through any weakness of sentiment, visits the mind of the Russian statesman or general who may resolve to pursue a course of ambition. Such an one recks of nothing. The word of the Czar has also been proved to be not more worthy of trust than that of his ministers. We are therefore compelled to recognise the stern fact that no faith can be reposed in the guarantee of Russia not to do such and such a thing. In Central Asia, where there is no Court of Great Powers to maintain the standard of international equity, Russia is supreme, and she guides her political action regardless of those scruples which mar the effect of the policy of less happily constituted governments and peoples. With regard, then, to negotiations upon the subject of Central Asia in the future, if we are not to make ourselves a laughing-stock to our children, we must brace our minds to the new condition of things, and resolve that whatever else betide, we will have no more of Russian promises. Such guarantees are no guarantees, and sully the paper on which they are written.

There can be little doubt that Russia will seek by every means in her power to repair the evil done by the failure of the Stoletoff mission, and it is probable that she will commence the undertaking in two different directions. The first will be by the incorporation of Bokhara, an event which is certain to occur the very moment Mozaffur Eddin dies, and it is reported that he is now dead. This report has not been confirmed, and it is possibly untrue. But when the

son of Nasrullah disappears, then Russia's frontier will be pushed down to the Oxus. The second will be by a development of Lomakine's operations against the Turcomans. If we were to content ourselves with a partial rectification of the frontier, and abandon the advanced positions we could secure at Candahar and even at Herat, the morrow of our withdrawal behind the Suleiman would witness the Russian attack upon Merv which has been so long forthshadowed. Internal disquiet has diverted something of Russia's attention from external policy, but it must be remembered that this will pass away, and that it affords us, not an excuse for neglecting our duty, but the most favourable opportunity for performing it in the most complete and successful manner. Russia will be urged into fresh activity by a sense of failure, and she will seek to recover her prestige, lowered in Afghanistan, by the occupation of Merv. For that event as being close at hand, unless we take steps to prevent it, we should prepare ourselves, and with a Russian occupation of Merv we shall be compelled to garrison Herat, with all the attendant disadvantages of being neighbours with Russia. The effects of a Russian garrison at Merv would only be partially counterbalanced by the presence of Anglo-Indian troops at Herat. We should indeed thereby have taken up a very strong position for defence, but we should not have increased the difficulty Russia should experience in delivering her attack. It lies within our power now to take such measures that Russia will never dare to persist in her resolve to invade India. We can nip the danger at

this stage in the bud, and if we only will, the Central Asian Question can now be solved wholly in our favour.

To secure this end the first step is to garrison Herat, if possible with the assent of Yakoob Khan; if impossible, without it. That act would unite the Turcomans in their resolve to oppose Lomakine, and it would also prove to Persia that England was as near at hand to afford aid as Russia was to attack. We should be in a position to inspire the Shah's Government with the necessary courage to declare that the Turcomans had become his subjects, that the province of Khorasan had returned to its historical limits in this quarter. In face of that declaration the Russian general would have to be a bolder man than he dare show himself if he persisted in advancing beyond Kizil Arvat. With an English garrison at Herat ready to assist the Turcomans if necessary, with a free trade in *arms* between Merv and Kurrachee, with a Persia beginning to recover its self-respect and to dream of conquests beyond the Araxes, the aspect of the Central Asian Question would be different to that which it has so long assumed. And this is the dream of no visionary. A small garrison at Herat, an agent at Merv, a statesman with complete powers at Teheran, in addition to English officers in the Persian army as there were forty-five years ago, would secure it all. There would probably be no war, and if there were one the chances would be all on our side. We can secure these great results this spring, and it might not be hopeless to obtain Afghan assistance in carrying them into execution. There is no reason why the garrison of Herat

should not be composed of Afghan troops as well as Anglo-Indian, and in the course of time it might be possible for us to withdraw our contingent behind the Helmund.

To solve the Central Asian Question we must do something more than rectify the Indian frontier, something more than oust Russia from Cabul, something more than obtain the right to place British agents in the country. We must occupy Herat, arm the Turcomans, and restore Persia to something of its pristine vigour. When we have done these things we may leave the further development of the rivalry of England and Russia to fate with perfect confidence in the result. Once and for ever we can dispel all dread from Russia invading India, and by simply profiting by our experience of Russia's falseness we may make the result of an Afghan war caused by her duplicity the grand turning-point in the whole question. By certain simple precautions the Central Asian Question can now be solved wholly in favour of this country. Those precautions have been specified, and it would be unpardonable folly to disregard the lesson that is contained in the writing upon the wall. Rome fell by neglecting her experiences, and England will not be able to avoid a similar fate if she shows equal obtuseness.

No nation, however great, can command the future, and in our position in India there is at least grave cause why we should hesitate to look forward to the permanent continuance of our rule. It may certainly be predicted that unless we pursue a widely different internal policy, it cannot endure for more than a cen-

tury. The precautions which are absolutely necessary for us to take have already been specified and need not here be further dilated upon. But it is equally incumbent upon us to take those precautions in our external policy which the good fortune of the moment places at our disposal. Whatever scruple we may have in sweeping apparently well-disposed feudatories from our path, we can have no similar reluctance to adopting towards Russia a policy which shall curtail that Power's capacity for doing us injury. At the present moment we can effect this object without incurring any risk worthy of the name and with little trouble. But if we let the moment pass by unutilised and neglected, we shall have lost the most favourable opportunity we are ever likely to enjoy for conclusively proving that of the two rivals England is to be the supreme and successful one. A neglected opportunity seldom recurs, but this country has been particularly fortunate during the development of this question. Several times has the auspicious occasion been afforded us, but each time we have failed to avail ourselves of it. Once more the turn of events provides that opportunity which, so often neglected, was never placed at our disposal in a more opportune moment than the present. It may be the last time that Providence will place it in our power to annihilate Russia's ambitious dreams, and if we neglect it the lost opportunity will never come again. The best defence for India is to keep Russia at a distance, and no scheme of border-improvement can do more than place us in a position to defend ourselves against attack. Our

policy should aim higher than this. We can prevent Russia ever being in a position to attack India if we act on the present occasion as our reputation demands. Are we to prove unequal to it? The answer lies mainly with the reader, but common sense *replies*, No.

APPENDIX A.

Russia and Persia.—The Treaty of Gulistan.

Their Majesties the Emperor of Russia and the King of Persia, actuated by their affections towards their respective subjects, are anxious to commute the present hostilities, so repugnant to their disposition, to an amicable understanding. With this view, Lieutenant-General Ritischeuf, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in Georgia, the line of Caucasus, Laghoor, and Astrachan, and Commander-in-Chief of the Caspian Fleet, Knight of the Order of Alexander Neuski, of the First Order of St. Anne, and Fourth of the Military Order of St. George, and of the Sword of Bravery, is fully empowered to treat on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. His Excellency Mirza Abul Hussein Khan, late Ambassador to the Courts of Constantinople and London, of noble descent, etc. etc. etc., is appointed Plenipotentiary on the part of His Majesty the King of Persia. The Plenipotentiaries having met at the Russian camp on the banks of Zuivan, near Gulistan, in the district of

Karabagh, and having exchanged their credentials in the name of their respective Sovereigns, whom they severally represent, hold themselves bound religiously to observe for ever the articles and conditions here entered into.

ART. 1.—After the conclusion of this treaty the hostilities which have hitherto existed between the States of Russia and Persia shall cease, and peace shall be established between the respective Sovereigns and their allies for ever.

ART. 2.—The *status quo ad presentem* having been agreed on as the basis of treatment in virtue of this arrangement, the several districts hitherto possessed by the respective States shall remain under their subjection, and the frontier is determined in the manner under-written. The line of demarcation is to commence from the plain of Aduna Bazar, running direct towards the plain of Mogham to the ford of the Anas at Yuln Bulook, up the Anas to the junction of the Capennuk Chace at the back of the hill of Mekri; from thence the boundary of Karabagh and Nukshivan is from above the mountains of Alighuz to Dualighuz, and thence the boundary of Karabagh, Nukshivan Erivan, and also part of Georgia and of Kuzah and Shums-ud-deen-Loo, is separated by Eishuk Meidaun; from Eishuk Meidaun the line is the chain of mountains on the right, and the river of Humya Chummun, and from the tops of the mountains of Alighuz it runs along the village of Shoorgil and between those of the village of Mystery until it reaches the river of Arpachahi; and as the district of Talish

during the hostilities has been partially subjected by the contending parties for the purpose of strengthening mutual confidence after the conclusion of the treaty, Commissioners shall be appointed respectively, who, in concurrence with each other and with the cognizance of the governors concerned, shall determine what mountains, rivers, lakes, villages, and fields shall mark the line of frontier, having first ascertained the respective possessions at the time of making the treaty, and holding in view the *status quo ad presentem* as the basis on which the boundaries are to be determined. If the possessions of either of the high contracting parties shall have been infringed on by the above-mentioned boundaries, the Commissioners shall rectify it on the basis of the *status quo ad presentem.*

ART. 3.—His Majesty the King of Persia, in demonstration of his amicable sentiments towards the Emperor of Russia, acknowledges, in his own name and that of his heirs, the sovereignty of the Emperor of Russia over the provinces of Karabagh and Georgia, now called Elizabeth Paul, the districts of Shekie Shiriwan, Kobek, Derbend, Bakoobeh, and such part of Talish as is now possessed by Russia, the whole of Degestan, Georgia, the tract of Shoorgil, Achook, Bash, Gooreea, Mingrelia, Abtichar, the whole country between the boundary at present established and the line of Caucasus, and all the territory between the Caucasus and the Caspian sea.

ART. 4.—His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, actuated by similar feelings towards His Majesty of Persia, and in the spirit of good neighbourhood wishing the

Sovereign of Persia always to be firmly established on the throne, engages for himself and heirs to recognise the prince who shall be nominated heir-apparent, and to afford him assistance in case he should require it to suppress any opposing party. The power of Persia will thus be increased by the aid of Russia. The Emperor engages, for himself and heirs, not to interfere in the dissensions of the prince unless the aid of the Russian arms is required by the king of the time.

ART. 5.—The Russian merchantmen on the Caspian sea shall, according to their former practice, have permission to enter the Persian harbours, and the Persians shall render to the Russian marine all friendly aid in case of casualties by storm or shipwreck.

Persian merchantmen shall enjoy the same privilege of entering Russian harbours, and the like aid shall be afforded to the Persian marine by the Russians in case of casualties by storm or shipwreck.

The Russian flag shall fly in the Russian ships-of-war which are permitted to sail in the Caspian, as formerly; no other nation whatever shall be allowed ships-of-war on the Caspian.

ART. 6.—The whole of the prisoners taken either in battle or otherwise, whether Christians or of any other religion, shall be mutually exchanged at the expiration of three months after the date of the signature of the treaty. The high contracting parties shall give a sum to each of the prisoners for his expenses, and send them to Kara Ecclesia; those charged with the superintendence of the exchange on

the frontier shall give notice to each other of the prisoners being sent to the appointed place, when they shall be exchanged; and any person who either voluntarily deserted or fled after the commission of a crime shall have permission to return to his country, [or] shall remain without molestation. All deserters who return to their country shall be forgiven by both contracting parties.

ART. 7.—In addition to the above Articles, the two contracting Sovereigns have been pleased to resolve to exchange ambassadors, who at a proper period will be sent to their respective capitals, where they will meet with that honour due to their rank, and due attention shall be paid to the requests they may be charged to make. Mercantile agents shall be appointed to reside in the different cities for the purpose of assisting the merchants in carrying on their trade; they shall only retain ten followers; they shall be in no way molested; they shall be treated with respect and attention, and parties of either nation injured in the way of trade may by their interference have their grievances redressed.

ART. 8.—With regard to the intercourse of caravans, the merchants of either country must be provided with a passport, that they may travel either by sea or land without fear, and individuals may reside in either country for the purpose of trade so long as it suits their convenience, and they shall meet with no opposition when they wish to return home. In regard to merchandise and goods brought from Russia to Persia, or sent from Persia to Russia, the proprietors may at

their own discretion either sell or exchange them for other property. Merchants having occasion to complain of failure of payment, or other grievances, will state the nature of their cases to the mercantile agents; or, if there are none resident in the place, they will apply to the Governor, who will examine into the merits of their representations, and will be careful that no injustice be offered this class of men. Russian merchants having entered Persia with merchandise will have permission to convey it to any country in alliance with that State, and the Persian Government will readily furnish them a passport to enable them to do so. In like manner, Persian merchants who visit Russia will have permission to proceed to any country in alliance with Russia. In case of a Russian merchant dying in Persia, and his goods remaining in Persia, as they are the property of a subject of a friendly State, they shall be taken charge of by the proper constituted authorities, and shall be delivered over, on demand, to the lawful heirs of the deceased, who shall have permission to dispose of them. As this is the custom among all civilised nations, there can be no objection to this arrangement.

ART. 9.—The duties on Russian merchandise brought to Persian ports shall be in the proportion of five hundred dinars (or five per cent.) on property of the value of one toman, which, having been paid to one city, the goods may be conveyed to any part of Persia without any further demand of duty being made on any pretence whatever. The like per-centage, and nothing more, will be paid on exports. The import

and export duties from Persian merchants in Russia will be levied at the same rate.

ART. 10.—On the arrival of goods at the sea-port towns, or such as come by land-carriage to the frontier towns of the two States, merchants shall be allowed to sell or exchange their goods without the further permission of the Custom House officers, because it is the duty of Custom House officers to prevent all sorts of delay in the prosecution of trade, and to receive the King's customs from the buyer or seller, as may be agreed between them.

ART. 11.—After the signature of this treaty the respective Plenipotentiaries shall immediately announce the peace to the different frontier posts, and order the suspension of all further hostilities; and two copies of this treaty being taken, with Persian translations, they shall be signed and sealed by the respective Plenipotentiaries, and be exchanged. They must then be ratified by the signatures of their Majesties of Russia and Persia, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the course of three months.

Done in the Russian camp, at the River Zuisan, near Gulistan, in Karabagh.

The 12th October 1813. The 29th Showal, 1228. Higira.

(Signed and sealed.) NICHOLAS RITISCHEUF.

(Signed and sealed) MIRZA ABUL. HUSSEIN KHAN.

APPENDIX B.

RUSSIA AND PERSIA.—TREATY OF TURKOMANCHAI.

IN the name of Almighty God. His Majesty the Most High, Most Illustrious, and Most Powerful Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russians, and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, equally animated by a sincere desire to put a period to the evils of a war entirely contrary to their mutual wishes, and to re-establish on a solid basis the former relations of good neighbourhood and amity between the two States through the medium of a peace comprising in itself the guarantee of its duration by the removal of all causes of future difference and misunderstanding, have appointed the following Plenipotentiaries charged with the execution of this salutary work, namely, on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the Sieur Jean Paskevitch, General of Infantry, and Aide-de-Camp General, Commander of the Corps detached from the Caucasus, Superinten-

dent of the civil portion of Georgia, and of the administrations of Astracan and of the Caucasus, Commandant of the Flotilla of the Caspian sea, Knight of the Diamond Orders of St. Alexander Newsky, of St. Anne of the 1st Class, of St. Vladimir of the 1st Class, of St. George of the 2nd Class, decorated with two swords of Honour, one of which bears the inscription "for valour," and the other bedecked with diamonds, Knight of the Foreign Orders of the Red Eagle of Prussia of the 1st Class, of the Crescent of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, and of many others; the Sieur Alexander Obuskoff, Counsellor of State and Chamberlain, Knight of the Order of St. Vladimir of the 3rd Class, of St. Stanislas of Poland of the 2nd Class, and of St. John of Jerusalem; and on the part of His Majesty the Shah of Persia, His Royal Highness the Prince Abbas Mirza, who, after having met at Dekhargane and exchanged their full powers, which were found in good and due form, have adopted and concluded the following Articles.

ART. 1.—There shall be established from this day, peace, amity, and perfect understanding between His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias on the one part, and His Majesty the Shah of Persia on the other part, their heirs and successors, their respective States and subjects, in perpetuity.

ART. 2.—Considering that the hostilities between the high contracting parties, now happily terminated, have caused the suspension of the obligations imposed on them by the Treaty of Gulistan, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His Majesty the Shah

of Persia have deemed it proper to replace the said Treaty of Gulistan by the clauses and stipulations, which are intended to regulate and consolidate more and more the future relations of peace and amity between Russia and Persia.

ART. 3.—His Majesty the Shah of Persia, as well in his own name as in that of his heirs and successors, cedes in full right and property to the Empire of Russia, the Khanate of Erivan on either side of the Araxes, and the Khanate of Nakhitchevan. In consequence of this cession, His Majesty the Shah engages to cause the delivery to the Russian authorities, within the space of six months at farthest from the signature of the present treaty, of all the archives and public documents concerning the administration of the two khanates above mentioned.

ART. 4.—The two high contracting parties agree to establish, as the frontier between the two States, the following line of demarcation :—Commencing from that point of the frontier of the Ottoman States which is the nearest in a direct line to the summit of Little Ararat, this line (of demarcation) shall proceed as far as the top of that mountain, whence it shall descend as far as the source of the river called Karasson inferior, which flows from the southern side of Little Ararat, and shall pursue its course down to the river's mouth in the Araxes opposite to Cherour. At this point the line shall follow the bed of the Araxes as far as the fortress of Abassabad ; above the exterior works of this place, which are situated on the right bank of the Araxes, there shall be drawn a radius of

half an agatch, or three and a half Russian versts, which will extend in every direction; all the territory comprised in this radius shall belong exclusively to Russia, and shall be marked out with the greatest exactness within the period of two months from this date. From the point where the eastern extremity of the radius shall have joined the Araxes, the frontier line shall continue to follow the bed of that river as far as the ford of Jediboulouk, whence the Persian territory shall extend along the bed of the Araxes over a space of three agatch, or twenty-one versts, below the confluence of the two little rivers called Obinabagar and Sarakamyche, and shall proceed along the right bank of the eastern stream of Obinabagar up to its source, and thence as far as the apex of the heights of Djikoir, so that all the rivers which terminate in the Caspian sea shall belong to Russia, and all those whose course (or disemboguement) is on the side of Persia shall belong to Persia. The boundary of the two States being here marked by the ridge of mountains, it is agreed that the declivity on the side of Talische shall belong to Russia, and the opposite declivity to Persia. From the ridge of the heights of Djikoir the frontier shall proceed as far as the summit of Kamar Konia, the mountains which separate Talyche from the district of Archa. The ridges of the mountains forming the separation on both sides, the course of the rivers shall determine here the frontier line in the same manner as is above indicated in regard to the distance comprised between the source of Obinabagar and the heights of Djikoir. The frontier line shall then proceed from the summit

of Kamar Konia, the ridge of mountains separating the district of Gouvant from that of Archa to the limits of Welkedge, always comformably to the principle laid down respecting the course of the rivers; the district of Gouvant, with the exception of the portion situated on the opposite side of the apex of the said mountains, shall fall to the share of Russia. From the limits of the district of Welkedge, the frontier line between the two States shall follow the summits of Klopontz, and the principal chain of mountains which intersect the district of Welkedge as far as the northern source of the river called Astara, always observing the principle regarding the course of the rivers; thence the frontier shall follow the bed of that stream to its embouchure in the Caspian sea and complete the line of demarcation, which shall henceforward separate the respective possessions of Russia and Persia.

ART. 5.—His Majesty the Shah of Persia, in testimony of his sincere friendship for his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, solemnly recognises the present article, in his own name and in that of his heirs and successors to the throne of Persia, the appertainment for ever to the Empire of Russia of all the countries and the islands situated between the line of demarcation indicated by the preceding article on one side and the ridge of the Caucasian mountains and the Caspian sea on the other, as also the wandering tribes who inhabit those territories.

ART. 6.—With a view to compensate for the considerable sacrifices which the war between the two

States has occasioned to the Empire of Russia, as well as the losses and injuries which have resulted therefrom to Russian subjects, His Majesty the Shah of Persia engages to make good these by the payment of a pecuniary indemnity. It is agreed between the two high contracting parties that the amount of this indemnity is fixed at ten crores of tomans, or thirty millions of silver roubles, and that the mode, time, and guarantee in respect to the payment of this sum shall be regulated by a separate arrangement.

ART. 7.—His Majesty the Shah of Persia having deemed it expedient to nominate as his successor and heir-presumptive his august son the Prince Abbas Mirza, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, with a view to afford to His Majesty the Shah of Persia a public testimony of his amicable disposition, and of his desire to contribute towards the consolidation of this order of succession, engages to recognise henceforward in the august person of His Royal Highness the Prince Abbas Mirza the successor and heir-presumptive of the Crown of Persia, and to consider him as the legitimate Sovereign of that kingdom from the moment of his accession to the throne.

ART. 8.—Russian merchant-vessels shall enjoy as formerly the right of navigating in freedom the Caspian sea, and of landing on its coasts. They shall find in Persia aid and assistance in case of shipwreck. The same right is granted to Persian merchants' vessels of navigating on the *ancient footing* the Caspian sea, and of landing on the Russian banks, where in case of shipwreck the Persians shall receive aid and assistance

reciprocally. With respect to ships of war, those carrying the Russian military colours being *ab antiquo* the only vessels which have had the right of navigating the Caspian sea, that exclusive privilege is for this reason now equally reserved and secured to them, so that, with the exception of Russia, no other Power shall be able to have ships of war in the Caspian sea.

ART. 9.—His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, cordially desirous of drawing closer by every means the bonds so happily re-established between them, have agreed that the ambassadors, ministers, and charge d'affaires, who may be reciprocally delegated to the respective High Courts, whether on a temporary mission or for the purpose of residing there permanently, shall be received with the honours and distinctions due to their rank and suited to the dignity of the high contracting parties, as well as to the sincere friendship which unites them and the usages of the countries. In this respect the ceremonies to be observed on both sides shall be agreed upon by means of a special Protocol.

ART. 10.—His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, considering the re-establishment and extension of the commercial relations between the two States as one of the principal benefits which the return of peace should produce, have agreed to regulate all the arrangements relative to the protection of commerce and the security of their respective subjects, as stated in a separate Act hereunto annexed, concluded between

the respective Plenipotentiaries, and which shall be considered as forming an integral part of the present Treaty of Peace. His Majesty the Shah of Persia reserves to Russia as formerly the right of appointing consuls or commercial agents wherever the good of commerce may require, and he engages to allow these consuls or agents, each of whom shall not have a suite of more than ten individuals under his protection, the enjoyment of the honours and privileges due to their public character.

His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias promises on his part to observe a perfect reciprocity in regard to the consuls or commercial agents of His Majesty the Shah of Persia; in the event of any well-grounded complaint on the part of the Persian Government against any one of the Russian consuls or agents, the minister or charge d'affaires of Russia residing at the Court of His Majesty the Shah, and under whose immediate orders they shall be placed, will suspend him from his functions and confer the charge provisionally on whomsoever he may think proper.

ART. 11.—All the affairs and demands of their respective subjects, suspended by the event of the war, shall be resumed and settled conformably to the principles of justice after the conclusion of peace. The debts which their respective subjects may have contracted among themselves shall be promptly and wholly liquidated.

ART. 12.—The high contracting parties agree, with a view to the interests of their respective subjects, to fix a term of three years in order that those who

possess simultaneously immovable property on either side of the Araxes may have the power to sell or to exchange the same freely. His Imperial Majesty of all the Russias excepts, nevertheless, from the benefits of this arrangement (as far as it respects them) the late Eriven Surdar Hossein Khan, his brother Ha Jun Khan, and Kurreem Khan, formerly Governor of Nakhitchevan.

ART. 13.—All prisoners of war made on either side, whether in the course of the last war or before, as well as the subjects of the two Governments who may have fallen into captivity at any period whensoever, shall all be delivered over within the term of four months, and after having been supplied with provisions and other necessary articles they shall be sent to Abassabad to be there made over to the commissioners respectively deputed to receive them and to take measures for their conveyance to their homes. The high contracting parties will adopt the same course in regard to all prisoners of war, and all Russian and Persian subjects reciprocally found in captivity who may not have been restored within the term above mentioned, either by reason of the distance at which they may have been, or owing to any other cause or circumstance whatever. The two Governments expressly reserve to themselves the unlimited right of claiming them at any time, and they bind themselves to restore them reciprocally as soon as they shall present themselves or shall be claimed.

ART. 14.—The high contracting parties shall not demand the surrender of refugees and deserters who

may have passed under their respective dominations before or during the war.

With a view, however, to prevent mutually the prejudicial consequences which might result from the communication which some of these refugees may maintain with their old compatriots, the Persian Government engages not to tolerate within its possessions situated between the Araxes and the line formed by the river called Tehan, the lake of Aroomiah, the river of Djikaton, and by the river named Higil Ogane as far as its confluence with the Caspian sea, the presence of the individuals who shall be designated by name now, or who may be so indicated hereafter.

His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias promises equally on his part not to permit Persian refugees to settle in the Khanates of Karabagh and Nakhitchevan as well as in the portion of the Khanate of Erivan situated on the right bank of the Araxes. It is understood, however, that this clause is not, and shall not be, obligatory except in regard to individuals invested with a public character, or of a certain dignity, such as khans, begs, and spiritual chiefs or mollahs, whose personal example, instigations, and clandestine communications might have a prejudicial influence on their old compatriots. As far as concerns the mass of the population in the two countries, it is agreed between the high contracting parties that their respective subjects who might have already passed, or who may hereafter pass, from one State into the other, shall be free to settle or sojourn wherever the Government

under whose authority they may place themselves shall deem proper.

ART. 15.—With the benevolent object of restoring tranquillity to their States, and removing from their subjects all that can aggravate the evils inflicted on them by the war to which the present treaty has so happily put an end, His Majesty the Shah grants a full and entire amnesty to all the inhabitants and functionaries of the province called Azerbegan. None of them, without any exception, shall be persecuted or molested for his opinion, acts, or conduct, either during the war or during the temporary occupation of the said province by the Russian troops. There shall be granted to them further the term of one year from this date to remove freely with their families from the Persian dominions into the Russian States, to export or to sell their property without the slightest opposition on the part of the Government or the local authorities, or the imposition of any duty or fee on the effects or articles sold or exported by them. With regard to their immovable property a period of five years shall be granted to them for its sale or disposal, according to their pleasure. From this amnesty are excepted those who may be guilty within the period above mentioned of one year of any crime or misdemeanour liable to penalties inflicted by the tribunals.

ART. 16.—Immediately after the signature of the present Treaty of Peace, the respective Plenipotentiaries shall lose no time in transmitting to every quarter the necessary advices and instructions for the immediate cessation of hostilities.

The present treaty, drawn up in two parts of the same tenor, signed by the respective Plenipotentiaries, impressed with their seals, and exchanged between them, shall be confirmed and ratified by His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, and the solemn ratifications bearing their own signatures shall be exchanged between their Plenipotentiaries within the term of four months, or earlier if possible.

Signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the high contracting parties, Camp, Turkomanchai, the 21st February, 1828.

APPENDIX C.

A French Opinion upon England and Russia in Central Asia.

The "Journal des Débats," in a long and exhaustive article published during the spring of 1878, from which it would appear that the eventuality of a Russian campaign against our Indian empire is one of the most improbable, if not impossible, undertakings that could well be imagined, notwithstanding the enormous numerical strength which Russia is supposed to possess in her army, gave the following account of the present positions and numbers of the Russian forces in Asia:—

"The Russian army in Asia is divided into four parts, corresponding to the administrative divisions of the country—namely, those of the Caucasus, Orenburg, Turkestan, and Fergana, leaving out of the calculation the troops disseminated in the various governments of Siberia, which, in consequence of the

distance, disposition of the country, and the smallness of their effective, could not take part in any operation. The army of the Caucasus on a war footing at the outset of the recent war numbered one hundred and fifty-five thousand three hundred and ninety-nine regulars, and forty thousand nine hundred and thirty-two irregulars. The field artillery amounted to three hundred and forty-four guns. The army of Orenburg numbered, in both regular and irregular troops, about eighty thousand men with sixteen guns. That of Turkestan, about fifty-two thousand men and sixty-four guns. To these may be added between three and four thousand sailors on the Caspian and Aral seas. We thus get a total of two hundred and sixty-four thousand, with four hundred and twenty guns. The troops occupying Khiva and Fergana are not comprised in these figures, as there are no official documents showing their number, but, taking them approximatively, they would probably bring up the whole of the Russian troops in Asia to two hundred and eighty-thousand men and four hundred and eighty-eight field guns.

"We will now consider what portion of these troops it would be possible to devote to an expedition against an English army in position on the frontiers of India, or taking the offensive by debouching through Afghanistan upon the Russian possessions of Asia. Taking the Turkestan army first, which is nearest to the scene of operations, Colonel Weninkof, of the Russian artillery, calculated six thousand men, and M. Stumm, a Prussian officer who accompanied the expedition to

Khiva, a competent judge, calculated seven thousand five hundred men—that is to say, twenty-six per cent. of the whole effective. This small number is not astonishing if we consider that the Turkestan army is spread over the enormous area of sixteen thousand and thirty-seven geographical square miles, and that it has to watch over turbulent populations incompletely subjugated. The troops of the government of Orenberg, which are spread over a surface of twenty-two thousand and twelve square miles, we do not suppose could provide a greater per-centage than that of Turkestan, but we will suppose that they could furnish twenty-thousand men, and this figure is certainly exaggerated. Of the districts of Khiva and Fergana we will reckon a third of the effective, although this is also much exaggerated for a country which is only partly subjugated, and where struggles are continuing between the populations. We thus obtain a total of disposable forces of thirty-three thousand four hundred men, which is twenty-five per cent. of the whole. In reality we do not think that this force would attain, and certainly not exceed, fifteen thousand men. But we will take the above figure of thirty-three thousand four hundred. This is all the Russian armies of Asia can furnish, all that they can concentrate with the view to offensive operations. If Russia would attack India, or contend in Afghanistan against an English army coming from the Indian frontier, she will have, by counting everything at the best, thirty-three thousand four hundred men to sustain the shock—about the same number which the Turks placed *hors de*

combat in the three assaults on Plevna. The army of the Caucasus is not included in this calculation, because it has on hand all that it can do at present. During the present war it never furnished more than one hundred and twenty thousand disposable men, and then only by borrowing from the European army. War and sickness have certainly reduced it a third. The eighty thousand men which thus remain would be absolutely required on the spot in case of war with England—partly to watch the eastern coasts of the Black sea, and partly for the occupation of the newly-acquired provinces, to watch the Turkish frontier in Asia, and to prepare to encounter any offensive operations on the part of England coming from the Persian gulf. We doubt even whether the army of the Caucasus would suffice for such a complex task.

"Now, let us consider how long it would take to concentrate this army of thirty-three thousand four hundred men. Two points of concentration have been before adopted for attacking India from the north. These are Cabul from Fergana, and Samarkand and Candahar coming from Khiva. Besides these two points no others exist, as will be seen by consulting a good map. We will first suppose a concentration of troops in Fergana, say at Tashkend, either with the view of massing troops nearer to India, or at Samarkand, or even at Balkh. According to the calculation of Lieutenant Stumm, under the most favourable circumstances it would take a column on the march, accompanied with the necessary convoys, four months

and a third to get from Orenburg to Tashkend. Admitting, therefore, that it would only take two-thirds of a month for the concentration of the Orenburg contingent at Orenburg and that of Tashkend at Tashkend, which would be absurd, and counting that contingent at twenty thousand men, which is an exaggeration, and supposing the mobilisation to be already accomplished, we arrive at this—the orders for concentration having reached all the fractions of the armies of Turkestan and Orenburg, five months after, under the most favourable circumstances, they would have concentrated at Tashkend twenty-seven thousand four hundred men. We must count another month for mobilisation and the distribution of orders, which to any military man would appear very short, thus making the delay six months for the concentration of the above forces at Tashkend. The five thousand five hundred men of the Turkestan army who formed the expeditionary force to Khiva in 1873 were concentrated at Djizak about the 10th March, and reached Khiva the 9th June, reduced to three thousand eight hundred and eighty-eight men. The movement of concentration upon Djizak having commenced in the beginning of January, by inverse calculation we find that it would take five months for the Khiva troops to reach Turkestan *viâ* Djizak.

"We arrive, therefore, at this conclusion, that everything going on well, a favourable season being chosen, the Asiatic populations remaining quiet, the Russians could group at Tashkend, for offensive or defensive operations against the English, a total of thirty-three

thousand four hundred men (on paper) the first day of the seventh month after the declaration of war, or rather after the arrival of the orders for mobilisation and concentration at Orenburg and Tashkend. We shall see further on the terrible difference of time within which the English could bring a minimum of sixty thousand men to Cabul, and it will be seen that the struggle in Central Asia will not be that of the horse and the fish, but of the waggon against the locomotive.

"In order to form an idea of the difficulties of locomotion between Russia, the Caucasus, and the governments of Orenburg and Turkestan, it will suffice to consider the following figures. Lieutenant Stumm, who travelled by post from St. Petersburg to Tashkend, fixed as the absolute maximum quickness of a courier between those two points at twenty days. M. Weninkof calculated the cost of transport of twenty-four bushels of corn to the Orenburg garrison at nine silver roubles. From Samara to Orenburg is only the sixth part of the distance from Orenburg to Tashkend, and by this an idea may be gained of the cost of transport of millions of bushels of provisions that would have to be sent to Tashkend if the Russians had to concentrate there an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men in order to meet the British army of India. Besides horses which would provide remounts for the Russian army, the possessions of Central Asia offer no resources whatever. Everything would have to be brought from Europe. Supposing that the disposable troops in Asia should number

forty thousand men provided with everything necessary for a long campaign against a European army, the Russians would still have to take one hundred and ten thousand men direct from Europe, with material and provisions."

The same paper followed up its analysis of the resources of Russia in Central Asia by examining the military resources of the British Empire in Asia, of which the following is an extract:—

"We will suppose that a Russian army has assembled in Turkestan with a view to an attack upon India. At Tashkend this army will be supposed to possess its material, and it will have its front extending from the south-west to the north-east, indicated by the localities Samarkand, Djizak, Ouratipa, and Khodjent. Such an army starting from this point would have to take up a position somewhere between Cabul and Kandahar, in order to commence active operations against India. To do this it would have to march a distance of four hundred and fifty miles as the crow flies. The mean distance of the points from which the Russian army would have to march between Samarkand and Khodjent to Cabul—the nearest point to their objective—is six hundred miles in a direct line. From the course of the river Ak-Darya, which is fifty kilometres distant from Samarkand, the Russians would enter upon an unsubjugated country. From the course of the Oxus at two hundred and forty kilometres from Samarkand the Russians would enter upon Afghan territory. From whatever point the Russians might start—admitting even that the unsubjugated populations and the

Afghans, far from being hostile to them, facilitated their march across their territory—they would have at least eight hundred kilometres, as the crow flies, to march across countries without roads and without resources, before they could be within a distance which would enable them effectively to attack India. One of the most competent men to give an opinion upon this subject—a conqueror of India, who has conducted offensive expeditions all over this region—Sultan Baber, says:—'The country of Cabul is naturally fortified, and difficult to assail. The chain of the Hindoo Koosh rises between Cabul on the one side and Badakshan on the other.' We must remember that it is precisely this chain which the Russians coming from Samarkand would have to cross in order to reach Cabul.

"We will stop for a moment here, and consider what astonishing facilities we have accorded to the Russians in this supposed campaign. We have taken no account of the seasons; we have not said that in the government of Orenburg and in a large part of Turkestan the march of an army would be absolutely impossible except in the spring; that in the mountainous districts south of Turkestan it would be possible only in autumn. We will put these trifles on one side. The Russian army would be concentrated at Tashkend in six months. In one month, with extraordinary rapidity, they have taken up positions at Samarkand and Khodjent—total seven months. The seventh month has just fallen at the moment when the Russian army can cross the heights of Chebertau in

autumn. The populations of the country have remained tranquil, and have in no way embarrassed the operations of the Russians against their co-religionists, the Mussulmans of Turkey. The Russians, in order to overcome the religious scruples of these Mussulmans, have been able to offer them more money than the English could offer them in order to support the cause of Islam. These rapacious and impressionable barbarians have found it more to their interest to side with the Russian invader, who is assembling his army six hundred miles away from their country, than on the side of the English, who put before them the imposing spectacle of their army assembled within view and within gunshot of their mountains. The world, in fact, is turned upside down. The Asiatics are no longer Asiatics. The Afghans laugh at Islamism, at the rupees of India, at the sixty thousand Anglo-Mussulman soldiers, magnificently dressed, well equipped, and they take the part of the thirty thousand miscreants clothed in rags and without a sou in their pockets, who are roaming about in the wilds of Turkestan. The Russian army proceeds without difficulty from Samarkand to Cabul, and marches eight hundred kilometres, as the crow flies, by a single pass over four mountains, the least of which is as high as the Alps, in one month—total eight months. The army is concentrated, disposed, and marches as with the aid of magic. This is marvellous. The first day of the ninth month after the declaration of war one hundred thousand Russians are at Cabul, having left behind them sufficient forces to occupy and protect six hun-

dred miles of communication across deserts and mountains, amongst barbarous and ferocious peoples. Within eight months they have marched across those fearful deserts, amongst terrible mountains; where isolated travellers have before with difficulty only been able to conduct a few mules, they have transported millions of kilogrammes of munitions of war, ambulances, etc., without breaking a single wheel, and without dismounting a single cannon. These three impossible things having been accomplished, as well as the despatch of one hundred and ten thousand men with the necessary material from Russia in Europe to Tashkend, the assemblage of forty thousand men with the necessary material in the region between Tashkend and Samarkand, the march of one hundred and fifty thousand men with the immense material from Samarkand to Cabul over four chains of mountains, whose mean height is over nine thousand feet, and all this in eight months. Here are, then, one hundred thousand Russians, who we will suppose to be as fresh as when they started on their march, as well as horses, clothes, and material.

"During the time that these armies, more marvellous than the tales of Hoffmann, have been pursuing their course, the English will have had fully eight months for their preparations. We will now see what they have been able to do. Here we leave the domain of fancy, and, instead of enlarging the effectives we will reduce them as much as we can. Instead of making armies to fly as with wings, we will simply transport them by railway. As regards the question of money,

we will not discuss it; for whatever may be the expense which England may be put to in the event of an Asiatic war, we must consider that she is perfectly able to meet it. In the first place the Indian empire requires nothing from Europe in the shape of material. It has its grand central arsenal at Meerut, its depot of railway material at Allahabad, with eight thousand (?) European workmen. They make their own cannon, their locomotives, their cartridges, and have means for manufacturing everything necessary. They have stores of meat almost inexhaustible, of leather as much as they require, and of rice they can obtain within three months by sea from Cochin China enough to feed their Hindoos for a whole year of famine, if they will only pay for it. We will, therefore, admit, in the first place, as an axiom most easy of verifying, that the English army of India will find upon its own ground, and in abundance, all that is necessary in material and provisions. But even if this were not the case, and were it necessary to have recourse to Europe or to neighbouring countries or to other English colonies, a steamer to Kurrachee from England takes only about a month. And if we turn to a map of the railways of India we are struck with the fact that the English, who are people not indifferent to commercial matters, have constructed in India railways which are in no way intended to supply commercial, but rather military requirements—purely strategic railways. From Calcutta, from Bombay, from Kurrachee, all these lines meet (?) at one point—Peshawur. Now, Peshawur is a hut, but in that hut there are six regiments garri-

soned, and close to, at Kohat, which is a small village, there are six more regiments.

"The most recent *Army List* which we have at our disposal is that of 1876, but at that time it may be seen that the Indian army was disposed with the view to what the Prussians call, in technical language, a defensive offensive. We will take for example the army of Bengal, and we will only speak of the native troops. This army comprises the army of Bengal proper; second, the Punjab Frontier Force; third, the Central Indian Corps; fourth, the Rajpootana Corps; and fifth, the Hyderabad Contingent. The three first of these corps form a total of twenty-five regiments of regular cavalry and of sixty regiments of regular infantry, with five batteries of artillery, one company of fortress artillery, and ten companies of engineers.

"By consulting the disposition of this force, we find that fifty regiments are placed upon the railway line from Calcutta to Peshawur, that forty-one are stastioned within a radius of one hundred and fifty miles, and seventeen within a radius of seventy-five miles of the frontier, and that the rest which are not upon the railway line are only at a distance of four days' march. The ten companies of engineers and the five batteries are upon the frontier itself. We will suppose that orders for concentration be given on the 1st of the month. On the evening of the 5th, or at latest the morning of the 6th, the whole of this force would be upon the railway line, and of the total force there are only twenty-seven regiments which are more than one hundred and fifty miles from the frontier. We will

reserve the railway line for them, and cause the others to march by the excellent roads which the British administration has created in India. By making the troops march about sixteen miles a day, and by commencing the movement on the morning of the 6th, on the 16th fifty-three regiments are upon the frontier. Nevertheless the railway has been at work, and it is not too great a task to impose upon a railway so well constructed as those of India to transport twenty-seven regiments at the rate of one regiment a day. Therefore on the 3rd of the second month there will be on the frontier sixty regiments of infantry, twenty-five of cavalry, five batteries of artillery, and ten companies of engineers, and we arrive at this by reducing the effective of the Indian regiments to six hundred men for infantry and three hundred men for cavalry. This gives forty-five thousand men in line of battle thirty-three days after the telegraphic order for their concentration. On the thirty-third day the railway line from Calcutta to Peshawur (?) is free, and can carry without interruption ammunition and other supplies which are stored in the vast military magazines of Mooltan, Lahore, and Jhelum.

"In order to obtain this result not a single man of the sixty thousand European troops of India has been moved from his place. Not a single man of the native troops of Central India, of Rajpootana, of Hyderabad, of the Bombay army, nor that of Madras, has left his station; not a reservist has been called up. There remain, therefore, to be disposed of sixty thousand men of European troops; and of native troops, the

army of Madras—four regiments of regular cavalry, two of irregular cavalry, forty-one regiments of regular infantry, and ten companies of engineers; and the army of Bombay—seven regiments of regular cavalry, thirty regiments of infantry, two companies of artillery, two squadrons of the train, and five companies of engineers. But of this force there are three regiments of cavalry and one of infantry, called the Scinde Frontier Force, stationed at Jacobabad, which form, in consequence of their position, the extreme left wing of the forty-five thousand men concentrated upon the north Indus. A French traveller, an excellent observer, and who is well acquainted with the country, assures us that the natives of the Government of Madras are absolutely devoted to England, and that that district might be completely denuded of troops without risk of temptation to the Indians, whatever might take place. These three thousand five hundred men, by sending them by railway from Madras to Calicut, by boat from Calicut to Kurrachee, and by rail from Kurrachee to the stations of the Scinde Frontier Force, would reach their destination certainly within a month. We therefore see that on the thirty-third day there could be fifty thousand men, native troops, at the disposal of the British commander upon the frontier of the Indus. Further, it is to be supposed that the metropolis will not have remained inactive. She could dispose immediately of five thousand men for reinforcements for India, and one month after this five thousand men would be at Kurrachee, and thus relieve an equal number of European troops

of the Bombay army, which a month after might have arrived at the general rendezvous on the north-west. The Governments of Madras and Bengal also could dispense with five thousand European troops, and could send them within a month also to the north-west. Within a month also in the large towns of England at least five thousand men could be recruited in order to be sent to Kurrachee, and a month after they could be dispersed among the regiments of India, so that an equal number of veteran troops, inured to the climate, could be spared to reinforce at the front the army.

"We now find ourselves at the first day of the third month after the order for concentration shall have been given. There are along the frontier, so grouped as to be ready to march forward, sixty-five thousand men, of whom fifteen thousand are Europeans. Five thousand more Europeans are on the road to join them, and behind they have a reserve of fifty thousand Europeans and fifty-two thousand seven hundred native troops—in all one hundred and two thousand seven hundred men. The native troops despatched to the front are of the *élite*—Sikhs whose bearing and aptitude for military instruction have excited the admiration of all who know them; Gourkas, of whom our poor Jacquemont said, that with a battalion of these mountaineers he would hold in respect the whole of India; the 6th Sikhs Regiment, the 3rd Gourkas, which headed the column of assault at the breach of Delhi; the 4th Cavalry, the 17th and the 16th, both having been presented with an honorary standard for

having so bravely and faithfully defended Lucknow against the great insurrection. In fine, at the end of two months, when the Russians are only still carrying out the first movements of concentration, the English have sixty-five thousand good troops and inexhaustible supplies at the frontier, supported by two lines of railway."

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LONDON:
PRINTED BY W. H. ALLEN AND CO., 13 WATERLOO PLACE, PALL MALL, S.W.

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 18 July, 2018